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Abstract 
 
This thesis looks at how Mexico’s new democratic regime led by President Vicente Fox 
(2000–2006) faced past state crimes perpetrated during the Institutional Revolutionary 
Party’s (PRI’s) seventy-year authoritarian rule (1929–2000). To test the new regime’s 
democratic viability, Fox’s administration had to settle accounts with the PRI for the 
abuses the party had perpetrated in the past, but without upsetting it in order to preserve 
the stability of the new regime. The PRI was still a powerful political force and could 
challenge Fox’s efforts to democratise the country. Hence, this thesis offers an 
explanation of the factors that facilitated the emergence of Mexico’s ‘transitional 
justice’ process without putting at risk Fox’s relationship with the PRI elite. 
 
This thesis is framed by a cluster of literature on transitional justice which follows a 
social-constructivist approach and it is supported by exhaustive documentary research, 
which I carried out for six years in public and private archives. 
 
This thesis argues that Fox established a Special Prosecutor’s Office (SPO) as he sought 
to conduct ‘transitional justice’ through the existing structures of power: laws and 
institutions (e.g., the General Attorney’s Office) administered by members of the 
previous regime. So, Fox opted to face past abuses but left the task in the hands of the 
institutions whose members had carried out the crimes or did nothing to prevent them. 
The PRI rapidly accepted the establishment of the SPO because the most relevant 
prosecutorial strategy to come to terms with the PRI was arranged by the PRI’s own 
elite during the authoritarian era – prosecutorial strategy that led to impunity. 
 
In this process, the language of human rights played a decisive role as it framed the 
SPO’s investigations into the past: it determined the kind of violations that qualified for 
enquiry and, hence, the type of victims who were counted in the process, which 
perpetrators would be subject to prosecution, and the authorities that would intervene. 
Categories of human rights violations (e.g. genocide or forced disappearance) were 
constructed and manipulated in such a way as to grant a de facto amnesty to 
perpetrators. Fox was able to preserve the stability of the new regime as his 
prosecutorial strategies never really threatened the PRI elite. 
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Introduction 
 
Vicente Fox’s victory in the 2000 presidential elections in Mexico ended the 71-year-
old political rule of a single political party, the Institutional Revolutionary Party 
(Partido Revolucionario Institucional, PRI). The PRI regime stayed in power for more 
than seven decades for four main reasons. First, the state actively intervened to limit 
social and political pluralism: the hegemonic party (the PRI) created an adverse 
environment for independent participation – no significant social movement or political 
group could exist outside the official party. Opposition political parties were marginal 
(Eisenstadt 2004; Loaeza 1999). Second, the PRI regime successfully demobilised 
groups not part of the government: the state controlled mass participation through 
worker and peasant unions, which were incorporated into the official party (Meyer 
1980; Ortega-Ortiz 2008). Third, the centralisation of power allowed the executive 
power to manipulate mass media, censor intellectual critics, co-opt dissidents, and use 
public funds for private ends (Aguayo 1998; Meyer 1977). Finally, and crucially, the 
regime brutally exterminated its enemies – a powerful security apparatus (e.g. police, 
secret police, the Military) repressed thousands of dissidents of the regime (Aguayo 
2001a; Stevens 1970). The use of kidnappings, torture, forced disappearances, and 
assassinations to attack the regime’s opposition was not an isolated practice perpetrated 
by ‘rotten apples’ in the army. The abuses were part of an official policy maintained for 
decades (Aguayo 2001b; Doyle 2003c; Rodríguez Munguía 2006). Hence, since the late 
1960s, there was a general consensus on the authoritarian nature of the Mexican 
political regime (Eisenstadt 2000; González Casanova 1965; Kaufman Purcell 1973; 
Keck and Sikkink 1998; Linz 1975; Meyer 1977; Middlebrook 1986; Needleman and 
Needleman 1969; Ortega-Ortiz 2004). 
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The triumph of Vicente Fox’s conservative National Action Party (Partido 
Acción Nacional, PAN) in 2000 was the culmination of a slow process of political 
openness and of the gradual liberalisation of the PRI regime, which resulted from a 
succession of reforms initiated in the 1970s (Eisenstadt 2004; Loaeza 1999; Ortega-
Ortiz 2000). However, for many observers, Fox’s victory was not the end of transition, 
but rather a point from which a series of political and social reforms could be 
implemented in order to consolidate a democratic regime in Mexico, e.g. the 
transformation of the judicial system, the reform of the police and the intelligence 
services, and the incorporation of human rights norms into local legislation 
(Middlebrook 2004).1 Thus the 2000 presidential election was a decisive step in the 
protracted democratisation process as it was the result of the electoral reforms that 
preceded it, but it was not the conclusion of the democratisation process. In the 
government’s official discourse and from the standpoint of many observers, Fox’s 
administration was rather its starting point, which, through diverse reforms, would 
eventually lead to the consolidation of democracy. Hence Fox’s ascendance to power, 
more than a change of the ruling party, established a change of regime – the transition 
from an authoritarian system to an incipient democracy (Bruhn 2004; Middlebrook 
2004; Ortega-Ortiz 2008).2
Consequently, immediately after the July 2000 election the team of the newly 
elected President Fox designed a series of governmental programmes with the intention 
                                                 
1 The term ‘consolidation’, as used both in Mexico’s official discourse and by scholars in Mexico’s 
transition, refers to the strengthening of some elements of democratic rule: respect for minimum 
individual rights (such as freedoms of expression) and protection from arbitrary state intervention; the 
consolidation of fair and clean elections; and institutional mechanisms to ensure that citizens can make 
public actors accountable for their public deeds. See, for instance, O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) and 
Middlebrook (2004: 2). 
2 There is no consensus, however, on how to classify Mexico’s current political system (Aristegui and 
Trabulsi 2009). Some observers consider that Mexico is currently a true democracy in the process of 
consolidation. Others believe the transition to a real democratic regime remains unfinished (Aguayo 
2010b; Meyer 2007). Others claim that Mexico’s transition was a farce – the alleged transition simply 
modernised the authoritarian system (Lopez Obrador 2010). 
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of democratising the country (Poder Ejecutivo Federal 2001b). Within the list of urgent 
institutional changes the new administration sought to carry out – reforms in national 
security, freedom of information issues, and a fiscal scheme – President Fox included 
‘transitional justice’ as a priority (Presidencia de la República 2001b). In this regard, 
‘transitional justice’ was one of the first and foundational acts of the new democratic 
regime, which would serve to accentuate and legitimate its authority and moral right to 
govern. 
Fox’s ‘transitional justice’ promise was supported by national and international 
human rights scholars, experts and activists who demanded accountability for the 
abuses perpetrated during the previous regime as a requirement for democratic 
consolidation (HRW 2003). From this perspective, by punishing the guilty, President 
Fox aimed to put an end to decades of impunity, and to send a signal that in the new 
democratic regime no one was above the law. In addition, human rights experts claimed 
that the investigation of tainted institutions that made the abuses possible – e.g. the 
army, the police, and the intelligence services – would allow Fox’s government to begin 
the reform and democratisation of such institutions (Benítez Manaut 2008a; Rodríguez 
Sumano 2008). In sum, the establishment of a ‘transitional justice’ process in Mexico 
aimed to send clear message that, unlike the PRI, the new regime was committed to 
human rights. I will return to this point in Chapter One. 
However, some of the new administration’s cabinet members were openly 
against any attempt to come to address the past. They believed that the consolidation of 
democracy required other reforms (e.g. the fiscal system reform), which depended on 
the PRI’s approval.3 From this perspective, the new administration could not pretend to 
investigate and prosecute the members of a political party – the PRI – with which 
                                                 
3 These political changes included judicial or tax reforms, changes in military–civil relations, and 
transformations in the relationship between the state and labour unions and the business sector. See, for 
instance, Bensusán (2004); Ai Camp (2004); Lawson (2004); Magaloni and Zepeda (2004). 
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President Fox sought to reach agreements and negotiate reforms. The PRI was still a 
dominant political force – powerful enough to challenge the new government in many 
areas and undermine Fox’s chances of success. The PRI was the largest party in 
Congress after the 2000 elections and so it was capable of blocking President Fox’s 
reforms. At the state level, the PRI controlled eighteen out of the thirty-two states. 
Moreover, officials implicated in violations (e.g. members of the Military) were never 
dismissed. Therefore, members of Fox’s cabinet argued that the most sensible option for 
the new administration was to bury any attempt at accountability. This group was joined 
by the complaints of the members of the same PRI who had openly warned that they 
would not be willing to tolerate Fox using ‘transitional justice’ to discredit their party. 
President Fox and his strategists faced a series of dilemmas. In order to test the 
new regime’s democratic viability, Fox sought to end an era of impunity, but by 
prosecuting former perpetrators of past human rights violations he placed at risk the 
incipient stability of the new regime. To implement important reforms to consolidate 
Mexico’s democracy, Fox had to negotiate with the PRI, which was now a powerful 
party in the opposition. But to negotiate with the former ‘official party’ certain reforms 
to democratise the political system implied preserving the previous regime’s impunity. 
The new administration had to settle accounts with the PRI for the abuses perpetrated in 
the past, but without upsetting it in order to negotiate the reforms necessary to advance 
democratisation. 
The way in which the Fox government solved this dilemma – complying with 
demands to face the past, without disturbing the PRI elites – is the topic of this thesis. 
Supported by exhaustive documentary research, conducted over six years in public and 
private archives, this thesis offers an explanation of the many factors that facilitated the 
emergence of Mexico’s ‘transitional justice’ process without putting at risk its 
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relationship with political elites from the previous authoritarian regime. In doing so, this 
thesis identifies some of the most significant consequences of the so-called transitional 
justice process in Mexico’s democratisation. 
Mexico’s ‘transitional justice’ process 
The so-called transitional justice process formally began with the change of regime in 
2000. With the arrival of Fox to the presidency a significant debate began in Mexico 
about whether or not to come to terms with the past in the first place. Simultaneously, 
another no less important debate centred on whether to face the past through a 
restorative or a retributive model of justice – a truth commission or a prosecutor’s 
office. ‘Transitional justice’ became a site for political negotiations and moral 
justifications, for the construction of rules and institutions, where diverse state and non-
state actors intervened, and sought to impose their political agendas. 
This controversy lasted almost a year. On November 27, 2001, President Fox 
established a Special Prosecutor’s Office (SPO) to investigate and prosecute the 
perpetrators of past human rights violations (Poder Ejecutivo Federal 2001a). There 
were no temporal limits to the operation of the SPO. It could prolong its work sine die. 
However, the SPO officially ceased to exist when President Fox ended his term 
in office on November 30, 2006. The SPO cost twenty million dollars, but its 
investigations led nowhere (Aguayo and Trevino-Rangel 2007). During its five years of 
existence, the SPO did not obtain a single criminal conviction (HRW 2006; ICTJ 2008). 
Approaches to transitional justice 
Mexico’s ‘transitional justice’ process has been practically ignored as a topic of 
academic research. To the best of my knowledge, apart from Mariclaire Acosta’s (2006) 
and Louis Bickford’s (2005) journal articles, there has been no research into Mexico’s 
reckoning with past abuses. Both articles are descriptive in nature: they take the SPO as 
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a departure point and from there describe its alleged benefits and flaws. The silence 
around Mexico’s SPO is particularly noteworthy in the transitional justice literature, as 
transitional justice is the main field of enquiry that seeks to explore how states and 
societies deal with past atrocities in political transitions. By offering a complete account 
of the diverse factors that facilitated the emergence (and policing) of Mexico’s 
‘transitional justice’ process, this thesis attempts to address this void in the literature. 
The concept of ‘transitional justice’ emerged during the mid-1990s, reflecting 
the different ways in which at that time certain transitional societies sought to address 
past state crimes (Arthur 2009; Bell 2009). It arose with reference to three particular 
processes of political change: the democratisation of some Latin American countries 
(e.g. Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay) in the 1980s and early 1990s; the dismantling of 
the Soviet Union and, thus, the political liberalisation of former communist states in 
Eastern Europe during the late 1980s; and the end of apartheid in South Africa in the 
mid-1990s (Cohen 1995; Teitel 2003). Since then, transitional justice has been the 
favoured label to describe efforts to deal with past human rights abuses within societies 
going through political transitions: in countries transitioning from dictatorships to more 
democratic rule; and in transitions from war or civil conflict to peace (Bell, et al. 2004; 
Ni Aolain and Campbell 2005; Root 2009). However, in the last decade the concept of 
‘transitional justice’ has gradually expanded – beyond accountability and transitions to 
democracy – to include a wide set of practices carried out by different societies seeking 
to amend past atrocity and suffering – what Claire Moon (2008) terms cases of 
‘historical injustice’ (e.g. Australia’s strategies to repair the damage caused to its 
Aboriginal population in the past). 
But transitional justice is not only a set of practices established in different 
countries in transitional contexts. It is also a growing, heterogeneous, and powerful field 
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of academic enquiry (Bell 2009). Moreover, transitional justice has become a site in 
which activists work, a field of ‘policy expertise’, a domain for a new sort of human 
rights activity (ICTJ 2009). Hence, this thesis considers that transitional justice 
comprises both a set of ideas (knowledge) and a sphere of practices, actions, and 
intervention (power). 
In the mid-1990s, a first cluster of studies on transitional justice centred mainly 
on a conceptual and doctrinal debate that revolves around two interpretations of justice 
– retributive or restorative – on which most characteristic institutions to face the past, 
the tribunals and the truth commissions, have been founded (Hayner 1994; Orentlicher 
1991). Retributive justice is identified with the punishment of perpetrators of abuses 
according to the rule of law (Zalaquett 1989). The restorative model of justice proposes 
to restore the dignity of victims by compensating them for the suffering they endured 
without, necessarily, the need to identify or punish the perpetrators (Minow 2000). 
Although these approaches (retributive and restorative) differ in the way in 
which they suggest facing the past, they share the idea that transitional justice is useful 
given the alleged moral, normative, or social benefits it generates (Malamud-Goti 1989; 
McAdams 1997; Méndez 1997a; Minow 2008; Zalaquett 1992). Moreover, echoing the 
early enthusiasm of transitional justice practitioners, the authors who make up this 
cluster focused on a series of explanations for the diverse – and sometimes 
contradictory – merits of transitional justice. They point out that it strengthens the new 
regime’s democratic institutions, averts the repetition of abuses in the future, aids 
political reconciliation, and has a therapeutic effect on society. These arguments 
circulate within this cluster as apparently incontrovertible truths, as ‘articles of faith’ 
(Ignatieff 1996; Mendeloff 2004).  
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During the last decade, a second cluster on transitional justice emerged 
(Gutmann and Thompson 2000). Its authors partly draw on the existing body of work on 
retributive and restorative justice. As with the first cluster, this group of authors 
assumes that the establishment of transitional justice is indispensable in societies that 
have suffered abuses. However, the literature of the second cluster differs from that of 
the first cluster in one main way. Scholars in the second cluster consider that transitional 
justice has proved unable to deliver the benefits promised to society – political 
reconciliation, social healing, public acknowledgement of the suffering of victims 
(Ensalco 1994; Goldblatt and Meintjes 1998; Sideris 2001). These scholars have 
focused on how to make transitional justice work better, with the purpose of truly 
delivering the benefits it should theoretically be able to provide. To do so, they have 
examined transitional justice institutions and proposed diverse methods to measure or 
quantify their scope and effects on society, new ‘tools of transition management’, with 
the objective of them achieving more effective change in society (Arenhovel 2008; 
Mallinder 2007; Stahn 2005). Additionally, these studies have suggested extending the 
original scope and goals of transitional justice, e.g. gender, social, and cultural or 
economic development (Meintjes, et al. 2001; Pillay 2001). 
Despite their differences, scholars writing in the two clusters share the same 
values: transitional justice is ‘intrinsic’ in transitions; transitional justice is ‘good’ 
because of the benefits it brings with it, e.g. democracy, societal healing, reconciliation; 
‘all good things go together’, e.g. truth has a cathartic effect, which leads to healing, 
which leads to reconciliation; even if transitional justice fails, the scholars offer to 
accomplish it by better means. 
More recently, a third cluster of studies on transitional justice emerged as a 
reaction to the two aforementioned clusters. This third academic cluster, framed by a 
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social-constructivist approach, raises concerns about practices and the more familiar 
ideas in transitional justice (Ainley 2008; Christodoulidis 2001; Du Bois 2001; McEvoy 
2007; Ross 2003; Short 2007; Veitch 2001; Wilson 2001). Authors in this cluster, 
sceptical of the assumptions accepted and promoted as self-evident by transitional 
justice activists and scholars, have exposed their contingent character (Moon 2008). 
Unlike the first and second clusters of literature, scholars participating in this social-
constructivist approach do not seek to ‘promote’ or ‘rectify’ transitional justice values 
or practices. They are instead concerned with analysing how transitional justice came to 
be an authoritative guide for thinking about and acting on the past in transitional 
societies (Wilson 2001). Thus the third cluster examines how claims about transitional 
justice are constructed, and how such claims affect the implementation of policies. 
From this perspective, transitional justice and human rights are not self-evident ideas, 
but the outcome of social actions and political interventions. This is a body of academic 
enquiry that seeks to understand the contingent and contextual factors that make the 
emergence and policing of transitional justice knowledge and practices possible. 
These scholars have sought to prove that far from being a necessary condition in 
transitions, as activists and experts on this issue would have us believe, transitional 
justice has mediated political agendas in conflict (Moon 2008). According to these 
explanations, rather than seeking moral and social benefits, transitional justice has 
served political interests (Short 2007). For example, in South Africa it served to bolster 
the construction of a new nation state and to maintain the political stability of the post-
apartheid regime (Wilson 2001). 
This thesis follows the research agenda opened by the third cluster of literature 
on transitional justice. The implication of this agenda, from a theoretical perspective, is 
that it problematises the feeling of inevitability that surrounds these types of institutions 
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and challenges the ‘articles of faith’ upheld faithfully by scholars of the first and second 
literature clusters. From an empirical perspective, this agenda’s most significant 
implication is that it opens the door to investigate transitional justice episodes as 
processes that far from being inherent to transitions have instead been instrumental to 
the legitimacy of incipient democratic regimes, and whose creation is the result of social 
and political manipulation. 
I share with scholars of the third cluster the assumption that the so-called 
transitional justice institutions in Mexico were neither necessary nor indispensable for 
transition, nor take as valid the alleged merits of transitional justice that promoters 
describe. Echoing the critical spirit of this cluster, this thesis demonstrates the 
contingent character of Mexico’s apparent transitional justice and shows the political 
purposes it served in the democratisation process. This work must thus be understood as 
a contribution to the theoretical and empirical agenda opened up by this third academic 
cluster, given that it offers a detailed account of how Mexican so-called transitional 
justice, far from bringing moral or social benefits, became a site for the negotiation of 
political agendas whose results benefitted Fox’s administration and, more importantly, 
the PRI elite. It shows how Mexico’s apparent transitional justice process was not 
inevitable, but contingent. As the PRI was still influential enough to thwart the stability 
of the new democracy, President Fox could have articulated a policy of oblivion (such 
as Spain’s ‘pact of forgetting’ about the repressive legacy of the Francoist dictatorship). 
Alternatively, as the truth commission method was so popular during Fox’s first year in 
office, he could have established a Mexican truth commission (I will return to this point 
in Chapter Three). But he did not. Instead, a SPO emerged with the critical consequence 
that it helped to perpetuate the impunity of perpetrators. 
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This is only a succinct revision of the literature on transitional justice. Moreover, 
the classification here presented is neither exact nor chronological. I will return to the 
analysis of these academic clusters in Chapter Two. This brief introduction into this 
field of research simply seeks to situate my work in relation to these studies. 
Research questions 
This research began when the so-called process of transitional justice process was still 
under way. Many observers had seen in ‘transitional justice’ proof that Fox’s 
administration really sought to advance democratisation in the country (HRW 2006). 
However, three years after being initiated, the SPO’s results were disappointing: not a 
single criminal was in jail, the public found it difficult to access the former secret 
police’s files, and the victims still had not received reparations. It seemed that 
‘transitional justice’ had not generated the merits that academics and activists of the first 
and second clusters claimed it would. On the contrary, in Mexico ‘transitional justice’ 
seemed to be manufacturing impunity. 
Victims and human rights NGOs immediately blamed the Fox administration. 
They claimed that the SPO’s ‘failure’ was related to the lack of funding, lack of political 
will, and poor handling of prosecutions (Acosta and Ennelin 2006; HRW 2003). As a 
result, they demanded more resources and better lawyers so the SPO could do its job 
efficiently. But, were they correct? I found this explanation unsatisfying. The SPO was 
actually receiving considerable resources (close to four million dollars) every year.4 
And the sometimes sophisticated strategies of the SPO were scrupulously guided by 
international human rights law. So why did things go terribly wrong? 
An explanation about the factors that led to this outcome – impunity – demanded 
more in-depth research into the historical development of the ‘transitional justice’ 
                                                 
4 At the time, information on the SPO’s budget was secret. It was made public after I investigated it in 
November 2006. I elaborate on the details of this episode in Chapter Two. 
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process, and especially the effect of the dilemma Fox’s government faced at its very 
origins: confronting the PRI elite without upsetting it. How was Fox able to solve this 
transition dilemma and, more importantly, how did the way in which it was solved 
affect the outcomes of ‘transitional justice’, which included neither truth nor justice? 
This was the main research question that guided this thesis: what factors in such 
a complex political context facilitated the emergence of the ‘transitional justice’ 
process, and did these factors lead to its results – i.e. impunity? Three key additional 
questions also framed this research: 
1. Why did Fox venture to establish a ‘transitional justice’ process that would put 
at risk the new regime’s stability, and why did the authoritarian elite allow it? 
2. How was the ‘transitional justice’ process constructed, and how did its particular 
construction condition its performance? 
3. How, and to what extent, did ‘transitional justice’ affect the process of 
democratisation? 
 
The first question is central to understanding why there was a process of 
‘transitional justice’ in Mexico in the first place. It seeks to understand the reasons why, 
although he sought to negotiate reforms with members of the PRI, Fox accepted the 
establishment of criminal prosecutions against them. Additionally, and crucially, it aims 
to shed light on the peculiar fact that the authoritarian elite allowed the creation of an 
institution – the SPO – whose apparent purpose was to investigate and prosecute its 
members and send some of them to jail. This is the subject of Chapter Three. 
The second question seeks to understand how the ‘transitional justice’ process 
allowed the conflicting political interests of the different actors involved to be 
transcended. If the first question inquires into what made ‘transitional justice’ possible 
(why), this second question attempts to find out how it was made possible. In doing so, 
it seeks to establish the relationship between the way in which Fox’s government 
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constructed ‘transitional justice’ and its outcome five years later (impunity). The 
question is relevant because it tries to elucidate how the construction of the ‘transitional 
justice’ process opened the possibility of a particular way of ‘policing the past’, in Stan 
Cohen’s (1995) words. This is the subject of Chapter Four. 
The third question is more general and has been a source of constant concern for 
many scholars of the third cluster. Its importance lies in its attempt to shed light on the 
political, social, and material consequences of transitional justice in countries 
undergoing democratisation. Through the examination of a new empirical case, 
however, this thesis aims to provide at least a partial answer to the question, showing 
the most significant social and political effects of ‘transitional justice’ in the Mexican 
case. This is the subject of Chapter Five. 
Arguments 
By means of a detailed documentary analysis of private and public archives, and based 
on the three aforementioned research questions, this work found sufficient evidence to 
support three central arguments. 
First, the ‘transitional justice’ process instituted by Vicente Fox was in no way 
intrinsic or necessary to Mexico’s democratisation. President Fox opted to establish 
‘transitional justice’ in his first year in office for three political and pragmatic reasons. 
First, the ‘transitional justice’ process contributed to validate the Fox government’s 
democratic credentials and showed its commitment to human rights. Second, 
strategically, by creating the ‘rules of the game’, Fox could regulate the participation of 
the other actors involved: activists, academics, human rights NGOs, victims’ relatives, 
or left-wing political groups such as the Revolutionary Democratic Party (Partido de la 
Revolución Democrática, PRD) – whose members demanded to know the truth of what 
happened and to see justice done – as well as those members of the new government 
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who were not necessarily loyal to president Fox himself and who disagreed with his 
stance (e.g. members of the cabinet who promoted the establishment of a truth 
commission). Third, by establishing a retributive justice model (the SPO), President Fox 
sought to conduct the ‘transitional justice’ process through the existing structures of 
power: laws and institutions that were operated by members of the previous 
authoritarian regime (the courts, the attorney general). So, Fox opted to face past abuses 
but left the task in the hands of the institutions whose members had carried out the 
crimes or did nothing to prevent them. The result of this operation was that Fox was 
able to preserve the stability of the new regime as his prosecutorial strategies never 
really threatened the PRI elite. This is the reason why the PRI did not oppose the 
‘transitional justice’ process. 
In addition, the PRI rapidly accepted (in fact, promoted) the establishment of the 
SPO because, as I will demonstrate, some of the prosecutorial strategies to come to 
terms with the PRI were arranged by the PRI’s own elite during the authoritarian era – 
prosecutorial strategies that led to impunity. Therefore, this thesis argues, in the new 
democratic regime the actors of the previous authoritarian system sought to protect the 
impunity they had enjoyed in the past. They did not have sufficient power to oppose 
‘transitional justice’ mechanisms completely, but did preserve sufficient power to 
intervene in their making. The PRI elite could not slow down the ‘transitional justice’ 
process, but was able to influence its effects. 
Second, Mexico’s ‘transitional justice’ process preserved the impunity of 
perpetrators. The language of human rights played a decisive role. It was the language 
of human rights that framed the SPO’s investigations into the past: the kind of human 
rights violations that qualified for enquiry and, hence, the type of victims who were 
counted in the process, the perpetrators of certain crimes who would be subject to 
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prosecution, and the institution and authorities that would intervene. However, 
categories of human rights violations (e.g. genocide or forced disappearance) were 
constructed and manipulated in such a way as to grant a de facto amnesty to 
perpetrators. 
Third, even if the ‘transitional justice’ process did not obtain truth or justice, it 
brought about important consequences for the Fox administration. It helped to 
legitimise key political institutions (e.g. the police, the General Attorney’s Office, and 
the Military) still working under authoritarian premises; it helped to improve the image 
of the justice system, which seemed no longer to be subordinated to the president as it 
was during the PRI era; it granted a de facto amnesty to former perpetrators and did not 
expose tainted officials, who were then incorporated into the new democratic system as 
if nothing had happened; and it blocked other ‘transitional justice’ efforts (e.g. a truth 
commission). 
Before describing the contributions of this thesis, let me clarify what I mean by 
the language of human rights. By human rights discourse, language of human rights, or 
human rights talk, this thesis refers to the set of ideas, assumptions, rules, concepts, and 
categories codified mainly through the vocabulary of international law which generates 
practices, institutions, and mechanisms for its implementation and rule (Chinkin 1998; 
Evans 1998 and 2005; Fields and Narr 1992; Stammers 1999).5 This language includes 
ideas and practices about human rights accountability in transitions to democracy. I 
assume that these ideas on human rights are not objective, but political. They are 
discussed, adopted, adapted, worked out, clarified, manipulated, and contested. They are 
in constant flux and a great number of actors – such as state agents, human rights 
experts, academics, and activists – intervene in their development, promotion, 
                                                 
5 The United Nations system has articulated human rights discourses through numerous international 
treaties and conventions, which states later adopt and adapt (Chinkin 1998). 
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surveillance, rectification, or replacement. Therefore, these ideas are historically 
situated and formed within an assemblage of institutions, advocates, newspapers 
articles, lawyers, court decisions, legal proceedings, NGO reports, and so on. The 
language of human rights has material effects – e.g. human rights commissions, truth 
commissions, ad hoc tribunals, special prosecutor offices – and their materiality is 
consequential on transitional societies. 
In Mexico’s transitional moment, the language of human rights was particularly 
relevant for two reasons. First, because the Fox administration used human rights talk as 
a language of political legitimation. President Fox and his strategists deployed this 
human rights rhetoric in order to demonstrate the new regime’s commitment to 
democracy; they sought to underline the discontinuity between the authoritarian era and 
the new democratic government. For example, the Fox administration justified – a 
priori or ex post facto – in the name of human rights every decision related to the 
process of ‘transitional justice’. If a truth commission was promised and then never 
instituted, Fox justified simultaneously his promise and then his refusal to fulfil his 
promise in the name of human rights. For instance, he has stated both that ‘to know the 
truth via a truth commission is an obligation according to human rights international 
law’, and that ‘Mexico cannot establish a truth commission because it observes due 
process guarantees and hence it would violate human rights laws’ (Presidencia de la 
República 2000b; Garduño 2001). 
Second, the language of human rights was relevant because, as I said before, it 
determined how crimes (e.g. genocide and forced disappearance) and protagonists of the 
past (victims and perpetrators) were constructed in order to frame the investigations into 
past crimes. 
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Originality and contributions of this thesis 
The contributions of this thesis include the following. First, there are practically no 
academic studies on Mexico’s ‘transitional justice’ process.6 This thesis is the most 
comprehensive study to date of the country’s efforts to come to terms with the past. 
Whilst the conclusions of this thesis relate specifically to Mexico, they make important 
contributions to some of the debates addressed by scholars on transitional justice, and 
give reason to re-examine transitional justice processes in other countries in a new light. 
Second, this thesis is valuable as it offers a comprehensive empirical snapshot of 
Mexico’s ‘transitional justice’ process. While the first and second clusters of literature 
on transitional justice provide many reasons to welcome transitional justice practices, 
the use of empirical data is just now catching up to the conceptual framework and urges 
greater caution. The relative paucity of empirical evidence has in part resulted from the 
fact that most scholarship in this field has mainly focused on elaborating its normative 
and theoretical benefits. In joining more recent efforts to provide empirical evidence 
and to analyse the different factors that facilitated the emergence of Mexico’s 
‘transitional justice’ process, this work is based on a detailed documentary analysis of 
private and public archives, some of which were just recently made available to the 
public (e.g., the former secret police’s files in 2002; Adolfo Aguilar Zínser’s Archives 
in 2009). Moreover, this research includes evidence that was previously inaccessible for 
public consultation until I suggested that the government disclose it through Mexico’s 
‘transparency law’.7 The result is a unique study of concrete examples and primary 
sources specifically focused on the development of ‘transitional justice’ in Mexico, a 
contribution that has only now been made possible. 
                                                 
6 I exclude reports generated by NGOs, and articles or book chapters I have published throughout this 
research. I refer to these items throughout the thesis and list details in the bibliography. As said, apart 
from Bickford (2005) and Acosta (2006)’s articles, there is no research on Mexico’s transitional justice. 
7 The way I requested official documents to the Fox administration is analysed in detail in Chapter Two. 
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Third, a study such as this is valuable because it contributes to an emerging body 
of scholarship (the third cluster) that seeks to understand the different contextual factors 
that shape transitional justice ideas and practices. Unlike the first and second clusters of 
literature on transitional justice, this research does not assume that transitional justice is 
‘good’, ‘apolitical’, ‘necessary’, or ‘inherent’ to transitional societies because of its 
alleged merits (e.g. social healing). On the contrary, this thesis aims to increase our 
understanding of how transitional justice efforts are constructed and shaped by their 
historical and institutional contexts, social actions, and political bargains. 
Outline 
This thesis is divided into six chapters. In Chapter One I situate Mexico’s ‘transitional 
justice’ process in the broader context of the country’s transition towards democracy. I 
describe the PRI’s seventy-year authoritarian regime, the political transition which 
began in 1968 and concluded with Vicente Fox’s victory in 2000, and the human rights 
violations committed by the state throughout both periods. Mexico was an auspicious 
scenario for the emergence of ‘transitional justice’, and I explain the reason for this. 
In Chapter Two I evaluate the relevant literature on transitional justice, present 
my approach in relation to it and explain my methodological considerations. 
In Chapter Three I demonstrate how the process of ‘transitional justice’ emerged 
as an answer to the dilemma faced by Fox’s government – whether to confront or bury 
the past – and examine the phase in which ‘transitional justice’ was merely a possibility. 
Thus I explore the contingency of the events that led to the establishment of the SPO as 
the key mechanism by which the past would be examined. 
In Chapter Four I examine how categories of human rights violations (e.g. 
forced disappearance) were constructed in such a way as actually to perpetuate 
impunity. In doing so, I shed light on the important role performed in this phase by the 
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National Human Rights Commission (NHRC). Although it was a tainted institution 
associated with the PRI era, the NHRC defined the kind of human rights violations that 
would qualify for investigation in the ‘transitional justice’ process. 
In Chapter Five I analyse the development and workings of the SPO and its 
consequences for Mexico’s democratic transition. I examine how the functioning of the 
SPO was affected by continuous political negotiations between the different actors 
involved in the process, and how the SPO’s prosecutorial strategies to do justice served 
to grant a de facto amnesty to the perpetrators. 
Finally, in Chapter Six I summarise the key findings. In so doing, I highlight 
how this thesis answers the research questions posed. The chapter also raises a number 
of important issues which would benefit from further research. 
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Chapter One – 
The Background: 
Authoritarianism and Past Atrocity in Mexico 
 
 
This chapter seeks to situate Mexico’s ‘transitional justice’ process (2000-2006) in the 
larger context of the country’s democratic transition. It renders an account of the 
authoritarian regime (the PRI era) since it began its rule in 1929 for almost seventy 
years, the protracted process of political transition which began in 1968, and the human 
rights abuses perpetrated by the state and its agents throughout both periods. Thus, this 
chapter outlines Mexico’s history of abuses in order to understand why the country 
became a scenario for the emergence of ‘transitional justice’. 
The conventional explanations of Mexico’s transition from authoritarianism to 
democracy have focused on the electoral reforms implemented by the authoritarian 
regime since the 1970s (Alvarado 1987; Bazdresch, et al. 1992; Dominguez and 
Lawson 2004; Dominguez and McCann 1996; Drake 1986; Harvey and Serrano 1994; 
Loaeza 1999; Merino 2003; Peschard 1994 and 1995). These reforms gradually 
liberalised the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) regime and reached their 
‘felicitous culmination in the 2000 presidential election’ with the triumph of the 
National Action Party (PAN) and its candidate, Vicente Fox (Schedler 2005: 10). In 
their analysis of electoral reforms, these interpretations highlight the continuous 
political negotiations between the elites in power and the opposition parties’ elites 
(Loaeza 2000b). In doing so, they disregard that these reforms occurred in a context 
characterised by political violence, and ignore the state’s brutal extermination of the 
regime’s enemies before and during the transition. They consider that the guerra sucia 
(dirty war) – in which hundreds of dissidents were assassinated and ‘disappeared’ 
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during the 1970s and 1980s – was a ‘minor skirmishing compared to the barbarities of 
the southern cone versions’ (Knight 1992: 100). 
Let me make it clear that the idea of Mexico as an authoritarian regime has not 
been entirely contested. What has been ignored or denied is the systematic violation of 
human rights during the authoritarian regime and its transitional period. The reasons 
why political violence was ignored – until recently – by the literature on Mexico’s 
democratisation are analysed in detail later in this chapter. Let me, however, list briefly 
some of them here: (a) local mass media was tightly controlled by the state; (b) scholars 
and journalists were repressed or co-opted by the PRI elite; (c) the PRI’s ideology 
concealed, discursively, the possibility of violent rule; (d) the authoritarian regime 
successfully maintained a democratic facade before the international community; and 
(e) other Latin American cases (e.g. Military dictatorships in Argentina, Chile, or 
Brazil) were more extreme and this is the horizon against which Mexico has been 
judged – even by Mexican scholars. 
The point is that, according to most of the dominant accounts, it seems as if 
Mexico experienced a ‘velvet’ transition, ‘smooth, soft, almost imperceptible’ (Espino 
2010: 127). However, if Mexico lived a non-violent political transition from 
authoritarianism to democracy as these conventional interpretations suggest, why did a 
‘transitional justice’ process seem so ‘necessary’ at the beginning of the democratic 
regime? 
The assumptions that the authoritarian regime had a ‘peaceful development’ and 
that the transition from authoritarianism to democracy took place without violence have 
been recently questioned in empirical studies that have shown that there were political 
violence, state crimes, and mass atrocity during the transition (Aguayo 1998 and 2001a; 
Eisenstadt 2004; Ortega-Ortiz 2000 and 2004). According to these investigations, if we 
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do not take into account the existence of social movements and the occurrence of 
political violence during the transition, we cannot understand why the authoritarian 
regime promoted electoral reforms with the alleged aim of democratisation. In fact, 
almost all of these reforms were the state’s answer to violence (Ortega-Ortiz 2004). 
Additionally, according to these studies, if we ignore state repression against the threats 
to the authoritarian regime we cannot understand why it survived for seven decades 
(Aguayo 1998). This chapter builds on this interpretation and offers new empirical 
evidence that bolsters it. This is not to suggest that the chapter’s objective is to confront 
opposing explanations of Mexico’s transition. Neither is it to delve into theoretical 
studies on transitions to democracy, political parties, or political systems. This chapter’s 
objectives are more modest. First, it shows the basic characteristics that allow us to 
describe the PRI regime as authoritarian. Second, it shows that the PRI era was not free 
of social and political conflict, and explains how these became neutralised by the state 
through a complex ‘repressive machine’. Third, it shows that during the democratic 
transition the PRI regime intensified the repression of dissidents, although at the same 
time it implemented electoral reforms that made greater political plurality gradually 
possible. Finally, it explores the reasons why state crimes, at one time ‘invisible’, 
became visible – i.e. Vicente Fox’s decision to ‘do something’ with the past; new 
transparency laws and the disclosure of secret files; a more democratic atmosphere that 
allowed scholars, activists, and victims’ families to dig into the past without fearing 
adverse consequences (death threats, repression, imprisonment). 
In sum, this chapter provides the background to an understanding of why 
‘transitional justice’ mechanisms – which sought to investigate and punish past atrocity 
–came to be so relevant to the inauguration of the new democratic regime. 
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The Mexican Authoritarian Regime (1929-1968) 
The Mexican authoritarian regime began in 1929 when the military elites that won the 
bloody Mexican Revolution created a state party, the Institutional Revolutionary Party 
(PRI), which remained in power until 2000.8 In spite of being a heterogeneous group, 
for decades the PRI elite managed to maintain a certain consensus on the general norms 
for the competition for power, and shared the common objective of promoting national 
economic growth and modernisation – i.e., industrialisation, ‘depeasantization’ of the 
countryside (Aguilar Camin and Meyer 1993). The result of these political agreements 
was a one-party regime, which enjoyed power for seventy years with a relative political 
and social stability that other Latin American countries envied (Knight 1992). 
Mexico was socially stable because it did not suffer major social conflicts like 
those that affected the country during the Mexican Revolution in the 1910s and 1920s, 
in which an estimated one million people died (Aguilar Camin and Meyer 1993; Gilly 
1983; Katz 1998; Knight 1986; Womack 1970). The government also did not face a 
sustained guerrilla insurgency for decades, as occurred in Peru with Sendero Luminoso 
or in El Salvador with the FMLN (Wickham-Crowley 1992). The indigenous 
communities that had not yet undergone an ‘acculturation’ process were relatively 
ignored in practice – although not in the official discourse – by the ‘revolutionary’ 
governments, but they were not subjected to genocidal policies as had been the case 
elsewhere in the Americas (Falcón 1999; Knight 1990 and 1994).9 That is, PRI 
governments, whose attitudes towards indigenous people fluctuated between 
                                                 
8 The PRI was founded in 1929 as the National Revolutionary Party (PNR) with the purpose of unifying 
within this institution the different revolutionary elites that had triumphed in the Mexican Revolution in 
the 1910s and 1920s. Hence, from 1928 to 1934, the General Plutarco Elías Calles was able to control 
political life in Mexico, achieving political stability and ending the rivalry between different political 
groups. In 1938, the PNR was restructured as the Mexican Revolutionary Party (PRM). The change 
implied the transformation of the official party into one of the masses refounded on four sectors: agrarian, 
worker, military, and popular. In 1946, after a new process of reorganisation, the PRM was renamed the 
PRI. 
9 By ‘acculturation’ I refer to the process of cultural modification of Mexico’s indigenous population as a 
result of its contact with the Spanish population living in Mexico.   
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indifference and paternalism, did not perpetrate a systematic ethnocide like the one that 
occurred, for instance, in Guatemala. 
Mexico was politically stable between 1929 and 2000 because there were no 
abrupt regime changes like those that occurred in the rest of Latin America. Whilst 
South American countries like Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, and Chile experienced the 
drastic rise of military dictatorships – sometimes, on more than one occasion – the 
Mexican military remained in their headquarters during this period. The last military 
insurrection in Mexico took place in 1929, and since 1940 the political participation of 
the Military has been officially limited to certain public offices (e.g. the Ministry of 
Defence). Since 1940 Mexico has had a series of civilian governments, elected 
periodically according to existing electoral legislation and the Constitution (Ai Camp 
1992). 
This relative political and social stability in Mexico allowed the PRI regime to 
maintain an appearance of ‘democratic normality’ for decades. The democratic façade 
of the PRI regime was consistent with the stipulation in the Constitution since 1917 that 
Mexico was a federal republic with a democratic, plural, and representative government 
(Loaeza 2008a: 45). So, why might we question this appearance of democratic 
normality? 
The problem with this formal definition in the Constitution – of Mexico being a 
federal republic with a democratic, plural, and representative government – was that it 
was very far from reality. Far from seeming an Occidental democracy, in fact Mexico 
resembled more the authoritarian model of limited pluralism and non-participation set 
forth by Juan J. Linz in his analysis of the Francoist dictatorship (Linz 1975). The 
appearance of democracy contrasted with the authoritarian praxis of an executive power 
whose actions overcame the attributions conferred by the established legal order 
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(Carpizo 1998). The notion of a pluralist and representative state apparatus was in sharp 
contrast with the factual presence of both a hegemonic political party (the PRI) as well 
as a security apparatus (police, secret police, Military, paramilitary groups), which de 
facto created an adverse environment for independent participation (Aguayo 1998). 
Hence, since the 1970s, academic writers, some segments of the country’s population, 
and international human rights organisations, have explicitly considered Mexico to be 
an authoritarian regime.10 This characterisation is based on the active intervention of the 
Mexican state to (a) limit social and political pluralism; (b) control or repress political 
mobilisations; and (c) articulate political and social demands (Middlebrook 1986: 124; 
Molinar 1993).11
Limited political pluralism  
The state successfully limited political pluralism because the PRI, the official party, 
enjoyed organisational and resource superiority, which marginalised other political 
organisations. The 1917 Constitution had included universal voting rights and legally 
recognised the existence of opposition political parties, but this was not enough to 
establish the foundations of a liberal democracy (Loaeza 1999: 53-60). Introducing the 
universal vote was merely a symbolic move because, in fact, voters did not have the 
option of choosing between different political parties (Loaeza 1999: 60-66). Even 
though elections to compete for political office took place regularly, electoral 
campaigns were a mere formality; electoral processes lacked content because 
                                                 
10 Of course, this classification was never accepted by the PRI regime, which carefully sought to maintain 
a democratic façade before the international community. I will go back to this point later in this chapter. 
11 Before the 1970s, disagreement prevailed among scholars over the appropriate classification of 
Mexico’s political system. In 1969 Carolyn and Martin Needleman charted differing interpretations about 
Mexico’s system: it was labelled as being ‘imperfectly democratic’, or ‘in transition to democracy’. For 
instance, Juan Linz recognised Mexico as one of the ‘rare cases’ in which ‘a non-traditional regime’ has 
been ‘transformed into a democracy without constitutional discontinuity and the use of force to remove 
the incumbent’. However, Linz called into question those authors who ‘want to classify it [Mexico] as a 
democracy’ (Linz 1975: 185). In 1973 Susan Kaufman Purcell (1973: 29) ‘demonstrate[d] the utility of 
classifying’ the Mexican regime ‘as authoritarian’. Since then, there has been a general consensus on the 
authoritarian nature of the Mexican political regime (Meyer 1977; Molinar 1993). 
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presidential candidates of the official party did not have any significant opponents 
between 1952 and 1988 (Lindau 1992). Until the end of the 1980s, the legally 
recognised opposition parties did not provide a real alternative, nor did they jeopardise 
the PRI’s hegemony (Meyer 1977: 10). 
Even with the presence of opposition parties, which gradually acquired a more 
relevant role in the 1980s, the absence of free and reliable electoral processes 
predictably ended in the triumph of PRI candidates (Aguayo 2010b: Chapter Two; 
Meyer 1977: 11). The executive power defined the number of parties that could contend 
through the electoral norms, diverted public resources in order to support the official 
candidate, directed the institution in charge of elections, and controlled the electoral 
results (Crespo and Gómez Tagle 2004). Krauze points to the different ways in which 
the government orchestrated fraud in each election: 
The methods [...] encompassed all stages of the electoral process [...]. Months before 
[the election], a rigged and selective electoral list is organised: all those suspected of 
favouring the opposition are removed from this list and members of the PRI are 
privileged [...]. All bureaucrats and most areas of the corporatist workers' and peasants' 
organisations receive instructions to vote massively for the official candidate, or to risk 
(the 'stick') their posts, jobs or lands respectively, or with the promise (the 'carrot') of 
increasing them. Many times these votes are placed days before or after the election as a 
'filling', in separate ballot boxes that are brought in for the final counting. Big buses 
bring peasants from remote places to vote with their ballot papers already filled out in 
favour of the PRI (1996: 117). 
 
During the PRI’s rule, elections took place regularly and according to the law, 
but in effect simply endorsed decisions made beforehand – i.e., the outgoing President 
designated his successor, who was then formally nominated by the PRI, and then 
legitimised through the electoral process. Until 1989, there was not a single opposition 
governor in any state of the Mexican Republic. The universal vote and opposition 
parties were legal, but the struggle for power was resolved de facto between the official 
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party’s elites (Ai Camp 1984; Hernández 1985; Smith 1979).12 The opposition was 
tolerated only within the Lower House ‘where it was kept as a minority that legitimised 
the democratic forms without the ability to really influence the behaviour of the 
legislative body’ (Meyer 1980: 121). Elections served as propaganda for the 
authoritarian regime’s activities and achievements. 
Political demobilisation  
The PRI governments also successfully promoted political and social demobilisation. 
The state controlled mass participation through worker and peasant unions and 
headquarters, which since 1938 had been ‘absorbed’ by the official party (Loaeza 
2008b: 28). Certainly, the inclusion of these vast social groups – workers and peasants – 
within the ‘revolutionary’ party provided an important source of political legitimacy for 
the authoritarian regime, for it was simultaneously ‘both elite dominated and mass 
based’ (Middlebrook 1986: 125). By incorporating worker unions and peasant 
organisations into the PRI, the state was able to regulate their social demands and 
constrain their political participation (Meyer 1980: 143). For instance, labour leaders 
could not form a union or hold a strike without the approval of the state; the PRI had 
also the discretionary authority to manipulate union elections and to influence the 
outcome of disputes regarding a union’s title to a collective contract. So, by being 
incorporated to the official-party, unions constructed formal and exclusive linkages with 
the PRI that generated leadership privileges (e.g. party posts), but also raised the costs 
of challenging the party’s authority. Additionally, the state control of workers and 
peasants through unions subordinated to the official party had a demobilisational 
                                                 
12 The PRI was a stage for competition between the elites. Hence, at least until the mid 1980s, the 
challenges to the PRI’s official presidential candidate came from within the party itself. Even so, on only 
two occasions did PRI official candidates find significant opposition within the party: first, against the 
Almazán movement in 1940; later in 1952 with the Henriquista movement. Both the Almazán and the 
Henriquista movements were defeated (Lindau 1992). 
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consequence: as the majority of these groups had been encompassed by the PRI, 
opposition leaders had little chance of mobilising mass groups against the regime. 
Another factor that contributed to political and social demobilisation was the 
legal neutralisation of those dissatisfied within unions. In spite of the unions’ diversity, 
their leaders were ‘united in their opposition to worker dissent’ (Middlebrook 1991: 
282). In order to facilitate the control of dissidents, unions employed the ‘exclusion 
clause’. This clause, included in all labour contracts, legally urged employers to fire any 
worker who had been previously expelled from the union. The clause was a powerful 
dissuasion tool: the price of dissidence was unemployment. It gave union leaders and 
employers an efficient legal resource to exterminate dissatisfied workers arbitrarily. 
The centralisation of power 
Electoral processes characterised because the official party did not have significant 
opponents, and political demobilisation facilitated the centralisation of power in the 
presidency. The effect of this striking concentration of power was the emergence of a 
dominant presidency characterised by the discretional use of its attributions (e.g. law, 
resources), since it was not accountable for any of its actions to any institution (Meyer 
1980: 136). The vast power of the president, legally established in the Constitution, was 
reinforced by the power granted by being the leader of the government party, which was 
in fact a state-party (Carpizo 1998; Casar 1996; Cosío Villegas 1972). Hence, the 
president was able to limit the legislative and judicial powers as well as those of local 
governments. 
From 1940 onwards, the presidency was a central element of the Mexican 
political system. The president had enough power to restrict the participation of the rest 
of the political forces and control political events (Flores Olea 1976; Reyna 1976). All 
presidents removed, arbitrarily, those state governors who, for any reason whatsoever, 
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they considered uncomfortable or threatening (Hernández 2005: 104). Additionally, as I 
explain later in this chapter, the centralisation of power allowed the executive to 
manipulate mass media, censor intellectual critics, co-opt dissidents, use public funds 
for private ends, and repress threats to the regime. The president and his party were 
indifferent to public opinion, which had no real means to make them accountable, as 
democratic systems of power require (Loaeza 2008a: 52). 
Oppressing and repressing threats to the PRI regime 
In 1990, prominent Mexican intellectuals, Octavio Paz and Enrique Krauze, organised a 
meeting of international intellectuals in Mexico City. Among the participants to the 
event were Cornelius Castoriadis, Daniel Bell, Michael Ignatieff, Hugh Thomas, 
Czesław Miłosz, Adam Michnik, and Carlos Monsiváis (Paz and Krauze 1991; Vargas 
Llosa 1991 and 1992). These distinguished intellectuals gathered to reflect on ‘the 
experience of freedom’ in a country whose regime was seen as authoritarian by 
academics at the time.13 The event was significant since it occurred in the context of the 
abrupt democratic transitions in Eastern Europe, which at the time surprised the world 
(Dominguez Michael 2009). To the amazement of those gathered, Mario Vargas Llosa 
referred to Mexico as the ‘perfect dictatorship’. For Vargas Llosa ‘the perfect 
dictatorship is not communism. It is not the USSR. It is not Fidel Castro. The perfect 
dictatorship is Mexico […] it is the camouflaged dictatorship.’ ‘The Mexican is [such] a 
dictatorship’, he concluded, ‘that all Latin American dictatorships since I can recall 
have tried to create something equivalent to the PRI’ (Vargas Llosa 1991). 
                                                 
13Another remarkable thing about some of these intellectuals is that they were also involved in the 
broader ‘justice in transition’ debates that dominated the post-89 wave of transitions in Eastern Europe, 
and those transitions from military rule in Latin America – Ignatieff and Michnik, for instance. Monsivais 
was involved in Mexico’s transitional process. 
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In describing the Mexican political regime as ‘a sui generis dictatorship’, Vargas 
Llosa (1991) referred mainly to its ‘permanence, not of a man, but of a party. And a 
party which is immovable.’ The prolonged permanence of the regime, as I mentioned 
before, was the result of the active intervention of the Mexican state to limit social and 
political pluralism, demobilise groups not part of the government, and articulate 
political demands through the official party. However, this does not mean that the PRI 
governments were free of social or political conflict (Ortega-Ortiz 2008; Rodríguez 
Munguía 2007). On the contrary, the regime faced multiple challenges between 1929 
and 2000. When the bureaucratic mechanisms of social and political control failed, the 
‘revolutionary’ state repressed and suppressed any form of politically independent 
participation (Aguayo 2001a and 2008; Ortega-Ortiz 2004; Rodríguez Munguía 2006 
and 2008; Stevens 1970). 
In order to keep opposition parties, independent movements or antigovernment 
groups at bay, the regime combined, successfully, negotiation with co-option, 
intimidation, repression, oppression, and censorship – what Sergio Aguayo calls ‘the 
Mexican style of the use of violence’ (Aguayo 1998: 27). These strategies, which 
sought to neutralise threats to the regime, depended on a sophisticated ‘security 
apparatus’ (Aguayo 1998: Chapter Two). At the centre of this ‘opposition crushing 
machine’ was the Interior Ministry, where two groups specialised in coordinating 
anything related to the country’s ‘internal security’: the Federal Security Direction 
(DFS), which ran from 1947 until 1985, and the Direction of Political and Social 
Research (IPS). The first had the power to survey and inform ‘on facts related to the 
nation’s security’ (Aguayo 1998: 30). The second carried out ‘research and analysis on 
the country’s issues of political and social nature’ (Aguayo 1998: 32). The DFS was a 
peculiar institution because, unlike other intelligence services in the world, it was also 
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‘operative’: it was in charge of persecuting, punishing, and eliminating the state’s 
enemies. 
The legal definitions of ‘internal security’ were characterised by their ambiguity 
(Rodríguez Sumano 2008). This allowed the Internal Ministry and its secret police to 
act in a rather discretionary and arbitrary fashion: in fact, the secret police had legal 
faculties to ‘neutralise’ (i.e. repress, oppress, exterminate) groups and individuals who, 
in their eyes, represented a threat to the country’s internal security. As a result, ‘despite 
its repeated official disclaimers, the Mexican government has […] shown a consistent 
tendency to regard any opposition movement as subversive’ – hence opposition 
movements (independent unions, activists, students protestors, members of opposition 
parties) were systematically repressed (Stevens 1970: 67). The work of the DFS was 
facilitated by its American counterpart. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
delivered daily ‘intelligence reports’ giving information on the activities of leftist 
groups (Aguayo 1998: 94). 
But the secret police (the DFS) was not alone in being responsible for silencing 
opposition. Two additional groups were a part of the ‘repressive machinery’: the police 
and the Military. The police depended on the executive power; it was made up by the 
General Attorney’s Office, the Riot Police, the Judicial Police, and Mexico City’s 
Preventive Police (Aguayo 1998: 26). These groups participated daily in the coercion of 
antigovernment groups. For example, in order to protect the security of the American 
President Lyndon Johnson during his state visit to Mexico in 1966, the police detained, 
‘just in case’, ‘five hundred potential rioters’ (Aguayo 1998: 68). 
Even though Mexico has had a civilian government since 1929, the army ‘was 
constantly involved in handling and controlling dissidents’ (Aguayo 1998: 32). The 
army fiercely repressed the railroad workers union’s movement in 1959, its most 
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significant challenge during the 1950s (Ortega-Ortiz 2008: 157). The army also took 
part in less known episodes, like the illegal arrest of six ‘communist agitators’ in the 
city of Tampico in 1966 (Aguayo 1998: 64). As documented by Aguayo, the 
participation of the armed forces in the repression of dissidents was more common than 
the literature allows. The Rural Guards, who also depended on the Ministry of Defence, 
carried out intelligence tasks in rural areas. Finally, there was the Presidential Major 
State, a military elite group that, until this day, depends directly on the president. 
The list of violently repressive state mechanisms does not end here. In addition 
to the army, police, and secret police, there were ‘informal’ or para-state organisations 
which were also responsible for repression. By being ‘informal’ these groups acted 
clandestinely and their relationship to the state was unclear. Examples are the multiple 
paramilitary groups, which flourished all over the country, like Ola Verde (Green 
Wave) in the state of Sonora, and the so-called ‘irregular forces’, which acted together 
with the Judicial Police, but without an official appointment, like the ‘Mandarinas’ 
(Tangerines) or ‘Aspirinas’ (Aspirin) (Aguayo 1998: 33). 
The groups that participated in the oppression and repression of state opponents 
did not necessarily act illegally. Sometimes, coercion was authorised by law. The police 
corporations neutralised dissidents protected by the law of ‘social dissolution’, which 
has existed in Mexico since 1941. This law was part of the Federal Penal Code. The law 
allowed the incarceration for from two to twelve years of anyone who ‘in a spoken or 
any other manner’ carried out ‘political propaganda’ among foreigners or Mexicans 
‘promoting ideas, programs or action norms of any foreign government that disturb the 
public order or affect the Mexican State’s sovereignty’ (Código Penal 1950). According 
to this law, ‘public order’ was disturbed when political propaganda ‘tended’ to ‘produce 
rebellion and sedition, mobs or riots’. The state was perceived to be under threat when 
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political propaganda hindered the functioning of ‘legitimate institutions’ or when it 
propagated ‘contempt on the part of Mexican nationals towards their civic duties’ 
(Código Penal 1950). 
By sending the project of the law of social dissolution to the Lower House for its 
approval, President Manuel Ávila Camacho (1940-1946) warned that his only wish was 
to ‘comply with his constitutional mandate of watching over the preservation of interior 
peace […] within the democratic principles of our Constitution’ (Cámara de Diputados 
1941). Paradoxically, the PRI regime justified the existence of a law that sought to 
‘dissolve’ (i.e. to quell) society in the name of democracy. During discussion of the law 
in the Mexican congress, the PRI congressmen argued that Mexico had to be always 
alert to the regime’s enemies. Hence, the law of social dissolution would not be of an 
‘emergency’ or temporary disposition; rather, it would have an anticipatory and 
‘permanent’ character. ‘Why should we wait for a rebellion to come upon us and 
destroy our form of government if we can avoid it and punish the acts preliminary to the 
rebellion?’ (Cámara de Diputados 1941). 
The vagueness of the law of social dissolution gave the police ample faculties to 
make use of it arbitrarily. The law did not demand that the acts defined by it as ‘crimes 
of social dissolution’ were the direct and immediate cause of ‘rebellion, sedition, 
mobbing or riots’. The only requirement the law demanded was that these acts (to carry 
out propaganda, promote ideas) ‘tended’ to produce such effects (Stevens 1970: 65). In 
other words, the law left it to the discretion of state agents to interpret the type of ‘ideas’ 
or ‘propaganda’ that, according to them, could tend to disturb public order. Therefore, it 
was up to the whim of the police to select the dissidents who ended up in jail for 
propagating such ideas. Certainly, it was not strange for the PRI governments to regard 
‘as a threat to the equilibrium of the political system any movement that appears capable 
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of capturing widespread public sympathy, regardless of the ends for which this 
sympathy might be mobilized’ (Stevens 1970: 69). 
The last measure that enabled the opposition to be crushed was the formation of 
a group of state organisations which had nothing to do with issues of ‘internal security’, 
but once in a while became involved in them. An example of this was the Agrarian 
Affairs Department, which occasionally spied on independent peasant organisations. 
Another example is that of the Postal Administration, which sporadically intercepted 
letters directed to dissident organisations (Aguayo 1998: 33). A final example is that of 
the Ministry of Health, which allowed the illegal and secret detention of political 
dissidents in mental hospitals – some of whom have been found alive at the time of 
writing this thesis (A case relevant to the thesis is discussed in detail in Chapter Five). 
In order to illustrate the nature of state violence between 1929 and 1968, I will 
explore briefly three episodes in which the state repressed dissident groups. The cases 
selected are not intended to be a representative sample, but they serve the purpose of 
demonstrating empirically the authoritarian nature of the regime and prove the sustained 
use of repression. 
As already indicated, the control of the demands of workers and peasants 
through unions docile towards the PRI structure was one of the main reasons why the 
authoritarian regime remained stable. However, worker movements did not always 
respect the regime’s guidelines. For example, in 1958 the railroad workers initiated a 
series of strikes in order to demand a salary increase and social benefits (Ortega-Ortiz 
2008: 157). In response, the government tried to co-opt the movement, granting workers 
a minimal salary increase and agreeing that the dissidents’ leader – Demetrio Vallejo – 
should become the new general secretary of the railroad union (Meyer 1980: 143). In 
1959 the railroad workers made further social claims, but on this occasion the 
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government opted to eliminate the movement. The authorities began by declaring that 
the movement did not exist and therefore the strike was ‘illegal’. So, through this 
significant legal operation, the movement ceased to exist, but as the members continued 
with the strike, it was regarded as a criminal act. Afterwards – and here the irony is 
obvious – the police and army brutally, but lawfully, repressed the dissidents. Carr 
offers a brief account of what occurred: ‘two suburbs of Mexico City inhabited by rail 
workers were besieged by troops, and large parts of the railways installations were 
occupied by the army. Up to ten thousand ferrocarrileros [rail workers] lost their jobs’ 
(Carr 1992: 207). The repression was accompanied by a wide media campaign designed 
to present the strike as Soviet subversion (Ortega-Ortiz 2004: 170). Twenty-five 
railroad leaders remained in jail until the 1970s accused of being communists. Whilst it 
is beyond the scope of this thesis to compare Mexico’s history of abuses with other 
experiences of state repression, it is important to note the extent to which the discursive 
justification of state repression in Mexico was doubled in power by the international 
rubric of the ‘War against communism’, as was the case with Argentina’s ‘Dirty War’, 
and Augusto Pinochet’s rule over Chile. 
During the 1960s the violent confrontations between the authoritarian state and 
different dissident groups proliferated. Two good examples that illustrate the ‘Mexican 
style of the use of violence’ during this decade are the cases of the ‘navista movement’ 
in 1961, and the ‘doctors’ movement’ in 1965. ‘Navismo’ was a local movement. It was 
born in the city of San Luis Potosí in 1959 and headed by Dr. Salvador Nava, dean of 
the university (Meyer 1980: 142). In order to end decades of PRI governments in the 
state, Nava formed the civic union Potosino, a coalition that brought together a great 
number of followers with diverse political preferences, e.g. communists, PAN members, 
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independent sympathisers. Its common objective was to topple the PRI in the local 
elections. 
Dr. Nava won the municipal presidential elections of San Luis Potosí and the 
President accepted the PRI’s defeat. As a consequence, PRI national authorities and the 
President began a damage control operation. According to the President, the main 
person behind the ‘success’ of ‘navismo’ was the PRI’s governor of San Luis Potosí – 
Miguel Álvarez – who had allowed the aforementioned opposition movement to exist in 
the first place. Governor Álvarez could have repressed Dr. Nava’s movement before the 
elections – as other governors did, annihilating democratising movements that emerged 
in their respective states – but he did not.14 As punishment, the President removed 
governor Álvarez from his post. 
However, the navista movement’s history does not end here. Two years later, in 
1961, Nava dared to compete for the position of governor of the state of San Luis 
Potosí, but the PRI did not allow it and made heavy use of electoral fraud. Dr. Nava lost 
the election and his movement’s efforts were reoriented towards protesting against 
electoral fraud (Ortega-Ortiz 2008: 162). 
In a context where the only way to gain power was through the PRI, Salvador 
Nava had made a double mistake: being part of the opposition against the regime and 
protesting against electoral fraud. As a result, the navista movement faced diverse state 
strategies in order to neutralise dissidents. First, the government tried to co-opt its 
members (Calvillo 1986). Afterwards, the press allied with the PRI accused Salvador 
Nava of being an ambitious man ‘without any other desire than to occupy, by whatever 
means, the command chair’ (Aguayo 1998: 118). They also disparaged the navista 
movement for having no reason to oppose the PRI governments, whose ‘program 
                                                 
14 For example, in 1945 the governor of the state of Guanajuato ordered the zone’s military to repress the 
Leonese Civic Union, a democratising movement similar to Salvador Nava’s. On that occasion, twenty 
six people died. 
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always rich and always enriched by an ongoing Revolution is fulfilled via institutions’ 
(Aguayo 1998: 118). In the end, the army occupied the navista movement’s offices and 
arrested forty-nine of its members, including Salvador Nava, who was accused of 
‘agitation’ and ‘disturbing public order’. The police suspended La Tribuna, an 
independent newspaper, which had favoured the navista movement, and arrested and 
tortured its director, Manuel Montiel (Ortega-Ortiz 2008: 163). Ironically, that same 
year, Mexico was to host the United Nations Hemispheric Conference on Human 
Rights. 
The doctors’ movement took place in Mexico City in 1965. It demanded better 
salaries and labour security. This movement warned that its ‘demands are not only of an 
economic character’. Rather, they sought ‘to exercise our right to belong or not to a 
union […] for we are forced to belong to pseudo unions’ which ‘lack autonomy’ 
(AMMRIAC 1964). According to the magazine Política – a magazine critical of the 
PRI regime – the medical conflict was a question of ‘freedom of association’ and ‘the 
need to purge and democratize the internal life of unions’ (Política 1965b). 
However, according to the PRI regime there were other reasons behind the 
medical movement: it sought to ‘show the […] Head of State as incompetent’. In the 
eyes of the government, the movement was created by ‘resentful, bitter politicians […] 
and disloyal [to the PRI regime]’ (Aguayo 1998: 47). The doctors had forgotten their 
‘moral duty to safeguard the system’, they were ‘enemies of our progress’, 
‘counterrevolutionaries’, and ‘anti Mexican’ (Aguayo 1998: 55 & 80; See also, Política 
1965a: A-B). 
The central government’s response was to fire more than five hundred doctors 
‘at bayonet point’ – in the end ‘there are plenty of doctors’; others were beaten, fled 
from Mexico, or ended up in jail (Ortega-Ortiz 2008: 164; Pozas Horcasitas 1993: 
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Chapter Five). The doctors’ movement’s repression was endorsed by the PRI’s 
congressmen. According to them, ‘the health of Mexicans is part of our national 
heritage. Nothing, absolutely nothing can justify those who, having the sacred mission 
of taking care of it, abandon this responsibility for the sake of selfish interests’ (Aguayo 
1998: 55). In the face of state repression, the movement was diluted because, according 
to the secret police’s reports, the doctors ‘no longer want to know about politics’, rather 
‘above all things they wish to keep their jobs’ (Aguayo 1998: 59). The latter is 
significant because forced unemployment – the exclusion of any employment 
opportunity – became a very common strategy for the PRI regime. ‘The object of such 
blacklisting’, Stevens has demonstrated, was designed ‘to so intensify the problem of 
earning a livelihood that the individual concerned will have little time or energy to 
engage in antigovernment activities’ (1970: 70). 
As it had done in the past with the railroad movement, the central government 
invoked the law of social dissolution to ‘dissolve’ the medical movement. However, the 
doctors who participated in the movement continued to be the object of repressive and 
intimidating practices. A year later still, ‘several of the leaders were arrested on a charge 
ostensibly unrelated to the strike […]. Later they were convicted of participating in a 
plot to overthrow the government by armed force’ (Stevens 1970: 70). 
Finally, it is necessary to tackle an additional factor that facilitated the use of 
repression during the authoritarian regime: secrecy. The lack of information regarding 
repression helped to preserve the state’s impunity, because people both nationally and 
internationally were unaware of these state crimes. 
The absence of evidence of state crimes can largely be attributed to the way in 
which state agents acted. State repression went from ‘assault and battery to 
assassination’, but the central government was ‘almost never connected in any direct 
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fashion to such attacks’ (Stevens 1970: 72). On the contrary, as Stevens illustrates, 
atrocities ‘take place at the local level and are usually carried out by unidentified 
assailants’. Additionally: 
Included in the category of covert violence is the kidnapping of the individual who is 
seen as obstructing a final solution of a conflict in a way favourable to the government. 
In such cases, persons who may or may not identify themselves as secret service agents 
call upon the obstreperous individual in his home, or waylay him en route to his home. 
They transport him to a distant place and hold him there until the conflict is resolved 
(Stevens 1970: 72). 
 
So there was ignorance of the atrocities committed under the regime because of 
the work of an experienced secret police, trained to leave no trace of their crimes, but 
also because the mass media omitted – deliberately, as I will illustrate below – to 
broadcast information about repression. The details of state violence against other 
Mexicans had barely been registered by the mass media. This can be explained in part 
because, as Jacinto Rodríguez Munguía (2007) has shown, the purpose of both the PRI 
government and the mass media was to hide what was occurring from the rest of the 
country. No news was broadcast about acts of repression. Therefore, as Mexican writer 
Carlos Monsiváis said: ‘this management of collective memory’ was the PRI regime’s 
‘impunity guarantee’ because ‘what is unknown either cannot be remembered or did not 
occur’ (Monsiváis and Scherer 2004: 146). For instance, neither the unlawful detention 
of dissidents in mental hospitals, nor ‘the death flights’ (dissidents killed by state agents 
and then dumped into the ocean) were atrocities publicly known until recently. This is 
what Stan Cohen meant when he said that ‘we didn’t know’ may be true for many 
people in authoritarian regimes as public knowledge of atrocity is limited because of 
government controls on information and the mass media (2005: 78). That is why, he 
suggested, authoritarian regimes do not need to elaborate sophisticated responses to 
allegations of human rights violations because no human rights violations are known, 
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exposed, or reported. With these regimes, says Cohen, ‘there is only literal denial: the 
laconic disavowal that nothing happened’ (2005: 104). 
Another way in which Mexico’s mass media collaborated with the authoritarian 
state was by slandering the image of dissident groups. The press transformed the 
discontented into ‘moral panics’, which stood between the progress of ‘revolution’ and 
the country (Cohen 2002). The press accused Salvador Nava, for example, of ‘adopting 
histrionic attitudes unsympathetic with the decorum that any intervention in public life 
requires’ (Aguayo 1998: 118). 
To control the mass media, independent journalists, and intellectuals, the PRI 
used co-option, censorship, or plain force. Co-option or manipulation of the media was 
possible because of the formal subsidies or sub rosa paid to media bodies (Granados 
Chapa 2007: 15). By receiving public funds – on which their subsistence depended – the 
mass media (i.e. print and broadcast media) were careful about the way in which they 
addressed information on the authoritarian regime. This is why press critiques written 
against the regime were rather sporadic and relatively inefficient. The PRI governments 
also tied the intellectuals’ and journalists’ hands through bribes, exile, and diplomatic 
careers. Vargas Llosa claimed that there was no other case in Latin America ‘of a 
dictatorship system which had recruited the intellectual medium more efficiently, 
bribing it in a very subtle manner’ (1991). In 1977, Lorenzo Meyer, an intellectual 
opposing the PRI regime, questioned that the state provided a ‘living for thousands of 
intellectuals’; and he criticised Mexican embassies because, instead of having 
professional diplomats, they were ‘full of writers and social scientists’ (Meyer 1977: 
16). Certainly, forced exile was not a punishment reserved for journalists or 
intellectuals. As Stevens has demonstrated: 
The time-honored Russian custom of exile is also observed in Mexico. A troublemaker 
may be ordered, upon pain of imprisonment or bodily harm, to leave the area where he 
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has been exercising noxious influence and to reside until further notice at a distant 
place. When it seems desirable that an individual leave the country and reside abroad, 
government funds may be furnished to cover his expenses. In a case involving a 
prestigious individual, he may be prevailed upon to accept an appointment as 
ambassador to a distant country (1970: 70).  
 
Censorship was a relatively common practice among government agents, who 
censored or limited previously published information, and it also involved a series of 
mechanisms aimed at dissuading the press from publishing unacceptable texts. In order 
to achieve this, the government threatened the press with cancelling their publicity, 
decreasing their subsidies, and even interrupting the paper supply, which was provided 
by a government agency, the Productora e Importadora de Papel (Paper Producer and 
Importer or PIPSA). Without paper, there are no newspapers. Certainly, some media – 
like the magazines Siempre!, Política, El Diario de Yucatán, and El Día – were critical 
of the PRI governments, but they lived under tight secret police surveillance. 
Journalists’ phones were tapped, their mail was opened, and the circulation of 
magazines or newspapers was impeded when they published ‘texts that were offensive 
to the regime’ (Aguayo 1998: 52; Rodríguez Munguía 2007: 24). 
When co-option and censorship failed, the PRI governments fired or 
incarcerated anti-government journalists or intellectuals. In 1965, Arnaldo Orfila 
stopped working as the director of the Fondo de Cultura Económica (Economic Culture 
Fund) – a publishing house founded by the Mexican government – for translating into 
Spanish and publishing the novel Los Hijos de Sánchez (The Children of Sánchez), by 
the North American anthropologist Oscar Lewis (1961). This novel, originally 
published in English in 1961, was the result of an ethnographic study of five poor 
families in Mexico carried out by Lewis during the 1950s. Of the five families, Lewis 
picked the Sánchez to carry out an ‘almost obsessive register of the economic, social, 
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symbolic, religious, psychological, sexual and life ties that make poverty not only a 
social form but, after a Georg Simmel concept, a way of life’ (Semo 2010). 
In response, another state agency, the Mexican Geography and Statistical 
Society (SMGE), sued the book and Lewis before the Republic’s General Attorney. 
Lewis was accused of being ‘obscene, crude and offensive to public morality’, because 
of his ‘impudent description of erotic scenes that offend the most elemental sense of 
modesty’ of the Mexican people (Política 1965c: 14 – 17). The book was, moreover, 
‘anti-Mexican and subversive’ (Política 1965c: 14). For the SMGE ‘the Sánchez family 
does not represent […] families with scarce economic resources’ in Mexico. According 
to the SMGE, the type of home the Sánchez family lived in ‘belongs to the past’, 
because the PRI’s ‘republican, democratic and representative regime’ had ‘built 
thousands of comfortable, hygienic and affordable homes’ for families like the Sánchez’ 
(Política 1965c: 14–17). The penal lawsuit against Lewis fell through, but the 
government forced Orfila to leave his post. 
Other examples of the regime’s repression of critical intellectuals involve Daniel 
Cosío Villegas and Adolfo Gilly. The first, who was President of El Colegio de 
México15 between 1957 and 1963, was accused – via a libellous book – of serving the 
interests of the United States, ‘the yankee imperialism’ (Cosío Villegas 1976). Cosío 
Villegas was found guilty of ‘making up entities that receive Uncle Sam’s subsidies’ as 
was the case of El Colegio de México, which ‘receives a money load which makes the 
apparently leftist posture of that organism questionable’ (Ibarra 1974: 56-65). And 
historian Adolfo Gilly ended up in the Lecumberri jail between 1966 and 1972, accused 
of ‘conspiracy’ and ‘criminal association’ for writing an article against the government. 
Once in jail, Gilly was tortured by state agents to make him confess that he was a 
                                                 
15 El Colegio de Mexico is a prestigious institute of higher education in Mexico City, specialised in social 
sciences, with many of Latin America’s leading experts in their fields. 
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member of the Fourth International – the communist international organisation 
(Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation 1966-1968; Liga Obrera Marxista 1966). 
Mexico’s protracted transition towards democracy (1968-2000)  
1968: the beginning of transition 
The significant number of social conflicts and the propagation of political violence in 
the 1960s revealed the structural changes that had occurred in Mexican society between 
1930 and 1960: e.g., demographic growth, industrialisation, urbanisation, and the 
transformation of values, attitudes, and lifestyles (Loaeza 2008b).16 For example, 
between 1963 and 1968 there were at least fifty-three student riots (Aguayo 1998: 84). 
Social discontent in the 1960s exposed, in particular, how the middle classes had 
become stronger; having benefitted from the economic growth that the PRI regime had 
guaranteed during the three previous decades, they demanded that their individual 
interests should be defended and asked for more participation in political events (Loaeza 
2008a).17 Even North American intelligence services were placed on alert following 
these socioeconomic changes. In 1967 the CIA noticed that the middle classes had 
achieved a ‘level of sophistication that could lead them to a conflict with the 
paternalistic Mexican government’ (Aguayo 1998: 112). At the same time, the political 
violence deployed by the state seemed to suggest that the traditional bureaucratic 
mechanisms of control successfully employed by the PRI regime until then were no 
longer sufficient to maintain state power (Loaeza 2005). 
In this context, the most important challenge to the regime was the student 
movement of 1968. On July 23rd of that year there was a confrontation between the 
                                                 
16 In 1940 Mexico was a barely populated rural country. It had only twenty million inhabitants; almost 
seventy percent of the workers worked in agriculture and only twenty percent of the population lived in 
urban areas. Only a fifth of the population could be considered middle or upper class. In contrast, in 1980 
there were more than fifty million people – three times as many as in 1940 – and less than forty percent 
worked in agriculture (Meyer 1991: 365; Meyer 1980: 131).     
17 Between 1940 and 1980, the GNP had an average growth of six percent (see Meyer 1991: 365). 
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students of two high schools in Mexico City. The police intervened: students were 
frisked, beaten, and some of them were arrested. In response, three days later, thousands 
of students protested against police brutality. The police quelled the demonstration 
again. This time, however, the confrontation between the students and the police left 
three protestors dead. From then until September 1968 a series of student protests took 
place, all of which were repressed by security forces (protests were suppressed; students 
were brutally beaten or illegally arrested). Each student protest had more participants 
(more universities, schools and unions joined the movement), and brought about a 
greater intensity of state violence (the Military joined the police in trying to quell the 
protests). On September 18th the government occupied the National University’s 
buildings and detained at least six hundred students. In spite of the oppression, the 
student protests continued until October 2nd – in less than one month there were fifteen 
people killed (See Aguayo 1998; Meyer 1980; Ortega-Ortiz 2008). 
Unlike other protests, the student movement was particularly disturbing for the 
government because in October 1968 the Olympic Games were to take place in Mexico 
(Loaeza 2005: 147). While the President sought to portray ‘an image of peace and 
progress to the rest of the world’, the students sought the opposite: they wanted to 
‘organise a strong mobilisation before foreign visitors in the month of October’. 
According to the secret police reports, the students wanted to ‘take advantage of the 
Olympiad to carry out a labour of proselytism, showing to the world […] the Mexican 
government’s attitude’ (Aguayo 1998: 118; see also Loaeza 2005). In response, the 
government and its allies in the press propagated the idea that the students were a part of 
a conspiracy against the country – ‘terrorists’, ‘guerrillas’, ‘agitators’, ‘anarchists’, 
‘unpatriotic’, ‘mercenaries’, ‘traitors’, ‘foreigners’ or ‘outlaws’, ‘communistoid pseudo-
students’, ‘misled adolescents’, and ‘bad Mexicans’ (Rodríguez Munguía 2007: 69). In 
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this atmosphere charged with violence, on October 2nd the police and the army repressed 
a student protest congregated in the Plaza de las Tres Culturas (The Three Cultures’ 
Square) in Tlatelolco and indiscriminately shot those present. Additionally, according to 
the report by the DFS’s director, Fernando Gutiérrez Barrios, one thousand and forty 
three people were detained (Ortega-Ortiz 2008: 172).18
Meanwhile, the Mexican press concealed the student massacre, misrepresented it 
or approved it. For instance, Excelsior’s main headline was reserved for the forthcoming 
Olympic Games (Brewster 2002: 183). Other newspapers simply echoed the official 
story told by the government: ‘what happened was justified’ (Aguayo 1998: 268). 
According to this narrative, the student movement was in fact a Communist subversion 
that sought to destabilise the country or boycott the Olympic Games; students were 
armed and shot first – the army just repelled the aggression; ‘outside agents’ were to 
blame for the violence (Valero 2009). 
This is how German journalists Heinrich Jaeneche and Eberhard Seeliger, Stern 
magazine correspondents, reported it on October 20th 1968: 
The [Mexican] press lied in favour of the government, distorting the meaning of the 
events. The Mexican newspapers took foreign correspondents who were visiting to 
cover the Olympic games by surprise, making them accomplices with the fable that they 
were only guerrilla members, snipers and student restlessness, when it was actually 
military repression of a civil protest movement (cited by Rodríguez Munguía 2007: 73).  
 
The 1968 student repression received relatively little attention outside Mexico, 
with the exception of the Argentine writer Jorge Luis Borges, who openly backed the 
Mexican government in its repressive actions (1968). Only the International PEN Club 
and a group of French intellectuals, via a telegram, showed their indignation about the 
                                                 
18 Notwithstanding its impact on Mexican democratisation, there are no investigations yet which offer an 
explanation on the reach of the atrocities perpetrated by the state, paramilitary groups, or antigovernment 
movements in 1968. The number of dead in the ‘Tlatelolco massacre’ illustrates this problem well. Until 
2000, journalists and academics had accounted for the death of between twenty six and eight hundred 
people. With the opening of the files of the extinct secret police in 2001, recent investigations revealed 
different numbers – twenty eight or twenty people – and these numbers, in turn, are subject to 
controversy. 
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political violence exercised by the PRI regime (PEN Club International 1968). Simone 
de Beauvoir, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Jean-Luc Godard, among others, urged the Mexican 
government to condemn ‘the police’s and Military’s violent actions’ and urged it to 
resume the ‘dialogue the students ask for’ (Beauvoir, et al. 1968). The existentialists 
requested of the President ‘not to destroy forever the image of the country of the 
[Mexican] Revolution of which it claims to be heir to’ (Beauvoir, et al. 1968). 
With the exception of these two telegrams, the international community did not 
condemn the massacre (Sikkink 1993: 428). For Sir Peter Hope, then UK ambassador in 
Mexico, what happened was ‘a conspiracy of silence. All of us at the embassy tried to 
find out what had happened and failed. The same occurred with the Korean, Japanese, 
Belgian, and other diplomats’ (Aguayo 2010a: 187). 
The government’s repression ended the student movement. The Olympic Games 
were carried out without further disturbance. As occurred with other protest movements 
during the 1960s, the student movement showed the growing existence of social and 
political pressure for change.19 It revealed the features of a more complex and 
pluralistic society, which demanded more opportunities for a political and independent 
participation, beyond the existing corporations, unions, or the official party. However, 
unlike other social movements, the brutal repression of these students in 1968 had 
significant effects on the political stability and legitimacy of the authoritarian regime. 
So much so that this mobilisation and its repression constituted the origins of the 
political liberalisation which would end, more than thirty years later, in the triumph of 
Vicente Fox. 
                                                 
19 However, we must remember that within the universities there were also co-opted student groups 
supported by the regime. The Federation of Students in Guadalajara or the National Federation of 
Technical Students were affiliated to the government and made use of violence to fiercely repress anti-
government student groups. These pro-government student groups enjoyed impunity. 
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The protest and repression of the 1968 movement unleashed a process of 
democratic transition in three ways. First, the students stripped the authoritarian regime 
of its democratic facade. A government that killed people in a peaceful protest could not 
define itself as democratic. The repression conflicted with the democratic and 
‘revolutionary’ credentials of the PRI regime, mainly before the eyes of the 
international community. Meyer observed that it was not until 1968 that the ‘co-option 
and repression were seen as an integral part of the Mexican political system’ (Meyer 
1991: 370). As a result, from then onwards, the concept of ‘authoritarianism’ – 
originally put forth by Juan Linz – became popular to explain the reality of the PRI 
regime (Meyer 1991: 370). 
Second, the importance of the 1968 student movement was that it shook one of 
the pillars upon which the authoritarian regime was founded: political demobilisation 
and non participation. Before 1968, the ‘revolutionary’ elite had limited political 
participation, arguing that it generated instability. The student movement showed that, 
on the contrary, lack of political participation was generating instability (Loaeza 2008a). 
Third, state repression of the 1968 student movement led to the radicalisation of 
some opposition leftist groups (Middlebrook 1986). These groups believed that peaceful 
political reforms and negotiation with the PRI government were a useless recourse and 
formed rural and urban guerrillas. Lorenzo Meyer, in a series of academic essays edited 
in 1977 by the Institute for the Study of Human Issues of Philadelphia, wrote: ‘given the 
lack of substance in the electoral process, we must conclude that in Mexico today the 
majority of the population has no political representation. The alternatives are 
resignation or violence’ (Meyer 1977: 15). 
Meyer’s academic predictions proved to be right. During the 1970s, the Mexican 
government ‘was fighting off attacks from twenty nine scattered leftist groups 
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numbering about one thousand eight hundred revolutionaries’ (Aguayo 2001a: 310; 
Zarembo 2001). For these organisations ‘the main thesis of Che Guevara’s 
revolutionary theory […] indicated that when the legal channels of the bourgeoisie are 
closed, the only open road left for transformation is that of armed conflict’ (Rojas 
Delgado 1972). 
Faced with this scenario, the authoritarian regime followed a dual strategy. 
Whilst the army, paramilitary groups, and the secret police brutally repressed dissidents, 
the president promoted electoral reforms to extend political participation and thus 
channel discontent against the regime through political parties and the electoral field. 
Certainly, the authoritarian regime’s elite had little interest in political liberalisation. 
However, the PRI regime had no other alternative than to open a legal space to promote 
the political participation of dissidents (e.g. students, strikers) within the institutional 
framework. Electoral reforms were, additionally, a means to bring back into the system 
those dissatisfied groups that made use of violence, mainly guerrilla members. 
Electoral reforms 
With the first strategy – moderate modifications to electoral legislation – the PRI sought 
to maintain the regime’s political stability and thus preserve its status quo within the 
establishment (Loaeza 2000b). By channelling social discontent through electoral 
reforms, the government was trying not to repeat the disturbing events that occurred in 
Latin America in the 1970s, characterised by the coup d’etat against the socialist 
government of Salvador Allende in Chile in 1973, the defeat of Peronismo in Argentina, 
the radicalisation of leftist groups, and the rise of military dictatorships. Hence, in 1977 
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the executive power presented an initiative of reforms to diverse constitutional articles 
related to political parties (Loaeza 1999: 317; Reyes Heroles 1984).20
These modifications made it possible for political parties to be recognised as 
entities of public interest and, therefore, gave them access to mass media and granted 
them public subsidies (Loaeza 1999: 320; Ortega-Ortiz 2008: 190). In order to promote 
participation, these changes in legislation facilitated the requirement for political parties 
to keep their national registries. However, the PRI regime also imposed conditions on 
the opposition parties. It demanded that they present candidates in federal elections, as 
not doing so would result in the loss of their registry. This measure sought to maintain 
the appearance that electoral processes were genuine in Mexico – to show that several 
political parties participated in elections, just as in western democracies – and to avoid 
the PRI’s presidential candidate being the only person ‘competing’ in presidential 
elections (Eisenstadt 2004: 38).21 Even though all opposition parties benefitted from the 
1977 electoral reform, the PRI regime sought to open a space for legal representation 
and participation of anti-government leftist groups. The reform legalised leftist parties 
which had been forbidden before, like the Communist Party (Eisenstadt 2004: 39; 
Ortega-Ortiz 2008: 190). 
These electoral measures were accompanied by an amnesty law, which came 
into force in 1978, thanks to which some political dissidents left prison. The amnesty 
law aimed to benefit those people ‘against whom penal action had been initiated […] for 
the crime of sedition, or because they had invited, instigated or incited to rebellion, or 
due to conspiracy’ (Ley de Amnistía 1978). The law applied only to those who had 
                                                 
20 There was a previous electoral reform, in 1973, designed by the government as a response to the 
discontent of the 1968 young students’ movement. The reform reduced the minimum age to become a 
Congressman, from twenty five to twenty one years old, and for Senators from thirty five to thirty. It also 
reduced the threshold for small political parties to get a seat in the Lower House (Ortega Ortiz 2008: 182). 
21 In 1976 the PRI was alone in the elections. The PAN doubted whether to participate or not, ‘whether to 
participate in elections (and accept losing even rigged elections) or abstain and punish the PRI by 
unmasking the regime’s elections as uncompetitive shams’ (Eisenstadt 2004: 38). 
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‘been a part of groups’ which acted ‘on political motives’ with the aim of disputing ‘the 
country’s institutional life’ (Ley de Amnistía 1978). This legal recourse, whose 
objectives were openly political, has been largely ignored by Mexican historiographers. 
The effect of this political amnesty, as Mexico City’s Ombudsman, Luis de la Barreda 
Solórzano (2008: 134), has so openly pointed out, was to concede ‘generous impunity to 
guerrilla members’.22
The electoral reforms that began in the 1970s slowly liberalised the regime. In 
fact, the PRI remained in power for another twenty three years. This is understandable if 
we consider that these electoral reforms did not seek to democratise the country but 
rather to prolong the life of the PRI regime. The reforms aimed supposedly to 
democratise the authoritarian regime ended up benefitting it for four reasons. First, they 
made it possible to manipulate the existing opposition. By creating the rules of the 
electoral game, the regime was able to control the political activities of the opposing 
political parties that were legally established. Second, the reforms contributed to the 
creation of artificial ‘window dressing’ opposition parties, whose mere presence 
legitimised the existing political system’s democratic credentials. Third, the regime 
silenced criticism from the international public, as the reforms made the authoritarian 
regime seem a little more democratic. Fourth, in great measure they helped to 
demobilise radical groups (Eisenstadt 2004). 
It was not until 1996, in the midst of an economic crisis and a political crisis 
originated by the zapatista movement, that President Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000) 
                                                 
22 This crude comment on the amnesty law is rather unusual, especially because it comes from a human 
rights defender. De la Barreda’s declaration makes more sense when we learn that he made it in defence 
of his father – Captain Luis de la Barreda Moreno – who was investigated and persecuted by the SPO for 
perpetrating human rights abuses throughout his career in the extinct secret police. By making this 
statement, De la Barreda involuntarily evidences one of the paradoxes of transitional justice: the difficulty 
of establishing with certainty the taxonomy of ‘victims’ and ‘perpetrators’ of human rights violations. 
Some ‘victims’ of the current Mexican transitional justice process (e.g. ex guerrilla members) were 
‘perpetrators’ of abuses in the past, but their crimes were erased by a political amnesty granted by the 
authoritarian state agents that now seek to punish. I will explore this issue further in Chapter Four. 
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negotiated a new electoral reform. It made a greater democratisation of the political 
system possible. The reform was significant in that it allowed complete autonomy of 
electoral institutions, protection of the political rights of voters through an electoral 
court, the use of diverse measures to increase the credibility of electoral results, and 
more equality in elections (Eisenstadt 2004: 51). This reform would allow the PAN to 
win for the first time in history in presidential elections four years later. 
Repression and political violence 
The regime’s second strategy – sustained dissident repression – lasted at least until the 
mid 1980s. The repression of the 1970s and 1980s is understandable because not all 
leftist groups viewed positively the electoral reforms promoted by the authoritarian 
regime. Some dissidents were convinced that the elections would not achieve an 
authentic change of regime; they thought that by constituting political parties they 
would end up legitimising an electoral process void of content and characterised by 
fraud. Not all dissidents were willing to maintain the system’s democratic façade. As a 
result, some of the dissidents who were not part of the recently legalised political parties 
took up arms. 
For example, according to political prisoners at Lecumberri, ‘the electoral 
reforms do not alter the control the government has on the mechanism to appoint public 
servants’. According to them, ‘each election is still a farce’ (Declaración de Presos de 
Lecumberri 1971). A group of dissidents in the city of Juchitán, Oaxaca, warned that 
elections were simply a ‘farce’; therefore, they openly discredited the vote and the 
electoral system. From their perspective, voting meant becoming ‘accomplices to a 
grotesque clownish stunt’ (De Gyves Pineda 1976). For the guerrilla group Liga 
Comunista 23 de Septiembre (September 23rd Communist League) ‘the proletariat must 
answer with a multiplicity of political strikes, flash rallies, street combats, guerrilla fight 
Chapter One: The Background 60
actions, and spreading Socialist slogans everywhere’ (Liga Comunista 23 de Septiembre 
1977). 
Rural and urban guerrillas de-stabilised the regime through bank robberies, 
political assassinations and kidnappings. For example, on August 11th 1976, the PRI 
candidate to the Presidency’s sister, Margarita López-Portillo, was travelling in her car 
when a taxi blocked her way. Four guerrilla members – three men and a pregnant 
woman – started shooting. The car crashed into a pharmacy. The chauffeur threw 
himself over Margarita thus protecting her with his body from the shots. Margarita’s 
bodyguards – she was travelling in the backseat – opened fire against the guerrilla 
members, injuring one of them. This failed kidnapping attempt was undoubtedly 
important because it involved the future President of Mexico, José López-Portillo’s 
(1976-1982) sister. However, as Alex Zarembo (2001) points out, the political violence 
of the guerrilla members ‘was nothing new in 1970s Mexico’. Between January 1974 
and June 1976, the guerrilla group Liga Comunista 23 de Septiembre killed ninety five 
policemen and soldiers (Aguayo 2008). 
Another example of violence by dissident groups occurred on August 1977 when 
a guerrilla group kidnapped a bus with forty passengers that had left Mexico City 
travelling to Manzanillo. The guerrilla members threatened to kill the passengers if the 
government did not free two political prisoners. When the police tried to rescue the bus, 
the guerrilla members opened fire, killed the chauffeur and detonated a grenade, killing 
five passengers and injuring eight others (Aguayo 2010a: 199). 
The PRI regime’s response to the violence of dissident groups was to brutally 
repress alleged guerrilla members. Between 1977 and 1978, according to press reports, 
soldiers, policemen, and paramilitary groups killed three hundred and two peasants 
(Aguayo 1998: 87). An example that illustrates the regime’s violence against dissidents 
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is the killing of alleged guerrilla members in Acapulco, in 1974. That year, an 
indeterminate number of people allegedly connected to the guerrilla organisation Lucio 
Cabañas were detained in Acapulco following instructions of the military zone’s 
commander. Detained illegally and ‘incommunicado’, the alleged dissidents were 
interrogated and tortured by state agents. At the end of the questioning, the state agents 
forced the guerrilla members to drink gasoline, set them on fire, and discarded their 
bodies in ‘solitary places where they would turn up disfigured by the effects of the fire’ 
(Aguayo 2010b: 87). 
Another method used to disappear dissidents was that of ‘death flights’. The 
Military Field No.1, in Mexico City, served as a prison for those opposed to the regime. 
In order to eliminate them, prisoners were transferred in military convoys or helicopters 
to Air Base No. 1 (BAM) in Santa Lucía, in the State of Mexico, to then be taken in 
Mexican Air Force airplanes to Military Air Base No. 7 in Pie de la Cuesta, in the State 
of Guerrero. According to the testimony of ex-military Gustavo Tarín Chávez, a 
member of Guerrero’s Judicial Police during the 1970s, there were at least one thousand 
five hundred people illegally detained in that state, who were later transferred to the 
Military Base in Pie de la Cuesta. Once there, all dissidents were shot in the back and 
then placed in a sack with stones. In order to ‘rationalise’ this atrocity, the executors 
dehumanised victims, calling them ‘sacked’. The Military would then transport these 
‘sacked’ bodies in special planes to Oaxaca, where they were dumped into the ocean. As 
this monstrous practice was carried out overnight, executors called it ‘going partying’ 
(Cedillo 2008: Chapter Five). 
Certainly, even today, there is little information publicly available about the 
regime’s repression against dissidents and guerrilla members in the 1970s and 1980s. 
As is common to other authoritarian regimes, in Mexico the state documented in minute 
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detail the activities of anti-government groups. However, foreseeing that they could 
eventually be responsible for their acts, state security agents were very careful to 
classify and guard any evidence that could incriminate them in human rights 
violations.23
Only when Vicente Fox came to power did the secret files start to be made 
public and evidence confirming the atrocities committed during the PRI regime began 
to emerge. Rather than being exposed by historians, sociologists, and political scientists, 
the information about the human rights violations committed during the previous regime 
has been primarily exposed by human rights NGOs. Even though these investigations 
frequently concentrated only on the most dramatic episodes of violence, for the first 
time they offered a more or less precise description of the multiple strategies deployed 
by the PRI to neutralise and annihilate dissidents. Human Rights Watch (2003: 4), for 
example, after studying the documentation of old secret files, claims that the Mexican 
government carried out: 
Repeated and systematic human rights abuses against political opponents and dissidents 
in what came to be known as the country’s dirty war. Its targets included armed groups 
and their sympathizers, real or alleged, as well as student activists and other people who 
participated in protests, but never armed activity. Its methods included torture, 
extrajudicial execution, and forced disappearance, and often entailed an extreme degree 
of brutality and wanton disregard for human life. 
 
Similarly, Kate Doyle (2003a; 2003b; 2003c; 2003d), who has carried out the 
most exhaustive research on the ex-secret police archives, illustrates how at least three 
Mexican Presidents – Gustavo Díaz Ordaz (1964-1970), Luis Echeverría (1970-1974) 
                                                 
23 The absence of analysis on this issue is understandable if we consider that, regardless of the gradual 
process of political transition, the authoritarian regime persisted until 2000. Hence, the PRI governments 
guaranteed relative freedom of expression, but it is also true that they intimidated and harassed journalists 
and critical intellectuals when they considered it necessary. Additionally, the little information on these 
issues is related to the type of violations and the type of perpetrators who committed them. Torture and 
forced disappearance – widely used by the regime – are practices that tend to leave no trace. For example, 
the armed forces detained dissidents, without a trial, in military detention centres, of whose existence 
there are few records, where prisoners were tortured and eventually disappeared. Furthermore, agents 
who perpetrated atrocities did not always form a part of the formal structure of the state apparatus, but 
were rather members of irregular organisations like paramilitary groups or informal groups, which acted 
informally alongside the judicial police. 
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and José López Portillo (1974-1982) – maintained repressive policies for almost two 
decades. ‘In those years’, Doyle demonstrated, ‘hundreds of Mexican citizens – 
uncounted innocent civilians as well as armed militants – were murdered or 
“disappeared” by Military and security forces. Thousands more were tortured, illegally 
detained, and subjected to government harassment and surveillance’ (Doyle 2006a). 
‘The use of kidnappings, torture, and assassinations to attack the regime’s opposition’ 
concludes Doyle (2006b), ‘was not attributable to military units or renegade officers in 
an isolated fashion. It was an official practice.’ 
But Mexico’s history of abuses and political violence does not end here. 
Dissident groups were repressed by the PRI regime even in the 1990s. President Carlos 
Salinas (1988-1994) arbitrarily removed seventeen state governors, and was responsible 
for the death of more than four hundred PRD members during his administration (Del 
Villar 2005: 71; Hernández 2005: 104). 
President Salinas was also responsible, notably, for the repression of the 
zapatista movement in 1994. Tim Padgett, Newsweek and Time correspondent in 
Mexico, describes the event as follows: ‘the streets were strewn with the bodies of 
indigenous peasant guerrillas lying in blackberry pools of blood […]. Inside the market 
stalls, we found guerrilla sympathisers executed by army troops – who, for some 
perverse reason, weren’t allowing the Red Cross into the town. So if there’s one thing 
worse than seeing the dead, it’s having to watch them die’ (Padgett 1996). Padgett said 
that ‘after a week of walking over the corpses of desperate campesinos in Chiapas’ his 
worst fears about Mexico’s regime were confirmed: ‘while communist and fascist 
regimes fall all around us, much of Mexico’s one-party totalitarianism still survives, and 
does so because of its genius for making us think we’re watching a democracy’ (Padgett 
1996). 
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Presidential elections in 2000: the change of regime  
Vicente Fox’s electoral triumph 
The electoral reforms that gradually liberalised the authoritarian regime sought to 
satisfy leftist political demands. However, it was not the left but the right-wing party – 
PAN – which capitalised on the benefits that the electoral reforms had brought. 
Although Fox was the candidate of the conservative party, his victory was 
possible because it received the support of NGOs and leftist political groups that saw in 
him a powerful candidate who might oust the PRI. Without resigning from his political 
party, during his electoral campaign, Fox sought to create a widely based and 
heterogeneous non-political affiliation coalition, whose object would be to unify all the 
PRI’s opponents behind him (Loaeza 2006). Fox’s followers – Foxists – made the 
presidential election an ‘anti-PRI plebiscite’. Soledad Loaeza suggests they ‘aspired to 
put Vicente Fox at the head of an opposition front similar to those that precipitated the 
collapse of authoritarian regimes in South America and Eastern Europe’ (2006: 4). 
Fox was able to transcend ideological positions because during the electoral 
campaign he promised to transform the way in which the country had been ruled: from 
authoritarian rule to democratic government (Bruhn 2004; Klesner 2004; Rottinghaus 
and Alberro 2005). In the past, the Mexican electorate division was marked by left and 
right ideologies. In contrast, during the 2000 elections, Klesner (2004: 110) shows that 
there had been a clear division between those among the electorate who supported the 
regime’s continuity and those who were against the PRI regime. In this context, Bruhn 
(2004: 142) demonstrates that Fox opted to dilute his own ideological profile and 
instead promoted himself as an agent of change. So, in the end, the main element of 
Fox’s campaign was the idea of change. And the idea of change became identified with 
the idea of change in the regime (from authoritarian to democratic) and the idea of 
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eliminating the PRI and the political, social, and cultural practices associated with that 
party. 
Certainly Fox’s triumph represented a decisive step in the protracted 
democratisation process, given that the 2000 presidential election was the result of the 
electoral reforms that preceded it. However, for many observers, Fox’s ascendance to 
power was not the end of transition, but rather a point from which a series of political 
and social reforms could be carried out to consolidate a democratic regime in Mexico. 
As Middlebrook points out, ‘Fox’s victory brought the country into the mainstream of 
Latin American democratization processes’ […] ‘the reform agenda in Mexico parallels 
that in many other post-transition countries, where the fundamental goal is to make real 
the formal conditions of political democracy’ (2004: 2). This is how Fox understood it. 
In his first message to the nation as President of Mexico, Fox ‘welcomed democracy’, 
but warned that ‘July 2nd is not the destination. The challenge in fact is just beginning’ 
(Presidencia de la República 2000a). 
However, as already indicated in my introduction to this thesis, Vicente Fox did 
not have an easy task. The PRI was still powerful enough to challenge him in many 
areas (e.g., tax reform, electric reform, or ‘transitional justice’) and undermine his 
chances of success. At the state level, the PRI was still in control of eighteen out of 
thirty-two states. The former official-party also ruled over almost seventy percent of the 
municipalities of the country (Merino 2010). Finally, and crucially, PRI dominance in 
both houses of the Mexican Congress made it clear that Fox would have to find 
fundamental accommodation with the PRI for his reforms to succeed in the legislature 
(Hernández 2010: 452). 
Immediately after the July 2000 election, in the midst of celebrations over a 
historic PRI defeat, the team of recently elected President Fox designed and publicised a 
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series of government programmes oriented towards democratising social justice and 
human development, economy and public finances, and public security and corruption 
(Poder Ejecutivo Federal 2001b: 9). The ‘essence’ of Fox’s strategy was to make 
‘Mexico respond […] to the challenges that different transitions in the political, 
demographic, economic and social arena pose’ (Poder Ejecutivo Federal 2001b: 9). 
According to Fox, the new political and institutional reforms sought to ‘build a new 
Mexico’. But, ‘in order to build this new Mexico’, Fox warned, it was necessary to 
‘update the country’ in different spheres, amongst which human rights were included. It 
was necessary for Mexicans to ‘adjust their watches to new times’ (Poder Ejecutivo 
Federal 2001b: 10). Six months later, on December 1st 2000, Fox took over office and 
began what he and his strategists called the ‘government of change’. 
‘Transitional justice’ in the new regime’s agenda 
Fox and his team took on the task of establishing ‘transitional justice’ with urgency. 
During his inaugural speech to the nation in Congress, on December 1st 2000, Fox 
stated that in Mexico ‘the political discrepancy with those who hold the power has been 
a frequent cause for the common citizen to be the victim of the state’s force’ 
(Presidencia de la República 2000b). Fox asserted that during his administration Mexico 
would no longer be a ‘reference of discredit in human rights matters’. He promised that 
his government would protect human rights ‘like never before’, respect them ‘like never 
before’, in order to consolidate ‘a culture that repudiates any violation and sanctions 
those guilty’ (Presidencia de la República 2000b). 
Fox then insisted on the importance of avoiding the recurrence of state crimes in 
the future. Fox assured people that it would no longer be ‘valid to use espionage, 
surveillance and intimidation equipment against other parties, unions, social 
organizations, political characters or opinion leaders’. For Fox’s government, 
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‘repression never again would be a means to solve political differences’. ‘My 
government’, he concluded, ‘will not distract the security organs to dissuade its critics 
or neutralize its opponents’ (Presidencia de la República 2000b). These statements were 
significant because it was the first time there was official acknowledgement that the 
state had repressed dissidents in Mexico. 
However, this was no regular speech. It was Fox’s inaugural speech in power, in 
which he informed his listeners about his intentions as a leader of a new democracy. 
Within the list of urgent institutional changes the new administration sought to 
implement – important reforms in public education, the health system, national security, 
and the fiscal system – Fox and his strategists had included the issue of ‘transitional 
justice’ as a priority. So, in that sense, the ‘transitional justice’ promise was one of the 
first and foundational acts of the new regime, which would serve to underscore its 
authority and moral right to rule. 
‘Transitional justice’ was thus given priority within Fox’s administration’s 
agenda over other government issues. It seemed to be part of the foundations of a 
democratic regime. For the perpetrators of abuses of the past there would be no ‘clean 
slate’, ‘no pious oblivion for those who committed crimes’ (Presidencia de la República 
2000b). Before the Congress and conspicuous political actors of the country and the 
international community, Fox had made it clear that there would be no policy of 
forgetting, or amnesties for perpetrators of state crimes, but mechanisms whose end 
would be to ‘know the truth’ and ‘do justice’. 
The ‘Mexican solution’  
The apparent urgency of addressing human rights violations did not extend beyond 
Fox’s inaugural speech. As the months went by, ‘transitional justice’ gradually became 
less of a priority for the new administration and was no longer highlighted by the press. 
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The issue was kept alive through the insistence of human rights NGOs, victims’ 
families, scholars, and members of Fox’s cabinet. Even so, a year passed before Fox put 
into practice his promise to reveal the truth and bring about justice. 
As we will see in Chapter Three, a significant debate arose around the dilemma 
of whether or not to face the past in the first place. The PRI members had no interest in 
taking out of the closet the skeletons they had so carefully guarded for seventy years. As 
the PAN did not suffer the brutal and sustained repression of the authoritarian regime – 
as the leftist political parties and their followers did – its members were indifferent to 
this issue. Furthermore, some of the new administration cabinet’s members were openly 
against any attempt to face the past, fearing that ‘transitional justice’ could destabilise 
the yet incipient Mexican democracy. They believed that the Fox government could not 
aspire to investigate or punish the members of a political party – the PRI – with which 
they sought to negotiate political reforms to strengthen democracy. Another, no less 
important, debate centred on the evaluation of the usefulness, efficacy, moral risks, and 
political benefits of following a restorative or retributive justice model to deal with 
events of the past. 
Hence, as I have argued in the introduction to this thesis, Fox faced a series of 
transition dilemmas. To test the new regime’s democratic viability called for ending an 
era of impunity, but by punishing the perpetrators of past state crimes, Fox placed at 
risk the fragile democracy’s political stability. In order to bring about the necessary 
reforms to consolidate democracy, Fox had to negotiate with the old ‘official party’, 
which was now in the opposition. And to negotiate with the PRI elite certain reforms in 
order democratise the political system involved preserving the old regime’s impunity. 
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The controversy lasted until November 2001, when Fox’s government decided 
to prosecute the perpetrators of human rights violations through a Special Prosecutor’s 
Office for Past Crimes (SPO), which would depend on the Attorney General’s Office. 
The SPO’s main task was to investigate and prosecute ‘alleged abuses’ 
perpetrated by federal state agents against individuals related to social and political 
movements. Yet, mimicking the work of other, previously existing and paradigmatic 
truth commissions such as those in Chile and South Africa, it would contribute to 
reconciliation. In order to carry out such a complex mission, the SPO put in place three 
programmes (SPO 2002). The first was the Programme of Cooperation, Citizens’ 
Participation and Institutional Relations, whose objective was to regulate the way in 
which human rights NGOs and relatives of the victims could participate in the process. 
The Programme of Analysis and Information would coordinate the documentary 
investigation to establish the historic truth. The third and most important programme 
was the Programme on Prosecutions, which would be in charge of the investigation and 
prosecution of human rights violations. 
Some observers foresaw that the SPO attempted to carry out a very ambitious 
task and questioned whether it sought truth and justice at the same time. In response, the 
Special Prosecutor, Ignacio Carrillo-Prieto, argued that this was the ‘Mexican solution’: 
‘truth, justice and reparations all go together; we cannot trade truth for justice […] The 
Mexican solution is a very appropriate response to impunity, a new model’ (Doyle 
2003c: 69). 
However, the ‘Mexican solution’ ceased to exist when Fox ended his term on 
November 30, 2006 (PGR 2007). For Felipe Calderón (2006-2012), the second 
president in the democratic era, ‘transitional justice’ has been a practically irrelevant 
matter. I return to this latter point in my concluding chapter. 
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The Mexican model of facing the past obtained no results (i.e., truth or justice). 
No perpetrator of human rights violence ended up in jail. The documents of the old 
secret archives used by the SPO during five years of judicial investigations are missing. 
As there are no guilty parties, officially there are no victims of past atrocities either. No 
victims, no one to grant reparations to, no truth, no justice, no compensation. Even 
when Mexico’s ‘transitional justice’ process worked according to the law and was 
framed by the language of human rights (e.g. the right to truth), it did not put an end to 
impunity, but rather perpetuated it. 
Conclusions 
This chapter on the background of the Mexican ‘transitional justice’ process has 
sketched an outline of the essential characteristics that made the PRI regime an 
authoritarian one that lasted almost seventy years, outliving the democratising waves 
that took place in Latin America and Western Europe. It showed that, in spite of 
maintaining a democratic facade before the international community’s eyes, this ‘one-
party regime’ was characterised by its limited political pluralism, and by the state’s 
active intervention to limit social demands and neutralise political mobilisations. 
Additionally, it showed how the significant centralisation of power in the executive 
power allowed the presidents to manipulate mass media, censor critical intellectuals, co-
op dissidents, and embezzle public funds with relative impunity, given their lack of 
accountability to any other institution. 
The chapter also demonstrated that the PRI regime was not free from social and 
political conflict. In contrast with most studies on Mexican authoritarianism, it offered 
an explanation for the sophisticated ‘repressive mechanisms’ deployed by the 
authoritarian regime in order to neutralise dissidents. Moreover, the chapter 
demonstrated that during the protracted transition towards democracy, the PRI regime 
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implemented electoral reforms that made more political pluralism gradually possible, 
but simultaneously intensified the repression of dissidents, at least until the mid-1980s. 
Political violence played an important role in the authoritarian regime and the 
transition to democracy’s survival. Torture, kidnapping, forced exile, illegal 
incarceration, forced disappearance, and murder of dissidents were not isolated practices 
committed by ‘rotten apples’ in the army or the police. These abuses were part of an 
official policy, maintained for decades, which sought to end threats to the regime. If we 
disregard these events we cannot understand why ‘transitional justice’ came to be such a 
relevant issue in Fox’s presidential campaign, and to the government of change’s 
official discourse. If we ignore this context we cannot understand why ‘transitional 
justice’ was a relevant element in the formation of a new democratic regime. Nor can 
we understand why, even today, different actors – victims, human rights NGOs, 
journalists, academics – continue to promote the deployment of strategies designed to 
deliver the truth about the past or carry out justice for the victims. 
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Chapter Two – 
Transitional Justice: 
A Field of Practice and of Knowledge 
 
The previous chapter presented the historical background necessary for understanding 
why coming to terms with the past was so important in Mexico’s new democracy. It 
described the emergence and characteristics of Mexico’s authoritarian regime and then 
analysed the country’s protracted transition towards democracy. In doing so, it showed 
that human rights violations took place during the PRI era (1929-2000) and briefly 
sketched how the new democratic regime proposed to deal with them via ‘The Mexican 
Solution’ established in 2001 through strategies that sought to establish the truth about 
past violence and to dispense justice accordingly. 
In this chapter, the discussion turns to what might be termed ‘transitional justice 
literature’: the field of enquiry that specifically studies ideas and practices related to the 
way in which societies face past abuses. If the previous chapter showed why dealing 
with the past was one of the most significant problems that emerged with the arrival of 
democracy in Mexico, this chapter seeks to suggest an insightful analytical perspective 
from which this thesis explores ‘The Mexican Solution’ to past abuses. To do so, my 
main purpose in this chapter is to evaluate the relevant literature on transitional justice 
and then to present my own approach in relation to the existing literature in terms of 
concepts, analytical tools, and research methods. 
It would be too ambitious, however, to attempt to analyse in detail a now large 
field of enquiry that has engaged both empirical research and normative arguments, and 
to which scholars from a number of different disciplines such as law, political science, 
sociology and anthropology, gender studies, and criminology have contributed. This is 
because, as Paige Arthur (2009: 359) states, ‘so far, there is no single theory of 
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transitional justice’. Thus, the chapter charts the three main strands followed by scholars 
and practitioners within this field over the last two decades – when transitional justice 
emerged as a field of practice, and then of enquiry from the mid 1990s onwards – in 
order to distinguish the main arguments and questions. By critically analysing these 
three lines of arguments – what I call: (a) ‘restorativist and retributivist approaches’ to 
past atrocity, (b) ‘broadened approaches’ to transitional justice, and (c) ‘social 
constructivist’ approaches – this chapter’s second purpose is to situate my thesis (and 
concerns) within the existing transitional justice debates. 
The chapter concludes that any account of the Mexican case must be grounded 
in an understanding of transitional justice as a site for political deliberations, in which 
state and non-state actors intervene – deliberations that depend on power relations, 
historical and social determinants in a given context for its materialisation, and that 
consequently alter the exercise and distribution of power. 
Before I proceed with my analysis, it is worth noting that this is a succinct 
survey of the literature, and it is neither chronological, nor exact. Yet it serves the 
purposes of this chapter as follows: to examine the relevant literature on transitional 
justice and locate my research within this field; to offer an analytical standpoint from 
which this thesis approaches the Mexican case; and to justify how this theoretical 
approach helps to both elucidate and respond to the research questions that guide this 
thesis. 
Conventional approaches to transitional justice 
Transitional justice as a concept appeared during the mid-1990s, reflecting the diverse 
ways in which at that time specific transitional societies attempted to deal with past 
abuses (Bell 2009: 7). It emerged with reference to three moments of political 
transformation: first, transitions toward democracy in a number of post-authoritarian 
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states in Latin America during the 1980s and early 1990s (e.g. Chile and Argentina); 
second, the political liberalisation of former communist states in Eastern Europe during 
the late 1980s (Cohen 1995: 8). Then, in the mid-1990s, the practice reached its 
apotheosis with the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) 
in South Africa, which ‘promoted a renewed fascination with previously existing truth 
commissions’, and inspired ‘new research agendas located within the broader concerns 
surrounding conflict resolution and democratization processes’ (Moon 2008: 2). At the 
same time, in 1995, the concept was established and popularised by Neil Kritz in his 
four volumes on ‘How emerging democracies reckon with former regimes’ (Garton Ash 
1998; Kritz 1995). 
The term transitional justice originally served to describe the ‘legal, moral and 
political dilemmas that arise in holding human rights abusers accountable’ for their 
deeds in societies facing political transitions – from a non-democratic system to a less 
undemocratic rule; and from political violence, war or civil conflict to peace (Bell, et al. 
2004: 305). However, the concept has not achieved a ‘fixed meaning’ (Arthur 2009). 
During the last decade, it has gradually evolved to encompass not only human rights 
accountability in democratic transitions, but a wider set of goals beyond accountability 
and beyond processes of democratisation (Bell 2009: 9). Scholars such as Ruti G. Teitel 
(2003) or Jon Elster (2004) have used the term to define all kind of efforts (e.g. purges, 
amnesty, lustration, reparations) to confront the past in any historical period, from the 
antiquity to our days. Elster (2004), for instance, has explored what he terms transitional 
justice in ancient Athens and has reinterpreted trials that occurred 2000 years ago 
through the lens of the contemporary rubric.24
                                                 
24 Ruti G. Teitel (2003) does something similar when she mistakenly uses the term a ‘genealogy’ of 
transitional justice. She locates the inception of transitional justice to the Nuremberg Trials.  
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Certainly, this evolving concept can create considerable confusion because 
scholars, experts, and activists use it to describe different efforts in diverse contexts. An 
ancient Greek tribunal bears little relation to the Canadian Commission that sought to 
improve policies towards indigenous communities in 1996. Nor is the South African 
Truth Commission, which sought to investigate the crimes of the apartheid regime 
similar to a so-called ‘truth commission’ that Mexico seeks to establish in 2012 in order 
to establish what happened to the twenty thousand ‘disappeared’ and nearly sixty 
thousand dead during the ‘war on drugs’ initiated by President Felipe Calderón in 2006. 
Although the concept has gradually evolved, it usually refers specifically to 
actions (efforts, practices) taken by societies in order to treat past injustices (e.g. ad hoc 
amnesty laws, special tribunals, historical truth commissions, specific judicial reforms, 
investigatory bodies, reparations programmes). But transitional justice is not only a set 
of efforts, but a field of enquiry about such efforts. It is, as Christine Bell (2009: 6) 
suggests, a ‘burgeoning interdisciplinary scholarship constituting unproblematically a 
distinct field’. It has become an important domain of enquiry that has justified the 
establishment of research centres, university courses, or institutes, such as the Project in 
Times of Transition at Harvard University, the Transitional Justice Project at the Notre 
Dame School of Law, the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation in Cape Town, or the 
Rabat Transitional Justice Fellowship Programme in Morocco. It also justified the 
creation of the International Journal of Transitional Justice in 2007 (IJTJ 2009). In fact, 
the Journal claims, transitional justice ‘is considered to be an academic discipline in its 
own right’ (IJTJ 2009, emphasis added). 
Moreover, transitional justice came to be a site in which activists work and 
debate these ideas. So it is not only a so-called ‘discipline’ but a profession. It ‘has fast 
emerged as a recognised field of policy expertise’ (IJTJ 2009). In this sense, the most 
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influential NGO within this field is the International Centre of Transitional Justice 
(ICTJ) instituted in 2001. It works in more than twenty societies ‘emerging from 
repressive rule or armed conflict’, as well in other societies ‘where legacies of abuses’ – 
according to such activists and experts – ‘remain unresolved’ (ICTJ 2010b). 
Therefore, it is important to underline that this thesis considers that transitional 
justice comprises both ‘a sphere of practice or activity and a sphere of academic 
knowledge, with a praxis relationship between the two’ (Bell 2009: 7). It is understood 
as a set of ideas, a cognitive frame (knowledge), and as actions, an object of policy, 
control, intervention (power), oriented to ‘face the past’, ‘work through the past’, 
‘confront the past’, ‘cope or deal with the past’, or ‘come to terms with it’. So, 
transitional justice is the field of enquiry that specifically addresses the general topic of 
study of thesis: Mexico’s process of dealing with past state crimes. But it is also a 
domain of knowledge that, as I will show later in this thesis, had material effects on 
Mexico’s transition. 
The first cluster of research on transitional justice: retributive and restorative 
approaches 
A first generation of studies on transitional justice classified moral and political 
dilemmas states faced at transitional moments, namely, from conflict to peace, or from 
authoritarian to more democratic regimes. This literature reflected, at least originally, 
the two legal narratives informing transitional justice debates and practices: the 
retributive and the restorative conceptions of justice (Moon 2008). These approaches – 
the retributive and the restorative – address the question of how to deal with past human 
rights violations in different ways. In a retributive approach to justice wrongdoers are 
punished according to the rule of law (Orentlicher 1991). In a reconciliatory or 
restorative approach to justice a victim’s dignity is restored when they are compensated 
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for the misdeeds they suffered without the need to identify or punish individual 
offenders. The restorative model of justice also aims to rehabilitate perpetrators, and to 
help victims and societies to heal their wounds via truth-telling strategies (Braithwaite 
1989; Braithwaite and Mugford 1994; Johnstone 2002; Minow 2000). Both approaches 
– retributive and restorative – imply the establishment of specific mechanisms or 
institutional reforms. The former justified the implementation of ad hoc tribunals; the 
latter contributed to the proliferation of truth commissions. 
Yet, these legal narratives were often deemed to be incompatible by those 
scholars and activists who advanced them (e.g. Méndez 1997a: 267; Minow 2000: 236). 
Framed by this typology, theorists with these views promoted the moral values or legal 
benefits of deploying one approach over the other in transitional situations. 
A. Retributive approaches 
The retributive type of justice in political transitions is rooted in the criminal law model 
(Aukerman 2002). Its goal is to make perpetrators of past abuses accountable for their 
deeds whether according to standard (domestic trials) or exceptional (ad hoc tribunals) 
legal procedures. The basic assumption framing this approach is that past atrocity, 
political crimes or crimes of the state constitute human rights violations and therefore 
crimes according to international law. Thus, as crimes are prohibited by domestic 
criminal systems and human rights are proscribed by international human rights laws, 
emerging democracies have the ‘obligation’ to punish those individuals responsible. In 
this sense, the retributive justice approach to transitional justice follows the same line of 
reasoning that frames the prosecution of ordinary crimes in domestic criminal justice 
systems: punishment is necessary when a person has broken the law. From this 
perspective the determination of culpability through prosecution is ‘necessary’ to 
redress criminal actions (Aukerman 2002: 43). 
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Scholars promoting the value of this vision of justice consider that the 
prosecution and punishment of perpetrators is the most appropriate method for dealing 
with past human rights abuses (e.g. Cassel 1996; Méndez 1997a; Orentlicher 1991; 
Roht-Arriaza 1990; Zalaquett 1989). They see alternative ideas and mechanisms such as 
truth commissions as an inferior way of doing this. Retribution is preferable to any other 
way of dealing with past crimes, they argue, because it allows the ‘identification, 
exposure, condemnation, and proportionate punishment of individuals who violated 
fundamental norms recognized internationally as crimes, and […] reparations to their 
victims, by means of fair investigations and fair trials by an authorized judicial body’ 
(Aukerman 2002: 41). So, unlike other alternatives to address past atrocity, trials in 
political transitions are advisable because they serve a dual purpose: by bringing human 
rights violators to justice, they restore the rule of law and they restore victims’ dignity 
(Orentlicher 1991: 2543; Zalaquett 1989: 29). 
A second justification for retribution in transitional moments is related to the 
allocation of responsibility for past abuses. Retributivists claim that since human rights 
violations are perpetrated by identifiable persons, responsibility and culpability must be 
allocated to those particular individuals found guilty of committing such violations. For 
José Zalaquett (1989: 35), ‘criminal responsibility is individual and it does not derive 
solely from the fact of being a member of an institution or group’. In this regard, Juan 
E. Méndez (1997a: 277) claims that ‘prosecutions are the most effective means of 
separating collective guilt from individual guilt’. Thus, trials and prosecutions are 
preferable to other alternatives of facing the past (e.g. truth commissions) because they 
allow individual wrongdoers to be identified and make them accountable for their 
actions. This is significant during transitions to democracy, according to these authors, 
because the identification of individual offenders ‘remove[s] the stigma of historic 
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misdeeds from the innocent members of communities that are collectively blamed for 
the atrocities committed on other communities’ (Méndez 1997a: 277). 
Of course, retribution requires the use of coercive measures because punishment 
is not voluntary (Cohen 1994: 67). Yet trials and prosecutions of past state crimes 
during transitions to democracy, retributivists argue, are undertaken according to 
accepted standards of due process. Thus, a third reason given for retributive 
mechanisms being preferable to alternative methods of bringing about transitional 
justice is that they follow internationally established procedural requisites according to 
the rule of law. Retributivists (e.g. Méndez 1997, Zalaquett 1989, Orentlicher 1991) 
argue that human rights abusers should appear before a public court, which follows 
established procedures, so they will have, for instance, the right to counsel and the right 
to appeal. The use of other ways of bringing about transitional justice – for example 
through a truth commission – is unlawful and would violate one of the basic principles 
of human rights: the right to due process (Méndez 1997a: 267-269; Zalaquett 1989: 35). 
It is worth noting that the application of the rule of law (and human rights principles) is 
independent of its results. As Méndez (1997a: 264) put it: ‘a state fully complies with 
its duty to punish even if the trial results in acquittal, as long as the prosecution has been 
conducted in good faith’. 
Another reason invoked to justify a retributive style of transitional justice is that 
it is based on human rights principles. For instance, the International Tribunals for 
Yugoslavia in 1993 and for Rwanda in 1994 were informed by international human 
rights laws (see Akhavan 1996 and 2001; Cassel 1996; Meron 1995; Rodley 1999; 
Wilson 1999). Two particular rights have served to justify transitional justice practices: 
the ‘right of the victim to see justice done’ and the ‘right to know the truth’ (Méndez 
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1997a: 261).25 Yet these are not ‘rights’ that pre-exist transitional justice, but have been 
the offshoot of it.26
The origin of these rights aside, the ‘right to justice’ has implied the state’s ‘duty 
to prosecute and punish’ past grave violations of human rights during transitional 
moments – genocide, torture, extra-legal executions, disappearances – as they are 
codified in international law, human rights law, criminal law treaties, human rights 
treaties, UN resolutions, UN covenants, and so on (Mallinder 2007: 212; Méndez 
1997a: 261; Orentlicher 1991: 2562; Roht-Arriaza 1990: 462). 
A final justification is that retributive justice mechanisms are a superior solution 
to past injustice because of their, arguably, non-political nature. Promoters of this 
approach recognise that emerging democracies may not be able to endure the 
‘destabilizing effects’ of ‘politically charged trials’ or any other transitional justice 
device that can be seen as a strategy for political revanchism (Orentlicher 1991: 2544). 
In contrast, by being legitimised by human rights norms, trials and prosecutions are less 
likely to be mistaken with acts of political vengeance – human rights, retributivists 
claim, help to depoliticise trials of human rights violators (Orentlicher 1991: 2549). 
Moreover, international law is ‘commonly thought to incorporate the impartiality 
associated with the rule of law’ (Teitel 2003: 73). Thus, echoing the enthusiasm of 
human rights activists, retributivists such as Orentlicher (1991) or Roht-Arriaza (1990) 
assume that their strategies are likely to prosper because they take place in the name of 
                                                 
25 In some cases, a third principle has been invoked by participants in this debate: ‘the right to 
compensations’. The underlying idea of this principle is that states have the duty to ‘redress the damage’ 
suffered by victims of abuses. Compensations can be monetary or non-monetary (See Moon 2012). 
26 According to retributivists, the most explicit obligations to punish past human rights crimes were 
established in the Velásquez Rodríguez Case brought by the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights against the government of Honduras for the unresolved disappearance of Manfredo Velásquez in 
September 1981. The Court established that ‘the States must prevent, investigate and punish any violation 
of the rights recognized by the Convention and, moreover, if possible attempt to restore the right violated 
and provide compensation as warranted for damages resulting from the violation’. Moreover, and 
crucially, the Court found that Honduras' duties under the Convention persisted even though the 
government in power at the time of its decision was not the same one that had presided over the practice 
of disappearances whose victims included Manfredo Velásquez. 
Chapter Two: Transitional Justice 81
universal principles accepted by the ‘international community’ – far away from material 
or political interests. Therefore, this literature suggests, retributive mechanisms’ 
‘depoliticised’ nature allows them to transcend normal political divisions in transitional 
moments, and overcome opponents of strategies requiring prosecutions. 
But the list of accounts offered by this literature to justify retributive justice does 
not end here. Beyond retribution per se, advocates of this type of justice have presented 
other moral arguments favouring prosecutions. This set of justifications follows a purely 
utilitarian way of thinking that sees retribution in terms of its moral ‘benefits’ or 
‘functions’ in transitional moments. 
A first justification of retributive justice is that trials have a deterrent effect 
because they prevent the recurrence of those abuses exposed and punished. Prosecutions 
and trials serve an educative purpose on perpetrators and society. They ensure that 
crimes are not forgotten. Prosecutions preserve, Zalaquett (1992: 1428) claims, ‘the 
collective memory and build up an effective deterrent’. Moreover, by stigmatising 
‘criminal conduct’, trials deter potential wrongdoers of committing future abuses 
(Akhavan 2001: 7). In contrast, a policy of impunity (e.g. amnesty laws) results in more 
human rights violations in the future (Méndez 1997b: 3). 
Second, these authors claim that prosecutions can strengthen a new democratic 
regime (Borneman 1997). Retributive justice mechanisms undermine the influence of 
‘delinquent leaders’ from the previous system who still retain some power, allowing the 
consolidation of the new democratic elite (Akhavan 2001: 7). Moreover, trials have a 
symbolic effect over transitions because they serve to draw a ‘thick line’ between the 
current and the previous regime. As Malamud-Goti (1989: 81) suggests, the official 
condemnation and punishment of human rights violations committed in the past 
underlines the discontinuity between the previous system and the transitional 
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government. This is why, according to these authors, ‘retrospective justice is an urgent 
task of democratisation, as it highlights the fundamental character of the new order to be 
established, an order based on the rule of law and on respect for the dignity and worth 
of each human person’ (Méndez 1997b: 1). 
A third assumption shared by these authors is that retributive justice mechanisms 
foster respect for democratic institutions and the rule of law in the new regime. For 
instance, in his study of accountability in the former East Germany, John Borneman 
argues that punishment strengthens legal institutions, faith in them, and is thus crucial to 
underscoring the authority and legitimacy of new democratic orders. Thus, Borneman 
concludes, settling accounts via retributive justice is absolutely necessary both to re-
establish the dignity of victims and as a ‘key index’ of state legitimacy (Borneman 
1997). In addition, by establishing trials and prosecutions of past state crimes, emerging 
democracies show that nobody is above the law. As prosecutions and trials follow 
standard – ‘depoliticised’ – legal procedures, they promote the idea that the rule of law 
is an integral part of the new democratic regime (Malamud-Goti 1989: 79). 
A final claim invoked by this cluster of scholars is related to the search for 
knowledge about what exactly happened in the past. These authors consider that 
transitional justice mechanisms, beyond merely uncovering factual evidence, should 
serve to confront the knowledge of what took place in the past, to face the facts, to come 
to terms with them. And this happens when this knowledge, the truth of what happened, 
enters the public sphere and is officially acknowledged. In this sense, trials are indeed 
preferable to truth commissions in promoting the truth. Trials follow an ‘adversarial 
format, with the ability to compete with equal arms in the establishment of the truth and 
to confront and cross-examine the opponent’s evidence’, which ‘results in a verdict that 
is harder to contest’. (Méndez 1997a: 278). Unlike a truth commission, Méndez (1997a: 
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279) claims, a court ‘strictly observes due process guarantees and restrict[s] its analysis 
to the principles of criminal law’. Therefore, what retributive mechanisms do – ‘the 
most to which the human rights movement can aspire’ – ‘is to get the facts right, so that 
arguments can go on about their meaning for as long as necessary’ (Méndez 1997a: 
279). 
B. Restorative approaches 
Restorative justice emerged in domestic criminal contexts in Australia, Canada, the 
United States, and the United Kingdom during the 1970s as an alternative, or at least 
supplementary to, the criminal justice system – as the ‘spectre of failure haunts modern 
criminology and penology’ (Braithwaite and Mugford 1994: 139; Dignan 1999; 
Marshall 1996). To rectify the ‘shortcomings’ of the penal model, which does ‘not 
always work’, restorative justice has advanced two radical changes. The first is related 
to the way societies deal with offenders: a change from retribution – often seen as 
‘revenge’ – to reintegration. The second is a shift of focus: from perpetrators to victims 
of abuses (Cohen 1985: 77). 
From this perspective, restorative justice ‘is about healing (restoration) rather 
than hurting. Responding to the hurt of crime with the hurt of punishment is rejected, 
along with its corresponding value of proportionality – punishment that is proportionate 
to the wrong that has been done’ (Strang and Braithwaite 2001: 1). Moreover, rather 
than seeing crime simply as the violation of legal rules, it is considered a harm produced 
over individuals by another person or group. Thus the damage caused to victims is not 
only about ‘abstract rights’ that victims possess, but about their suffering. Advocates of 
restorative justice claim that victims experience emotional damages (traumas) that need 
to be restored (Johnstone 2002: 65). 
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In the context of political transitions, to address present suffering that follows 
past human rights abuses, restorative justice has emerged as an alternative way of 
rectifying what trials and prosecutions have failed to achieve. As its retributive 
counterpart, restorative justice is a cognitive grid used to talk about, and to act upon, 
past atrocity in transitions. In various permutations, the model has entailed the 
implementation of truth-telling and truth-seeking strategies in which both victims and 
perpetrators can participate and narrate their experiences. Such efforts have found 
institutional expression in truth commissions, which are official bodies that investigate 
and report on past atrocity in a specific country over a delimited period of time (Hayner 
2002: 14; Teitel 2003: 78). These institutions’ main objective has been to reveal ‘the 
truth’ about what happened in the past. 
Scholars exploring the restorative dimensions of transitional justice have 
suggested that the implementation of a truth commission is in the hands of the state. 
Some truth commissions have been instituted by non-state actors such as in Brazil or 
Uruguay (Weschler 1998). However, according to Minow (2008: 50), these 
investigatory bodies cannot be considered truth commissions. She argues that the 
institution of a truth commission is an indication that the new democratic state is 
committed to human rights, and able to overcome the difficulties of transitional 
moments (e.g. people in power opposing transitional justice mechanisms). Therefore 
investigatory bodies created by non-state actors demonstrate that the new regime has not 
met the challenges of transition. 
Promoters of restorative justice claim that it is ‘clear that there are a whole range 
of needs’ arising out of transitional moments that ‘cannot be satisfied by action in the 
courts’ (Hayner 2002: 11). For Minow (2000: 236), for instance, trials and prosecutions 
‘miss another collection of purposes that are at least of equal importance for individuals 
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and societies emerging after large-scale violence and brutality. These purposes’, she 
claims, ‘center on rectifying the damage of human dignity that so often endures even for 
those who survive violence and on healing societies torn by hatred and brutality.’ As a 
result, restorativists have offered various reasons to justify why restorative justice is 
preferable to retribution. 
The first argument invoked is that the harm suffered by victims is not always 
redressed by the penal system, which focuses on the punishment of perpetrators. For 
restorativists, ‘the need for restitution or reparation of harm to victims’ should prevail 
‘over demand for the punishment (or treatment) of offenders’ (Johnstone 2002: 13). 
They argue that restorative justice is a better way to heal the wounds of crime, as it is 
‘successful’ in satisfying victims who really feel that justice has been done. 
A second claim made by those who advocate restorative justice is that it shifts 
the way in which society deals with offenders. Restorative justice is an inclusionary 
rather than an exclusionary way of dealing with offenders, and this model allows 
perpetrators to be somehow reintegrated into society. Certainly, this entails a profound 
change in the presumption in retributive justice that the perpetrator is basically different 
from us, a deviant; those who believe in restorative justice think that perpetrators are, 
like us, members of our society. Deviants are with us: they also weave the community’s 
social fabric. To exclude them could render them more threatening as they become more 
alien to their communities (Braithwaite 1989: 18).  
A third justification of restorative justice is that, unlike retribution, it ‘helps’ to 
change perpetrators. For restorativists, offenders should be confronted with their victims 
in order to understand the actual harm they caused; perpetrators should know about the 
suffering of victims in order to grasp the effect and extent of their acts. Thus, 
restorativists claim, by working together with their victims and communities, offenders 
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will become aware of the consequences of their misdeeds and be ashamed of what they 
did (See Braithwaite and Mugford 1994). Perpetrators will express remorse and, by 
doing so, show that they remain part of the law-abiding community. Moreover, 
offenders will understand that they should repair the damage and, therefore, will 
contribute to appeasing the indignation of victims and communities. So once this 
somewhat causal process comes to an end, offenders are likely to be reintegrated within 
society. 
Another argument is related to the allocation of responsibility. As we have seen, 
retribution focuses on abuses committed by individual perpetrators. The problem with 
this approach, according to restorativists, is that the structural conditions that allowed 
the occurrence of abuses remain intact. For restorative justice, in contrast, there is no 
need to produce an identified offender. Blame is somehow shared or not even allocated. 
Reconciliatory justice is rather concerned with disclosing a pattern of events that made 
abuses possible. As Teitel (2003: 79) puts it, ‘the appeal of the model is its ability to 
offer a broader historical perspective, rather than mere judgements in isolated cases’. 
For example, this is what the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa 
sought to achieve: to establish ‘as complete a picture as possible of the causes, nature 
and extent of the gross violations of human rights’ (TRC 1998: 60). In a similar way, 
the Chilean Commission on Truth and Reconciliation considered that ‘the judgement of 
individual cases to establish criminal responsibility, to individualise guilt, is the 
exclusive attribution of the tribunals’. Therefore, it sought ‘to establish as complete a 
picture as possible of the most serious human rights violations’ (Comisión Nacional de 
Verdad y Reconciliación 1990). 
An additional, and crucial, justification for preferring restorative to retributive 
justice is related to the way this model seeks to establish the truth about past violence. 
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Restorative justice theorists and practitioners question whether trials and prosecutions 
are at all helpful in uncovering these truths. They doubt whether the retributive model 
really translates private knowledge into public acknowledgment. For restorativists, legal 
truths cannot generate a ‘shared’ or ‘full’ knowledge of ‘what really happened’. And 
this is more evident when political rather than individual issues are addressed in legal 
events, and when such issues happened in the past, rather than the present. In contrast, 
restorativists suggest, truth commissions can actually offer the ‘full truth’, ‘the whole 
picture’. This certainly entails the recovering of past records, the uncovering of factual 
evidence about violations, and listening to victims’ testimonies of suffering. But beyond 
merely gathering data and declarations, truth commissions also seek to come to terms 
with past abuses by officially recognising what was officially denied. 
Hence, it is argued that truth commissions are crucial in transitions not only 
because they produce knowledge about relevant facts on past crimes, but because they 
‘lift the lid of silence and denial from a contentious and painful period of history’ 
(Hayner 2002: 25). By formally acknowledging past atrocity, truth commissions restore 
victims’ dignity as they bring into the public domain private, denied or repressed stories 
of suffering (Du Toit 2000: 132-39). The term ‘acknowledgement’ here implies that the 
state has admitted its misdeeds and recognises that it was wrong. Weschler’s work on 
past state crimes in Brazil and Uruguay captures the importance that knowing and 
officially recognising the truth has for restorative justice studies: 
Fragile, tentative democracies time and again hurl themselves towards an abyss, 
struggling over this issue of truth. It’s a mysteriously powerful, almost magical notion, 
because often everyone already knows the truth – everyone knows who the torturers 
were and what they did, the torturers know that everyone knows, and everyone knows 
that they know. Why, then, this need to risk everything to render that knowledge 
explicit? The participants at the Aspen Institute conference worried this question around 
the table several times – the distinctions here seemed particularly slippery and elusive – 
until Thomas Nagel, a professor of philosophy and law at New York University, almost 
stumbled upon an answer. “It’s the difference”, Nagel said haltingly, “between 
knowledge and acknowledgment. It’s what happens and can only happen to knowledge 
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when it becomes officially sanctioned, when it is made part of the public cognitive 
scene.”(1998: 4). 
 
Another argument shared by these scholars is that truth commissions help 
victims and societies to heal old wounds. Mimicking some assumptions from 
psychotherapy, these authors claim that victims need instances in which they can tell 
their stories of suffering and how crime has affected them. Restorativists believe that 
allowing victims and survivors (‘wounded souls’) to narrate what they suffered has 
cathartic effects. Moreover, these authors claim, this process gives victims a voice and 
thus makes them feel empowered. So once victims meet these needs, they can recover 
from trauma. For Minow (2000: 243) ‘the restorative power of truth telling, of being 
heard by sympathetic listeners and forging a relationship with them, and of establishing 
potentially affirmative roles for bystanders and perpetrators are key elements of the 
recovery for trauma survivors’ – ‘know the truth and it will set you free; expose the 
terrible secrets of a sick society and heal that society’. 
Advocates of restorative justice claim that, by healing old wounds, truth 
commissions have a therapeutic effect on victims of past abuses. And once victims are 
healed, they are able to ‘resume normal relationships with others’ (Johnstone 2002: 66). 
Therefore, an additional justification evoked by restorativists is that as restorative 
justice heals, it leads to reconciliation. They claim that once truth-telling efforts come to 
an end, post-traumatic experiences belong to the past, victims can then reconcile, and 
survivors can then face the work of ‘building the future’ (Minow 2000: 244). This is 
what Hayner meant when she suggested that ‘societal healing’ might be called – ‘in 
short’ – ‘reconciliation’ (Hayner 2002: 133). She claimed that truth commissions are 
indeed essential during transitions because countries ‘need to repair torn relationships 
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between ethnic, religious, regional, or political groups, between neighbours, and 
between political parties’. 
One more explanation favouring restorative justice is that, like retribution, it has 
a deterrent effect. Restorativists assert that by being reconciled with their communities, 
actual perpetrators and potential offenders will be less likely to commit abuses. That is 
why, they claim, ‘failure to address damage to individual dignity and to the very idea 
that members of targeted groups are personas with dignity’ is likely to ensure that ‘the 
consequences of mass violation will persist and may give rise to new rounds of revenge’ 
(Minow 2000: 236). Thus restorativists assume that exposing past human rights 
violations should be enough to prevent the conditions that made abuses possible. This 
moral objective has been captured by the phrase Nunca Más (Never again), which has 
served as title for the final reports of the Brazilian and Argentinean investigatory bodies. 
Finally, restorative justice literature also invokes human rights principles to 
justify the implementation of restorative justice strategies.27 Truth commissions, like 
trials and prosecutions, are framed by human rights norms. According to restorativists, 
there is a ‘right to the truth’ – an ‘inalienable right to know the truth about past events 
and about the circumstances and reasons which led, through the consistent pattern of 
gross violations of human rights, to the perpetration of aberrant crimes’ (Hayner 1996: 
176). These scholars suggest that this is the ‘position taken by many international rights 
advocates’ who ‘prescribe truth-seeking unconditionally’.28
                                                 
27 It is worth noting that the discourse of restorative justice has been shaped and manipulated by experts 
participating within the first and second clusters of literature on transitional justice ex post facto. That is 
to say, such discourse became commensurate with the institution of the truth commission, rather than 
truth commissions being developed as a consequence of the rise of restorative values. 
28 For restorativists, the right to truth has been explicitly established by the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights (IACHR): ‘every society has the inalienable right to know the truth about past events, 
as well as the motives and circumstances in which aberrant crimes came to be committed, in order to 
prevent repetition of such acts in the future’ (Annual Report of the IACHR 1985-86, OEA/Ser. L/V./ 
II.68, Doc. 8, rev. 1, September 26, 1986, ch. V, p. 205). 
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The second cluster of research on transitional justice: broadening and rectifying 
transitional justice 
Over the last decade a second cluster of literature on transitional justice emerged. In 
part, its authors draw upon the existing body of work on retributive and restorative 
justice. And to some extent the first and the second cluster of literature share a common 
stock of facts and values. Scholars whose work spans both clusters frequently explore 
the same empirical cases (facts), and claim to be progressive and well meaning (values) 
– progressive in the sense that transitional justice can always be improved upon. 
However, this literature (the second cluster) differs from the earlier one described (the 
first cluster) in four important ways. 
(a) Scholars in the second cluster challenge whether transitional justice ideas are 
practical, desirable, or appropriate. (b) They question whether transitional justice 
practices work and seek to explain why practices fall short of the ideal embodied in the 
literature. (c) They are inspired by a utilitarian vision that sees transitional justice 
practices in terms of measurable functions and outputs. Finally, (d) they have broadened 
the field of transitional justice from its original focus on human rights and political 
transitions to whatever they consider to be a case of present suffering produced by past 
abuses (e.g. the legacy of colonial rule). That is, scholars in the second cluster have 
expanded the optic of transitional justice from the first two sets of cases – transitions to 
democracy and post-conflict transitions – to cases of what Moon calls accounting for 
‘historical injustice’ such as those in Australia, Canada and the United States where, 
often, it is the harm suffered by indigenous peoples or the history of slavery and its 
iniquitous and persistent consequences that have been under scrutiny (Moon 2008: 21). 
 
(a) More and better analysis 
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Scholars whose work comprises the second cluster of literature have partially 
challenged the conceptual basis (ideas) upon which many transitional justice practices 
are based (e.g. ideas about truth, reconciliation, or retribution). Some authors criticise 
the fact that transitional justice literature (i.e. the first cluster) is ‘highly theorized’, that 
it is simply an ‘overblown version’ of ordinary legal problems. Transitional justice 
scholars are basically ‘reinventing the wheel’ (Posner and Vermeule 2004: 764). Others 
claim, on the contrary, that transitional issues have not been analysed in detail by the 
first cluster of literature. Transitional justice literature is indeed characterised by 
‘knowledge deficits’. Scholars and practitioners within this field still lack a 
‘comprehensive theory’; ‘there is still too little knowledge about it’ (Arenhovel 2008: 
584) – what is needed is more and better analysis. So, whether transitional justice 
literature is under-theorized or hyper-theorized, it has to be broadened and improved 
according to scholars participating within the second cluster. 
Unlike the first cluster of literature on transitional justice, which focused on 
trade-offs and tensions between the restorative and the retributive model, some scholars 
within the second cluster perceive the goals of these distinctive approaches as mutually 
reinforcing and complementary (Rotberg 2000). Other scholars, in contrast, propose to 
explore theoretically the unsolved tension between the restorative and the retributive 
types of justice. To analyse such ‘inherent’ tensions is useful, they argue, in designing 
further and superior transitional justice institutions (Leebaw 2008). 
The second cluster of literature on transitional justice certainly replicates a 
number of assumptions fostered by the previous literature in the field. For instance, 
scholars in this area share the idea that some level of human rights accountability is 
always ‘necessary’ in transitions – ‘sooner or later the legacy of the former regime has 
to be addressed’ (Arenhovel 2008: 570; Roehring 2009: 722). They also share the idea 
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that transitional justice strategies are justified as they are ‘morally acceptable’, and 
because of their moral benefits in transitional societies (Du Toit 2000). However, the 
scholars whose work comprises the second cluster of transitional justice literature have 
been somewhat critical of the premises informing this field (amnesty, truth, justice, 
reconciliation, healing, deterrence). Points of disagreement remain about the 
implications of these concepts, and the contexts in which they are used are more 
complex. Scholars participating in this debate have reviewed these concepts or ideas in 
order to assess if they have been ‘appropriate’ in dealing with transitional problems, e.g. 
victims’ suffering, wounded souls, divided societies, post-traumatic stress disorders, 
historical injustice, impunity, and so on (Gutmann and Thompson 2000). Such 
assessment is often characterised by an inherent optimism that transitional justice 
concepts and praxis can always improve. For instance, Quinn (2009: 267) suggested 
that beyond the acknowledgment of previously denied events, facing the past can 
contribute to the ‘development of social trust’, ‘civic engagement’, ‘social capital’, and 
‘social cohesion’. Similarly, Arenhovel (2008: 576) questions whether retributive 
justice serves for deterrence. However, he is certain that it may ‘awaken a dormant legal 
consciousness’, ‘having a perceptible impact on the minds of people’. 
Some scholars within the second cluster consider that some ideas worked out 
and debated by restorativists and retributivists, who originally reflected the interests of 
practitioners, were untenable and naïve. For them, the evaluation of the whole package 
of transitional justice assumptions incorporated in the first cluster showed that such 
assumptions were far from correct, as they were unlikely to provide the alleged benefits 
predicted by theorists and practitioners. For example, Snyder and Vinjamuri (2003) 
consider that trials and prosecutions have a negative impact on transitional societies as 
they can actually increase the probability of future atrocities, exacerbate conflict, and 
Chapter Two: Transitional Justice 93
undermine efforts to build democracy. Accordingly, they praise the use of amnesties, 
which, they claim, have been highly effective in curbing abuses. There is another 
illustration of this in the work of Michael Ignatieff (1996: 117). First, Ignatieff 
confronts the notion of allocation of responsibility, which is invoked by retributivists as 
one of the most significant functions of trials and prosecutions in transitions. Despite 
what retributivists claim, Ignatieff considers that ‘trials inevitably fail to apportion all 
the guilt to all those responsible’. Second, he questions the very essence of restorative 
justice: the official acknowledgment of past atrocity (coming to terms with the past). 
Contrary to the belief of many restorativists, Ignatieff claims that it would be unrealistic 
to expect that ‘when truth is proclaimed by an official commission’ it would be 
accepted by ‘those against whom it is directed’ (Ignatieff 1996: 113). 
Moreover, scholars within the second cluster have constantly sought to advance 
better definitions of concepts and practices, and to improve theoretical approaches to 
transitional problems (Borer 2003). For instance, they have attempted to clarify and 
classify the kind of efforts that ‘really’ qualify as transitional mechanisms, claiming that 
if we hope to move forward with empirical research, it is necessary first to determine 
the ‘appropriate’ catalogue of truth commissions and trials (Dancy, et al. 2010: 46; 
Sikkink and Booth Walling 2007). Posner and Vermeule (2004: 763) propose to 
redefine what we understand as transitional moments in which transitional justice 
mechanisms work. For them, transitions can be simply a ‘spate of constitutional 
amendments’, transitions from one government to another after contested elections, or 
even ‘quotidian changes in economic and social regulation and taxation’. Unlike the 
first cluster, which has been ‘dominated’ by legal scholarship, the second cluster has 
proposed new analytical devices beyond the discipline of law, e.g. a Kantian approach 
based on the idea of ‘perpetual peace’, the use of comparative analysis, international 
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relations literature, or a ‘sociological’ approach from ‘the perspective of 
cosmopolitanism’ (Arenhovel 2008; Nash 2007: 417; Sikkink and Booth Walling 2007; 
Turner 2008). 
 
(b) Improving practices and outcomes 
The second cluster of literature has sought to address the correspondence between 
transitional justice ideas and policies. The assessment of the relationship between theory 
and reality has allowed scholars to ‘improve’ the social impact of transitional justice 
mechanisms and overcome their shortcomings. Therefore, scholars writing in this 
cluster have sought to provide new ideas to address practitioners’ demands, and then 
elaborate stories and invoke moral justifications to rationalise what they are doing. 
Scholars within this cluster have evaluated how trials or truth commissions work 
and function. Invariably, they have found gaps and deficiencies (Ensalco 1994). Their 
aim is to assess if transitional justice mechanisms have delivered the goals they claim to 
reach, to question whether transitional justice interventions were well executed and 
whether they made a difference in the lives of ‘ordinary people’ (Arriaza and Roht-
Arriaza 2008). In doing so, they have found at least three reasons why transitional 
justice practices fail and, in turn, to advance further attempts to reform their work. 
First, for this literature, the ‘success’ of trials and truth commissions is closely 
related to the moral authority and commitment of specific actors, which vary depending 
on the author. Some scholars claim that ‘to be successful and to produce legitimate 
outcomes’, transitional justice mechanisms ‘need a prominent spokesperson with moral 
authority’ (Arenhovel 2008: 577). Others suggest that ‘the human rights community’, 
NGOs, or ‘organised civil society’ are crucial to ‘successfully’ reform states practices 
by ‘convincing’ politicians to ‘adjust their behaviour’ in transitional societies. Thanks to 
their ‘expertise’, ‘legitimacy’ and ‘moral standing’, NGOs can force state actors to 
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implement and enforce transitional justice policies based on international treaties that 
can guarantee domestic stability and therefore international security (Crenzel 2008; 
Root 2009; Sikkink 1993; Turner 2008). Others suggest that more transnational actors – 
‘the international community’ – should be included in the process as they may play the 
role of ‘facilitators’ (Turner 2008: 149). Some others argue that only the president (the 
executive power) is the crucial element in efforts to hold the Military accountable 
(Roehring 2009). 
Second, to improve transitional justice efforts, scholars have suggested that 
transitional societies should take into account local initiatives; and to mix retributive 
and restorative agendas. Some scholars claim that national-level mechanisms are 
insufficient to come to terms with past atrocities suffered by victims living in ‘villages, 
towns and hills’, where experience of suffering may vary from that of people living 
elsewhere in the country (Arriaza and Roht-Arriaza 2008). Therefore, they have 
suggested the use of ‘independent initiatives arising from the local level’ – ‘bottom-up 
local’ mechanisms of transitional justice, such as ‘Mayan methods’ – to address conflict 
resolution in transitional societies. Other scholars have proposed abandoning behind 
restorative and retributive trade-offs. They suggest that truth commissions and trials, 
once considered as advancing conflicting agendas, should be seen as promoting 
reinforcing goals (Leebaw 2008). Therefore, they have advanced ‘a whole array of 
methods combining truth-seeking and prosecutorial functions’ (Roht-Arriaza and 
Mariezcurrena 2006). 
Finally, scholars have sought to improve the timing to implement transitional 
justice policies. Scholars of the first cluster of literature considered that truth bodies and 
trials had to be created by the state to look into ‘recent events’, ‘usually at the point of a 
political transition’. So transitional justice policies were in fact viewed as a central 
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component of a transition from one government to another (Hayner 2002: 17). 
Certainly, some scholars participating within the second cluster follow the same 
approach: it is crucial to construct a public truth about the crimes ‘as soon as possible, 
immediately after the fall of state terrorism regimes’ (Crenzel 2008). But others, in 
contrast, suggest that trials and truth commissions are more likely to exist later, over 
time, as the influence of once powerful actors diminishes (Sikkink and Booth Walling 
2007: 434). 
 
(c) Measuring the efficiency of ideas and practices 
Scholars within the second cluster of literature have sought to come up with criteria, 
indicators, predictors, models, or whatever to measure the achievements or malfunction 
of transitional justice programmes. Scholars within this field have recently developed a 
fervent desire to calculate what constitutes success or failure. Certainly, by presenting 
these methods to quantify the efficiency of transitional justice, scholars have sought to 
justify what they think is desirable and possible, to legitimate or improve the existing 
practices, or to propose alternative mechanisms to come to terms with the past. 
These scholars have advanced the use of indicators and quantitative measures to 
examine how good transitional justice intentions went wrong. Wrong in the sense that 
some transitional justice ideas resulted in projects that failed or could not be 
implemented during transitional moments (Mallinder 2007; Stahn 2005). By using 
indicators for success, some scholars have attempted to justify or to amend the existing 
mechanisms of transitional justice. To do so, the first step has consisted of producing a 
set of classifications to establish whether an institution created during transitional 
moments to deal with the past actually qualifies as a transitional justice mechanism. 
Dancy et al. (2010), for instance, have recently offered the ‘most comprehensive truth 
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commission database we know to be in existence’. Then, scholars use the data to assess 
the impact of truth bodies and trials. For instance, Kathryn Sikkink and Carrie Booth 
Walling (2007) manufactured a ‘new dataset’ in order to demonstrate that transitional 
justice mechanisms have a ‘favourable impact’ over transitional societies. Using 
‘averages of the Political Terror Scale (PTS) as a measure’, Sikkink and Booth Wallis 
compare the human rights conditions before and after trials in Latin America. Whatever 
these byzantine scales might mean, these scholars ‘discovered’ that Mexico had a pre-
trial PTS of 3.2 and a post-trial PTS of 3.4, which allowed them to conclude that human 
rights trials had a negative impact in the country as the change in PTS average was −2. 
Whatever we might think of the results, we do not really get much sense of what 
happened in Mexico. And certainly we do not need this baroque method to understand 
how transitional justice had a negative impact in Mexico’s transition to democracy. I 
will return to this point in the following section. 
 
(d) Broadening the field 
Finally, studies within this strand have linked transitional justice ideas and practices to 
other goals beyond transitions and beyond human rights. They have made transitional 
justice coterminous with a host of social and political developments: from gender rights 
to poverty and development. As a result, more areas of social and political life are 
becoming colonised by transitional justice expertise and practice. Thus, transitional 
justice comes to be about not only human rights accountability, but also ‘collective 
identities’, ‘cosmopolitanism’, ‘NGO networks’, ‘domestic governance’, ‘social 
capital’, ‘international security’, ‘global citizenship’, ‘civic virtues’, or whatever 
(Arenhovel 2008; Nash 2007; Quinn 2009; Roniger and Sznajder 1997; Root 2009; 
Turner 2008). 
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The second cluster of literature has paid particular attention to gender issues. 
Ashnie Padarath (1998: 65), for instance, has emphasised that women during the TRC 
hearings spoke mainly about men’s experiences of violence rather than their own. In 
doing so, she claims, the hearings distorted the reality, which was that women too were 
(direct and indirect) victims of extended abuses. Therefore, some scholars suggest there 
should be a gender-based approach to transitional justice processes (Meintjes, et al. 
2001; Pillay 2001). 
An increasing number of transitional justice studies have also paid attention to 
the link between economic growth and transitional justice. Authors such as Goldblatt 
(1998), Meintjes (2001), and Sideris (2001) have claimed, for instance, that the TRC 
ignored that for decades whole communities were uprooted from their land and were 
‘dumped in inhospitable environments […] without adequate infrastructure’ where 
individuals – women in particular – ‘found themselves in a less secure position than 
men in relation to opportunities for employment, security of land or farm tenure, and 
access to housing’ (Goldblatt and Meintjes 1998: 30). These scholars claim that 
transitional justice has failed to make a difference in the lives of ordinary people 
because of the lack of economic and social justice (Arriaza and Roht-Arriaza 2008: 
153). From this perspective, ‘the more well to do a nation is, the greater the chances it 
will be equipped for transitional justice measures’ (Arenhovel 2008: 584). Therefore, 
they claim, transitional justice might include issues related to poverty alleviation, 
economic and social development, social justice, and sustainability. 
Moreover, transitional justice is no longer confined to transitions to democracy. 
As Moon suggests, scholars within the second cluster of literature broadened the scope 
of transitional justice by analysing a ‘broad range of reflective junctures and reparatory 
gestures in the life of the nation that have been designated to deal with “historical 
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injustice”, frequently towards indigenous populations such as in the U.S., Canada and 
Australia’ (Moon 2008: 21). The second cluster of literature reflects what Stan Cohen 
terms ‘political times for instant virtual apology’ in which countries are busy 
apologising for everything – ‘countries which did not even pay lip-service to democracy 
a decade ago are […] adopting the rhetoric of accountability for past abuses. And more 
stable democracies are being pushed to acknowledge their own historical victims’ 
(Cohen 2005: 246). While Tony Blair apologised for the Irish potato famine, Jacques 
Chirac apologised for the role played by France in the persecution of Jews under 
German occupation; and the U.S. for the eradication of Native Americans, slavery, and 
medical experiments on black, male, syphilis sufferers. 
In fact, some scholars suggest that transitional justice mechanisms should exist 
also within ‘conflicted democracies’ or even in ‘consolidated democracies’ (Ni Aolain 
and Campbell 2005; Posner and Vermeule 2004). For example, in democratic regimes 
every election creates transitional justice problems as new presidents want to reward 
supporters with official posts and punish enemies with the loss of office. In 
consequence, the optimal transitional justice policy in such cases would be a ‘targeted 
lustration scheme’, which can serve to eliminate an important layer of the old regime’s 
officials. From this perspective, transitional justice mechanisms should be understood as 
just another regulatory scheme in any given country at any time – past state crimes are 
like ‘ordinary’ crimes, therefore transitional justice efforts should be like any other 
ordinary governmental policies, so reparations programmes for victims of past abuses 
should be ‘like the Endangered Species Act’ (Posner and Vermeule 2004: 786). 
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The limits of the arguments made in the first and second clusters of literature on 
transitional justice 
The varied rationales worked out by transitional justice scholars, even if they sometimes 
conflict with each other, seek to advance particular ways of thinking about, and acting 
upon, transitional societies. They have created a specific language to represent 
transitional problems, and to justify the kind of strategies through which certain 
authorities might rule transitional justice processes. Despite their differences, theorists 
writing in the two clusters share similar values, the underlying principle being that 
transitional justice is ‘good’ insofar as it works to achieve the following benefits: 
reconciliation, peace, democracy, forgiveness, and societal healing. These scholars are 
clearly progressive and optimistic. So, even if ideas and practices go wrong, they offer 
as a solution to ‘do more of the same’ under the guise of novelty, or to accomplish the 
same end by better means, e.g. interdisciplinary approaches, mixed models, ‘bottom-up 
local’ strategies, or Kantian variants of transitional justice. 
Whether or not we agree with these visions of transitional justice, I think these 
views present three shortcomings. First, most academics proposing these sophisticated 
theories often provide little evidence to support their claims. Second, these studies often 
lack a historical perspective sensitive to contingent historical determinants of 
transitional justice processes. Centred on the evaluation of predetermined normative 
frameworks, both clusters tend to ignore the way in which ideas and practices of 
transitional justice were brought into existence; and how they were shaped by social 
events, political forces, and structures of power. They frequently bypass the fact that 
transitional justice outcomes are the result of negotiations and political deliberations in 
which multiple actors intervene. Third, focused on the important role played by state 
actors, these theorists have paid less attention to the way in which non-state actors – 
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including transitional justice scholars – intervene, exercise power, and affect transitional 
justice processes. 
Lack of empirical evidence 
Proponents of the first and second clusters of literature on transitional justice have 
mainly focused on making up its normative positions, theoretical claims, moral 
foundations, and supposed benefits. They have produced the organising concepts – 
truths – that allow us to talk about transitional justice. They claim, for instance, that 
prosecutions and trials strengthen the judiciary, and ensure that crimes are not forgotten; 
that retribution undermines the power of former delinquents; and that trials produce a 
shared memory, which in turn leads to a shared identity, which in turn leads to 
reconciliation. They also claim that the process of collecting and exposing publicly 
factual evidence about past atrocity via a truth commission leads to its official and 
public recognition; that establishing the truth promotes healing; that healing leads to 
reconciliation because once truth-telling practices end, traumatic experiences belong to 
the past, and victims can then be reconciled. 
But how did these claims achieve a self-evident status? These claims are always 
invoked, but evidence of them is hardly ever given. David Mendeloff (2004), for 
instance, has demonstrated that popular and scholarly claims about peace-promoting 
benefits of formal truth-seeking mechanisms have not been established empirically. For 
Mendeloff, ‘despite claims of truth-telling advocates, we actually know very little about 
the impact of truth-telling […] on peace’. Transitional justice assumptions ‘rest far more 
on faith than on sound logic or empirical evidence’ (Mendeloff 2004: 354). 
Thus, transitional justice scholars have produced truth claims that are bolstered 
by theoretical formulations, but rarely empirically addressed. Theorists of the first and 
second clusters of literature offer diverse rationales to welcome transitional justice, but 
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provide little evidence to support their arguments. These claims are, in Ignatieff’s 
(1996) words, ‘articles of faith’. 
Lack of an historical approach 
Scholarship in this field lacks an historical perspective: it pays little attention to the 
contingent historical factors that allow the emergence of transitional justice; and it does 
not take into account the fact that transitional justice is shaped by political interests and 
alters the balance of power in political relations. This shortcoming is reflected in three 
ways by the literature. 
First, theorists writing in both clusters of literature produce a sense of 
inevitability; they have a tendency to represent transitional justice as an unavoidable, 
‘intrinsic’ condition in transitional societies. They often claim that trials, truth 
commissions, reconciliation, reparations, and so on are ‘expected responses’ in 
transitions, which lead to the transformation of institutions, the consolidation national 
unity, and the establishment of a ‘true democracy’ (Du Toit 2000: 125; Zalaquett 1989: 
30). These mechanisms are portrayed as a ‘necessary’ effort that ‘can make the 
difference between success and failure’ (Garton Ash 2002: xii). In particular, as Hirsch 
(2007) has demonstrated, members of the transitional justice ‘epistemic community’ are 
currently propagating the notion that reconciliation via the public procedure of truth 
commissions is ‘an indispensable’ stage in states’ transition to democracy. 
However, I argue, transitional justice is anything but indispensable. Transitional 
justice is the outcome of political bargains. Since there are no historical cases of total 
regime change, as Cohen (1995: 15) argues, trials and truth commissions engage with 
former structures of power in order to preserve a certain degree of stability and 
legitimacy; and their achievements are often compromised by the fact that many people 
in power in the democratic regime ‘were involved in crimes of the past or (more 
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commonly) colluded in them by their silence’. For instance, in South Africa, political 
amnesty was the foundational agreement upon which transitional justice was built. The 
use of political amnesties – which granted impunity to perpetrators – served the purpose 
of maintaining the political stability of the post-apartheid regime. In Mexico transitional 
justice was understood – and materialised – in a different way as it served other political 
purposes: it sought to legitimate Vicente Fox’s democratic credentials. So it led to the 
creation of the SPO – a retributive mechanism – as the ‘fight against impunity’ was one 
of the most widespread demands for the consolidation of democracy (I will return to 
this point in Chapter Three). Hence transitional justice is made to seem as natural and 
inevitable, as an effort that is not an effect of power. But it is in fact the outcome of a 
constellation of elite forces that produce the political compromises that are, intrinsically, 
conditional of transitional justice. 
Second, the lack of a more historical perspective leads to an incomplete 
understanding of human rights as a means through which power is exercised. Scholars 
from both clusters consider that the ‘right to see justice done’ and the ‘right to know the 
truth’ are moral, legal, universal, neutral, and depoliticised imperatives, which states are 
‘obliged’ to observe (Cassel 1996: 207; Hayner 2002: 31; Méndez 1997a: 255). But 
human rights are not free-standing norms. They are discussed, adapted, contested, and 
changed by different authorities. Although these set of ‘duties’ or ‘obligations’ to face 
past atrocity are established by international laws, their use during transitional moments 
has not always been ‘immediately obvious’ or self-evident (Orentlicher 1991: 2551). 
Diana Orentlicher, who participated in the Aspen Institute Conference, which led to the 
emergence of transitional justice as we know it, recognised that during that meeting her 
colleagues were not so clear about what kind of international human rights principles 
were indeed required to justify their claims (Orentlicher 2007: 12). So they just made 
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them up: they arbitrarily selected and adapted the kind of principles and international 
laws that, according to them, could serve to justify and legitimise the existence of 
mechanisms to deal with past abuses. In so doing, they connected transitional justice 
policies to a particular kind of new regime – that of western liberal democracy – and 
they linked it exclusively to civil and political rights. Thus, instead of coming to terms 
with historical problems, as one might expect in an effort to ‘face the past’, transitional 
justice was simply presented as related only to the violation of civil rights, which can be 
addressed only by legal institutions operated by the state. 
Moreover, these scholars treat these particular human rights principles as the 
direct cause of transitional justice practices – they see an unequivocal causal 
relationship between these principles and the implementation of truth commissions and 
trials. However, I argue (alongside other scholars in the field – the third cluster), the 
adoption of human rights norms is conditioned by political determinants (McEvoy 
2007; Moon 2008; Short 2007). Only certain rights are invoked, they are only applied to 
specific people or situations, and their enforcement is discretional. As Ainley (2008: 29) 
notes, ‘all acts of atrocity are not prosecuted: the decision over whether to hold a trial in 
any given situation is highly politically loaded’. In Argentina, Uruguay, South Africa, 
and Mexico, the materialisation of these extra-political legal rules was possible only 
when such rights were adapted to the local context, when they did not interfere directly 
with other political interests, and when they did not put at risk those in power. In 
Mexico, for instance, the universally recognised concept of genocide was tailored by the 
SPO to describe the alleged killing of twenty five students in 1971. The strategy led to 
impunity, granting a de facto amnesty to perpetrators – of course, in the name of human 
rights. (I will return to the ‘genocide case’ in Chapter Five.) Thus, here, these human 
rights norms are understood as a site of political negotiations. 
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The third way in which the theorists of the first and second clusters of literature 
demonstrate a lack of historical approach is the way in which they analyse transitional 
justice strategies as if they were frozen in time, isolated from their institutional and 
social milieus. Scholars in this field tend to focus in just one point in time, and see trials 
and truth commissions as immutable entities. Therefore, their explanations are normally 
incomplete. Transitional justice processes, like any other political process, are far more 
complex and evolve through time, often unpredictably. Transitional justice institutions 
change during their operation and their performance is shaped by institutional crises or 
extra-legal political interventions. Sometimes, for instance, transitional justice 
mechanisms are affected by the implementation of conflicting human rights (McEvoy 
2011: 377). 
The problem of agency 
An additional problem with the literature on transitional justice is the way it addresses 
the intervention of different actors in transitional justice processes. These studies claim 
that transitional justice derives its legitimacy from universal, neutral, depoliticised, 
human rights principles (the ‘right to see justice done’ and the ‘right to know the truth’). 
These moral imperatives are normally worked out, debated, fostered, and monitored by 
scholars, human rights activists, experts, civil society, transnational organisations, and 
so on. Yet transitional justice efforts are (or should be) put into practice by the state and 
its agents. 
Therefore, when reading this literature, one gets the feeling that the actors 
intervening in transitional justice processes are acting in different spheres. Human rights 
activists, scholars, and experts are acting in the field of principles and values, away 
from the sphere of state politics and political interests. They offer a set of extra-political 
legal rules and institutions to deal with past atrocity. By doing so, they are supposed to 
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play a counter-hegemonic role against the state over which they ‘impose’ their 
principles and ideals. But it is the state and its agents, acting in the field of politics, 
which have the power to materialise and conduct such transitional justice practices 
(Méndez 1997a: 255; Méndez 1997b: 1; Zalaquett 1989: 27). Thus, the materialisation 
of transitional justice mechanisms is restricted only to the state, which these same 
scholars and activists restlessly criticise. 
However, this thesis suggests, these divisions between state and non-state actors, 
between morals and politics, do not seem to be clear. In fact, the problem of agency 
becomes even more complex if we consider that some human rights activists 
participating in this field are also scholars, some of whom even work in governmental 
agencies. Hirsch (2007) and Arthur (2009), for instance, have demonstrated that 
transitional justice is formed by a specific network of academic scholars and legal 
experts that advances and instigates the international spread of particular transitional 
justice mechanisms. But these scholars and experts tend to be practitioners as they have 
‘first-hand learning experience of participating in and learning the lessons’ of truth-
seeking processes and trials (Hirsch 2007: 190). What happened is that these 
practitioners gradually became recognised experts and authorities in the ‘newfangled’ 
domain of transitional justice (Hirsch 2007). 
Nicolas Guilhot (2005: 11) has also demonstrated that the actors who 
contributed the most to constructing and expanding the field of promoting democracy 
are those who were able ‘to play on different levels, to occupy pivotal positions at the 
junction of academe, national and international institutions, activists movements, and to 
mobilize the diversified resources of all these fields’. Hence the distinction between 
state and non-state actors acting in different fields inspired by different goals is no 
longer operational. 
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To illustrate this point, I now consider some of the authors cited above in order 
to show the way they have multiple affiliations. They have simultaneous allegiances to 
different state and non-state institutions – they are, at the same time, university 
professors, consultants for transnational organisations, activists in well-known NGOs, 
and state agents. At the time of writing this chapter (autumn 2011), Méndez is the ‘past 
president’ of the ICTJ. Zalaquett, who participated in Chile’s National Commission on 
Truth and Reconciliation, is currently a member of the ICTJ’s Board of Directors (ICTJ 
2010a). Both are in charge of the Latin American Transitional Justice Fellowship 
Programme in Chile. Hayner is a cofounder of the ICTJ, and is currently the Director of 
the ICTJ Geneva Office and Peace and Justice Programme (ICTJ 2010a). In March 
2008, Hayner served as human rights adviser for the Kenyan National Dialogue and 
Reconciliation. Akhavan is associate professor of the Faculty of Law at McGill 
University, but he was the first legal adviser to the Prosecutor’s Office of the 
International Criminal Tribunals for Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and is a UN 
adviser on transitional justice issues (McGill 2010). Cassel, currently director of the 
Centre for Civil and Human Rights at Notre Dame Law School, was the legal adviser of 
the UN Commission on the Truth for El Salvador (KI 2010). Minow is a professor of 
law at Harvard Law School, but she also serves on committees of the Project Justice in 
Time of Transitions, which ‘assists leader in divided societies struggling with conflict’, 
from which Zalaquett is part of the advisory board (PJTT 2010). Even Arthur – whose 
genealogical study on transitional justice is quoted in this chapter – is currently Deputy 
Director of Institutional Development at the ICTJ, leading ‘ICTJ’s initiatives in 
evaluating its impact, improving the effectiveness of its work, and knowledge 
management’ (ICTJ 2010a). 
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Transitional justice scholars who take for granted the clear-cut division between 
state and non-state fields offer incomplete explanations about the role played by 
transitional justice in political transitions. Moreover, they bypass the role that they 
themselves play within a constellation of power relations – by constituting objects of 
inquiry; by the way they endow themselves with the authority to speak about the past 
(or by the way their authority is endowed by association with powerful institutions and 
organisations); and by producing the concepts that rule transitional justice mechanisms. 
This is relevant because transitional justice ideas debated and fostered by these scholars 
have material effects and so affect people in transitional moments. 
The third cluster of research on transitional justice: a social constructivist 
approach 
More recently, a third cluster of literature emerged as a critique of transitional justice 
ideas and practices: critique in the sense that it breaches self-evidence (Owen 1995). 
This third approach might be called ‘social constructivist’ because it seeks to ‘raise 
consciousness’ about transitional justice (ideas and practices) (Bourdieu 1986 and 2004; 
Hacking 2000). That is, scholars participating within this cluster – e.g. Claire Moon 
(2008), Kieran McEvoy (2007), Kirsten Ainley (2011), Damien Short (2007) or Richard 
Wilson (2001) – are critical to the status quo enjoyed by transitional justice. They seek 
to strip transitional justice of its false authority. And they do so in three ways. 
First, they hold that transitional justice ideas and practices are not inevitable. 
This approach seeks ‘to show that things “weren’t” as necessary as all that’ (Foucault 
1991c: 76). For them transitional justice ideas and practices were brought into existence 
by social events (Bourdieu 1986; Hacking 2002c). Second, scholars of the third cluster 
of literature have demonstrated that transitional justice is shaped by social factors, and 
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institutional contexts (McEvoy 2007; Moon 2008 and 2009; Wilson 2001). It is an 
historically informed approach. 
In this sense, proponents of the third cluster of literature assume that important 
areas of transitional justice – e.g. ‘truth’, ‘reconciliation’, ‘healing’, ‘individual agency’ 
or ‘responsibility’ – are not self-evident or pre-given (e.g. Ainley 2011; Short 2007). 
Indeed they consider that such issues are constituted, debated, and replaced by different 
actors, within or beyond the state, in specific historical moments. These scholars  show 
how ‘experts’ became so essential to transitional justice, as they claim to know what the 
problems in transitional situations are and what to do with them (Arthur 2009; Guilhot 
2005; Hirsch 2007; Moon 2008 and 2009). Therefore, unlike scholars of the first and 
second clusters, these theorists take into account the problem of agency, and the 
relationship between experts (knowledge) and practices (power). 
Third, these authors hold that transitional justice is not apolitical. Sceptical of 
the ‘articles of faith’ of transitional justice, these theorists have exposed their contingent 
character and have examined how instead of seeking ‘moral’ benefits, transitional 
justice practices have served to reconcile political interests in conflict (Ainley 2008; 
Moon 2008). 
This thesis follows the social-constructivist research agendas of this cluster of 
writers (Ainley 2008; McEvoy 2007; Moon 2009; Short 2007; Wilson 2001). From a 
theoretical perspective, these theorists appear to confront the feeling of inevitability that 
encompasses transitional justice ideas. By doing so, they challenge the ‘articles of faith’ 
upheld devotedly by those who wrote the first and second clusters of literature. From an 
empirical perspective, the most relevant implication of these scholars is that they open 
the door to investigate transitional justice practices as processes that far from being 
‘inherent’ to transitional moments have been instrumental to the legitimacy of new 
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democracies. By using the term process I suggest that transitional justice mechanisms 
do not just happen, but rather occur in a series of steps (as I explained in my 
Introduction to this thesis). As Short suggests, the institutionalisation of human rights 
(e.g. the right to truth or the right to see justice done) should be analysed as ‘social 
processes’ that involve power and that are not necessarily beneficial (Short 2007: 859). 
This thesis shares the spirit of critique in which these social constructivists 
scholars have engaged, and draws upon some of the same analytic devices that they 
have sought to advance (e.g. transitional justice is not inevitable; it was brought into 
being by social events; it is shaped by its historical context; it is a site for political 
deliberations). The next section lays the theoretical foundation that frames how I shall 
answer the key research questions guiding this thesis in the ensuing chapters. 
Transitional justice as ‘knowledge’ 
As discussed, the first and second clusters of literature on transitional justice produce a 
sense of inevitability: (a) transitional justice is ‘intrinsic’ and ‘necessary’ during 
transitions; (b) transitional justice is ‘good’ because of the benefits it brings with it, e.g. 
pace, justice, truth; and (c) ‘All good things go together’, e.g. truth has a cathartic effect, 
which leads to healing, which leads to reconciliation, which leads to peace or whatever. 
In contrast, the third cluster (based on social constructivist approaches) 
investigates: how such statements become self-evident truths through quite specific 
historical processes (Ainley 2008; Moon 2009); where such ideas came from, how they 
perform, and what purpose they serve (McEvoy 2007; Moon 2006; Wilson 2001); how 
such ideas and assumptions came into being as objects of knowledge (Christodoulidis 
and Veitch 2001; McEvoy 2007; Veitch 2001). 
The third cluster of literature is useful to this thesis as it shows how transitional 
justice ideas and assumptions are formed and transformed within a particular social 
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setting (Moon 2008; Short 2007). Arthur (2009) traces the emergence of the field of 
transitional justice to the Aspen Institute Conference in 1988, which brought together 
human rights activists, philosophers, legal experts, and political scientists to debate on 
the moral and political dilemmas faced by new democracies: claims for justice and 
claims for political stability. The conference was the site in which the now self-evident 
claims on transitional justice emerged. It was the turning point that made it possible to 
‘clarify and solidify a conceptual framework’ for this field of knowledge (Arthur 2009: 
326). Since then transitional justice has gradually become the field of enquiry that 
systematised knowledge deemed useful to deal with the past. 
But the Aspen Institute Conference was informed by another major project that 
shaped the way we understand transitions towards democracy: the Woodrow Wilson 
project on democratisations. Between 1979 and 1981 the Latin American Programme of 
the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars funded several conferences on 
‘regime change’, to analyse how and why a particular state turned toward democracy 
(Bermeo 1990). The working paper series resulting from the conference was published 
in 1986 within the collection Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, edited by Guillermo 
O’Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (See Middlebrook 1986; 
O’Donnell 1986; O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; O’Donnell, et al. 1986a; O’Donnell, et 
al. 1986b; Przeworski 1986; Schmitter 1986; Stepan 1990). This collection offered 
theoretical frameworks, classifications, and concepts to frame understandings of 
democracies, authoritarian regimes, and typologies of transitions, and to make 
recommendations on the appropriate steps that authoritarian countries should follow to 
consolidate a specific kind of democratic rule – liberal democracy.29
                                                 
29 The idea of ‘authoritarian countries’ was constructed during the late 1970s by Juan J. Linz (1975), who 
later participated in Kritz’s volumes on transitional justice in 1995. See Juan Linz (1995). 
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The Woodrow Wilson project questioned the idea that democratic change was 
primarily based on structural conditions. O’Donnell and his colleagues called into 
question the idea that democratisations depended on structural socioeconomic 
development (Przeworski 1986). Rather, O’Donnell suggested that transitions to liberal 
democracy succeed because of the choices taken by political elites who know how to 
govern (O’Donnell, et al. 1986b: 37). Since then, transitions towards democracy have 
been understood as a ‘negotiated, orderly and, ultimately, manageable political change, 
kept distinct and separate from socioeconomic transformations’ (Guilhot 2005: 135). 
Thus the Woodrow Wilson Project identified transitions (moderate, nonviolent, 
pact-based) specific to a certain kind of democracy (liberal democracy). This particular 
way of classifying transitions had a significant effect: it contributed to protecting the 
existing structures of power. By promoting a gradual approach to political change, 
Guilhot (2005: 148) claims, this literature left intact the power of authoritarian political 
elites – ‘by focusing on democratic agents within authoritarian coalitions’, the 
Woodrow Wilson Project ‘located within the state the principles of its own 
transformation’. As a result, ‘a lot of new democrats, it may be expected, will be 
retooled autocrats’ (Guilhot 2005: 146). 
In examining the Woodrow Wilson Project and the literature on transitions that 
it produced, my intention is to show the particular kind of ideas about transitions to 
democracy that affected the Aspen Conference and in turn helped to shape the 
emergence of transitional justice as an idea and practice. State crimes and the distinctive 
mechanisms deployed by new regimes to address them, as Elster (2004) and Teitel 
(2003) have shown, have existed for a long time. However, it is from the 1990s that 
ideas about transitional justice came to be related to a specific type of transition. In fact, 
as Arthur (2009: 333) puts it, ‘instead of “coming to terms” with historical complexities 
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(as one might expect in an effort to deal with “the past”), transitional justice was 
presented as deeply enmeshed with political problems that were legal-institutional and, 
relatively, short term in nature. So short-term, in fact, that they could be dealt with 
specifically during a “transitional period”.’ Additionally, it is since then that transitional 
justice practices are seen ‘as having an underlying, determined connection related to the 
normative goal of promoting democracy’ (Arthur 2009: 334). Moreover, and crucially, 
it is from the 1990s that transitional justice ideas and practices are justified by the 
language of human rights, as human rights are the principles from which democracies 
derive their legitimacy (Guilhot 2005: 1). So, transitional justice came to be, as Arthur 
(2009: 326) suggests, ‘a device to signal a new sort of human rights activity’, a 
‘response to concrete political dilemmas human rights activists faced in what they 
understood to be “transitional” contexts’. 
Additionally, the third cluster of research on transitional justice makes another 
important and distinctive contribution because, unlike the first and second clusters, it 
sees the field of enquiry on transitional justice as a system of ‘knowledge’: knowledge 
that claims a status of truth; and knowledge that makes aspects of reality thinkable and 
amenable to interventions (power) (e.g. Bourdieu 1986; Foucault 2008; Latour 2010; 
Moon 2009). Here, knowledge is used to describe the collection of scholars, theories, 
and research techniques that produce and organise the particular concepts that allow us 
to talk about transitional justice, and includes the set of rules that determine what kind 
of claims can be made, authoritatively, about past atrocity and how it might best be 
‘dealt with’.30
Finally, this approach is significant, this thesis suggests, because it destabilises 
self-evident transitional justice assumptions not by refuting them, but by exposing the 
                                                 
30 On the concept of knowledge understood in this sense, see Miller and Rose (2008: 14); Rose and Miller 
(1992: 178).  
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purposes they serve. Paraphrasing Ian Hacking (2000: 20), the third cluster ‘unmasks’ 
transitional justice concepts by disclosing its alleged authority (McEvoy 2007; Moon 
2004; Veitch 2001). This is crucial because, as Hacking (2000: 58) explains, the point 
of unmasking is to show that categories of knowledge are used in power relations. This 
can be illustrated using Moon’s (2004; 2008) and Wilson’s (2001) investigations, which 
have contributed to demystifying transitional justice efforts in South Africa. They have 
demonstrated how truth claims on ‘truth’ and ‘reconciliation’ were in fact constructed 
and presented as a legitimate way of thinking and intervening in the post-apartheid 
regime. In this research, this approach is important to understanding how – and to what 
effect – particular assumptions on ‘transitional justice’ (e.g. about ‘truth’, ‘justice’, 
compensations, transparency) emerged in Mexico’s transitional moment and acquired 
the status of self-evident truths. 
Knowledge and material effects 
The third cluster of research on transitional justice is useful because, unlike the first and 
second clusters, it connects the concepts that come into existence with their subsequent 
use and effects (Du Bois 2001; McEvoy 2007; Moon 2008; Veitch 2001). Scholars 
whose work falls inside this cluster argue that transitional justice classifications and 
concepts do not exist only in the literature – in language – but in institutions, practices, 
material interactions, and so on. Transitional justice literature is not only related to ways 
of representing reality (knowledge): it is also a matter of intervention (power). By 
making up concepts, experts delimit the kind of practices and institutions that come into 
being; they determine the relevant problems during transitions and the legitimate actors 
who can act upon them (Short 2007). For example, by examining how truth claims were 
constructed in South Africa’s transitional moment, Moon (2008) has exposed the 
material and political effects that resulted from such construction: the establishment of a 
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particular kind of truth commission, which closed off the possibility of retributive 
responses to past abuses; of redeeming those who benefited from the apartheid order 
without committing human rights violations themselves; of leaving unacknowledged the 
everyday suffering of many under apartheid.  
This is why the work of Bourdieu (1984), Latour (2010), Hacking (2000) and 
Shapin (1998) is relevant to this research as these scholar see ‘knowledge’ not only as 
the set of ideas, concepts, or research techniques that determine what it is possible to 
say, but believe that language, labels, concepts, have material consequences. Hence, by 
analysing how transitional justice claims were constructed in Mexico’s transitional 
period, I seek to show how such construction had important political effects: the 
establishment of a retributive mechanism – the SPO – whose work depended on the 
existing structures of power (laws and institutions influenced by members of the 
previous authoritarian regime). 
Historical approach 
The third cluster of research on transitional justice is relevant to this thesis as it is 
historical in character. Scholars whose work falls within this cluster consider that 
transitional justice efforts are shaped by social and institutional contexts (McEvoy 2011; 
Moon 2008; Wilson 1997a and 1997b). They believe no iron law of historical 
inevitability has determined which of these alternatives to face the past have been 
chosen at any particular time, nor is there any method to foresee future choices. 
Apart from showing that far from being ‘inevitable’ transitional justice efforts 
are shaped by specific historical events, the third cluster of literature is relevant for two 
reasons. First, by being historical in character, it considers the way in which transitional 
justice efforts are constrained by political bargains (Ainley 2008: 30). Scholars 
participating in this cluster have analysed how transitional justice transforms the 
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balance of power during transitional moments. They also examine how, as groups 
participating in the previous regime do not disappear, transitional justice practices are 
compromised by political arrangements between members of the authoritarian elite and 
the elite of a new democratic regime. Therefore, it allows one to understand how, 
although transitional justice mechanisms aim to transform transitional societies, they are 
closely linked to inherited institutions, traditions, and structures of power in order to 
maintain a degree of stability (Short 2007; Wilson 2001). 
Second, this historical approach shows that transitional justice institutions 
change. Unlike previous approaches, which see transitional justice mechanisms as 
frozen in time, the third cluster makes it possible to examine how such institutions are 
adapted throughout time due to institutional crises, to serve bureaucratic mandates or 
political interests. Therefore, what this approach offers is a complete account of the 
construction and evolution of transitional justice processes, which occur in steps, where 
the later steps are built upon the product of earlier steps. So it allows for the 
examination of how such processes are built and with what consequences. This is 
important as the way these mechanisms are transformed favours some outcomes over 
others (Moon 2008; Wilson 2001). 
The language of human rights 
This social-constructivist approach is relevant because it raises concerns about the 
increasing significance of the language of human rights during transitions. It challenges 
the authority of human rights discourses, which have become a crucial feature of the 
governance of particular transitional moments (Ainley 2008: 29; McEvoy 2007: 418; 
Moon 2008: 4). Scholars participating in this debate have examined how, and to what 
ends, trials and truth commissions gradually came to ‘represent the sites of 
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materialisation of a meta human rights narrative of progress that today is one of the key 
drivers of political transitions and democratization processes’ (Moon 2008: 19). 
As explained before, scholars whose work comprises the first and second 
clusters of literature on transitional justice ignore the role played by human rights as a 
means through which power is exercised. They believe that trials and truth commissions 
are built upon moral, legal, universal, neutral, and depoliticised imperatives, which 
states are ‘obliged’ to observe. Scholars participating within the first and second clusters 
of literature believe, as Ainley (2008: 9) says, that human rights law is ‘objective and 
neutral’, ‘entirely separate[d] from politics (which is subjective, arbitrary and value-
laden)’. Thus scholars in both clusters follow a variant of what Cohen (2005) and 
McEvoy (2007) have termed ‘magical legalism’; transitional justice theorists think that 
things (reality) can exist simply because they are prescribed by law. This is an example 
of this ‘magical syllogism’: human rights laws are universal, extra-political, neutral, 
eternal rules; transitional justice mechanisms are based on such laws (e.g. the right to 
truth, the right to justice); therefore transitional justice mechanisms are universal, extra-
political, and neutral in nature. The problem is that this ‘magical legalism’, as McEvoy 
(2007: 418; 2011: 377) has demonstrated, denies ‘the quintessentially political nature of 
its argumentation’. And certainly it also ignores the way in which the materialisation of 
this language is compromised by political arrangements. 
In contrast, scholars whose work comprises the third cluster of research on 
transitional justice examine the trajectory of human rights in transitional societies in a 
way that ‘goes beyond the formal, legalistic dimensions of such rights, where […] they 
will always be a “good thing” (Short 2007: 859).’ These social constructivist 
approaches take a ‘broad sociological approach’ that explores how the construction and 
institutionalisation of human rights are social processes bound by existing structures of 
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power and ‘intertwined with power, elites […] and the actions, intentions and interests 
of the social actors involved’ (Short 2007: 859). The third cluster of literature sees the 
language of human rights as the set of ‘prescriptive norms that emerge from and guide 
social forms and practices’ around the idea of individuals and collectivities with human 
rights (Evans 2005: 1049; Fields and Narr 1992: 9). They consider that human rights 
talk is ‘created, re-created, and instantiated by human actors in particular socio-
historical settings and conditions’ (Stammers 1999: 981). Therefore, by following this 
approach, by the language of human rights (human rights discourse or human rights 
talk) this thesis refers to a set of assumptions, concepts, categories, classifications and 
ideas on human rights, which are codified mainly through international law vocabulary 
(Ainley 2011), and that generates institutions, practices, strategies, and efforts for its 
implementation and government (rule, control, policing). This language includes ideas 
and practices (knowledge/power) on knowing about, and accounting for, past atrocity 
(Arthur 2009; Moon 2008; Wilson 2001). 
In this sense, the third cluster of literature on transitional justice is useful to this 
thesis as its proponents do not assume that human rights are free-standing ideas. On the 
contrary, they are concerned with classifications: they attend to the way in which human 
rights categories are constructed and adapted in particular transitional societies – e.g. 
‘gross violations of human rights’, ‘the right to truth’ (Ainley 2008; Christodoulidis 
1999; Moon 2009; Short 2007). In examining how human rights concepts are 
constructed, scholars in this cluster investigate the way in which such concepts are put 
to work via trials, truth bodies, in ad hoc laws, special legislation, new practices, or 
research centres; or incorporated in new professions – e.g. social workers, 
psychologists, NGOs of human rights, transitional justice experts, ‘transitologists’, 
retributivists, and restorativists. 
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From this perspective, this social-constructivist approach is relevant to this thesis 
because it challenges the authority of human rights discourses in political transitions. In 
so doing, different authors take different critical positions on the language of human 
rights. Their critiques vary in intensity and in their ‘grades of commitment’ (Hacking 
2000: 19). The first grade, following Hacking’s classification, is ‘historical’. This can 
be illustrated by Moon’s study on South Africa’s transitional justice process. Moon 
suggests that, far from being inevitable, human rights categories are the contingent 
outcome of historical events. Moon does not show whether this is a bad or a good thing. 
What Moon does is to demonstrate that human rights categories are not-self evident or 
necessary – they were constructed in a particular historical context. 
Other scholars take an ‘ironic’ attitude: the irony is that even if we recognize 
that something (e.g. human rights law) is highly contingent, the product of social history 
and forces, we are forced to leave things as they are (Hacking 2000: 20). In her study on 
individual agency and responsibility for atrocity, Kirsten Ainley (2008) raises concerns 
about the increase in the amount of international human rights law which is concerned 
with identifying and prosecuting individual offenders in transitional justice processes. 
According to Ainley this approach to past atrocity has ‘insidious effects’: e.g. ‘it ignores 
the enormous influence of socials and environmental factors upon human actors’; it 
‘means that many of those people who enabled atrocities by creating the socials 
conditions which made them possible will escape unpunished at they cannot be shown 
to have intended particular harms’; it ignores instances of great suffering which cannot 
be framed by international human rights law (Ainley 2008: 2 & 23). Yet, she does not 
really suggest how to change this approach and so leaves it much as it is. 
Others take a ‘reformist constructionism’ perspective (Hacking 2000: 20). 
According to Hacking, having in mind that ideas and practices that are socially 
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constructed (e.g. transitional justice) are not inevitable, some social-constructivists 
scholars seek to reform some aspects of such ideas and practices. In her study on the 
limits of international human rights law during transitional processes, Ainely (2011) 
criticises the unprecedented individualisation and criminalisation of responsibility for 
past atrocity through ad hoc tribunals during political transitions. Ainley claims that the 
responsibility for past state crimes lies not with individual perpetrators alone but also in 
significant measure with collectives and with those individuals who did not commit 
crimes but did contribute to harm. Thus, in response to the limits of international human 
rights law, Ainley (2011: 428) suggests to ‘support not just trials as responses to atrocity 
but also mandate such mechanisms as responsibility and truth commissions to establish 
political responsibility’. This reform would require large number of culpable (but not 
necessarily guilty) actors to take responsibility for their actions and inactions (Ainley 
2011). 
Another position taken by scholars participating in this cluster is that 
‘unmasking constructivism’ (Hacking 2000: 20). According to Hacking, some social- 
constructivists do not seek to ‘refute ideas but to undermine them by exposing the 
function they serve’. There is an illustration of this in the work of Wilson (2001). 
Wilson exposes how – and to what effects – human rights discourses are used by new 
regimes: to manufacture legitimacy for key state institutions such as the criminal justice 
system; to ‘construct the present moment as post-authoritarian when it includes many 
elements of the past’ (Wilson 2001: xvi). 
Grades of commitment aside, this social-constructivist approach is also relevant 
as these scholars emphasise the significant role played by the language of human rights 
in the formation of new political regimes. Rights discourses have in fact led to the 
establishment of transitional justice mechanisms which have facilitated complicated 
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political transitions. In some transitional societies (e.g. South Africa, Argentina, and 
Mexico), human rights legal devices have been explicitly used to challenge 
conventional legal operations and reasoning in order to preserve the political stability of 
the new system. Through amnesty laws, for example, truth commissions have forced 
law to be ‘merciful rather than just in the conventional sense’ (Christodoulidis and 
Veitch 2001: x). In this sense, these third cluster scholars claim, law is actually 
‘stretched’ in order to comprehend a set of political desires (Veitch 2001: 34). For 
instance, law is being forced to incorporate elements of forgiveness (e.g. amnesties) in 
the service of peaceable futures (Christodoulidis 1999; Veitch 2001). Moreover, by not 
addressing the cultural or social contexts that produced violence in the first place, the 
language of human rights attempts to transcend political divisions, and fails to challenge 
the previous structures of power that made abuses possible (Ainley 2011; Moon 2008). 
In Mexico’s ‘transitional justice’ process, the analysis of the language of human 
rights is particularly relevant for two reasons. First, because as I will show in Chapter 
Four, particular human rights categories (e.g. forced disappearance) led to the 
establishment of the SPO and framed its investigations. This is important because such 
human rights categories were in fact constructed in such a way as to actually maintain 
the impunity enjoyed by perpetrators. That is what Moon meant when she claimed that 
transitional justice processes, framed by human rights discourses, can mediate 
complicated transitions because they do not, ostensibly, threaten the power elite. 
Second, because as I explore in Chapters Three and Five, human rights discourses were 
used by Fox’s administration as a language of political legitimation. As Moon (2008) 
suggests, the deployment of the language of human rights in transitional moments can 
be instrumental to state legitimacy – that is, it is put in the service of state power – 
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rather than being a fundamental priority in its own right. The Mexican case provides a 
particularly powerful empirical demonstration of this insight. 
Agency 
The third cluster of literature on transitional justice does not assume that this form of 
justice is a domain reserved to the state and its agents. Proponents consider that 
transitional justice processes are constituted mainly, but not exclusively, as an effect of 
the centralised power of the state. Hence they take the state as their main, but not 
exclusive, empirical focus. This approach is relevant to this thesis as it shows how 
transitional justice is a field in which non-state actors (e.g. activists and scholars) and 
state agents intervene and negotiate agendas. Non-state actors exercise power by 
making up the appropriate definitions related to transitional justice that later have to be 
adopted, instituted, and controlled by state institutions (McEvoy 2011). State and non-
state actors share, paradoxically, the same language: the language of human rights. 
Therefore, this approach can help increase our understanding about the role 
played by a growing epistemic community of transitional justice practitioners (Hirsch 
2007). At least in Mexico, the emergence and rule of the ‘transitional justice’ process 
entailed a close relationship between state and non-state actors. The official 
establishment of Mexico’s ‘transitional justice’ mechanism – a Special Prosecutor’s 
Office – was certainly an act of the state. Yet (a) this act of the state was framed within 
the human rights framework advanced by civil society (see Chapter Four); (b) the 
official institution of these mechanisms was preceded by political deliberations in which 
NGOs, scholars, and human rights activists intervened and prescribed the appropriate 
ways to deal with past atrocity (see Chapter Three); (c) activists and scholars, who 
claim to represent civil society, were indeed working within these institutions; and (d) 
the entire process was constantly scrutinised by a multiplicity of non-state actors who 
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persistently promoted reforms in order to rectify the way in which these mechanisms 
were working (see Chapter Five). 
Policing the past 
The third cluster of literature on transitional justice is useful to this investigation 
because it provides the basis for analysing the relationship between the way in which 
transitional justice is constructed and policed. A useful concept that captures the 
relationship between the emergence of particular transitional justice ideas, the way in 
which those ideas are secured, put into practice, controlled – and, crucially, the purposes 
that this control serves – is that of ‘policing the past’. The concept was originally 
developed by Cohen in 1995, in a seminal article on diverse strategies to deal with state 
crimes of previous regimes. Cohen’s (1995: 10) concept ‘meant to convey no more than 
a loose analogy’ between the way transitional societies confront previous state crimes 
‘and the more familiar ways in which all societies confront their “ordinary” crime 
problems’ (See also: Cohen 1994). Recently, McEvoy’s critical analysis on transitional 
justice suggests a similar analogy in what he terms ‘a criminological understanding of 
transitional justice’. For McEvoy (2007: 433) criminology is useful to transitional 
justice because it provides ‘a better aetiology of crime and the ways in which crime is a 
socially and politically constructed phenomenon’. 
However, Cohen briefly explores the concept ‘policing the past’ in a different 
sense: as the way in which states control the past through transitional justice strategies 
in order to meet the political agenda of the present – control by opening, control by 
closing, recovery of memory or its eradication, selective remembering, or forgetting. 
This is the sense in which this thesis understands this concept, which is relevant here for 
three reasons. 
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In his study on social control, Cohen (1985: 174) suggests that the language 
used by those in the ‘helping professions’, in which the human rights movement is 
clearly involved, defines people’s status. These professionals (e.g. human rights 
activists) use particular terms to categorise their ‘clients’ (e.g. victims of past abuses, 
offenders), and such terms justify the way that clients are regulated. And this, Cohen 
(1985: 174) claims, reveals ‘the essentially political function of language’. 
Consequently, he concludes, ‘language creates multiple realities and, in particular, the 
bifurcatory reality of who is worthy and who is not’. Similarly, Hacking (2002b: 40) 
argues that ‘we make up the categories we use to describe the world’ […] ‘we may 
generate kinds of people and kinds of action as we devise new classifications and 
categories’. 
Therefore, following this line of reasoning, the term ‘policing the past’ is useful 
to illustrate how, in transitional societies, the language of human rights allows for the 
conceptualisation, legitimacy, and policing of transitional justice mechanisms. This 
language frames the discourses and practices of transitional justice processes: the kind 
of human rights violations that qualify for investigation and, hence, the type of victims 
that are counted in the process, and concomitantly the perpetrators of certain crimes 
who would be subject to prosecution. That is to say, the crimes and protagonists of the 
past are socially and politically constructed in such a way as to permit certain forms of 
action in relation to the past (policing), to bring certain authorities, laws and institutions 
into being, and to proscribe or permit certain forms of action – namely prosecution. 
Certainly, the very same language tacitly determines the kind of abuses which would be 
excluded, the suffering that would be forgotten, and the perpetrators who would be 
forgiven or ignored. (This is the subject of Chapter Four.) 
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Second, the concept ‘policing the past’ captures the political determinants that 
lead to variation in transitional justice efforts, e.g. trials, ad hoc laws, special 
prosecutions, investigatory bodies, truth commissions. States and societies control the 
past not only by opening it to scrutiny, but by closing it. As Cohen (1995: 47) argues, 
all societies use both strategies: ‘particular societies, at particular times, slip into one or 
the other mode – control by opening, control by closing. And both opening and closing 
are, of course, highly selective.’ As Ainley notes, not all state crimes are prosecuted or 
investigated: the decision over whether to investigate particular crimes or criminals is 
political. ‘Power can prevent certain atrocities ever being tried’ (Ainley 2008: 30). This 
is relevant because incipient democracies define the kind of events that can be 
scrutinised and the specific way to do it in order not to threaten the survival of the 
regime, its political stability, or the process of democratisation. 
In this regard, the concept serves to illustrate the powerful political symbolism 
imposed by transitional justice processes: they transform the relationship between what 
has gone before (during the previous regime) and what currently exists (in the new 
democratic system). By ‘policing the past’ through diverse transitional justice practices 
new democratic regimes seek to ‘assert discontinuity between past and present’ (Cohen 
1995: 49). Such mechanisms imprint a sense of ending to the political transition – a 
sense of ‘closure’ in Moon’s (2006) terms – in both symbolic and material ways. 
Although those responsible for the worst oppression are incorporated within the new 
system, and even if the structures that made abuses possible remain intact, transitional 
justice efforts are supposed to mark the end of transitions; by instigating transitional 
justice practices the new government is demonstrating it has met the challenges of 
transition – these practices symbolise the beginning of a new peaceful and democratic 
era: ‘history was ruptured; something happened; it no longer happens; there is no point 
Chapter Two: Transitional Justice 126
in talking about it too much for too long’ (Cohen 1995: 49). (I deal with this issue in 
Chapter Three.) 
Third, the policing of the past is also possible by the control of memory of past 
atrocity. Memory, as Cohen (1995: 45) suggests, ‘is a social product – a product that 
reflects the agenda and social location of those who invoke it and the political struggle 
to suppress or resurrect what has been or what potentially might be forgotten’. By 
eliminating special elements of the past and preserving others, transitional justice 
processes allow new democracies to adjust the past to the present political agenda in 
order to establish a version of history that legitimates current policy. In this sense, 
Martin Innes and Alan Clarke (2009: 548) suggest that transitional justice can serve to 
fix the past. For them, ‘fixing the past involves repairing previous errors or mistakes’. 
But also, they argue, fixing ‘equates to the production of an unchanging and stabilized 
narrative account that explains as far as possible “who did what to whom and why”’. In 
her research on South Africa’s transitional justice process, Moon illustrates this point. 
Moon (2008) examined how the TRC sought to unify disparate and conflicting 
perspectives on the past; and how the TRC’s narration produced ‘the nation’ as its 
central subject – a subject that, according to this narrative, would evolve automatically 
from past violence to future reconciliation. (I will return to this point in Chapter Five.) 
States of denial 
Finally, this thesis draws on Cohen’s sociology of denial. In his book States of Denial, 
Cohen (2005) examines how people, organisations, governments or societies deny, 
repress, or reinterpret information that is too disturbing or threatening to be openly 
acknowledged. Cohen identifies three forms of denial. Literal denial: the assertion that 
something did not happen (Cohen 2005: 7). Interpretive denial: when facts are not 
denied, but given a different meaning from what seems apparent to others (‘what 
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happened was something else’). Implicatory denial: facts are not denied – what are 
denied are the moral or political implications of such facts (‘what happened was 
justified’; ‘it’s worse elsewhere’) (Cohen 2005: 8). 
Cohen’s sociology of denial is particularly useful to transitional justice studies as 
transitional justice practices attempt to overcome official denial: i.e., to acknowledge 
what was known, but officially disavowed. As Cohen suggests, the entire rhetoric of 
government responses to allegations about atrocities consists of denials: literal denial: 
‘there was no massacre; no one was tortured; people like us don’t do things like that’; 
interpretive denial: ‘there was a “transfer of population,” not genocide; “collateral 
damage,” not killing civilians; “moderate physical pressure,” not torture; “an isolated 
incident,” not a systematic pattern’; implicatory denial: ‘we acted for morally good, 
even noble reasons: in defence of national security, part of the war against terrorism, for 
the revolution, to protect democracy’ (Cohen 1995: 15). Hence the establishment of 
truth commissions, tribunals, or lustrations systems implies – at least tacitly – the 
official acknowledgment that ‘something’ happened in the past. 
In the previous chapter (Chapter One), Cohen’s insights proved relevant in 
understanding how the PRI regime systematically denied the occurrence of human 
rights violations during decades. This is important because if we ignore the authoritarian 
regime’s official rhetoric of denial concerning state crimes we cannot understand why 
the PRI survived for seven decades. In the following chapters, Cohen’s insights are 
valuable as they help us to make sense of the way in which the Fox administration 
established a transitional justice process that did not deliver anything. The rhetoric of 
denial used during the PRI era was incorporated into the new democratic regime to 
justify how prosecutorial strategies were leading nowhere (‘you can’t call this 
genocide’, ‘the category of forced disappearance is not included in Mexico’s legal 
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framework’, ‘this is a human right violation, but not exactly a crime’); why most 
victims of past abuses were ousted from the transitional justice process (‘there are not 
official documents to confirm what the victims’ relatives testified’, ‘what victims 
suffered was not exactly forced disappearance, but something else’, ‘there is not enough 
evidence to be certain that a person in fact disappeared’); and why perpetrators were 
granted a de facto amnesty (‘I am not legally authorized to give the name of 
perpetrators’, ‘the statute of limitations for such crime has run out’, ‘this looks like 
forced disappearance, but the General Attorney should keep investigating’). As I will 
show throughout this thesis, ‘The Mexican solution’ is a preeminent exercise in political 
denial. 
Methodological considerations 
As explained in the introduction to this thesis, this work is based on a detailed empirical 
analysis of the official documents published by the Mexican government between 2000 
and 2009 to institute, police, and bring to an end Mexico’s ‘transitional justice’ process. 
Also, based on exhaustive documentary research of private and public archives to which 
I had privileged access, this thesis is supported by the scrupulous inspection of texts 
generated by local and international human rights NGOs, as well as the main Mexican 
newspapers (e.g. Reforma, El Universal). Therefore, this research’s great strength is that 
it offers a thorough ‘empirical snapshot’ of the different factors that facilitated the 
establishment of ‘transitional justice’ mechanisms that were, ostensibly, designed to 
deliver justice without placing the Fox administration’s relationship with the previous 
authoritarian regime at risk. 
This section sets out my methodological considerations in accessing, collecting, 
and interpreting the selected empirical evidence. It gives an overview of the research 
process, explains the research techniques I used to pull together the corpus of material 
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analysed in this thesis, and describes the methodological problems I encountered during 
this research. 
The corpus of material 
This thesis is based on documentary evidence – the written evidence produced and 
published by Mexican state officials (e.g. presidential decrees, congressional debates); 
national and international NGOs of human rights (e.g. International Centre of 
Transitional Justice), experts and activists intervening in this process; and the national 
press. These texts are visible, open to the public, and easily accessible – i.e., the data I 
used throughout this thesis is fully available for independent inspection. So readers 
interested in this research can review the evidence that led to my conclusions directly. 
By official documents I refer here to all those relevant texts produced by the 
state or by actors working as state officials for state institutions related to Mexico’s 
‘transitional justice’ process. This corpus of material includes texts published by 
institutions within any of the three branches of the federal government. First, the 
executive branch – mainly, the Presidency, the Minister of Interior, the National Human 
Rights Commission (NHRC), and the Attorney General’s Office – produced the texts 
that mandated the creation and determined the powers of the ‘transitional justice’ 
mechanisms (e.g. the Special Prosecutor’s Office mandate, its Regulatory Procedures, 
Statements of Accounts, and Final Historical Report). Second, the legislative branch 
(the Senate and the House of Representatives) created or modified laws that affected the 
process (e.g. the reform that established that prisoners above seventy years old must 
serve their sentence under house arrest, which undoubtedly benefited most of the 
perpetrators under investigation as they were above this age. I return to this issue in 
Chapter Five). Third, the judicial branch decided over the cases under investigation by 
the SPO (e.g. Mexico’s Supreme Court’s rulings on the massacre of students in 1968). 
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The official texts setting out the creation and policing of Mexico’s ‘transitional 
justice’ mechanisms appeared to provide objective, neutral rules. For instance, the 
presidential decree that officially established a ‘Special Prosecutor’s Office for the 
Attention of Matters Allegedly Related to Federal Crimes Committed Directly or 
Indirectly by Public Servants Against Persons Linked to Social or Political Movements 
of the Past’ was never officially debated. The decree was presented as a fait accompli; 
as something fixed whose legitimacy was unquestionable (I return to this issue in 
Chapter Three). Once published in the Federation’s Official Gazette or in the 
Parliamentary Gazette, ‘transitional justice’ norms existed as final products – self-
evident truths. These legal texts were also impersonal: ‘transitional justice’ rules 
seemed to be created somehow by an unspecified agent. Law, as Bruno Latour (2010: 
xi) suggests in his study on the Conseil D’Etat, seems to ‘have no possible individual or 
personalised site: it had to speak from nowhere as the Voice of the Law’. However, 
these neutral, objective, impersonal, final legal products were in fact preceded by 
controversy. Ideas on ‘transitional justice’ were out there in public. Assumptions and 
rules about ‘truth’, ‘reconciliation’, and ‘reparations’ were proposed, secured, 
challenged, and adapted by state officials, transitional justice theorists, experts, and 
activists. Therefore, as this thesis is concerned with the way in which ‘transitional 
justice’ came into being, I also collected texts that make it possible to offer an account 
of how these rules were constructed, the way in which legal reasoning was knitted, 
allowing ‘transitional justice’ practices to be established, e.g. parliamentary debates, 
legal interpretations contained in Mexican Courts’ decisions, and transcripts of public 
speeches made by the President, its ministers, or the Special Prosecutor. 
By NGO documents I refer to the significant texts reflecting both the NGOs’ and 
activists’ perspectives and proposals about the suggested mechanisms for dealing with 
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past abuses in Mexico. This set of texts includes those published by national 
organisations formed by victims of past abuses or their relatives, e.g. Asociación de 
Familiares de Detenidos Desaparecidos y Víctimas de Violaciones a Derechos 
Humanos en México (AFADEM), Fundación Diego Lucero, Comité de Madres de 
Presos Políticos y Desaparecidos de Chihuahua, Comité 68 Pro Libertades 
Democráticas, Nacidas en la Tempestad, Asociación de Familiares de Detenidos, and 
Desaparecidos y Víctimas de Violaciones a los Derechos Humanos en México. 
Additionally, it incorporates those significant texts produced by national or international 
organisations of human rights that had specific programmes about Mexico’s 
‘transitional justice’, e.g. Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the 
International Center for Transitional Justice, Miguel Agustín Pro-Juárez Centre for 
Human Rights, Comisión Mexicana de Defensa y Promoción de los Derechos 
Humanos, and Red Nacional de Organismos Civiles de Derechos Humanos ‘Todos los 
Derechos para Todas y Todos’. 
The corpus of material includes texts published in the form of ‘public letters’, 
press releases, sub-sections within NGOs’ annual reports, or as reports specifically 
addressing ‘transitional justice’ matters. An example of the latter is Human Rights 
Watch’s (2003) report Justice in Jeopardy: Why Mexico’s First Real Effort to Address 
Past Abuses Risks Becoming Its Latest Failure. 
Human rights NGOs also announced their positions through press conferences 
or brief press releases. But they were not the only ones. Press texts are important 
because they make it possible to identify the experts’ opinion on the matter. To the best 
of my knowledge, apart from Mariclaire Acosta’s (2006) and Louis Bickford’s (2005) 
journal articles, there has been no academic work on Mexico’s reckoning with past 
abuses. Experts and scholars published their work in the press, so Mexico’s newspapers 
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became the forum in which experts debated how to deal with the past, whether 
discussing moral considerations or through political analysis. So, newspapers accounts 
were excellent sources for providing contextual information (Yin 2003: 88). 
Consequently, I collected all the relevant articles that referred to the process of 
facing past atrocity published in Mexico’s leading newspapers and magazines from 
2000 to 2009: Reforma, La Jornada, Milenio, El Universal, and Proceso Magazine. 
These are Mexico’s most influential newspapers and they tend to show diversity in 
news coverage (between the government and the oppositional forces), and they reflect 
some ideological differences. Therefore, these newspapers chosen for this thesis 
‘represent the range of variations of news production in Mexico’ (Hughes 2006: 13). 
Together, they reach more than sixty five percent of newspaper readers in Mexico City, 
the country’s largest and most influential media market (Hughes 2006). 
The texts analysed in this thesis were published between July 2000 and June 
2009. Although the ‘transitional justice’ mechanisms were officially instituted in 
November 2001, controversies over how to address past political crimes can be traced to 
Vicente Fox’s electoral triumph in July 2000 (This is the subject of Chapter Three). And 
although the Special Prosecutor’s Office came to an end in November 2006, state 
officials, NGOs, transnational organisations (e.g. Human Rights Council of the United 
Nations), and experts (e.g. Juan Méndez from the ICTJ) have continued their debates on 
how to reactivate and rectify Mexico’s ‘transitional’ mechanisms up to now (October 
2011). I decided to end this research in June 2009 because that was the month when the 
last significant effort to re-establish Mexico’s ‘transitional justice’ mechanisms during 
the Universal Periodic Review of the United Nations was made.31
                                                 
31 The Universal Periodic Review is a mechanism in which the Human Rights Council of the United 
Nations assesses the human rights records of the UN member states.  
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How the material was interpreted 
Essential to any account about methodological considerations is an explanation of how 
to read the material – the empirical data – in order to answer the research questions 
posed. As previously explained in this chapter, this thesis builds upon the third cluster 
of literature on transitional justice – a social-constructivist approach. Accordingly, the 
content analysis of the texts used in this investigation was shaped by Foucault’s (1986; 
1991b; 1991c) genealogical methods.32
Foucault provided two key methodological pointers. First, analysis must begin 
with a systematic scepticism towards universals. Thus, one must research what 
conditions make it possible for societies, using a set of rules regarding true and false 
statements, to recognise a subject, or a universal (Payne 2010; Reubi 2009). As 
Foucault (1991c: 76) suggested, a genealogical method is to write a story that makes 
‘visible a singularity at places where there is a temptation to invoke a historical constant 
[…] or an obviousness which imposes itself uniformly on all’. 
Second, analysis needs to address practices. Thus, one needs to understand what 
was constituted as real by those who sought to manage reality and constitute themselves 
as subjects capable of knowing, analysing, and ultimately altering reality (Payne 2010). 
It is an approach that rediscovers ‘the connections, encounters, supports, blockages, 
plays of forces, strategies and so on which at a given moment establish what 
subsequently counts as being self-evident, universal and necessary’ (Foucault 1991c: 
76). 
In this sense, when analysing the empirical data, this investigation looked at the 
conceptualisations within texts that determined how the past was to be recovered 
                                                 
32 Certainly, in using a genealogical approach, this research builds on an increasingly important literature 
that has addressed how particular issues (e.g. crime, schooling, memory, and trauma) have been 
constituted and then ruled (e.g. Barron 1996; Greco 1993; Hacking 1995; Moon 2009; Osborne and Rose 
1999; Owen 1995; Reubi 2009 and 2010; Valverde 1997). 
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organised, and adjudicated. In so doing, I explored how particular claims around past 
crimes acquired authority during Vicente Fox’s administration. Therefore, I focused on 
how particular practices and institutions (e.g. the SPO) were brought into being as a 
result of those claims. Finally, I considered the set of rules that proscribed which actors 
(e.g. the Attorney General, Mexico’s ombudsman) were authorised to intervene in 
Mexico’s ‘transitional justice’ process (Hall 2003: 45). 
This is an insightful analytical approach that makes it possible to examine how 
human rights rules on knowledge and accountability for past atrocity emerged; and how 
such rules appeared to be valid simply because of their normative quality – although the 
elaboration of human rights norms, and its deployment, were always mixed with extra-
legal processes and affected by political interests. The method used to analyse the 
empirical data seeks to bring to the reader’s attention the way in which the language of 
human rights became the vehicle that allowed different actors to establish and rule 
Mexico’s ‘transitional justice’ process. 
But, importantly, ‘Foucault’s stories’, Hacking (2002a: 74, 75) argues, ‘are 
dramatic. He presents a reordering of events that we had not perceived before’. 
‘Foucault’s genius’, Hacking goes on, ‘is to go down to the little dramas, dress them in 
facts hardly anyone else had noticed, and turn these stage settings into clues to a 
hitherto unthought series of confrontations out of which […] the orderly structure of 
society is composed.’ Therefore, to construct this critical story of Mexico’s ‘transitional 
justice’ process, I have had to move beyond the official documents and NGO reports. 
So I have relied on the press. Texts published by the Mexican press on this process 
allowed me to further contextualise the country’s efforts to deal with past atrocity. 
Certainly, when analysing these data, I bring to the reader’s attention the significant 
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contingent events, and the ‘little dramas’ out of which Mexico’s ‘transitional justice’ 
emerged. 
Before explaining the way I collected the documentary evidence used in this 
thesis, it is important to clarify that the analytical tools developed in Foucault-inspired 
studies are flexible and open-ended (Rose, et al. 2006: 101). They are in fact compatible 
with many other methods, and they are not hardwired to any political perspective. For 
Nikolas Rose and his colleagues, ‘what is worth retaining above all from this approach 
is its creativity’. Therefore, the significance of using this method is that it offers a 
‘certain ethos of investigation, a way of asking questions, a focus not upon why certain 
things happened, but how they happened and the difference that that made in relation to 
what had gone before’ (Rose, et al. 2006: 101). 
Data collection 
Central to any discussion of method is an explanation for the selection of documentary 
evidence. The texts on which this thesis is based were collected from October 2004 to 
June 2009. This section explains the methodological decisions made to access these 
documents, and the process of data collection. It also validates the quality of the 
evidence analysed in this thesis. 
To validate the material collected, this thesis follows John Scott’s (1990: 
Chapter Two) criteria on the assessment of documentary sources. Thus, this section 
demonstrates that the texts analysed are genuine and reliable; and that they are 
representative of the totality of relevant documents. Moreover, it renders visible the 
‘authorship’ and ‘accessibility’ of my documentary data. By ‘authorship’ I mean the 
origin of the documents – whether these documents belong to the official or civil 
society spheres (Scott 1990: 14). By ‘access’ I mean the availability of the documents – 
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whether these documents were public and easy to find or if their availability was limited 
and restricted (Scott 1990: 14). 
NGOs texts and the press 
To collect the significant texts on Mexico’s ‘transitional justice’ process generated by 
national and international NGOs and the press, I followed the ‘method for composing 
our world’ established by Bruno Latour (1988: 3-13) in his study on pasteurisation on 
France and adopted by David Reubi (2009: Chapter Two) in his genealogy of bioethical 
governance. According to Latour (1988: 9), this ‘method does not require us to decide 
in advance on a list of actors and possible actions. If we open the […] literature of the 
time’, he argues, ‘we find stories that define for us who are the main actors, what 
happens to them, what trials they undergo.’ Thus, as Reubi (2009: Chapter Two) argues, 
‘the identification of a governmental logic’s key moments, actors, ideas and issues is 
best left to those who developed the logic themselves’. 
In this thesis, using this technique I started at one point and traced what human 
rights activists, scholars, and experts wrote about ‘transitional justice’ in Mexico. As 
Latour (1988: 10) suggests: 
the fact that we do not know in advance what the world is made up of is not a reason for 
refusing to make a start, because other storytellers seem to know and are constantly 
defining the actors that surround them – what they want, what causes them, and the 
ways in which they can be weakened or linked together. These storytellers attribute 
causes, date events, endow entities with qualities, classify actors… The analyst does not 
know more than they; he has only to begin at any point, by recording what each actor 
says of the others. 
 
This technique proved deeply appropriate to this study. For instance, the first 
major investigation on Mexico’s ‘transitional justice’ was carried out by Human Rights 
Watch in 2003. HRW’s report on the investigation sought to ‘answer the question’ of 
why the SPO’s had produced ‘few significant results’ and to urge strategies to remedy 
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its ‘failure’. According to this report, Human Rights Watch ‘conducted a research 
mission’ in Mexico, where the organisation: 
interviewed dozens of victims and relatives who have been working with the Special 
Prosecutor’s Office – and in some cases have been struggling for years on their own – 
to advance investigations into their cases. We interviewed local human rights advocates 
who expressed deep frustration with the slow progress of the work of the Special 
Prosecutor’s Office, but appeared ready to collaborate with it to bring about results. 
 
Thus, this HRW report allowed me to identify the main actors, beyond the state, that 
were intervening in Mexico’s ‘transitional justice’ process – experts, activists, and other 
organisations of human rights. 
Moreover, my professional background allowed me quickly to identify the 
various actors involved in the process, and the dynamics of their relationship with each 
other. I arrived at this research project from my professional background working both 
as a consultant to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Office in 
Mexico and as a research assistant to Professor Sergio Aguayo, who pioneered the study 
of past state crimes and guerrilla movements in Mexico. Thus, as a result of that work, I 
had a fairly clear notion of the relevant organisations and scholars actively intervening 
in the process of ‘transitional justice’. 
Most NGOs published their reports online. On occasion, activists and 
organisations make public statements about the ‘transitional justice’ process, 
particularly when reacting to critical events, e.g. the arrest of a former president accused 
of genocide, or a Supreme Court’s controversial decision on the cases under 
investigation. However, once the urgency that provoked the press release ceased, these 
documents were removed from the NGOs’ websites. So, with the exception of Human 
Rights Watch or Amnesty International, which have a complete online database, 
domestic NGOs’ documents removed from the website are commonly lost. To 
overcome this problem, the organisation Strategic Human Rights Litigation (Litigio 
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Estratégico en Derechos Humanos, IDHEAS), a leading nongovernmental organisation 
that monitors, researches, and advocates in relation to human rights litigation in Mexico, 
gave me access to its archive where many of the NGOs’ reports related to ‘transitional 
justice’ are held. 
I have found most press texts with contextual information online. With the 
exception of Proceso Magazine, all the newspapers analysed in this thesis have 
databases available on their websites. Therefore, it was fairly easy to make a complete 
survey of the journalistic articles and op-ed sections related to ‘transitional justice’ 
between 2000 and 2009. Proceso Magazine, separately, gave me access to its archive 
held in its offices in Mexico City. 
Official texts 
This thesis used three supplementary research strategies in order to collect official 
documents. First, inspired by Latour’s (1988) ‘method for composing our world’, I 
started gathering official texts related to Mexico’s ‘transitional justice’ process in 
October 2004. My emphasis was on the Special Prosecutor’s Office because it had the 
leading role in the process. At that time, the SPO was an integral part of Fox 
administration. Dependent on the Attorney General’s Office, the SPO had a specific 
budget, offices, and a public website. And as any other bureaucratic institution in 
Mexico it was regulated by the Federal Public Administration Act (Ley Orgánica de la 
Administración Pública Federal). This simplified the process of gathering official 
information because all the relevant governmental texts on Mexico’s ‘transitional 
justice’ process were public and available on the Internet. A good illustration of such 
texts is the Agreement on Certain Measures to Do Justice for Abuses Committed 
Against Persons Linked with Social and Political Movements in the Past (Acuerdo Por 
El Que Se Disponen Diversas Medidas Para la Procuración de Justicia Por Delitos 
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Cometidos Contra Personas Vinculadas con Movimientos Sociales y Políticos del 
Pasado), which delimited the way in which the problem of past atrocity would be ruled 
by the state in collaboration with non-state actors through diverse institutional 
mechanisms and legal dispositions. Another example of this is the SPO’s working plan. 
This included the Programme on Legal Investigations, which determined the SPO’s 
prosecutorial strategies (the SPO’s programmes have been already mentioned in 
Chapter One). 
But the SPO was suddenly dismantled on November 30, 2006 (PGR 2007). 
Consequently, its Internet site was no longer available and the official documents posted 
there were no longer accessible to the public. As a result my documentary sources did 
not meet the basic criteria suggested by Scott (1990: Chapter Two) to assess the quality 
of documentary sources. As the official institution that generated the official evidence 
used in this thesis no longer existed, it was impossible to validate the authenticity, 
representativeness, or credibility of the material. Moreover, the texts were not easily 
available for the reader any more. 
As a result, I had to re-trace all the relevant official texts that I had gathered 
online related to the SPO. To do so, I conducted archival work at the Daniel Cosío 
Villegas Library, at El Colegio de Mexico, in Mexico City. There, I confirmed the 
documentary sources used in this research in the Federation’s Official Gazette, in which 
rules and regulations of the three branches of the federal government are published 
daily. 
My second supplementary research strategy was to request official texts related 
to the ‘transitional justice’ process using Mexico’s ‘transparency law’. This law – the 
Federal Law of Transparency and Access to Government Public Information – was 
created by Vicente Fox in order to end the secrecy that characterised the previous 
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authoritarian regime (IFAI 2004). According to this law, individuals (‘petitioners’) have 
the right to request any document containing public information from any federal 
institution. 
I requested official texts via the transparency law because of an incident that 
occurred while carrying out this research. In 2005, Professor Sergio Aguayo, from the 
Centre for International Studies at El Colegio de Mexico, invited me to co-author a brief 
journalistic article about the SPO. We evaluated the SPO’s work and published our 
results in Proceso Magazine on November 13 (Aguayo and Trevino-Rangel 2005). Two 
weeks later, the Special Prosecutor’s Office responded to our article by publishing a 
press release in the same magazine. The SPO considered our article as ‘fiction’ derived 
from ‘sociological analysis’ (SPO 2005). According to the press released published by 
the Special Prosecutor, Ignacio Carrillo-Prieto, we had conducted a ‘premature’ and 
‘unfortunate assessment of the activities carried out by SPO’ (SPO 2005). 
The significance of this press release lies – apart from attempting to 
disqualifying our investigation – in its conceptualisation of the SPO’s moral 
foundations; it justified the rules governing Mexico’s ‘transitional justice’. Invoking the 
language of human rights, the press release sought to legitimise Mexico’s ‘official 
response’ to past abuses and explicitly banned other ways of dealing with the past (e.g. 
a truth commission, political amnesty). According to this press release, the SPO was the 
only appropriate mechanism to ‘strengthen democracy and the rule of law’ (SPO 2005). 
Consequently, other alternatives to past injustice, such as a truth commission, were 
simply ‘good intentions paving the road to hell, delaying the consolidation of the 
democratic regime’ (SPO 2005). 
This unexpected official response published in Proceso Magazine suggested that 
state agents were also producing knowledge about Mexico’s ‘transitional justice’ 
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process through the press. So, using the transparency law, through the request number 
0001700066106, I requested all the ‘press releases’ or ‘letters to the editor’ published 
by the SPO in Mexican newspapers during its almost five years of existence. What I 
found was surprising. The SPO had published several press releases in which it 
delimited its conception of ‘transitional justice’, whilst justifying what it claimed had to 
be ‘done’ about past crimes. The significance of these official texts in the production of 
knowledge about Mexico’s ‘transitional justice’ can be illustrated by taking the year 
2006 in which the SPO published fifty four press releases (more than one per week!). 
This incident was relevant for another reason. The response given by the SPO 
was published in a well-known magazine. As in any other magazine of this type, 
responses, comments, or critiques to the authors are published free of charge in a section 
normally called ‘letters to the editor’. In Proceso Magazine this section was placed at 
the end of the publication. However, instead of using the space devoted to clarify 
opinions in the ‘letters to the editor’ section, the SPO paid almost eight thousand pounds 
(one hundred and sixty thousand pesos) in order to publish its response on the first page 
of the magazine. Thus the official position about the process of facing past atrocity was 
deemed to be so important that it could not be published at the end of the magazine. The 
response had to be seen and known, so it was worth paying the expensive cost of its 
publication. The importance of my methodological decision to collect this type of 
official text in this thesis is that it makes it possible to analyse how legal reasoning was 
constructed and publicised in such a way that it was accessible to a bigger audience, via 
the press. 
My third supplementary research strategy was to conduct archival research at 
Adolfo Aguilar Zínser’s private collection. During its first year in office, Vicente Fox 
determined institutional reforms in order to democratise and improve Mexico’s public 
Chapter Two: Transitional Justice 142
administration (Poder Ejecutivo Federal 2001b: viii). As a result, Vicente Fox instituted 
the Commissioner of Order and Respect, and appointed Adolfo Aguilar Zínser to head 
this office (Benítez Manaut 2008a: 188; Rodríguez Sumano 2008: 155). Among other 
tasks, Fox instructed Aguilar Zínser to create a ‘body charged with the public 
investigation of human rights abuses’ (Acosta and Ennelin 2006: 100). Up to November 
2001 – when the SPO was officially instituted – Aguilar Zínser kept records of his 
communications, meetings, and personal correspondence with President Fox, the 
Minister of Interior (Santiago Creel), ‘experts’, and human rights organisations. 
(Chapter Three is based on the information gathered in this archive.) 
Early in 2005, I was granted exclusive access to Aguilar Zínser’s private 
archive. The significance of these texts is that they make it possible to analyse the way 
in which Mexico’s ‘transitional justice’ process was ‘in the making’. This archive offers 
a rich site through which to explore the thinking of a distinct group of experts, scholars, 
and state officials as they sought to deal with ‘transitional justice’. One month after I 
visited the archive, in April 2005, Aguilar Zínser died in a car accident, but in 2009 his 
family donated his personal archive to the Daniel Cosío Villegas Library, at El Colegio 
de Mexico. 
Challenges 
In carrying out this research, I encountered the following challenges. 
 
Translating legal reasoning 
Translating texts for this thesis has not always been an easy endeavour. Transitional 
justice is about domestic and international legal responses to past atrocity framed by the 
language of human rights. Yet the language of human rights, and the international 
norms from which it derives, were adapted and reframed within Mexico’s legal system 
(and were affected by political decisions). Therefore, the legal reasoning framing 
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Mexico’s ‘transitional justice’ process was sometimes uttered in a very local and 
technical way – so technical that at times its meaning was incomprehensible for me 
since I am not a lawyer. Some legal concepts and technical terms were at times as 
unusual to me or any other Mexican as they would be to an English-speaking reader. 
Therefore, informed by Latour’s (2010: vii-viii) methodological considerations 
in his study about the making of law in France, instead of constantly citing technical 
terms in the ‘local tongue’, I selected words that can have a meaning for an English-
speaking reader. Thus I approached the process of translation, as Kate Maclean (2007: 
786) suggests, as a relationship between the original (Spanish) and target (English) 
languages, which takes into account the contextual import of words, as well as the 
interconnection of the original terms with other words and clusters in the same 
language. While translating elusive concepts or sentences in the texts, I imagined what 
an English speaker in a parallel position and situation would say. 
Moreover, and crucially, also informed by Latour’s (2010: vii) approach to the 
study of the construction of law, when writing this thesis I assumed that the reader does 
not need to be familiar with Mexico’s legal system. Rather, the reader will learn about 
the particular legal reasoning that facilitated Mexico’s ‘transitional justice’ mechanisms. 
As a consequence, this thesis provides contextual information in order to render visible 
the events (the ‘little dramas’) that gave rise to such kinds of legal reasoning. 
Secrecy according to the law 
It was not easy to access governmental information ‘using’ the transparency law. 
Although I had collected a large number of official documents on Mexico’s ‘transitional 
justice’, I requested additional information to find out what the state and its agents were 
saying they were doing during the SPO’s years of functioning (e.g. via press releases 
published by the Special Prosecutor). I was not necessarily interested in the veracity of 
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official accounts, but in obtaining official documents in order to explore how the state 
represented, talked about, and problematised past state crimes. However, the process of 
getting this information – which by law should be public and easily available – was 
sometimes troubling as state institutions did not allow me to access it. 
Certainly, official responses denying me access to information related to the 
process of ‘transitional justice’ were revealing. The General Attorney’s Office 
prevented me obtaining this information in three ways. First, by saying that what I was 
requesting never existed or that the institution in charge was not responsible: ‘It is not 
within our institutional purview to keep a register of the Programmes that the SPO ran’; 
‘The SPO is technically autonomous’; or, ‘This administrative unit does not possess in 
its archives any document containing the information requested’. Second, the state 
denied me access to information on – ad hoc – legal grounds: ‘The information 
committee deeply regrets that it cannot respond to your request for information due to 
its classification as confidential’; and, ‘The applicant has not demonstrated the express, 
written consent of the information’s owners’. Finally, there were cases where the state 
denied me access to information by reinterpreting my request in a way that it was 
incorrect. According to their responses, I did not know what I wanted to know, but they 
did: ‘The appellant [that is, myself] is attempting to confuse the Honourable Plenary of 
the IFAI’; and, ‘If what the applicant wants is to know how much the SPO has spent, 
this information should be requested via a separate form’ (Trevino-Rangel 2007). 
Conclusions 
This chapter surveyed the literature on transitional justice – the field of enquiry that 
specifically studies ideas and practices related to the way in which societies face past 
abuses. The chapter’s main purpose was to examine the relevant literature in this field 
and then present the concepts, research approach, and methodological considerations of 
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this thesis. To do so, the chapter charted the three main clusters of research on 
transitional justice by scholars (experts and activists) within this field over the last two 
decades in order to discern their main arguments and concerns. Also, by critically 
analysing these three clusters of literature, this chapter’s second purpose was to locate 
this thesis within a third, and critical stream of transitional justice investigations. 
The chapter began by offering a critical survey of the first and second cluster of 
transitional justice literature. Most of the conventional accounts or justifications about 
this field can be accommodated within any of them. The first cluster focuses on specific 
strategies to settle past accounts (retributive and restorative senses of justice) and 
presents sophisticated explanations about their alleged virtues. For retributivists and 
restorativists, transitional justice ideas and practices have an inherent utility within 
transitional societies, e.g. transformation of criminals, deterrence of atrocities in the 
future, consolidation of democratic institutions, cathartic effects, healing of post-
traumatic experiences, reconciliation of groups in conflict, and so on. The second 
cluster evaluates whether transitional justice strategies succeed or fail; and attempts to 
advance new strategies that seek to rectify the alleged shortcomings – to do more of the 
same, to accomplish the same ends by better means. 
This chapter then considered the theoretical and empirical shortcomings of both 
clusters: lack of empirical evidence, lack of historical perspective, and overlooking the 
ways in which transitional justice is a field for political deliberations in which state and 
non-state actors intervene. By doing this the thesis provides an original contribution to 
the way we see conventional accounts on transitional justice. 
In any event, this thesis only shares the topic of interest with these transitional 
justice studies. Unlike the first and second clusters of literature, this investigation does 
not seek to advance the ‘merits’ of restorative or retributive legal responses to past 
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abuses. In fact, this research does not presume that the ‘benefits’ of transitional justice 
are clear-cut at all; nor does this thesis seek to assess or rectify transitional justice ideas 
or practices, or assume that transitional justice claims are self-evident, or its practices 
inevitable. 
This thesis is rather framed by a third cluster of literature on transitional justice, 
which explores how claims and ideas about transitional justice are constituted, and how 
these ideas affect the implementation of institutions and policies. This is a distinctive 
and critical body of literature that seeks to understand the contextual factors that allow 
the emergence and policing of transitional justice knowledge and actions. This social-
constructivist approach is important as it considers how transitional justice efforts are 
constrained by political bargains, and raises concerns about the increasing significance 
of the language of human rights during transitions. In particular, this thesis takes up 
Moon’s argument that the deployment of transitional justice claims and practices can be 
instrumental to state legitimacy because they can mediate complicated political 
transitions as they do not seriously threaten the power elite. The chapter ends by 
offering a brief account of the analytical devices that have informed my work 
methodologically. 
In sum, this chapter justifies my decision in this thesis to use the third cluster of 
literature on transitional justice to analyse Mexico’s process of ‘coming to terms with 
the past’; and shows how a social constructivist approach frames the key research 
questions that guide my overall analysis. 
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Chapter Three – 
Neither Inevitable, Nor Necessary: 
The Emergence of Mexico’s ‘Transitional Justice’ Process  
 
The background chapter (Chapter One) introduced the reader to ‘the Mexican solution’. 
It explained how, after Fox’s electoral triumph in July 2000, ‘transitional justice’ 
seemed urgent for the new democratic regime. It described how Fox sought to 
materialise ‘transitional justice’ ideas via a retributive mechanism in November 2001: 
the Special Prosecutor’s Office (SPO). 
The authors of the few scholarly articles on Mexico’s ‘transitional justice’, and 
the vast number of press and non-governmental organisation (NGO) reports about it, 
begin their analysis by describing the SPO, taking for granted its alleged benefits, and 
then explain how things went wrong: lack of political will, money, and lawyers.33 
However, as explained in the introduction of this thesis and in the theoretical chapter 
(Chapter Two), my research follows a different approach, and seeks to answer a 
different set of questions: what factors facilitated the emergence of Mexico’s 
‘transitional justice’ process? And how did these same factors lead to its results – 
namely, impunity? Thus, unlike previous investigations of Mexico’s ‘transitional 
justice’, I am concerned here with the way in which the country’s process of facing the 
past came into being. The chapter shows that ‘transitional justice’ was contingent 
(Moon 2008; Short 2007; Wilson 2001). This chapter is, hence, central to understanding 
why there was a process of ‘transitional justice’ during Fox’s administration in the first 
place. 
In particular, this chapter seeks to answer the first key research question posed in 
the introduction of this thesis: why did Fox venture to establish a ‘transitional justice’ 
                                                 
33 The literature on Mexico’s transitional justice has been described in the introduction to this thesis. 
Chapter Three: Neither Inevitable, Nor Necessary 148
process that would put at risk the new regime’s stability, and why did the authoritarian 
elite allow it? To do so, the chapter goes back to Fox’s first months in office, before the 
‘transitional justice’ mechanisms existed, in order to show three things. First, the 
contingency of the events that led to the establishment of this particular process to come 
to terms with the past. Second, how ‘the Mexican solution’ was constrained by political 
bargains between members of the new democratic regime and members of the previous 
authoritarian system, who sought to protect the impunity they enjoyed in the past. Third, 
how, by creating the ‘rules of the game’, Fox sought to (a) regulate the participation of 
other actors involved through the existing structures of power; (b) legitimise key 
political institutions still working under authoritarian premises; and (c) validate his 
administration’s democratic credentials. 
In concordance with my theoretical and methodological approach (drawing on 
Ainley 2011; Foucault 1986; Hacking 2000; McEvoy 2007; Moon 2008; Short 2007; 
Wilson 2001), I do not follow a chronological order through the chapter. Rather, I 
reorganise the sequence of events in order to rethink the sense of inevitability and 
familiarity that characterises Mexico’s ‘transitional justice’ process. The point, as 
Hacking suggests, is ‘to go down the little dramas’ out of which Mexico’s ‘transitional 
justice’ mechanisms emerged (Hacking 2002a: 74). Therefore, instead of starting with 
Fox’s electoral victory in July 2000 and concluding in November 2001 when he 
instituted the SPO, I approach this the other way around. The chapter begins with the 
sudden establishment of the SPO in November 2001; then examines the (historically 
contingent) events that gave way to such establishment (October 2001); then offers an 
account of the various options available to Fox (June 2000 to April 2001). Finally, I 
return to November 2001 in order to explore the political purposes served by facing the 
past in this way. 
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The Black Palace (November 2001) 
On November 27, 2001, more than one year after Fox’s electoral triumph, an impressive 
public ceremony to institute ‘transitional justice’ mechanisms took place at El Archivo 
General de la Nación (National Archives, AGN). Mexico’s political elite, human rights 
activists, non-governmental human rights organisations, victims of past atrocity, and 
their families were present, listening to what President Fox had to say about how his 
administration would come to terms with the past (Granados Chapa 2001). Ironically, 
the National Archives building was the former Palacio de Lecumberri, where political 
prisoners were interned (isolated and tortured) during the PRI era. The prisoners here 
were members of the guerrilla movement, student protestors (e.g. in 1968), academics 
(e.g. Adolfo Gilly), dissident political leaders (e.g. Demetrio Vallejo), and labour 
organizers (e.g. the railroad workers, the navista movement, and the doctors’ 
movement) ‘who dared to operate outside the tight strictures for dissent established by 
the government’ (Doyle 2003c) – all of which have been addressed in Chapter One. 
Also known as El Palacio Negro (The Black Palace), the AGN edifice follows 
the panopticon principle described by Foucault (1991a: 200): ‘at the periphery an 
annular building; at the centre, a tower […] with wide windows that open onto the inner 
side of the ring; the peripheric building is divided into cells’. It was a structure 
designed, as Doyle (2003c) suggests, ‘to permit total surveillance and control of the 
prison population’ by the PRI regime: ‘simply by pacing the tower’s small circular 
room, a guard could watch any prisoner, day or night, moving about in his exposed 
cage’. 
However, since 1982, the Black Palace has been the site of Mexico’s national 
archives, where millions of files of the country’s documentary heritage are preserved for 
public consultation. And, since June 2002, the AGN also stores sixty thousand newly 
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opened files related to state-sponsored terror from the 1960s to the 1980s. Prison cells 
became repositories of Mexico’s history of abuses. 
Strangely enough, the event in which Fox officially established the country’s 
‘transitional justice’ mechanisms was not formally organised by him or his cabinet, but 
by the Comisión Nacional de Derechos Humanos (National Human Rights Commission, 
NHRC), which is the state institution in charge of monitoring human rights practices of 
state agencies, as well as of promoting human rights in Mexico. It is the country’s 
ombudsman, which was established since 1990. In addition, the ceremony was not 
planned – at least formally – to inaugurate Fox’s ‘transitional justice’ strategies, but to 
announce the NHRC’s ‘special’ investigation on forced disappearances perpetrated 
between 1970 and 1980, and its recommendations to Fox concerning the steps he should 
take to redress them (i.e. ‘Special Report on the Complaints Related to Forced 
Disappearances that took place in the 1970s and early 1980s’ – hereafter referred to as 
the Special Report – and ‘Recommendation 26/2001’).34 Finally, the event was atypical 
because the NHRC’s recomendaciones (recommendations) are hardly ever presented in 
high profile public events and are rarely attended by the President or any other senior 
state official. Therefore, this unusual ceremony, charged with symbolism, seemed 
important. 
‘Knowing the truth and doing justice’, declared Dr. José Luis Soberanes, 
President of the NHRC, was a ‘fundamental task’ for President Fox if he truly sought to 
adjust the rule of law to the new ‘reality that our country lives today’ – Mexico was, 
after all, a new democracy (CNDH 2001c).35 Then, through Recommendation 26/2001, 
                                                 
34 This is the CNDH’s ‘modus operandi’: the ombudsman documents human rights abuses that are 
published in a ‘special report’, and then issues a ‘recomendación’ that indicates the necessary steps that 
other state institutions (e.g. the army or the police) should take in order to redress the damage (DOF 1992: 
article 6; 2009: article 102). I will return to this point in the following chapter (Chapter Four). 
35 José Luis Soberanes spoke with the authority of an expert who creates and surveys the law. According 
to the rules that regulate the functions of the NHRC, the President of the Commission must have 
Chapter Three: Neither Inevitable, Nor Necessary 151
Dr. Soberanes demanded that President Fox should instruct the Republic’s General 
Attorney to name a special prosecutor to investigate and prosecute the forced 
disappearance cases from ‘1970s and beginning of the 1980s’ (CNDH 2001a; CNDH 
2001d: 38). (The origin and implications of this recommendation are the subject of the 
following chapter.) 
Immediately after the NHRC’s presentation of its Special Report and 
Recommendation 26/2001, Fox gave an unprecedented speech to the nation. Fox said 
that the presentation of the NHRC’s special report was a ‘transcendental event in the 
country’s political life’, which ‘helps us to think on our recent history’, and ‘about the 
nation we want to build’ (Presidencia de la República 2001b: leaf 1).36 ‘Today’, Fox 
declared, ‘my administration reaffirms’ its ‘absolute respect for human rights […]. 
Since the presidential campaign I have paid attention to the Mexican society’s justified 
demands to eradicate impunity in every sphere of our national life.’ Accordingly, Fox 
promised that his administration was ‘committed to the General Assembly of the United 
Nations to act forcefully in the promotion of human rights and democracy, at all times, 
and everywhere’ (Presidencia de la República 2001b: 1). 
To prove that his commitment to human rights and democracy was real, Fox 
invoked the power conferred on him by the Constitution and issued, by presidential 
decree, the ‘Agreement on Certain Measures to Do Justice for Abuses Committed 
Against Persons Linked with Social and Political Movements in the Past’ (Poder 
Ejecutivo Federal 2001a). Then, Fox clarified that such ‘measures’ would be setting up 
                                                                                                                                               
‘preferably a Juris Doctor in Law’ and enjoy ‘reputable public fame’ (DOF 1992: article 9). Soberanes 
held a J.D. and a J.S.D. (Doctor of Science of Law). In this regard, as a jurist, Soberanes was an agent 
‘invested with a competence, inseparably social and technique, consisting essentially of the capacity, 
socially recognized, of interpreting […] a corpus of texts containing the legitimate vision, right, of the 
social world’ (Bourdieu 1986: 4). 
36 Manuscripts do not have page numbering. So the numbering is my own. In these cases I state ‘leaf’ 
rather than ‘page’ in order to indicate that I am not citing any form of published or ‘official’ pagination.     
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a Special Prosecutor’s Office. So, peculiar as it was, this was the official establishment 
of Mexico’s ‘transitional justice’ process. 
The next day, every national newspaper carried a leading report on the subject. 
The headlines are self-explanatory: ‘A Special Prosecutor’s Office will prosecute those 
state agents who committed forced disappearances’ (La Jornada) and ‘Fox promises to 
punish all those responsible of committing forced disappearances’ (Reforma). 
International coverage was extensive throughout. For example, The New York Times 
covered the event in detail. The description is worth quoting at length (Thompson 
2001b): 
The Mexican government was responsible for detaining and torturing hundreds of men 
and women who have been missing since the 1970's, says a report released today by the 
National Human Rights Commission. […]. The 3,000-page government report is based 
largely on information from top-secret intelligence archives […]. The release of the 
report, in a ceremony at the National Archives, marks the first time the Mexican 
government has acknowledged a role in the disappearances of hundreds of leftists and 
paints a harrowing account of a government fighting terrorism with terror […]. The 
desaparecidos's fate had become the focus of national and international human rights 
protests […]. In response, Mr. Fox – who was flanked by soldiers as he released the 
report – announced today that he would appoint a new special prosecutor to investigate 
the disappearances as well as other reported incidents of abuse, including massacres in 
the conflict-ravaged states of Chiapas and Guerrero. The new office would prosecute 
those held responsible for the abuses and arrange for reparations to the victims. 
 
The story of how the ‘transitional process’ was staged at the Black Palace is 
important because the setting had symbolic consequences that helped Fox to assert 
discontinuity between past and present. At the Black Palace, Fox sought to draw a thick 
line between his democratic administration and the previous authoritarian era. In 
contrast with his predecessors, the newly elected President was committed to human 
rights principles – digging out the past in order to see justice done. This was a new 
epoch: politics was to be an orderly and democratic business. The mass media reflected 
this message. 
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But the ceremony was also significant because it produced, following Hacking 
(2000: 58; 2002c: 21), what might be termed a sense of inevitability. That is to say, 
during the ceremony, reflecting the enthusiasm of transitional justice practitioners, Fox 
presented the ‘transitional justice’ process as something that simply had to happen – as 
inescapable – and as a good thing because of the benefits it would bring with it. 
Additionally, and crucially, Fox presented the ‘transitional justice’ mechanisms as the 
only lawful approach to address past human rights violations – thus they would be the 
‘only way’ to deal with the past during his administration. In other words, after the 
ceremony at the AGN, Fox’s ‘transitional justice’ mechanisms were presented as a fait 
accompli – as something that was already there, planned, established, and irreversible. 
These mechanisms actually seemed to be anticipated ‘since the inauguration of the 
administration’ because Fox had always had a ‘firm commitment to defend and promote 
human rights and combat impunity’ (Poder Ejecutivo Federal 2001a: leaf 1). In this 
sense, ‘transitional justice’ was, in Fox’s words, ‘inescapable’ and ‘necessary’ (Poder 
Ejecutivo Federal 2001a: leaf 1). Moreover, it was a good thing, according to Fox, as it 
was supposed to ‘heal old wounds’ and bring about ‘national reconciliation’, and it was 
a ‘fundamental requirement for strengthening our institutions, the rule of law, and 
democracy’ (Poder Ejecutivo Federal 2001a: leaf 1). 
At El Palacio de Lecumberri Fox said that ‘without any doubt, the past should be 
unearthed’, but only through the specific ‘transitional justice’ mechanisms established 
by his administration (i.e. the SPO). That day, Fox claimed that he was ‘demonstrating’ 
that it was ‘a mistake’ to face past human rights abuses through any other transitional 
justice mechanism, as any other alternative would ‘abandon the rule of law’ 
(Presidencia de la República 2001b: leaf 4). Since then, Fox incessantly repeated that 
another transitional justice approach, such as a truth commission or amnesty process, 
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would be inappropriate because it would be anti-institutional, and illegal. Neither 
Mexico’s legal system, nor the Constitution, ‘confers power to the President to create 
extra-institutional bodies’ such as a truth commission (Poder Ejecutivo Federal 2001a: 
leaf 1). Other transitional justice mechanisms would be ‘above the law’, Fox warned, as 
they are not able to ‘qualify an act as a crime or as a human rights abuse’ (Poder 
Ejecutivo Federal 2001a). As a result, Fox argued, in Mexico ‘we have to go beyond the 
idea of a truth commission’; we ‘aspire’ not only to know what happened in the past, 
but to make perpetrators accountable for their deeds (Presidencia de la República 
2001b: leaf 3).37
These arguments are important because they would become a mantra during the 
Fox administration. These very same arguments would be repeated, for example, in an 
official ceremony just one month later, after the Christmas holidays. On January 4, 
2002, as instructed by the NHRC, the General Attorney’s Office appointed a special 
prosecutor in order to address ‘social demands’ to ‘clarify past events’ and ‘do justice’ 
regarding the ‘alleged disappeared political dissidents’ (Macedo de la Concha 2002: leaf 
1). During that event, Rafael Macedo de la Concha, the Attorney General, confirmed 
that the SPO was ‘the only way to restore old wounds and consolidate national unity’ 
(Macedo de la Concha 2002: leaf 1, emphasis added). 
Dr. Ignacio Carrillo Prieto, the newly elected special prosecutor, ‘inspired by the 
spirit of justice’, warned that other transitional justice strategies, such as ‘establishing 
institutional responsibilities’ – rather than individual responsibility – simply ‘do not fit 
in our legal system’ (Carrillo Prieto 2002: leaf 1). Indeed, the special prosecutor 
claimed that the SPO was ‘an unequivocal response from the authority to establish the 
                                                 
37 These arguments deployed by Fox’s administration were in fact in line with human rights standards. 
The Inter-American Commission established in Garay Hermosilla et al. v. Chile that truth commissions 
are ‘not sufficient to guarantee respect for human rights of the petitioners […] as long as they are denied 
the right to justice’ (See Mallinder: 2005: 216). 
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truth, heal old wounds, and start a new deal for justice and public morality’ (Carrillo 
Prieto 2002: leaf 1, emphasis added). 
Again, every national newspaper published a detailed report on the subject the 
morning following the appointment of Dr. Carillo Prieto. In doing so, the media 
repeated faithfully the same stock of ideas about ‘transitional justice’ uttered by Fox and 
his strategists. For instance, El Universal claimed that the special prosecutor would 
‘achieve national reconciliation’, ‘reveal exactly what happened in the past’, ‘heal old 
wounds’, and foster ‘national unity’ (Gómez and Alcántara 2002). Similarly, La 
Jornada captured the kind of assumptions shared back then by the Mexican press: the 
SPO was supposed to be the only lawful way to face the past, which sought to ‘disclose 
the truth’, ‘heal wounds’, ‘achieve reconciliation’, and ‘build a better future’ for the 
country (Castillo 2002). This is relevant because this was the way in which Mexico’s 
‘transitional justice’ mechanisms were presented by Fox’s administration and then 
interpreted by the press; and, crucially, these claims framed the broader transmission of 
information about the issue. 
It is also worth noting that by insisting that the SPO would ‘heal wounds’ and 
promote reconciliation, Fox sought to justify his decision not to establish a truth 
commission. That is, Fox elaborated (and promoted) a peculiar syllogism: truth 
commissions are argued to achieve reconciliation within an entire society but are 
unlawful according to Mexico’s Constitution; the SPO seeks to promote reconciliation 
in Mexico and it is lawful; hence, there is no point in establishing a truth commission in 
the country as the SPO would achieve the same goals according to the law. This 
sophisticated excuse was important because, as I will show later in this chapter, 
Mexican political parties (the PRD), international and domestic NGOs, scholars and 
human rights activists openly demanded the creation of a truth commission – such as 
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those in Argentina (1984), Chile (1990), El Salvador (1992), or South Africa (1996). 
However, Fox insisted that the lawfulness, merits, and desirability of the SPO was a 
firm response to the proponents of the truth commission method. This is understandable 
because, as Moon (2008: 4) has demonstrated, ‘the truth commission become the most 
important institutional location of reconciliation since the early 1980s, and in particular 
over the last decade’. During the time the SPO was in existence (2001-2006), at least 
thirteen truth commissions were set up in other countries to investigate the past: Panama 
(2001), Grenada (2001), Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, (2001), Ghana (2002), Serbia 
and Montenegro (2002), Timor-Leste (2002), Sierra Leone (2002), Paraguay (2003), 
Democratic Republic of Congo (2003), Morocco (2004), Indonesia (2004), and Liberia 
(2006). 
The ceremony and the press aside, we might want to ask, how can a prosecutor’s 
office foster a new spirit of reconciliation while exposing and prosecuting former state 
officials who retained some power or who maintained power within the new political 
system? As demonstrated by Choi and David (2012: 1195) in their study on ‘Lustration 
systems’ in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland: the exposure of tainted officials 
associated with the former regime ‘inadvertently creates a shaming ritual that 
stigmatizes tainted officials in the eyes of the public’ (Choi and David 2012: 1173). 
Hence, these authors conclude, ‘this findings runs contrary to theories of restorative 
justice and their extensions of transitional political contexts, which maintain that truth 
[the exposure of past wrongdoers] can lead to reconciliation’ (Choi and David 2012: 
1195). 
Moreover, it is relevant to note that it was never clear what Fox meant by the 
term reconciliation. The concept was often used in public, but never explained on any 
official document. Fox and his strategists, as I will show later in this chapter, simply 
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repeated the assumptions shared by restorativists (scholars and practitioners): truth heals 
and leads to reconciliation (Hayner 2002; Minow 2000). However, the term 
reconciliation, as Moon (2004) argues, evokes the idea of ‘return’, ‘a return to an 
originary, unified harmonious social and political formation’. But what if, as Moon 
suggests, there is nothing to return to, no preceding situation one would wish to restore? 
In Mexico, as examined in Chapter One, the authoritarian system began in 1929 – and 
before that there had been ten years of Mexican Revolution (1910-1920), and before 
that there had been thirty five years of Porfirio Diaz’s dictatorship (1876-1910). Where 
did Fox want to go back to? This is what Moon meant when she suggested that 
‘reconciliation’ is an ‘authoritative trope governing transitional justice’, which serves 
‘to shape the political imagination of transition, governing the “moral reordering” of 
national communities in the wake of conflict’. This insight bears particular fruit in an 
examination of the discourse of reconciliation deployed by Fox and his political 
strategists.  
Whatever reconciliation meant to Fox, the point is that when announcing 
Mexico’s SPO, he repeated the most diverse reasons invoked by transitional justice 
theorists and practitioners to justify retributive and restorative models of justice. At the 
Black Palace, the ‘Mexican solution’ appeared as an inevitable choice, an inescapable 
condition for democracy. And it acquired its own explanatory potential – it came to be 
identified with the following ideas: inevitability, lawfulness, reconciliation, truth, and 
justice. As stated in Chapter Two, transitional justice, as a field of knowledge, served to 
justify state practices to confront the past in Mexico’s transition. 
The problem is that the ‘Mexican solution’ was not, in fact, as inevitable as the 
political declarations seem to suggest. As the PRI was still powerful enough to 
challenge the stability of the new democratic regime, Fox could have articulated a 
Chapter Three: Neither Inevitable, Nor Necessary 158
policy of oblivion similar to the Spanish ‘pacto del olvido’ (pact of forgetting: the 
deliberate, but largely tacit, agreement to forget the repressive legacy of Francoism) 
(Davis 2005: 864). For the sake of the stability of the new democracy, he could have 
openly refused to come to terms with the past. Alternatively, as the truth commission 
method was so popular, President Fox could have established a Mexican truth 
commission. As public servants associated with the former regime were often viewed 
by the public as corrupt and loyal to the previous regime, Fox could have deployed a 
lustration system based on ‘dismissal’ such as in Czechoslovakia in 1991 where high-
ranking communist cadres, members of the secret police, and their collaborators were 
disqualified from senior posts in the new administration and security forces and barred 
from returning (Choi and David 2012), but he did not. 
Therefore, one must understand the reasons why President Fox opted to come to 
terms with the past more than one year after he took office, the factors that led Fox to 
establish this particular ‘transitional justice’ mechanism – the SPO – in November 2001. 
These are the questions taken up in the following section. The clue can be found in the 
very same speech Fox gave to announce the establishment of the ‘Mexican solution’: ‘I 
follow with attention and concern’, Fox said at El Palacio de Lecumberri, ‘the 
investigation into the killing of Digna Ochoa, exemplary defender of human rights in 
Mexico.’ ‘We have to get to the bottom of this case, we have to find those allegedly 
guilty’, Fox warned, because ‘this is one of the most sensitive topics in the international 
field’ (Presidencia de la República 2001b: leaf 1). Fox’s remark was reported by The 
New York Times: ‘in recent weeks, after the assassination of a prominent human rights 
lawyer, the calls for a thorough investigation into the past seemed deafening’ 
(Thompson 2001b). But, who was Digna Ochoa and what was her significance in 
relation to Mexico’s transitional efforts? 
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The story of Digna Ochoa’s death (October 2001) 
In October 19, 2001, a distinguished human rights activist, Digna Ochoa y Plácido, was 
found dead in her office. She worked in the legal department of the Miguel Agustín Pro-
Juárez Centre for Human Rights (PRODH) – a leading non-governmental organisation 
of human rights in Mexico City. Ochoa was shot twice, once in her leg and once in her 
head, and an anonymous note was left by her side threatening further attacks against 
human rights defenders: ‘Bastards. If you carry on like this you will also be touched. 
This is a warning, not a trick’ (Tuckman 2001). 
During Mexico’s transitional moment, Digna Ochoa’s death became a disturbing 
‘accident’ in a Machiavellian sense: it was an unexpected political event, over which 
authorities appeared to have had no control at all, and that was impossible or difficult to 
foresee by Vicente Fox’s administration. Yet, as a Machiavellian ‘accident’, Fox and his 
strategists sought to deal with it at an appropriate time in order to preserve the stability 
of the new democratic regime (see McCormick 1993).38
This event had a destabilising effect in Mexico’s transitional moment because 
the commission of political crimes, as Ochoa’s death seemed to be, was identified with 
the previous authoritarian system, a system from which the Fox’s administration – the 
so-called ‘government of change’ – was ostensibly trying to differentiate itself. The 
impact of her death can be understood because, as Wilson (1997b: 138) suggests, 
‘narratives on murder […] serve to crystallise social relations and feed off perceived 
tensions and discordance. As in the television murder mystery genre, the message is 
usually that, despite apparently calm external appearances, something is rotten in 
Denmark.’ So Mexico’s peaceful transition was altered by the death of a notable human 
rights activist as it showed that authoritarian forces were still alive within the new 
                                                 
38 The term ‘accident’ does not assess if an event was good or bad. Rather, its importance lies on its 
unexpected quality. In this respect, see McCormick’s (1993) article on political exceptions. 
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democratic order that was inaugurated by Fox’s electoral triumph fifteen months before, 
during the July 2000 presidential election. Ochoa’s case showed that the ‘arrival of 
democracy in Mexico had not brought real change’ (Thompson 2001a). As a result, this 
‘political accident’ – or ‘little drama’ – had important political consequences that 
conditioned how Mexico came to terms with past human rights violations. 
The immediate problem was that of NGO protests. Organisations of human 
rights called into question the new democratic regime’s commitment to human rights. 
Amnesty International made public its concerns ‘that impunity for human rights 
violations continue to be rampant in Mexico despite commitments from President Fox’s 
administration to bring in a new era of human rights protection’ (AI 2002b). 
The widespread publicity of Digna Ochoa’s death in domestic and international 
human rights reports had political effects in Mexico’s incipient democracy because, as 
Wilson (1997b: 140) demonstrated, ‘the mere appearance the murder on a human rights 
report’ indicated that ‘it was not a “common crime” but that it was somehow related to 
the political process’. This incident challenged Fox’s administration fragile legitimacy 
during its first year in office because, activists argued, it showed that ‘nothing had 
improved after the election’ in the field of human rights (Thompson 2001a). NGO 
reports suggested that the new regime, which promoted itself as an era of radical 
democratic change, allowed the use of old politics: the repression, torture, and killing of 
dissidents and human rights activists. 
Reports in the press were no better. An influential article in The New York Times 
one week after Ochoa’s deaths stated, ‘Her murder shocked the international human 
rights community, and sobered a nation still celebrating the promise of its first 
democratic government’ (Thompson 2001a). ‘Her murder’, declared Jo Tuckman 
(2001) in the Guardian, ‘is embarrassing for President Vicente Fox’s government, 
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which took office last December pledging a new era of democracy and respect for 
human rights in the wake of seventy one years of one-party rule.’39
Domestic and international human rights organisations, independent activists of 
human rights, and the leftist Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) readily 
articulated Ochoa’s death as a political crime and assumed state culpability. Although 
diverse versions and rumours spread about her death, they blamed Fox’s administration 
for being involved, at least tacitly, in her ‘assassination’ (Tuckman 2001).40 Ochoa had 
been investigating highly publicized cases of torture perpetrated by the Military and the 
police against two peasant farmers – Rodolfo Montiel and Teodoro Cabrera – involved 
in environmental protests in their communities. Both farmers, illegally detained by PRI-
state agents in 1992, were widely known by environmental organisations because they 
were recipients of international environmental awards in 2000 and 2001 – awards they 
received while in prison. Victims of military torture, the peasants were also known by 
local and international human rights organisations. Given that Ochoa brought charges of 
torture against the soldiers who interrogated them, suspicion about her ‘assassination’ 
fell on the Mexican state, particularly on the army (Untouchable? 2001). Moreover, 
conspiracy theories circulated everywhere about her case because she had received 
several death threats. Thus, even if Fox’s administration was not directly involved in 
Ochoa’s alleged murder, human rights organisations still accused it of being responsible 
for her death because it failed to take death threats against human rights activists 
seriously (McKinley 2005; Thompson 2001a). 
As a result, through a national and international mass media campaign, human 
rights organisations, activists, experts, and the PRD requested president Fox to 
                                                 
39 According to the Mexican Constitution, although elected in July 2000, the President should assume the 
duties of office on December 1, 2000, for a term of six years. 
40 According to Jo Tuckman (2001) there were at least eighty-two national and international organisations 
of human rights publicly questioning Vicente Fox’s commitment to human rights. 
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intervene in this particular case. Moreover, and more importantly, they demanded the 
implementation of human rights policies in order to evidence the new regime’s 
democratic credentials. As I explained in Chapter One, the rhetoric of human rights was 
manifestly present in Fox’s electoral campaign and in his inaugural agenda once in 
office. However, it was Ochoa’s death that, as Acosta and Ennelin put it, ‘forced 
President Fox to take his responsibilities in the field of human rights more seriously’ 
(Acosta and Ennelin 2006: 100). The deployment of human rights policies became a 
crucial feature in the legitimacy of the new regime because ‘people across Mexico’, 
Ginger Thompson (2001a) claimed, ‘wonder[ed] whether the democratic government 
being led by President Fox ha[d] the political will to transform a culture of impunity 
into a system of law and order’. 
The increasing pressure drove Fox’s administration rapidly to take two political 
actions – of course, in the name of human rights. First, to demonstrate that his 
democratic administration had nothing to conceal, Fox instructed the creation of a 
‘special commission’, formed by ‘prominent’ members of the civil society, to follow the 
official investigation on Ochoa’s death. By doing so, ironically, Fox tacitly recognised 
the lack of confidence in Mexico’s judicial processes. Second, to avoid greater criticism 
from the international community, Fox ordered the immediate release of the 
environmental peasants defended by Digna Ochoa. Mimicking shows of authority 
characteristic of the authoritarian regime, Fox ordered the instant release of both 
prisoners by ‘exercising the legal powers invested in the President of the Republic’ to 
do so. ‘As I speak’, Fox declared, ‘Montiel Flores and Cabrera García are free men’ 
(Presidencia de la República 2001a). 
These measures represented, as Fox himself acknowledged, his government’s 
‘interests in this case […] in response to numerous requests by Mexican and 
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international human rights organizations’ (Presidencia de la República 2001a). 
Moreover, Fox’s political decisions regarding this case, he claimed, were justified 
because they were taken ‘in strict adherence to the principles of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
and the Convention against Torture, all signed and ratified by Mexico’ (Presidencia de 
la República 2001a). The irony here is evident. Motivated by political factors, Fox 
ordered the instantaneous release of the two farmers, ignoring all standard legal 
procedures, but then justified his deeds invoking human rights principles. These 
pragmatic responses were defended as a ‘tangible evidence’ of Fox administration’s 
‘commitment to the promotion and observance of human rights in Mexico’ (Presidencia 
de la República 2001a). So Fox’s human rights disposition had a political message: the 
farmers were in prison; they are no longer there; there is no point in talking about it any 
more. 
But these two measures did not end the story. Ochoa’s ‘murder’ became more 
relevant as it reactivated demands to face past state crimes. As Ochoa’s death was 
considered a political crime by her family, activists, and the press, NGOs and experts 
linked this incident to Fox’s electoral promise to establish a mechanism to do something 
about human rights abuses perpetrated during the PRI era.41 For instance, Giles 
Tremlett and Jo Truckman (2001) claimed in the Guardian: 
Since taking power Mr Fox has backed away from his campaign promise of a truth 
commission into past abuses, apparently for fear of antagonising members of the PRI, 
which remains the biggest single party in parliament. But the murder of the human 
rights lawyer Digna Ochoa in October renewed the pressure on Mr Fox to address the 
issue.  
 
In particular, Fox was accused of breaking his electoral ‘promises to create a truth 
commission to investigate the worst abuses of the long-ruling Institutional 
                                                 
41 As Wilson states: ‘the whole concept of human rights violation is constructed around state 
involvement, in opposition to the category of “common crime”’ (Wilson 1997b: 140). 
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Revolutionary Party, including a student massacre in 1968 and the disappearances of 
hundreds of suspected guerrillas during the 1970’s’ (Thompson 2001a). 
The Ochoa affair thus challenged the legitimacy of ‘the government of change’, 
which, far from dismantling the previous authoritarian regime, was allowing its survival 
in the new democratic system, and even adopting its nondemocratic practices. In 
response, one month after this incident, the Fox administration established the ‘Mexican 
solution’. In Mexico’s transitional context, the death of Ochoa, arguably, played a more 
important role than that of human rights principles or commitments to international 
human rights legal norms. 
Therefore, the case was significant during Mexico’s transition for four reasons. 
First, it rendered visible that institutions working under authoritarian premises (e.g. the 
army) were incorporated intact in the democratic regime. That is, as several scholars 
and human rights NGOs have observed, in Mexico’s new democracy the army 
continued working with exactly the same rules, structure, and laws as it did during the 
authoritarian era (Benítez Manaut 2008a; Piñeyro and Barajas 2008; Rodríguez Sumano 
2008). As a result, as HRW has demonstrated, the Fox administration never ‘found an 
adequate way to police the army’ (HRW 2001: 3). Under the current system: (a) soldiers 
have been able to use their policing power to commit serious human rights violations 
against civilians; (b) the government has failed to investigate and punish such abuses; 
(c) this failure has exacerbated a climate of fear and distrust that reinforces the impunity 
of military personnel (HRW 2001). Additionally, particular army officials, responsible 
for violations, continued in office. Fox never dismissed tainted officials or discredited 
bureaucrats. 
Second, the case provided evidence that the new regime was tolerating the use of 
repressive strategies (killing and torture) in order to deal with political opponents (such 
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as the two peasant farmers defended by Ochoa, and Ochoa herself). Third, and in more 
practical terms, it showed that Fox’s administration did not have enough control over 
Mexican security forces to stop repression. Finally, and crucially, the death of Ochoa 
was politically relevant because it was this particular ‘little drama’ – which was political 
in nature – that led to the official establishment of Mexico’s ‘transitional justice’ 
mechanisms – mechanisms that, as I have shown in the previous section, were presented 
as apolitical and inevitable, somehow ‘inherent’ to transition and ‘necessary’ to 
democracy. It also allowed Fox’s administration to invoke – selectively and 
pragmatically – human rights ideals to justify new practices, and political decisions 
concerning past political violence. 
In 2003, a criminal investigation declared that Digna Ochoa had killed herself: 
first shooting herself in the leg with her right hand, then falling to her knees and 
shooting herself in the head with her left hand. It was not murder, but suicide according 
to Mexican prosecutors (AI 2003; International Federation for Human Rights 2005; 
McKinley 2005). This unconvincing conclusion produced a new wave of criticisms 
against Fox’s administration and its alleged commitment to human rights, which, in 
turn, reopened new criminal investigations. 
Whatever the ending of this case was, Ochoa’s case is useful, as McCormick 
(1993: 889) argues about Machiavellian ‘accidents’, to draw attention to the ‘irregular, 
non-systematic nature of political reality’ and, hence, to increase our understanding of 
the pragmatic and selective practices implemented to mitigate or redress its 
consequences. The story of her death is an important demonstration that Mexico’s 
‘transitional justice’ mechanism – the SPO – was a pragmatic response to resolve a 
political conflict, rather than a purely moral endeavour. 
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Controversy about how to come to terms with the past (July 2000 to April 2001) 
The Ochoa affair in October 2001 provided the distinctive political juncture at which 
the policing of past political crimes came to be an urgent problem of government. It was 
the crisis point – the ‘political accident’ – that drove President Fox to put into effect the 
‘Mexican solution’. However, the precise mechanisms through which Mexico was to 
confront its past were heavily conditioned by numerous bargains between political 
actors with clear political interests in the process. Before Ochoa’s death, there were a 
series of confrontations – between state and non-state actors (experts, scholars, victims 
of past abuses, activists, non-governmental human rights organisations), and between 
elites of the previous authoritarian regime and members of the Fox administration – out 
of which the orderly structure of Mexico’s ‘transitional justice’ mechanisms emerged. 
In what follows, I examine how the controversy on how to deal with past state crimes 
lasted for nearly one year, before it was settled when the SPO was officially established 
in November 2001. 
Before embarking upon that analysis, it is worth noting that the story of these 
political bargains prior to the official establishment of the SPO has been rather ignored 
by academic literature and NGO reports on Mexico’s ‘transitional justice’. This gap is 
understandable, in part, because most negotiations related to the creation of the 
‘transitional justice’ mechanisms took place in private, so information about them was 
not easily available to the public at the time. On occasions, those involved in the 
negotiations publicly expressed their views on this issue through press conferences, 
speeches, or press releases. Thus, only the press reflected the conflicts of interest that 
existed, at the time, at different levels – e.g. between those who sought to bring 
perpetrators to justice, and those against any sort accountability. Here, to reconstruct 
this story, I draw on not only information published on the Mexican press, but also 
Adolfo Aguilar Zínser’s private archive. As Commissioner of Order and Respect in 
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charge of the establishment of any ‘transitional justice’ mechanism during Fox’s first 
year in office, Aguilar Zínser kept records of his communications with most actors 
involved in the process.42
The account of these political deliberations is relevant because it explains the 
‘transitional justice’ process (ideas and practices) ‘in the making’. It shows that the 
particular ‘transitional justice’ mechanisms established by President Fox during the 
ceremony at the Black Palace were anything but inevitable. Nor were they politically 
uncompromised or carried out far away from political deliberations. If the first section 
of this chapter showed how the ‘Mexican solution’ was presented as ‘the only way’ to 
face the past, this section demonstrates what alternatives Fox had. The previous section 
showed how ‘the only way’ was a moral discourse deployed to delimit and justify what 
was ‘right’ to do about the past (to prosecute former human rights abusers via the SPO). 
In contrast, this section explores the politics behind this moral discourse. This account is 
important as it illustrates how in the process of debating the specific ‘transitional 
justice’ mechanisms that would confront the past, disagreements arose between the 
actors involved regarding the rules, and the political consequences of such mechanisms. 
The way this controversy was resolved favoured some outcomes over others, and those 
‘transitional justice’ mechanisms which appeared to threaten the stability of the new 
regime (such as a truth commission) were closed off. 
A policy of oblivion 
During Fox’s opening months in office, the first and more coordinated strategy to deal 
with the past was formulated by members of the PRI. The authoritarian elite had not 
been dismantled, and retained enough power and influence to prevent the past from 
                                                 
42 In Chapter Two, I described his collection and the way in which I was granted privileged access to it. 
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being unearthed, so they advanced a policy of oblivion (Trevino-Rangel 2009: 46). The 
priistas (PRI members) sought to deny what happened by officially organizing what 
Stan Cohen (1995: 13) terms ‘social amnesia’: organized forgetting, a ‘deliberate cover 
up’ – control by closing. 
For example, to prevent the establishment of any ‘transitional justice’ policy, the 
priistas claimed that a mechanism to confront the past could be ‘manipulated’ by other 
political parties against them. They considered that ‘transitional justice’ gave the Fox 
administration an opportunity for political revanchism. So, the members of the defunct 
‘perfect dictatorship’ – which for decades imprisoned, tortured, and disappeared 
political dissidents – were now concerned with the ‘political’ use of justice. They 
demanded the benefits of an ‘apolitical’, fair, and impartial judicial process, which they 
had never allowed to their victims. In particular, priistas were against a restorative 
model of justice for the obvious reason that, as Cohen (1995: 15) suggests, ‘revelations 
might prove politically embarrassing for those with something to hide and open a past 
too dangerous to acknowledge today’. And, at least initially, they opposed a retributive 
model of justice as they feared criminal prosecutions. 
Shame and criminal punishment aside, members of the PRI had another reason 
to oppose ‘transitional justice’: electoral costs. Coming to terms with the past could 
affect the PRI’s popularity. The PRI lost the presidential election in 2000, but most state 
governors and sub-national political actors (municipal officials, local congresses) were 
members of the PRI (Cornelius 2000). At the national level, the PRI was a powerful 
political party – now in the opposition – which sought to preserve its majority in federal 
Congress during the midterm election in 2003. 
Accordingly, in July 2001 the PRI began a major counter-offensive against 
‘transitional justice’. The party’s first move was to condemn the condemners, to ‘shoot 
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the messenger’. The PRI questioned the new administration’s intentions to confront the 
past: Fox could not be trusted as the administration had a political interest in 
discrediting the PRI. For example, Dulce María Sauri, president of the PRI, argued that 
‘the society’ – a classic euphemism frequently used during the authoritarian era to refer 
to the PRI – was ‘definitely against’ ‘transitional justice’ as it was simply a political 
strategy based on ‘falsehoods’ and ‘fundamentalist persecutions’ (Garduño 2001). Then, 
the priistas attacked the credibility of Fox’s administration by revealing the ‘real 
reasons’ behind ‘transitional justice’: according to Sauri, this was just the president’s 
plan to conceal the lack of results of his administration, the failure to live up to his 
electoral promises. So, according to the PRI, the wrongful political revanchism of the 
new regime and, particularly, its incompetence were the real issues. 
Other members of the PRI adopted a different strategy: they denied all 
accusations. Anticipating that their crimes could be soon exposed and judged, the 
priistas followed what Cohen (2005: 101) terms ‘the classical discourse of official 
denial’: literal denial (‘nothing happened’); interpretive denial (‘what happened is really 
something else’); and implicatory denial (‘what happened is justified’). A nice example 
of this comes from Fernando Gutiérrez Barrios (who we met in chapter two as he 
worked for twenty years at the former secret police – the DFS – and was in charge of 
the agency from 1964 to 1970). In October 2000, four months after Fox’s victory, 
different ideas about ‘transitional justice’ strategies were debated in Congress – where 
Gutiérrez Barrios was then a PRI senator and so enjoyed immunity. Senator Gutiérrez 
Barrios disapproved any attempt to establish ‘transitional justice’ mechanisms as the 
outcome could be ‘uncertain’. Uncertain because the ‘analysis’ of ‘such a complex 
problem’ as past crimes – as ‘the incident that took place in October 2, 1968’ – entails 
‘different and even conflicting interpretations’: so conflicting that ‘thirty years later it 
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has not been possible to know what exactly happened’ (Senado de la República 2000a). 
From this perspective, to know the truth about the past was neither desirable nor 
possible (literal denial). 
Gutiérrez Barrios also denied his responsibility by appealing to authority and 
obedience (interpretive denial). He was just ‘following orders’, doing his ‘duty’. Head 
of the DFS during the student’s movement in 1968, Gutiérrez Barrios claimed that he 
simply ‘informed the President, in writing and in detail, about the violent incident that 
took place’ – as if the illegal abduction, torture, and killing of students just happened, 
rather than being caused by him or the office under his charge. He just, diligently, 
notified his superior ‘with accuracy and timeliness, taking into account the situation that 
existed at the time. I did not conceal anything’ (Senado de la República 2000a). So, it 
seems, Gutiérrez Barrios, as Hannah Arendt said of Adolf Eichmann, ‘was perfectly 
sure that he was not […] a dirty bastard […]; he would have had a bad conscience if he 
had not done what he had been ordered to’ (Arendt 1994: 25). 
As a final excuse, Gutiérrez Barrios tried to persuade his peers in Congress that 
the students’ massacre in 1968 was justified (implicatory denial). He did not deny the 
facts, but minimized the implications of the massacre, and denied responsibility by 
appealing to necessity and self-defence. According to Gutiérrez Barrios the real problem 
in 1968 was that ‘the atmosphere was charged with tension’. In that context, the 
Mexican government, reluctantly, acted out of necessity: by killing the students, the 
government simply sought to ‘preserve the institutional order’. In a similar way, the 
Military – which is the ‘fundamental institution’ responsible for ‘preserving the 
integrity and sovereignty of the nation’ – was just doing its duty according to the 
‘values of discipline and loyalty’ (Senado de la República 2000a). 
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The PRI elite was not alone in its efforts to secure a policy of oblivion. Some 
conservative scholars advanced the idea that the Fox administration should abandon any 
attempt to confront the past in favour of the more desirable (to them) goal of stability 
(literal denial: nothing happened). For example, Soledad Loaeza (2000a; 2001), 
professor at El Colegio de México, suggested that forgetting was crucial if Mexico was 
to be reconciled and the transition to democracy was to succeed. In this sense, oblivion 
was preferable to the recovering of historic memory as a means to political stability, as 
this had been demonstrated in other successful processes of democratization – such as 
Spain’s transition to democracy in the late 1970s where the elites refused to come to 
terms with the Civil War and Franquismo. 
Loaeza (2000a: 95), a renowned public scholar whose ideas on ‘transitional 
justice’ were published in the press, also invoked ‘the French referent’. According to 
her, those who participated with De Gaulle and the French resistance ‘turned a blind eye 
on those who collaborated’ with the Nazi occupation. Loaeza thus claimed that 
unearthing the past is ‘driven by resentment and vengeance, rather than by an intent to 
rebuild the social fabric that has been severely damaged by past conflicts’. Therefore, 
‘truth commissions do not guarantee reconciliation’. On the contrary, she argued, 
‘transitional justice’ mechanisms are likely to ‘open wounds and delay healing’ (Loaeza 
2000a: 96; Loaeza 2001: 49). 
The final support for a strategy of forgetting came from within Fox’s own 
political party (Acosta and Ennelin 2006: 100; Aguayo and Trevino-Rangel 2006b: 58; 
Aguayo and Trevino-Rangel 2007: 718; Benítez Manaut 2008a: 185-188). In October 
2000, speaking on behalf of the PAN before the Congress, Senator Diego Fernández de 
Cevallos lashed out against ‘transitional justice’ (Senado de la República 2000a). He 
opposed accountability by appealing to a higher loyalty: that of the Mexican people. 
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According to Fernández de Cevallos, ‘transitional justice’ was ‘inadmissible’ as it 
would ‘exploit in a seditious way the pain of a people who never, never, deserved to 
live that nightmare’ (sic). He also appealed to righteousness: ‘to bring to the present 
past hatreds and resentments will certainly not be a righteous conduct’ (Senado de la 
República 2000a). Fernández de Cevallos presented ‘transitional justice’ as a deep 
‘wrong’, as an injustice. 
Retributive v. restorative justice? 
While former perpetrators, members of the PAN, and some conservative scholars 
opposed ‘transitional justice’, Vicente Fox’s strategists, human rights activists, 
members of the PRD and victims’ families, called for ending an era of impunity and 
demanded to ‘know the truth of what happened’ and to ‘see justice done’ (Aguayo and 
Trevino-Rangel 2006b). Yet, echoing the two legal narratives informing transitional 
justice ideas and practices, a significant debate arose between them on whether a 
retributive model was preferable to a restorative one to deal with past events. This 
shows how the debate about the styles of justice is thoroughly predicated on political 
struggle between the continuation in power of past political (and security) figures, and 
the moral demands of the present. As a result, two groups grappled to control the 
‘transitional justice’ process. One group supported the creation of a prosecutor’s office; 
the other favoured the establishment of a truth commission. These groups ‘never 
completely understood one another’, Acosta lamented, ‘thus weakening their respective 
causes’ (Acosta and Ennelin 2006: 96). 
On July 24, 2001, Santiago Creel, Minister of Interior of the ‘government of 
change’, visited the PRI’s central building in order to announce the Fox administration’s 
strategies to fight bureaucratic corruption, and to enforce transparency in government 
activities. Important members of the PRI were there, waiting together to listen to what 
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Creel would say. They knew the meeting was important: a member of the new regime 
paid them the courtesy of addressing them in their own domain. However, ignoring the 
official purpose of the meeting, a member of the Executive National Committee of the 
PRI, Sabino Bastidas, claimed that the issue that concerned them most was the 
establishment of a truth commission (Garduño 2001; Sánchez and Herrera 2001). Next, 
Dulce María Sauri, president of the PRI, spoke briefly on behalf of her party: priistas 
were opposed to the idea of creating a truth commission as it would produce an 
unacceptable ‘Manichean vision of the PRI administrations’ (Garduño 2001). Again, 
she sought to deflect the attention from her party’s behaviour to Fox’s intention to 
investigate: a truth commission would generate a prejudiced interpretation of what 
really happened – that was the issue. 
To justify her party’s opposition to the establishment of a truth commission, 
Sauri deployed a rhetorical device that Cohen (2005: 114) terms ‘isolation’: when an 
official discourse acknowledges that ‘the alleged event happened’, but claims ‘it [was] 
only an isolated event’ – ‘violations arose from individual excesses […] and are not 
condoned by the government’. As Sauri put it: during the authoritarian regime ‘those 
who committed crimes were persons, not institutions’ – there were some identifiable 
individuals (a few bad apples) who perpetrated abuses, but certainly not the PRI 
(Garduño 2001). 
In response, Santiago Creel reached out reassuringly to the PRI. He gave the 
priistas his word that ‘any illicit conduct committed in the past’ would be ‘processed’ in 
an ‘institutional way’ (Garduño 2001). By this he meant that past abuses would be 
investigated and prosecuted through the existing institutions – inherited from the 
previous regime – according to standard legal procedures (via the public prosecutor’s 
office, the Attorney General’s Office, and the courts). And to prove he was right, Creel 
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followed a variant of what Cohen (2005) and McEvoy (2007) term magical legalism 
(examined in Chapter Two): the ‘institutional way’ was laid down in the Mexican 
Constitution so it was lawful; by contrast, a truth commission was not already 
prescribed in any Mexican law, so it could not possibly be correct. As Creel put it, the 
new regime’s promise was simply ‘to respect the rule of law and the institutions of the 
Republic’. Therefore, a truth commission would ‘discredit our institutions […] weaken 
our legal framework and the rule of law’. Truth commissions are ‘extremely risky’, he 
warned, because ‘we know, generally speaking, where they begin but not where they 
end’ (Garduño 2001). 
This peculiar incident was registered by the press (Sánchez and Herrera 2001). 
The message, as reflected by Mexico’s newspapers, was clear: if Fox’s strategists 
sought to bring about important reforms to consolidate democracy, they had to negotiate 
with the old ‘official party’, which opposed the establishment of a truth commission. 
Moreover, by emphasising that crimes were committed by individual offenders, the PRI 
seemed to foster – at least tacitly – a retributive model of justice to deal with the past. 
But why, we might want to ask, did former perpetrators seek to advance criminal 
prosecutions? And why did the Minister of Interior of the new regime readily accepted 
the PRI’s demands? I will address these questions at the end of this chapter and again in 
Chapter Five. 
Meanwhile, other members of Fox’s cabinet sought to advance a restorative 
model of justice to deal with the past. Fox’s cabinet was not only formed by members of 
his political party (the PAN), but by ‘experts’. After his electoral triumph, he began a 
complex recruitment process to select the right people to staff the ‘government of 
change’: ‘the new era of Mexican politics required the incorporation of leaders 
representing various sectors of society’ (Díez 2010: 42). Thus Fox selected individuals 
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from different career backgrounds and political persuasions – some of whom were 
human rights activists and experts such as Mariclaire Acosta, Adolfo Aguilar Zínser, or 
Jorge Castañeda, who were widely esteemed by the human rights community in Mexico 
and abroad (Acosta and Ennelin 2006; HRW 2002).43 Together, they openly promoted 
the creation of a truth commission. 
But Castañeda, Acosta, and Aguilar were not alone. The left-wing Party of the 
Democratic Revolution (PRD) joined them in their efforts. Echoing the enthusiasm of 
restorativists, members of the PRD offered a set of arguments on the merits of a 
restorative approach to deal with past atrocity in the country. According to them, the 
first justification for restorative justice in Mexico was that it would consolidate 
democratic rule. ‘If we do not face our historic traumas’, said Senator Fernando 
Chavarría Barrera on October, 2000, ‘our democracy will be weak […]. If we do not get 
rid of the ghosts that are oppressing us, they will start blocking our democratic 
transition’ (Senado de la República 2000b: 16). 
A second reason invoked by members of the PRD to prefer restorative justice 
was that it would have a deterrent effect. ‘On July 2, the Mexican society celebrated its 
triumph over the state’, said Chavarría before the Congress, but ‘inside today’s victory 
beats the juvenile heart’ of ‘those who thirty two years ago lived the 1968 student 
movement’. ‘We cannot cross the threshold of history without settling accounts with the 
past’, he went on, because ‘our social edifice could collapse; we need to know what 
                                                 
43 Before becoming Minister of Foreign Affairs in the new regime, Jorge Castañeda – currently member 
of the board of HRW – worked at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, at the Woodrow 
Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, and as a Global Distinguished Professor at New York 
University. Before being appointed by Fox as sub-secretary for Human Rights and Democracy in the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mariclaire Acosta was the President of Amnesty International in Mexico, and 
worked at the Centre for International Development and Conflict Management. She later became director 
of the International Centre for Transitional Justice’s programme on The Americas. Adolfo Aguilar Zínser 
was appointed Commissioner of Order and Respect at the beginning of Fox’s administration. Before that, 
he worked at the Centre for Economic and Social Studies of the Third World, where he promoted the 
human rights of Central America refugees who fled from violence in their homelands during the 1970s 
and 1980s. 
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happened’ (Senado de la República 2000a; Senado de la República 2000b: 15). ‘This is 
the only way to inhibit the authoritarian instincts still embedded in the Mexican state. 
This is the way to protect our sons from the same criminal fate’ (Senado de la República 
2000b: 16). 
A final argument was related to the allocation of responsibility. The PRD 
recognised that, even with the best political will, some criminals would ‘never be 
punished because they are dead’; or because they ‘hold positions [of] power’. Yet, they 
justified the establishment of a truth commission as the issue of past abuses was ‘not 
only a legal problem’, it was also ‘about historical and moral responsibility’ (Senado de 
la República 2000b: 16). Thus, members of the PRD celebrated ‘the creation of 
tribunals in the international field to punish crimes against humanity’, and prosecute 
‘tyrants’. However, in Mexico, they backed ‘the newly elected President Vicente Fox’s 
will to create a Truth Commission with public figures from civil society’. ‘Fox’s 
intention’, they claimed, ‘will surely find support among all political and social forces’ 
(Senado de la República 2000b: 17). 
The PRD’s perspective proved correct. At least some international non-
governmental organisations, such as Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Amnesty 
International (AI), shared the PRD’s enthusiasm and thus supported the creation of a 
truth commission in Mexico (Aguayo 2001d; AI 2001a; Gilmore 2001; ICTJ 2002: 12; 
Vivanco 2001). In doing so, these organisations repeated the familiar – yet barely 
proven – assumptions made by those transitional justice scholars and practitioners 
supporting a restorative sense of justice: e.g. every society has the inalienable right to 
know the truth about past events according to international human rights law; exposing 
past human rights abuses should be enough to prevent repetition of such acts in the 
future; by knowing the truth of what happened victims and societies heal old wounds; 
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by healing old wounds, truth commission have a therapeutic effect on victims; revealing 
the truth can contribute to accountability (all good things go together). 
The first reason invoked by HRW and AI was timing. According to Priscilla B. 
Hayner, conspicuous representative of the first cluster of literature on transitional 
justice: ‘as a general rule a truth commission should begin as soon as possible after a 
political transition’ (Hayner 2002: 220). Following Hayner’s line of thought, HRW and 
AI claimed that 2001 was the right moment to confront the past in Mexico: it was time 
to ‘turn promises on human rights into actions’ (AI 2001b). HRW warned the president: 
‘[W]hen you took office last December […] you promised that you would take steps to 
clarify and resolve past abuses. We strongly support your efforts in this regard, and 
believe that it is now time to put your plans into effect’ (Vivanco 2001). 
In addition, HRW and AI argued that to come to terms with the past through a 
truth commission was simply Mexico’s ‘obligation’ to know the truth – the ‘right to 
truth’ – according to human rights international law (AI 2002a: 2; Gilmore 2001). 
‘Seeking the truth about abuses that occurred under past governments is not a matter of 
political vengeance or witch hunting’, but ‘a fundamental obligation binding on your 
[Fox’s] government, regardless of who was in power at the time the abuses were 
committed’, HRW said (Vivanco 2001). According to this organisation, ‘the 
international treaties ratified by Mexico […] require[d] states parties to prevent human 
rights violations’: consequently, ‘a first step in this process is the systematic 
investigation and clarification of past abuses’ (Vivanco 2001). A truth commission, 
HRW concluded, would ‘clarify the many cases that have never been adequately 
investigated and prosecuted by judicial authorities such as the massacres of Tlatelolco 
in 1968 and Acteal in 1997’ (Vivanco 2001).44
                                                 
44 In 1997, in Acteal, in the state of Chiapas, forty five men, women, and toddlers were killed by 
paramilitary agents related to the PRI. 
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A third explanation offered by these human rights organisations was that a 
Mexican truth commission would have a deterrent effect. As HRW put it: ‘[E]nding 
impunity for past abuses is crucial for preventing future ones’ (Vivanco 2001). Another 
justification was that a truth commission in the country would have a therapeutic effect 
on Mexico’s society. According to AI’s ‘experience in many countries of the world’, 
‘the total or partial concealment of the Truth […] as the abandonment of victims, 
leave[s] wounds irremediably open in the social fabric’ (AI 2001a). 
A final justification was that Mexico’s truth commission, rather than displacing 
‘justice’ in courts, would contribute to the accountability of the perpetrators. Hayner, 
who published the first generic study about truth commissions in 1994, argued that such 
mechanisms serve as a ‘complement to a very weak judicial system, helping to fill the 
void created by the […] incompetence, or inability of the courts’ (Hayner 2002: 88). 
This was exactly HRW’s argument: ‘[T]the value of truth commissions as a spur to 
judicial efforts is especially obvious when legal institutions have failed to administer 
justice fairly and adequately in the past. This, unfortunately, has been the case in 
Mexico’ (Vivanco 2001). Moreover, HRW reported to Fox: 
History has shown that truth commissions do not undermine existing judicial 
mechanisms, but rather they strengthen them. In Argentina, Chile, and Guatemala, for 
example, truth commissions have played a crucial role in improving the judiciary's 
capacity to handle human rights cases. Not only have they presented new evidence 
necessary for prosecutions, they have also helped these societies to understand and to 
address the failings of the judicial institutions that allowed these crimes to go 
unpunished (Vivanco 2001). 
 
Truth commissions, AI said to President Fox, ‘are an important supplement to the 
institutionalisation of the rule of law’ (Gilmore 2001). So a truth commission would 
‘deeply transform […] structures and entities’ that made abuses possible (Gilmore 
2001). 
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However, unlike Mariclaire Acosta, Adolfo Aguilar Zínser, Jorge Castañeda, or 
the PRD, these human rights organisations considered that the creation of a truth 
commission did not ‘exonerate’ Fox’s administration from its obligation to prosecute 
criminals of past abuses (AI 2001a), an obligation that ‘derive[d] from the right of 
victims to see their abusers brought to justice’ (Vivanco 2001). As HRW put it: 
We understand that the proposed truth commission has its critics – even within your 
administration – who fear that it might undermine the institutions already charged with 
administering justice in Mexico. Faced with a choice between truth and justice, these 
critics argue, Mexicans should choose justice. Put this way, who could possibly be 
against the criminal prosecution of those responsible for egregious human rights 
abuses? But this is in fact a false choice. Mexicans have the right to truth and justice. 
And, under international law, your government has an obligation to provide both 
(Vivanco 2001). 
 
HRW and AI went well beyond simply supporting a restorative conception of 
justice. They actually advised the president the way to proceed in order to set up 
Mexico’s truth commission. According to these organisations, a truth commission had 
to be ‘appropriately constituted, adequately funded, and equipped with the necessary 
legal powers’ by the Mexican state (Vivanco 2001). Yet, it had to be an ‘independent, 
non-political body, made up of knowledgeable and distinguished members’ of civil 
society (Vivanco 2001). AI even suggested it should include UN staff, and offered 
President Fox a memorandum containing the ‘basic principles for the establishment and 
operation of a truth commission’ (AI 2001a; Fernández Sánchez 2001). 
It was never clear, however, what they meant by ‘independent’. How can an 
institution created and funded by the state be, simultaneously, ‘independent’ from it? 
HRW and AI were clearly suspicious of the Mexican state. But, these organisations 
appeared to suggest that the implementation of a truth commission depended 
exclusively on the Mexican state. As seen in Chapter Two, according to the first and 
second clusters of literature on transitional justice, investigatory bodies instituted by 
non-state actors are not considered to be truth commissions. So, there is a paradox here. 
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According to these human rights organisations, Mexico’s ‘independent’ truth 
commission would depend on the state they relentlessly criticised – a state that inherited 
institutions and structures of power from the previous regime. As I have argued in 
Chapter Two, human rights organisations represent themselves as playing a counter-
hegemonic role against the state over which they seek to ‘impose’ their ‘transitional 
justice’ ideals, but it is the state that has the power to turn such ideals into practices. 
Even less clear is what these organisations meant by ‘non-political body’. As the 
third cluster of literature on transitional justice that this thesis endorses has 
demonstrated, truth commissions are political bodies par excellence. HRW and AI seem 
to believe that truth commissions are built upon moral, legal, universal, neutral, and 
depoliticised imperatives, which states are ‘obliged’ to observe. However, as Moon and 
others have shown, far from being ‘non-political’ entities, truth commissions have 
altered the exercise and distribution of power during transitional moments, and have 
served to mediate complicated political transitions as they do not ostensibly threaten the 
power elite (Ainley 2008; Moon 2008; Wilson 2001). 
These paradoxes aside, it is important to note the way these human rights 
organisations took part in Mexico’s ‘transitional justice’ process, and how they 
intervened and negotiated agendas. Human rights organisations present themselves as 
acting in the field of principles, away from the domain of state politics and political 
interests. Therefore, when they proposed the establishment of ‘non-political bodies’ to 
deal with past atrocity, they followed an extreme version of ‘magical legalism’ (Cohen 
2005; McEvoy 2007): we (the NGOs) are apolitical; human rights laws are extra-
political; the ‘transitional justice’ mechanisms proposed by us are based on such laws; 
therefore ‘transitional justice’ mechanisms should be ‘non-political’ in nature. However, 
as McEvoy correctly notes, this ‘magical legalism’ ignores the essentially political 
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nature of this argumentation. It denies the fact that these human rights organisations 
exercise power by making up the definitions related to transitional justice, which later 
have to be instituted and policed by the state. That is why the third cluster of literature 
on transitional justice proved so useful to this investigation, as it challenges the 
language of human rights during transitions, as it shows that this language is not only 
related to free-standing, non-political, ideals and principles, but that it is also a matter of 
political intervention. 
Thus, Fox’s mechanisms instituted in November 2001, particularly the SPO, 
were not self-evident or necessary at all. Different possibilities to come to terms with 
the past coexisted and were seen as lawful during the first months following Fox’s 
electoral triumph in July 2000. But over the spring of 2001 the truth commission 
proposed by Mariclaire Acosta, Jorge Castañeda, and Aguilar Zínser took sudden 
significance. 
Truth commissions 
Controversy on how to deal with the past came to an end in April 2001, when Vicente 
Fox took the decision to create a truth commission. In a private meeting with members 
of his cabinet, on a small piece of paper, Fox scrawled the following instruction: 
‘Adolfo [Aguilar Zínser] will be the Coordinator for the Project “Truth Commission” 
and also will be in charge of the democratisation of the CISEN [Centre for Research and 
National Security, which is Mexico’s intelligence agency]’ (Fox 2001).45 This scribbled 
text marked the beginning of Mexico’s ‘transitional justice’ process. This was the first 
semi-official document on the country’s process to come to terms with the past. It was 
handwritten in April, 2001 – seven months before the establishment of the Special 
                                                 
45 It is worth noting that, originally, the idea of a transitional justice was closely related to the 
democratisation of the security apparatus (in particular of the intelligence services). I will return to this 
issue in the conclusions of this thesis. 
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Prosecutor’s Office at the Black Palace (November 2001). The text officially mandated 
the creation of a truth commission that would never exist in reality. 
The commission would be implemented by ‘Adolfo [Aguilar Zínser], Santiago 
[Creel], Ramón [Muñoz], Rodolfo [Elizondo], M[arta] Sahagún, and the external team 
(3)’ (Fox 2001). All of them were members of the cabinet.46 By ‘external team’ the 
president meant three academics with multiple affiliations – ‘double agents’ in Nicholas 
Guilhot’s terms: school professors who were, at the same time, human rights experts, 
consultants, journalists, and activists in well-known NGOs: Dr Sergio Aguayo, Dr José 
Antonio Crespo, and Clara Jusidman. 
The truth commission suddenly became the favoured ‘transitional justice’ 
mechanism in Mexico’s transitional moment. HRW, for instance, eagerly applauded this 
decision in a public letter addressed to President Fox saying: ‘Not only the victims and 
their families, but Mexican society as a whole benefit from having […] cases [of past 
abuses] properly resolved’ (Vivanco 2001). HRW’s public statements gave the 
impression that a truth commission would definitely transform a country ‘in which 
impunity had flourished for decades’ (Vivanco 2001). 
Also, the international mass media carried reports about Mexico’s plans to 
establish a truth commission. This headline of the Dallas Morning News in July 2001 is 
self-descriptive: ‘Fox is right to pursue truth commission’: 
[PRI] party members have made it clear that the prosecution – they consider it 
persecution – of PRI officials would have a chilling effect on Mr. Fox’s legislative 
agenda for his remaining 5 1/2 years in office. The men and women of the Fox 
administration take those warnings seriously, and some have advised el presidente [the 
president] to take a ‘forgive and forget’ approach. Now, Mr. Fox appears ready to do 
the right and just thing […]. He would ask Congress to form a ‘truth commission’ after 
it reconvenes in September. Concerned that previous attempts to investigate the past 
                                                 
46 Santiago Creel was Minister of Interior. Ramón Muñoz was the Chief of Staff of the Presidential Office 
for Governmental Innovation. Rodolfo Elizondo was coordinator of the Presidential Office for the 
Citizens’ Alliance. Marta Sahagún, who later became Fox’s controversial wife, was Coordinator General 
of Social Communication and Spokesperson of the Mexican Presidency. With the exception of the 
Ministry of Interior, all these offices were created by Fox’s strategists. However, in less than one year, 
most of these newly created offices were dismantled (Loaeza 2006: 13). 
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have – in Mexico and in other countries – ‘created more problems than they have 
solved’, Mr. Fox would prefer to limit the power and scope of the inquiry. Whether 
those limitations are helpful or necessary is for the Mexican people to decide, but the 
fact that Mr. Fox is ready to convene a truth commission is most encouraging. 
 
Similarly, in May 2001, the BBC covered the meeting between Jacob Zuma, 
South Africa Deputy President, and Vicente Fox in Mexico City. The BBC reported that 
Zuma’s discussions with Fox ‘touched on Mexicans’ past experiences, focusing on 
correcting the legacy of the previous government of seventy-one years’ (BBC 2001). 
Zuma and Fox, this report said, ‘were keen to take a leaf from South Africa’s 
experiences of transition from apartheid to a democratically-ruled country’ (BBC 2001). 
According to the BBC, Zuma stated: 
We [South Africa] are seen as a model other countries of the world, including Mexico, 
could use to transform. I can tell you that there’s even talk here that a structure in the 
form of our country’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission has been formed […]. The 
government here is keen to draw into our experiences in its quest to build a new nation. 
 
These reports on the press are relevant as they show that in Mexico and abroad 
there was a general belief about the coming existence of a truth commission. Moreover, 
the press was already justifying a particular course of action (Fox was doing the right 
thing), and foreseeing the truth commission’s outcomes (if it worked in South Africa, it 
should work in Mexico too). 
In this context, Aguilar Zínser, in charge of establishing this mechanism, began 
by gathering historical data about different truth commissions that proved to be 
‘effective’ in other countries (Morales Avilés n. d.). Based on the information available 
in his private collection, he was planning to establish a truth commission with legal 
powers to compel witnesses, and those allegedly involved in cases under investigation, 
to testify (AI 2001a). Following the South African example, he also sought to make 
public the results of the investigations (Aguayo 2001c; AI 2001a; Morales Avilés n. d.: 
leaf 6). In addition, according to his advisers, Mexico’s truth commission should 
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investigate only ‘gross violations of human rights’ (Aguayo 2001c; Morales Avilés n. 
d.: leaf 1). 
To justify its creation, Aguilar Zínser and his strategists relentlessly repeated 
some of the assumptions shared by transitional justice practitioners and theorists: the 
truth commission would have a therapeutic impact, a deterrent effect in Mexico’s 
society, and a reconciliatory outcome. The truth commission, Aguilar Zínser’s aides 
argued, was a ‘basic precondition for reconciliation’, which would ‘help society […] to 
heal traumas’ (Morales Avilés n. d.: leaf 1 and 3). It would also ‘prevent perpetrators 
from returning to political life and undermining the rule of law’ (Morales Avilés n. d.: 
leaf 2). The problem with the latter assumption was that perpetrators were already well 
embedded within the new regime and, as I will show in the following section, actually 
prevented the establishment of Mexico’s truth commission.47
On June 18, 2001, the project on Mexico’s truth commission was ready to hand 
over to Fox. The president simply had to approve it. Aguilar Zínser organised a private 
meeting to introduce the proposal with members of the cabinet and his team (Aguilar 
Zínser 2001). The next day they all met at Los Pinos, the presidential residence, and 
learned about the project (AA 2001d). 
According to Aguilar Zínser’s proposal, the commission would be composed of 
three ‘sub-commissions’ or ‘chapters’ (capítulos) (AA 2001a; AA 2001b; AA 2001c). 
The first sub-commission would be in charge of investigating cases of corruption. The 
second would investigate past human rights abuses. And the third would not be an 
investigatory body as the former two, but a ‘state commission’ that would have two 
purposes: to give access to state files, and to serve as a ‘mediator’ between state agents 
and the two investigatory commissions (AA 2001b: leaf 1). 
                                                 
47 Adolfo Aguilar Zínser’s private archive is hereafter cited as AA. 
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The ideas about reconciliation and deterrence invoked by Aguilar Zínser and his 
assistants to justify the creation of a truth commission were not reflected at all in the 
final proposal. On the contrary, paying no attention to human rights principles or 
transitional justice ideals, throughout the programme presented to Fox and his cabinet, 
the human rights ‘experts’ offered a series of pragmatic and political arguments on why 
establishing a truth commission was so relevant for the country. The main issue on the 
table was not reconciliation or truth, but how to make the truth commission politically 
acceptable to members of the PRI, on the one hand, and victims’ families and members 
of the human rights community, on the other (AA 2001b). 
In this regard, the first problem was how to select the commissioners. According 
to Aguilar Zínser’s scheme, each investigatory body would have eight commissioners – 
sixteen in total – who would be ‘absolutely free’ to undertake their investigations and 
assemble a final report (AA 2001a: leaf 4). This sought to convey to the victims and 
their families that the truth commission would be led by people ‘independent from the 
government, with prestige and social recognition’. However, the commissioners would 
be cautiously selected and guided by Fox’s administration: first, they would be 
appointed ‘entirely confidentially’ by the president, ‘taking care not to disclose this 
debate to the mass media’; and then they would be ‘helped’ by the third sub-
commission, composed of members of the government  (AA 2001a: leaf 3). 
The second problem was how to defend in public the creation of the truth 
commission before the members of the PRI and those who opposed ‘transitional 
justice’. According to Aguilar Zínser’s programme, Fox should ‘prepare convincing 
arguments’ to prove that the commission was not unlawful or ‘unconstitutional’, as it 
was not prescribed in the Constitution (AA 2001a: leaf 2). This was important as 
Aguilar Zínser said that declarations on the unlawfulness of restorative justice ‘could be 
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very persuasive to society’. And to placate the restless PRI, Aguilar Zínser’s proposal 
suggested the president should state that the truth commission’s results would not be 
legally binding: its ‘findings would not have legal value’ (AA 2001a: leaf 1; AA 2001c: 
leaf 1). So, the point was to show that the official policy would be to do nothing to those 
found guilty: because the truth commission’s findings were not legally binding, 
perpetrators had nothing to worry about. 
Aguilar Zínser’s project sought to stage Mexico’s truth sub-commissions in 
three phases. The first, as he put it, was the ‘preliminary stage of consultation’, which 
would start a few weeks after the meeting at Los Pinos. It would last two months, 
commencing on July 1 and ending on September 1, 2001. Five members of the cabinet – 
Creel, Elizondo, Muñoz, Sahagún, and Aguilar Zínser – as well as the three academics 
would be in charge of this step, and their objective was to determine how the truth 
commission should be implemented without placing at risk the fragile political stability 
of the new democratic regime. During this ‘consultation phase’ Aguilar Zínser sought to 
answer the following fateful questions before setting up the commission: how would 
Mexican people react to a truth commission? How could the commission meet the 
expectations of victims’ families and the human rights community? What sort of events 
could be investigated without disturbing the priistas? (AA 2001a: leaf 5; AA 2001b: 
leaf 2). 
To assess if the truth commission was seen as a ‘risk for the stability of the 
country’ or not, Aguilar Zínser’s team would conduct opinion surveys (AA 2001a: leaf 
6; AA 2001b: leaf 2). First, they would organise ‘focus groups’ with ‘influential sectors’ 
of Mexico’s society – ‘reporters, entrepreneurs, members of the different churches, 
scholars’ – in order to find out what their expectations of the commission were. Second, 
they would conduct a ‘comprehensive opinion poll’ to determine citizens’ attitudes 
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toward ‘transitional justice’. Finally, Aguilar Zínser would interview ‘experts on 
popular culture and psychology of Mexican people’ as they should be able to give a 
‘theoretical framework’ to understand how Mexicans would respond to the 
establishment of the investigatory bodies (AA 2001a: leaf 5; AA 2001b: leaf 2). 
But the consultation phase would serve another significant purpose: it would 
allow President Fox to ‘pre-select’, secretly and arbitrarily, uncontroversial cases of past 
abuses that could be investigated without threatening the PRI elite (AA 2001a: leaf 6; 
AA 2001b: leaf 2). Based on opinion surveys, Fox would evaluate and predict ‘the 
political costs’, as well as ‘the political instability’ that ‘every case could generate’ (AA 
2001c: leaf 3). As Aguilar Zínser’s team put it: ‘[I]nvestigations should combine 
principles of justice and ethics with pragmatism for the sake of democratic viability and 
political stability’ (AA 2001c: leaf 3). This phase would be absolutely secret. 
To ‘pre-select’ the cases to be investigated by the commission, Aguilar Zínser’s 
team would follow three criteria. First, in order to avoid criticisms, they would ‘select’ 
only those cases of past abuses it was unproblematic to ‘clarify’. That is, the truth 
commission would seek to investigate uncontroversial cases that could be easily 
handled and, hence, that would not put at risk the stability of the new democracy. The 
criteria to do so were never disclosed. Second, the cases should have a symbolic effect: 
they should be significant enough to ‘restore credibility and public confidence in 
institutions’. It was never specified, however, what Fox and his strategists meant by 
‘significant’, nor how significance was to be assessed. Finally, Aguilar Zínser’s group 
would avoid tilting ‘the weight of evidence excessively’ against specific members of 
perpetrators such as the army (AA 2001a: leaf 8; AA 2001b: leaf 3) They sought to 
avoid cases that could threaten tainted officials incorporated in the new system. Yet, the 
methodology to assure this outcome was never revealed. 
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The second phase would start on September 1, 2001, and come to an end on 
December 31, 2001. This phase would begin with the official institution of the truth 
commission and the appointment of its sixteen commissioners. Once in office, the 
commissioners would organise a ‘public consultation’ to ‘choose’ (again) the cases that 
they would investigate. But it would be a phoney consultation as the cases had already 
been ‘pre-selected’, secretly, by the President during the ‘preliminary stage’. In the 
second phase, the commissioners – ‘independent’ members of society with ‘prestige and 
social recognition’ – would just be pretending they were doing so. Of course, as this 
pseudo-consultation could not be so blatant before the public, when pretending to 
choose the cases, the commissioners would invoke their ‘historic and civic relevance’ – 
‘those cases which have deeply hurt society’ (AA 2001a: leaf 7; AA 2001b: leaf 3). 
Fox’s strategists never unveiled the criteria to do so. 
The third phase would last twelve months, from January 1, 2002, to December 
31, 2002. Over this period the commissioners would investigate the particular cases of 
past abuses they had previously ‘pre-selected’ in private and ‘selected’ in public. At the 
end, the commission would present a final report with its main findings (AA 2001a: leaf 
8; AA 2001b: leaf 4). This stage could be extended for another year if the 
commissioners considered it necessary (AA 2001c: leaf 4). The final report would be 
made public and would contain recommendations to the executive branch of the state 
and ‘general recommendations’. The recommendations would not be legally binding 
(AA 2001a: leaf 2), and the Executive would have the power to reject the 
recommendations (AA 2001c: leaf 4). 
President Fox read the project while the cabinet members and the human rights 
experts were listening. At the end of the meeting, he said: ‘[W]ell done, in a week 
everything will be ready to start working’ (Aguayo and Trevino-Rangel 2006b: 60). On 
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June 19, 2001, the truth commission was formally approved, but weeks passed and no 
project developed. Five months later, on November 27, Fox suddenly instructed that a 
Special Prosecutor’s Office should be created. 
The story of the truth commission that never materialised is important for four 
reasons. First, it demonstrates there were different available ways of dealing with the 
past, including a policy of oblivion, which was widely favoured by members of the new 
democratic system. Second, it shows how the ‘transitional justice’ process was a site in 
which non-state actors (scholars, activists, and victims’ families) and state agents 
negotiated agendas: the official establishment of the SPO was preceded by a protracted 
process of political deliberations, in which NGOs and human rights experts helped to 
prescribe the appropriate ways of dealing with past atrocity. Third, the story shows how 
‘transitional justice’ assumptions (knowledge) about truth, justice, and reconciliation 
were constructed, debated, and contested by all actors involved, and the material effects 
this way of representing reality had (power). Finally, and crucially, it demonstrates that 
the construction of Mexico’s ‘transitional justice’ was shaped by contingent-historical 
determinants. 
These arguments aside, a significant question remains: why did Fox change his 
mind? Why, if he was so careful not to threaten the PRI elite with the truth commission, 
did he establish a prosecutor’s office that would, ostensibly, be more intimidating, as it 
would imply that perpetrators would be brought to justice? This is the subject of 
Chapters Four and Five. 
Mexico’s ‘transitional justice’ thus underwent a drastic change from April to 
November 2001. We will never know what happened in the five month interval, but we 
can explore the purposes served by the move from a restorative model, via the 
institution of a truth commission, to a retributive model based on the prosecution of 
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those responsible. We can examine the immediate effects this transformation had on 
Mexico’s democratisation. This is the subject I now address and that I will discuss in 
subsequent chapters. 
Back to the Black Palace: the SPO and its immediate political effects 
I have already described the two symbolic effects that the establishment of the SPO had 
on the new regime. First, the ceremony at the Black Palace bolstered the idea that the 
Fox administration represented not only a ‘change of political party’ in government, but 
a ‘change of regime’, the ‘gateway to the twenty-first century’ (Fox 2000). Second, as 
the ceremony was organised by the NHRC and the SPO resulted from its specific 
recommendations, it showed that the new regime was deeply committed to human rights 
(the language of human rights as a discourse of political legitimation). It was an 
example of the Fox administration’s careful cultivation of its pro-human rights image (I 
will return to this point in the following chapter). 
However, the move from a restorative model of justice to a retributive one also 
served more pragmatic ends. The first was that it channelled the ‘transitional justice’ 
process through the existing structures of power which still operated under authoritarian 
premises. As I have described throughout this chapter, there was a special emphasis on 
the idea that – unlike a truth commission – a retributive process would be strictly 
subordinated to the rule of law: the SPO was ‘constitutional’ and ‘lawful’, inspired ‘by 
the spirit of justice, but not of revenge’ (Poder Ejecutivo Federal 2001a: leaf 2). In a 
country in which impunity characterised the previous authoritarian era, Fox’s manifest 
respect for the rule of law was a significant indication that things had changed. The 
problem was that some, significant, things had not changed. The SPO’s performance 
and outcomes depended on other state institutions in which the PRI had significant 
influence and that experienced no reform, e.g. the General Attorney’s Office, the 
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Military, the Mexican courts (Benítez Manaut 2008a). Hence, by establishing the SPO, 
Fox allowed Mexico’s ‘transitional justice’ process to be undertaken by the very same 
institutions that were directly involved in past abuses (the Military), had colluded in 
them through their silence (the courts), or had done nothing to investigate and prosecute 
human rights violations in the past (the General Attorney’s Office). 
A second consequence of establishing the SPO was to avoid an inquiry into the 
role played by different institutions involved in gross violations of human rights. The 
SPO would investigate individual offenders, rather than a pattern of past abuses. As I 
examined in Chapter Two, retributive justice is based on the assumption that since past 
abuses are committed by identifiable persons, responsibility must be allocated to those 
specific individuals found guilty of perpetrating such abuses (Zalaquett 1989). That is 
why, Méndez argues, trials and prosecutions are preferable to truth commissions 
because they eradicate the stigma of ‘historic misdeeds’ carried out by ‘innocent’ 
institutions or members of society that are collectively blamed for the abuses 
perpetrated during the previous regime (Méndez 1997b: 277). As Fox put it at the Black 
Palace: ‘for an effective review of the past, we must trust in our institutions’, because ‘it 
is the only effective way to combat impunity’ (Presidencia de la República 2001b: leaf 
3). But how to ‘trust’ – to look the other way – institutions involved in past human 
rights violations? 
Choi and David (2012) argue that some measure of ‘trust’ in the political regime 
contributes to citizens’ compliance and ethical reciprocity, therefore helping to sustain 
democracy. That is why, they have demonstrated, it is so relevant to rebuild citizens’ 
trust in the government after transition (Choi and David 2012: 1174). In Mexico, an 
investigation of the involvement of different institutions in the commission of past 
abuses was relevant in the context of the country’s ‘history of abuses’. As I have 
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examined in Chapter One, the PRI regime had a sophisticated security apparatus – 
paramilitary groups, the Military, the secret police, the police – that intimidated, 
repressed, tortured, and disappeared dissidents. The problem was that some of these 
institutions had survived democratization and were far from being reformed. Digna 
Ochoa’s case showed that at least the Military was reintegrated untransformed in the 
new regime. As said earlier, in Mexico’s new regime the army is still operating under 
the authoritarian paradigm: the same rules, structure, laws, and staff. So soldiers who 
commit abuses are allegedly accountable to military authorities, but neither they nor the 
military court system are accountable to civilians. This has resulted in human rights 
violations going unpunished (HRW 2001). Another example of institutions implicated 
in past abuses would be that of the judges and courts, who turned a blind eye to the state 
criminal deeds. Unlike in the transitional justice processes of South Africa (1996), Chile 
(1983), and Argentina (1990), in Mexico the role of the judicial system as a whole in 
tolerating abuses by the authoritarian authorities would be ignored (Hayner 2002: 102). 
Unlike post-transition Czech Republic where tainted officials were dismissed, in 
Mexico compromised judges and members of the army retained their posts. Hence, the 
institutional context that made abuses possible would remain unharmed. In Mexico, 
contrary to what Méndez suggests, the SPO would not remove the stigma of historic 
wrongdoings from innocent institutions – it would perpetuate the impunity these 
institutions enjoyed in the past. As Francisco Panizza has argued, ‘the return to 
democracy in most Latin American countries has not brought about judicial reform or 
resulted in a more and independent judiciary’ (Panizza 1995: 183). The Mexican case 
does not provide an exception to this argument. 
The SPO resulted from a particular recommendation issued by the National 
Human Rights Commission (NHRC) that was not addressed to the Military, the 
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Attorney General’s Office, nor any other state agency that took part in past crimes. The 
NHRC’s recommendations were addressed directly to the President, who had the 
authority to decide whether to accept and implement them or not. Legitimately, the 
materialisation and policing of the country’s ‘transitional justice’ mechanisms would 
derive from a unilateral decision taken by the Executive. Therefore, the third effect of 
this move from a restorative to a retributive model of justice was that it strengthened 
Fox’s authority for three reasons. First, as shown in the first section of this chapter, it 
allowed President Fox to take the credit for the creation of the SPO, which would 
increase his popularity and validate his democratic credentials. Secondly, Fox delegated 
the right to act upon past atrocity to the SPO. However, the SPO depended on the 
General Attorney’s Office, which in turn depended on the President. Consequently, Fox 
was simply delegating more power to himself in the name of legality. Thirdly, this 
operation helped Fox – at least initially – to transfer the political costs of any decision 
concerning the SPO to the NHRC, as the NHRC recommended its creation: the 
President was just ‘following orders’ from the highest authority on human rights in the 
country. 
Another consequence of establishing Mexico’s ‘transitional justice’ mechanisms 
in this particular way was that Fox did not have to face a plural Congress, which could 
have opposed the presidential actions. There was no need for Congress to discuss or 
approve Fox’s personal ruling to create the SPO. Had the Congress intervened – e.g. in 
the selection of the special prosecutor – Fox’s proposal may have suffered changes or 
been blocked. 
A final effect of unilaterally imposing the SPO was that Fox could dictate the 
framework within which the past was to be addressed. This allowed him to instruct 
controversial policies or take decisions arbitrarily without being challenged. For 
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instance, it was in his power to select the specific person who would be responsible for 
the ‘transitional justice’ process. By appointing a polemic member of the PRI era who 
had clear conflicts of interest in dealing with the past, Fox could protect two crucial 
institutions involved in the perpetrations of past human rights violations: the Attorney 
General’s Office and the Military. The Attorney General’s Office – the institution that 
failed to investigate the abuses in the past – was in charge of conducting the enquiries 
concerning past abuses during the Fox administration. To do so, as recommended by the 
NHRC, the Attorney General created a Special Prosecutor’s Office. A problem with this 
was that the Attorney General, General Rafael Macedo de la Concha, worked during his 
youth in the Minister of Interior under the orders of Fernando Gutiérrez Barrios who, as 
explained in Chapter Two, was the former director of the secret police (Aguayo 2003). 
Therefore, during the authoritarian regime, Macedo de la Concha worked closely with 
the same perpetrators he was now trying to bring to justice in the new democracy. And, 
as previously explained in this chapter, Gutiérrez Barrios was still alive, now a powerful 
senator who enjoyed immunity.  
‘We should remember’ that ‘our Armed Forces […] are the first to honour our 
institutions […]. They are the first ‘to recognise that nobody can be above the law’, 
claimed Vicente Fox at the Black Palace (Presidencia de la República 2001b: leaf 3). 
Then, to calm the anxiety of the country’s Armed Forces, Fox promised that to face the 
past would not ‘discredit the Military, which is of the people and for the people’ 
(Presidencia de la República 2001b: leaf 3). Whatever the message Fox sought to 
convey, he performed a significant operation in order to protect the Military. As already 
stated, the Special Prosecutor’s officially depended on the Attorney General’s Office, 
which bureaucratically depended, in turn, on President Fox. The problem was that the 
Attorney General, General Macedo de la Concha, was a military member on active duty 
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(AI 2001c: 10). Hence he was also bureaucratically subordinate to the Minister of 
Defence. The Attorney General was subject to both the president’s orders (a civil) and 
the Military’s approval. But the story of Macedo de la Concha does not end here. He 
was the former chief military prosecutor during the authoritarian era and according to 
Amnesty International he had a ‘record of failing to prosecute military officials accused 
of human rights violations’ (AI 2002a: 15). 
Thus, the obvious question to be asked is: how can a general on active duty 
investigate and prosecute past crimes perpetrated by members of the Military? I will 
return to this question in Chapter Five. My point here was simply to show the 
immediate political purposes the SPO would serve. Inspired by the third and critical 
cluster of literature on transitional justice, this last section of the chapter sought to 
demonstrate – at least briefly – that transitional justice knowledge has material and 
political effects. That is to say, that it is not a straightforwardly normative project, but 
one that is thoroughly imbued with power, contrary to what much of the earlier 
literature in the field suggests. In particular, the detailed account of the role played by 
Attorney General, Rafael Macedo de la Concha, sought to emphasise a crucial factor 
that the first and second cluster of literature on transitional justice tend to ignore: 
beyond universal, neutral, and depoliticised transitional justice ideals, transitional 
justice mechanisms are – to paraphrase Steven Shapin (2010) – implemented and 
controlled by people with bodies, situated in time, space, culture, and society, and 
struggling for credibility, and authority. 
Conclusions 
This chapter sought to answer, in part, the first research question that framed this thesis: 
why did Fox venture to establish a ‘transitional justice’ process that would put at risk 
the new regime’s stability, and why did the authoritarian elite allow it? So, to partially 
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answer this question the chapter reviewed Fox’s first months in office, between July 
2000 and October 2001, before the ‘transitional justice’ mechanisms were fully 
established. In so doing, the chapter examined the contingency of the events – the ‘little 
dramas’ or ‘political accidents’ – that led to the creation of the SPO. And it showed how 
the ‘transitional justice’ process was constrained by political negotiations between 
members of the new regime and members of the PRI era. Thus, the ‘transitional justice’ 
mechanisms instituted by Vicente Fox in November 2001 were everything but intrinsic 
to Mexico’s democratisation. They were a practical response to a set of political 
conflicts, rather than being and indubitable imperative that Fox had claimed. 
Consequently, this chapter showed that Vicente Fox dared to come to terms with 
the past via a retributive model of justice for three main reasons. First, a retributive 
justice process would have a symbolic effect over the new regime: Fox differentiated 
his ‘regime of change’ from the previous regime; validated his administration 
democratic credentials; and showed his commitment to human rights. The second 
reason was strategic: by creating the ‘rules of the game’, Fox sought to strengthen his 
authority; impose decisions arbitrarily without being questioned; and regulate the 
participation of other actors involved in the process (e.g. NGOs, victims’ families, the 
PRD, members of his own cabinet that had divergent opinions on the matter). The third 
reason was, ironically, to preserve the incipient stability of the new regime. By 
establishing the SPO, Fox (a) sought to conduct the ‘transitional justice’ process via the 
existing structures (the courts, the attorney general); and (b) to legitimise key political 
institutions still working under authoritarian premises (e.g. the Military). 
Clearly, this process did not seem to threaten the previous authoritarian elite, 
which had been reincorporated into the new democratic system. This is central to an 
understanding of why the PRI elite did not oppose a retributive justice process. Of 
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course, during Fox’s first months in office, the PRI elite sought to protect the impunity 
its members had enjoyed in the past. They did not have enough power to fully oppose 
the establishment of ‘transitional justice’ mechanisms, but did retain enough power to 
intervene in their making. The PRI could not prevent the ‘transitional justice’ process, 
but was able to neuter its effects. 
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Chapter Four – 
Making up ‘Transitional Justice’: 
Defining, classifying and acting on human rights abuses  
 
The last chapter showed the reasons why Vicente Fox ventured to establish a 
‘transitional justice’ process that would put at risk the stability of the new democratic 
regime; and why the PRI elite allowed it. In so doing, it explored Fox’s first months in 
office, from July 2000 to November 2001, before the SPO was officially established. In 
this chapter, the analysis turns to the human rights ‘organising concepts’ (Hacking 
2002c: 22) through which Mexico’s ‘transitional justice’ process was framed: i.e. the 
category of ‘forced disappearance’, which is nested within a broader taxonomy of ‘gross 
violations of human rights’.48
This chapter seeks to answer, in particular, the second research question posed in 
the introduction of this thesis: how was the ‘transitional justice’ process constructed, 
and how did this construction frame and proscribe its performance and results? As I 
described in the previous chapter, on November 27 2001, Fox established the Special 
Prosecutor’s Office (the ‘Mexican solution’) because the highest authority of human 
rights in the country – the National Human Rights Commission, NHRC – urged him to 
do so through ‘Recommendation 26/2001’. This recommendation offered the particular 
category of human rights violation that framed Mexico’s ‘transitional justice’ process: 
the SPO would investigate the ‘forced disappearance’ of hundreds of dissidents in the 
1970s. However, this chapter argues, this category was constructed (and materialised) in 
such a way that it actually served to perpetuate the impunity of perpetrators. 
Inspired by the third cluster of literature on transitional justice – examined in 
Chapter Two of this thesis – this chapter shows three things. First, it shows how this 
                                                 
48 Following Foucault, Hacking uses the term ‘organising concepts’ in order to define the notions that 
allow the existence of ‘what it is possible to be or to do’ in a certain historical context. 
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category of human rights (i.e. force disappearance) was not a free-standing idea, but 
historically contingent, and affected by political arrangements. That is, this chapter does 
not take human rights categories as givens, but as a socially constructed ideas, the 
consequence of social and political interventions (Short 2007: 858). Second, it shows 
how the language of human rights framed the investigation into the past: that is to say, 
the kind of human rights violations that qualified for investigation and, hence, the type 
of victims that were counted in the process, and the perpetrators of certain crimes who 
would be subject to prosecution. It shows how the language of human rights shaped the 
way crimes and protagonists of the past were constructed and, therefore, how such 
construction permitted certain forms of action in relation to the past (e.g. in bringing 
certain authorities, laws, and institutions into being). Third, it shows how this particular 
way of representing (and intervening upon) past atrocity had social, material, and 
political effects during Mexico’s transition towards democracy. 
Before embarking upon that analysis, two notes should be added to my 
argument. First, it is worth noting that the previous chapter examined human rights talk 
as a language of political legitimation. As human rights are the principles from which 
new democracies derive their legitimacy, Fox justified different ‘transitional justice’ 
ideas and practices by invoking the language of human rights (e.g. the right to truth, the 
right to justice) (Arthur 2009; Guilhot 2005). Such language was deployed by Fox’s 
administration to indicate (and legitimise) the discontinuity between the previous 
authoritarian system and the new democratic era. To contrast with the previous 
chapter’s analysis, this chapter intends to demonstrate how human rights categories (e.g. 
forced disappearances) framed the SPO’s investigations. (This distinction has been ad 
explained in Chapter Two.). As said, this is relevant as one of the consequences of 
deploying such categories is that it makes interventions into past political violence – by 
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redescribing it as this or that violation – amenable to legal description, intervention and 
action. It also has a reductive effect in that it extrapolates the effects of deeper structural 
injustices whilst leaving those injustices untouched. 
Second, it is also important to emphasise that by exploring how particular human 
rights ‘organising concepts’ emerged and framed the process of facing past atrocity, this 
chapter attends to both the discursive practices and the particular material consequences 
of the process. Thus, following the third cluster of literature on transitional justice, in 
this chapter I investigate human rights talk and the ‘transitional justice’ practices and 
institutions that this particular talk produced. 
The chapter is divided into five parts. The first describes the story of the NHRC 
and its recommendation that led to the establishment of the SPO. The second addresses 
the way in which a particular human rights category (forced disappearance) was 
constructed: i.e., the section explores the ‘social life’ – in Short’s (2007) terms – of the 
category. The third section explains how such construction was secured: i.e. how the 
NHRC sought to validate (legitimise, make credible) such construction. The fourth part 
explains the purposes such construction served: i.e. it shows how the way in which the 
NHRC constructed the category of forced disappearance perpetuated impunity – the 
way the category of forced disappearance was constructed granted a de facto amnesty to 
perpetrators. The final section analyses the social and political effects that such 
construction had in Mexico’s transitional moment. 
(Pre)Transitional (in)justice: the (non-democratic) origins of the National Human 
Rights Commission’s Recommendation 26/2001 
The process of ‘transitional justice’ in Mexico began, as I described in the last chapter, 
when the most senior human rights authority in the country (the National Human Rights 
Commission, NHRC) urged President Vicente Fox to face the abuses perpetrated during 
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the previous authoritarian regime. In the official ceremony at the Black Palace, on 
November 27 2001, the NHRC issued Recommendation 26/2001 (González and 
Jiménez 2001; Granados Chapa 2001; Ruiz and Alcántara 2001; Venegas and Ballinas 
2001). Through this Recommendation, Dr. José Luis Soberanes, President of the 
NHRC, demanded President Fox to establish a Special Prosecutor’s Office in order to 
investigate and prosecute the forced disappearance cases ‘in the 1970s and beginning of 
the 1980s’ (CNDH 2001d: 38). 
So far this story is well known. What is often ignored is the role played by the 
NHRC in Mexico’s ‘transitional justice’ process. Why was this human rights institution 
suddenly so interested in promoting the establishment of the SPO? As I described in the 
previous chapter, in June 2001, Fox had ordered the creation of a truth commission, but 
no such project emerged. Instead, five months later, Fox instructed that a Special 
Prosecutor’s Office should be created because the NHRC so recommended. What 
happened in the five month interval we do not know. However we can explore the 
purposes the NHRC served in Mexico’s transitional moment by ‘recommending’ this 
particular way of dealing with the past. Thus, before analysing how the concept of 
forced disappearance was constructed, let me begin with the story of the controversial 
institution that constructed such category. This is important because, as Short rightly 
notes, more analysis is needed on how human rights are socially constructed according 
to the actions and intentions of social actors, within wider historical constraints of 
institutionalised power (Short 2007). 
The NHRC was created in 1990 by the same regime responsible for the 
repression of dissidents in the past. President Carlos Salinas (1988-1994) established the 
NHRC four days before a crucial meeting with the American president, George Bush, in 
which they were about to announce their intention to begin negotiations for a free trade 
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agreement between the countries (i.e. North America Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA). 
As stated in Chapter One, Salinas had been accused of gross violations of human rights: 
he repressed dissidents, arbitrarily removed seventeen state governors from their posts, 
was accused of the deaths of more than four hundred PRD members, and was 
responsible for the massacre of Zapatistas sympathisers (Del Villar 2005: 71; 
Hernández 2005: 104). Therefore, concerned about the negative publicity on Mexico’s 
history abuses, Salinas created the NHRC because he sought to demonstrate that his 
government had its human rights problems under control (See Ackerman 2007; 
Covarrubias Velasco 1999; Gil Villegas Montiel 1996; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Mazza 
2000; Trevino-Rangel 2003). This can be understood because, as Wilson suggests, the 
human rights bureaucracies, such as the NHRC, have served in Latin America ‘as a 
substitute for a government’s lack of commitment to the rule of law’ (Wilson 2001). 
The NHRC helped the PRI regime to maintain a democratic façade before the 
international community. By deflecting criticisms away from the government, the 
NHRC was an institution that helped to prolong the PRI era (Ackerman 2007).49 This is 
important because it means that Mexico’s ‘transitional justice’ process began because a 
powerful institution from the authoritarian era – the NHRC – pointed out to President 
Fox the way in which his administration should deal with the past. 
But there is an even more ominous – and barely known – side of this story. 
Recommendation 26/2001 did not originate within the democratic regime. The NHCR 
investigation on forced disappearances, which led to Recommendation 26/2001, had 
begun eleven years earlier, during the PRI era. The NHRC had been dealing with cases 
of forced disappearance since September 18 1990, through the Special Programme on 
Alleged Disappearances (CNDH 2001b). The aim of this ‘particular’ programme was to 
                                                 
49 Recent studies show that the NHRC continued to protect authoritarian enclaves even after the 
transition, at least until 2008. See HRW (2008), Fundar (2004), and Programa Atalaya (2004). 
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investigate the accusations of relatives of the victims of forced disappearances or non-
governmental human rights organisations related to past abuses (e.g. the Union of 
Parents of Disappeared Children, the Association of Relatives and Friends of the 
Disappeared in Mexico and the Committee for the Defence of Prisoners, Persecuted, 
Disappeared, and Political Exiles in Mexico). However, to carry out its inquiries, the 
NHCR collected evidence from other state institutions that had participated in the 
repression, and were still functioning in the 1990s under non-democratic premises – e.g. 
the Military, the Ministry of Interior, and intelligence services (Benítez Manaut 2008b). 
The irony is obvious: the NHRC demanded that the perpetrators should incriminate 
themselves. Not surprisingly, according to the NHRC itself, the result was that the 
investigations stalled for more than a decade – from September 1990 to November 2001 
(CNDH 2001d: 6). 
Unexpectedly, in 2000, the NHRC designed ‘a work programme geared towards 
advancing the investigations’ (CNDH 2001d: 6). According to this new programme, 
‘the first lines of action established were driving to maintain contact with the relatives 
of the victims of the disappearance’ (CNDH 2001d: 6). So, the NHCR would contact 
the victims of abuses a decade later after they – the victims – had filed their complaints. 
Why did the NHRC suddenly take up again the investigations on past state 
crimes that it had abandoned for more than a decade? The reactivation of NHRC’s 
programme on disappearances in 2000 was no coincidence: it was a year of presidential 
election campaigns. As I explained in Chapter One, during the 2000 electoral campaign, 
one of Fox’s promises was to ‘do something’ about past human rights abuses (Acosta 
and Ennelin 2006; Thompson 2001a). In particular, Fox had promised to establish a 
truth commission. Thus, while Fox campaigned on human rights accountability, the 
NHRC initiated ‘contact’ with the victims, NGOs, and human rights activists to promise 
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them a new ‘working programme’ that would make it possible to punish those guilty of 
past abuses (Aguayo 1999).50 That is, the ‘working programme’ that gave way to 
Recommendation 26/2001 was in fact developed in the context of the 2000 presidential 
electoral campaigns: while Fox promoted the establishment of a truth commission, a 
tainted institution (the NHRC) promoted the establishment of the SPO. Once in office, 
Vicente Fox changed his mind – he abandoned the idea of a truth commission – and 
adopted the NHRC’s approach. Again, we will never know why he did it. But we can 
explore the effects that this transformation – from a restorative to a retributive sense of 
justice – had on Mexico’s transition. As I will show in what follows, the human rights 
categories (e.g. forced disappearance) that framed Mexico’s ‘transitional justice’ 
process were constructed in such a way as to allow the impunity that those who violated 
human rights in the past enjoyed to be perpetuated. 
The constitution of past human rights violations51
The (original) object of knowledge: forced disappearances of persons 
The original purpose of the NHRC’s investigations and recommendations was to 
‘establish the truth and do justice’ on ‘the issue of people denounced as victims of 
forced disappearance’ during the 1970s and early 1980s (CNDH 2001b: 1). Initially 
only these types of acts – forced disappearances – were considered to constitute human 
rights violations in the ‘transitional justice’ process. This is relevant because, as I will 
show in Chapter Five, once established the SPO modified its mandate several times as a 
response to ‘political accidents’ (McCormick 1993) and thus came to investigate other 
human rights abuses such as genocide. 
                                                 
50 Dr. José Luis Soberanes owed his appointment of President of the NHRC to the PRI. 
51 This section takes up Claire Moon’s (2008) methodology used in her study on South Africa’s 
transitional justice process. 
Chapter Four: Making up ‘Transitional Justice’ 205
The legal process that the NHRC used to limit Mexico’s ‘transitional justice’ to 
the issue of forced disappearances was meticulous, legitimate and authoritative. Article 
102 of the Mexican Constitution established that the NHRC has the faculty to receive 
complaints against any other authority or public servant (DOF 2003: article 9; DOF 
2009: article 102). Once the NHRC admits complaints on alleged human rights 
violations it initiates investigations and documentation (DOF 2003: article 97). If, and 
only if, the NHRC determines the existence of human rights violations does it issue a 
recommendation in which it establishes the steps that state authorities must take to 
award restitution (DOF 1992: articles 43 & 44). This is the modus operandi which, 
according to the law, the NHRC must follow when investigating human rights 
violations (HRW 2008: 13).52 By investigating and documenting the complaints that led 
to Recommendation 26/2001, the Ombudsman followed exactly that procedure. 
Recommendation 26/2001(CNDH 2001b; CNDH 2001d) was based exclusively 
on five hundred and thirty-two complaint files that the NHRC claims to have received 
between 1990 and 2000. Such complaints were ‘formulated’ by relatives of the victims 
‘in a direct fashion or through a Non Governmental Organization’ (CNDH 2001b: 11). 
Hence only these cases were investigated by the Ombudsman. Thus, the conduct of this 
powerful institution born during the authoritarian era was absolutely legal. This is 
important because, as retributivists claim, the application of the rule of law is 
independent of its results (Méndez 2007; Zalaquett 1989): i.e. as long as the juridical 
process to deal with the past is conducted in accordance to the law, states fully meet 
their duty to punish even if such process ends in acquittal. And this was exactly what 
president Fox argued when he later suspended the SPO in 2006 although it had not 
obtained a single criminal conviction. According to him, whatever its results, the SPO 
                                                 
52 This modus operandi has been already explained in the previous chapter (Chapter Three). 
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and the institution that ordered its creation – i.e. the NHRC – carried out their work 
always according to the law. 
The NHRC recognises that the five hundred and thirty-two cases were not ‘the 
only ones’ (CNDH 2001b: 10). The NHRC continued ‘receiving and seeing to 
complaints on disappeared persons’ (CNDH 2001b: 10; CNDH 2001d: 13). Yet, in 
Recommendation 26/2001, the NHRC decided – ad arbitrium – to refer to just five 
hundred and thirty-two particular cases of forced disappearance. This is relevant as the 
abuses ignored by the Ombudsman were not included in the Recommendation and thus 
were not counted in the ‘transitional justice’ process. Had other type of complaints 
related to other past abuses (e.g. torture, ill treatment, killing) been included in 
Recommendation 26/2001, the NHRC would have issued other recommendations to put 
in place other types of transitional justice strategy. This is what Hacking (2000: 31) 
meant when he claimed that ‘classifications do not exit only in the empty space of 
language but in institutions, practices, material interactions with things and other 
people’. 
Even though Recommendation 26/2001 only included five hundred and thirty-
two complaint files on disappeared persons, the NHRC did not approach all cases in the 
same way. After analysing the complaints, the NHRC concluded that the evidence in 
ninety-seven of them was ‘insufficient, legally speaking, to conclude the existence of 
forced disappearance or any other human rights violation’ (CNDH 2001d: 17). That is 
to say, the NHRC considered that the abuses committed in ninety-seven cases did not 
constitute human rights violations as the evidence available was not enough to classify 
them as such. The victims’ complaints could be true, but legally inadmissible. As a 
result, these ninety-seven cases were ousted from the ‘transitional justice’ process. 
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The NHRC’s argument for dismissing these cases was, again, legally valid. The 
law that regulates the NHRC’s actions establishes that the Ombudsman, ‘in his actions’, 
has ‘public faith to certify the veracity of the facts in relation to the complaints […] filed 
before the National Commission’ (DOF 1992: article 16, emphasis added). In this 
regard, the NHRC relied on the Manual for the classification of violation acts of Human 
Rights (1998; 2008), which contains a list of categories and concepts to classify acts that 
can be considered, according to the law, to be human rights violations.53 By invoking 
the authority of these legal classifications, the Ombudsman invested itself as the ‘master 
of a joint social store of words, of concepts’, as an expert allowed to offer ‘the means to 
think realities yet unthinkable and proposes a whole arsenal of organizational 
techniques and operational models […] a stock of solutions and precedents’ (Bourdieu 
2004: 30). This is significant because, as Bourdieu (1986: 13) suggests, ‘law is, without 
doubt, the form par excellence of symbolic power of nomination’ since it ‘creates the 
things named’.54
In addition, the NHRC was ‘unable to accredit’ forced disappearance in another 
one hundred and sixty cases according to the available evidence (CNDH 2001d: 17). 
However, for this group of cases the NHRC transferred the responsibility of 
determining if forced disappearance had taken place or not to the General Attorney’s 
Office. None of these cases achieved the status of human rights violations – yet they 
were not necessarily cancelled. With this operation, these one hundred and sixty 
complaints on alleged forced disappearances were ousted from the ‘transitional justice’ 
process, and automatically became ‘investigation hypotheses’, which the General 
                                                 
53 This manual has been the object of critiques by human rights experts who have pointed out its 
deficiencies. See, for example, Programa Atalaya (2008). The manual was recently re-edited and is sold 
in Mexican bookstores. See Soberanes (2008). 
54 This is significant because, as Hacking (2002a: 40) suggests, ‘in natural science, our invention of 
categories does not “really” change the way the world works. Even though we create new phenomena 
which did not exist before our scientific endeavours we do so only with a license from the world (or so 
we think). But in social phenomena we may generate kinds of people and kinds of actions as we devise 
new classifications and categories.’ 
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Attorney’s Office would investigate not as past human rights violations, but as 
‘common crimes’. 
As a result, the NHRC considered that in only two hundred and seventy-five 
complaints – out of the five hundred and thirty-two – could it be concluded that human 
rights had been violated (CNDH 2001d: 17). Only within this group of cases was it 
‘feasible to prove as demonstrated’ that forced disappearances had occurred (CNDH 
2001d: 21). And only in these cases could the NHRC demonstrate that the 
disappearances had been ‘carried out or tolerated by the Mexican State’s public 
servants’ (CNDH 2001d: 21). This is relevant as the ‘transitional justice’ process in 
Mexico – which was supposed to come to terms with almost seventy years of Mexican 
authoritarianism – was founded only on the disappearance of two hundred and seventy-
five people. (The kind of violations that were excluded are analysed later in this 
chapter.) 
The subjects: victims and perpetrators 
Recommendation 26/2001 defined and classified the type of victims of past state crimes 
that would be counted in the process, and the perpetrators of certain abuses that would 
be subject to prosecution. That is, the recommendation distinguished victims and 
perpetrators of human rights violations (which are politically motivated and imply state 
involvement) from victims and perpetrators of common crime (Wilson 2001: 81). And 
each group (victims or perpetrators) would be clearly identified by specific 
characteristics. So the NHRC concocted the kind of slots into which people could fall 
and be counted. This is relevant because, as Hacking (2002b: 48) suggests, ‘categories 
of people come into existence at the same time as kinds of people come into being to fit 
those categories’. 
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Victims of past abuses came to be officially accepted as such if they were able to 
satisfy three requisites demanded by the NHRC. First, at the moment of opening 
investigations, victims’ families were supposed to have ‘no news’ […] ‘on the 
whereabouts’ of those disappeared. Second, the NHRC also had to prove ‘beyond a 
doubt’ that the disappeared persons had been detained ‘illegally and unconstitutionally’ 
by ‘public servants’ (CNDH 2001b: 28). Third, the NHRC had to ‘be certain’ that the 
victims ‘had been detained by public servants who exceeded their functions’ and 
‘lacked the power to carry out such an illegal deprivation of liberty’ (CNDH 2001b: 28). 
Only after all these characteristics were satisfied could the NHRC ‘assume’ the ‘forced 
disappearance’ of a person on whose behalf a complaint was made. 
Thus, with the authority to qualify the validity of the complaints from victims, 
the NHRC only investigated victims in whose cases it was ‘able to credit’: 
That the disappearances were carried out through a procedure that began with the 
detention of the person and its reclusion in a safe house or remission to a reclusion 
centre habilitated ex professo, where they were subjected to constant interrogations in 
complete isolation, and that those responsible for the detentions were public servants 
who acted at the law’s margin and with the utmost impunity (CNDH 2001d: 27) 
 
This conceptualisation of human rights violations demanded proof that the 
victims were actually victims on the basis of the parameters imposed by the NHRC’s 
definition. Victims whose disappearance did not meet these criteria, whose suffering 
was not demonstrable according to this particular legal reasoning, were ousted from the 
‘transitional justice’ process: e.g. dissidents abducted and killed by paramilitary groups, 
victims illegally detained and tortured in military camps who were released years later, 
dissidents who were unlawfully imprisoned in psychiatric institutions. 
The definition of perpetrators of past crimes was exclusively ‘state public 
servants’, ignoring the guerrilla groups that – as examined in Chapter One – also 
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perpetrated atrocities. According to the NHRC, the two hundred and seventy-five cases 
under investigation showed ‘without a doubt’ that: 
the actions of the public servants […] violated the human rights of those disappeared, 
by deviating [from] the essential objective of all democratic states of respecting its 
subjects’ right to life and to procure the conditions that will allow them to exercise the 
right to a free and full development, without any limits except personal capacity, as 
[the] means to achieve the purpose of a dignified life, employed the state’s power as an 
instrument to force them simply to subsist in incompatible conditions with the dignity 
that they were entitled to as a person, for the sole fact of being a person [sic] (CNDH 
2001b: 42). 
 
The public servants who Recommendation 26/2001 refers to were only those 
who ‘lacked the authority’ to carry out the ‘illegal deprivation of liberty’ of two hundred 
and seventy-five persons – as if there were state agents who were authorised illegally to 
deprive people of liberty (CNDH 2001b: 28; CNDH 2001d: 20). These would be the 
perpetrators of past sate crimes that the new democracy would bring to justice. 
The NHRC’s definition of perpetrators of past abuses led to a retributive style of 
‘transitional justice’ being implemented because the main objective of the SPO was to 
investigate and prosecute individuals who committed forced disappearances. However, 
at the same time, the definition of perpetrators implied that they were officially part of a 
class: as members of ‘public offices in the country’ they were members of a political 
group (CNDH 2001b: 13). Recommendation 26/2001 even pointed out some of the 
political institutions in which the perpetrators – as members of a political group – 
worked, for example ‘the Federal Security Direction, the General Attorney’s Office, 
Mexico City’s General Attorney’s Office, the Police and Transit General Direction of 
the Department of Mexico City, the General Attorney and Justice Department of the 
State of Mexico, and the Mexican Army’ (CNDH 2001b: 33). Additionally, the NHRC 
asserted that it had ‘evidence’ that allowed it to ‘corroborate the organisation and modus 
operandi of the security forces that participated in the retention of people’ (CNDH 
2001b: 34). Clearly, this is an odd operation. The NHRC, a priori, identified 
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perpetrators as members of a group (‘public servants’), but simultaneously it 
recommended that they should not be treated as members of a group, but as individuals. 
In other words – and the irony here is evident – the idea of prosecutions was justified 
over the notion of individual guilt rather than over institutional responsibility, but 
perpetrators had to belong to a political institution or a political group in order to be 
prosecuted.55
Moreover, according to the NHRC the state agents who committed forced 
disappearances were not the only people responsible for human rights violations. 
Recommendation 26/2001 included the Public Prosecutor’s Office’s agents who, at the 
time, did not investigate nor bring to court the guilty. The NHRC treated ‘the public 
servants’ who ‘failed to comply with their responsibility by not carrying out an 
investigation to establish the fate of the persons filed as missing in the 70s’ as also 
responsible (CNDH 2001b: 40). The NHRC reported that ‘the investigations, when they 
were opened, were closed without any progress in the clarification […] of [the] forced 
disappearances. Neither could they locate the beginning and conclusion of the procedure 
foreseen in the law for that type of case’ (CNDH 2001b: 40). Thus, Recommendation 
26/2001 concluded that: 
From all the latter it is clear that the public servants who violated their obligations, in 
turn violating the human rights of those aggravated and their families, were, amongst 
others […] the Federal Public Prosecutors Office’s agents, and the federal entities 
where these cases were presented, who were in charge of the previous investigations 
aforementioned, who at the time should have exercised the powers that were conferred 
to them as society’s representatives, did not adjust their actions [to abide by] the law, 
and consequently, with their respective omissions, [contravened] the principle of 
legality and the right of access to justice of the aggravated and their families (CNDH 
2001d: 36). 
 
Therefore, according to this reasoning, it was not only those who carried out the 
atrocities who were responsible for human rights violations but also those who did 
                                                 
55 A similar irony is explored by Scott Veitch (2001) in his study on legal amnesties in South Africa. He 
wrote (2001: 39), ‘the applicant [of an amnesty] can neither be treated as a member of a class (because of 
the need for full disclosure which is dependent on the uniqueness of the case), nor not be treated as a 
member of a class (for the purposes of the political criteria of the offence)’. 
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nothing to prevent, investigate, and punish the abuses. This was significant for three 
reasons. First, because the NHRC had involved a particular group of bystanders in the 
‘transitional justice’ process: the Public Prosecutor’s Office’s agents who failed to 
investigate the whereabouts of the disappeared. Second, because the NHRC implicitly 
recognised that the administrators of the PRI era were aware that these atrocities had 
occurred, although they had officially denied it for decades. Third, the NHRC tacitly 
recognised that the abuses were possible as there had been an extensive complicity 
network amongst public servants of different state agencies. However, responsibility 
attributed to this group of ‘public servants’ was never officially established through any 
specific ‘transitional justice’ mechanism. 
The historical period under investigation 
Recommendation 26/2001 set the temporary limits of the period that would be 
examined in the ‘transitional justice’ process: from 1970 to 1985. Since the NHRC only 
included the complaint files on forced disappearances that occurred between 1970 and 
early 1980, Fox’s administration was reduced to investigating abuses that had occurred 
in those years only. This was significant because the atrocities committed during 
Mexico’s protracted authoritarian regime had been identified as occurring mainly during 
this brief period of time. Moreover, the importance of this reasoning was that the 
atrocities perpetrated before 1970 and after 1980 – examined in Chapter One – did not 
achieve the status of human rights violations and so would not be counted in the 
‘transitional justice’ process. 
Outlining the ‘only way’ to proceed 
The NHRC had classified human rights violations, the victims, the perpetrators, and the 
historic period that would be a part of the ‘transitional justice’ process (knowledge). But 
this classification had also established the particular mechanisms through which the Fox 
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administration, experts, and non-governmental human rights organisations could 
intervene in this process (power). 
The NHRC’s main recommendation was the creation of a Special Prosecutor’s 
Office (the SPO) that would be appointed by the Republic’s General Attorney (CNDH 
2001a). The SPO should investigate – solely – the crimes that ‘could follow from the 
facts’ referred to in Recommendation 26/2001(CNDH 2001d: 38). Nothing else. So the 
SPO was ‘special’ because it would only investigate the two hundred and seventy-five 
cases of forced disappearance laid out by the NHRC. The investigation of any other 
type of past human rights violation was not mandated to the SPO and, therefore, would 
not be a part of the ‘transitional justice’ process. 
Moreover, according to the NHRC, only if it was ‘legally appropriate’ should 
the SPO share ‘in consideration of the competent judicial authorities the results’ of its 
investigations – only in those cases in which in the SPO’s opinion the suffering of the 
victim had legal grounds and could satisfactorily be taken before a judge (CNDH 
2001d: 38). So the investigations that the NHRC carried out during eleven years were 
insufficient. The SPO had to validate again the evidence provided by the NHRC and 
only then decide, arbitrarily, whether it would take the cases before the courts. This is 
an illustration of Short’s insight that human rights ‘are not simply givens, but products 
of social and political creation and manipulation’ (Short 2007: 858). 
As in Kafka’s (2009: 197) parable, ‘Before the Law’, victims of abuses and their 
relatives waited patiently for years before the NHRC because it guarded the door that 
appeared to lead to the Law. But, just as the door-keeper in Kafka’s parable, the NHRC 
responded with ambiguity: perhaps they will have access, but not at this moment. The 
victims’ only certainty was that the NHRC guarded the only door through which they 
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could access justice. So the victims would have to wait and go through that particular 
door to the Law or leave without truth or justice being realised. 
In other words, if the NHRC was unable to determine the existence of forced 
disappearance, the victims’ complaints were dismissed as providing insufficient 
evidence of being human rights violations cases and abandoned from the ‘transitional 
justice’ process. If the cases were dismissed, the victims found after eleven years (1990-
2001) that the alleged human rights violation – forced disappearance – had never taken 
place (legally). But if the complaints acquired the status of being forced disappearances 
they had to be investigated, once again, by the SPO (from 2000 to 2006), which had to 
take the cases to a judge. Finally, according to Recommendation 26/2001, only in the 
cases in which a judge credited the offence should the Fox administration ‘revise the 
possibility of awarding restitution’ (CNDH 2001d: 38). Thus the courts should officially 
decide if the atrocities indeed existed – legally speaking. Only then could Fox’s 
administration contemplate the possibility of providing compensations to victims. This 
is why Short claims that the study of the social construction of human rights categories 
– the ‘social life of rights’ (Short 2007) – is so relevant, because such ideas do not only 
exit in the sphere of language, but in practices; because these human rights categories 
have material effects and hence affect people (e.g. victims of past abuses) and 
transitional societies. 
The point is that, according to the NHRC, this should be the ‘only way’ to face 
Mexico’s history of abuses. Vicente Fox could have rejected this strategy, but he did 
not.  As I examined in Chapter Three, Fox had different alternatives to face the past (a 
truth commission, a policy of oblivion), but he presented the SPO as the only lawful 
approach to address past human rights violations during his administration. By facing 
the past via the SPO, Fox sought to draw a thick line between his democratic 
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administration and the previous authoritarian era. The problem was that the SPO – the 
only way – had been devised by an institution of the authoritarian era. 
Making ‘transitional justice’ valid 
The previous section showed how, by issuing Recommendation 26/2001, the NHRC 
had established the concepts that would allow the organisation and, above all, to 
intervene in the ‘transitional justice’ process. This section turns to the analysis of how 
Recommendation 26/2001 served another political purpose: it validated, officially and 
publicly, the ‘transitional justice’ process; it legitimised – as an incontrovertible truth – 
that which could be considered to be the only correct way to come to terms with the 
past. 
A process in accordance with the law 
The NHRC legitimised its recommendations emphasising its legality: i.e., the validity of 
the arguments carefully constructed by the NHRC was predicated upon their legal 
authority, on being legally correct. In doing so, the NHRC elaborated a peculiar 
syllogism: the Ombudsman carried out his investigations according to the law, which is 
apolitical, neutral, and objective; the NHRC’s recommendations are based on such 
investigations; therefore, the NHRC’s recommendations are apolitical, neutral, objective 
and hence legitimate. This is ‘the immense advantage of law’, as Latour (2010: X) 
suggests, that people who talk on its behalf – such as Mexico’s Ombudsman – ‘never 
have any doubt that their way of arguing is entirely specific; that there is a clear 
distinction, inside this way of arguing, between what is true and what is false’. This 
mattered in Mexico’s ‘transitional justice’ process as some of the NHRC’s 
recommendations could have been controversial or questionable, but they were legal 
and, therefore, they were right: e.g. the arbitrary decision to reduce the investigations to 
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cases of forced disappearances that occurred between 1970 and 1985. The NHRC did 
not include, for instance, the case of the killing of students in 1968. 
The NHRC’s first step to show that Recommendation 26/2001’s regulations 
were adequate was to highlight the legal quality of its evidence, its investigation 
methodology, and its legal analysis. According to the Ombudsman, Recommendation 
26/2001 was valid as the procedure employed to collect and analyse the evidence was 
correct according to the law – ‘in accordance to the current legal framework’ in Mexico 
(CNDH 2001d: 4). Moreover, the NHRC claimed that it made ‘its best effort to gather 
evidence that allowed [it] to achieve historical truth and corroborate facts that stem from 
the complaints filed [by the victims] regarding forced disappearance’ (CNDH 2001d: 
20). It was never clear, however, what the NHRC meant by ‘historical truth’. 
The NHRC emphasised that it carried out ‘a logical–legal analysis’ of the 
evidence in order to determine if human rights violations were committed at all in the 
cases under investigation. Its reasoning was not just legal but ‘logical’ – neutral, natural, 
methodical, rational, and universal (Bourdieu 1986: 5).56 But the ‘logical–legal 
analysis’ consisted of a very particular operation. After ‘integrating the files’ the NHRC 
compiled the ‘declarations or testimonies of the people who had adequate information 
[about] the investigation of forced disappearances’ (CNDH 2001d: 26). However, only 
some relatives of the victims had the opportunity to narrate their stories of suffering – 
those who did not have ‘adequate information’, according to the NHRC’s criteria, were 
                                                 
56 Recommendation 26/2001 came to be valid because the NHRC followed a ‘logical’ and ‘legal’ 
‘method’. By arguing that its method was following legal standards, the NHRC sought to present its 
method as ‘a system of norms and practices that appears to be founded, a priori, on the equity of its 
principles, the coherence of its formulations and the rigour of its applications, that is, as if it were 
participating from the positive logic of science and of the normative logic of morality’ (Bourdieu 1986: 
4). By arguing that its method was logical, the NHRC was echoing the arguments deployed to justify the 
objectivity of natural sciences. So the NHRC legal methodology, like modern natural sciences, would 
appear to be ‘objective rather than subjective accounts […]’. And the objective character of the NHRC’s 
analysis, like the objective character of the natural sciences, was ‘supposed to be further secured by a 
method that disciplines practitioners to set aside their passions and interests in the making of scientific 
knowledge’ (Shapin 1998: 162). 
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simply ignored. As a result, the NHRC gathered – in eleven years – ‘five hundred and 
forty-four testimonies of three hundred and thirty-four people’ (CNDH 2001d: 34). 
But these five hundred and forty-four depositions of the victims’ relatives were 
not evidence that was valid or truthful in itself. Victim testimonies had to be evaluated 
and approved by the Ombudsman and his agents. This is significant because, as 
Bourdieu (1986: 10) suggests, ‘the judicial facts are the result of a juridical construction 
(and not otherwise) […] a real retranslation of every aspect of an “affaire” is necessary 
[…] in order to constitute an object of controversy as a case’. But in Mexico this 
process of ‘retranslation’ was visibly more complex: in order to ‘certify’ victims’ 
testimonies, the NHRC ‘linked’ them to ‘other public and private documents, resulting 
[in] the ocular inspections, expert opinions, and presumptions’ (CNDH 2001d: 17). So 
the testimonies became acceptable only if human rights officials were able to ‘link’ 
them to other types of factual and documental evidence. Therefore, in Mexico, as Moon 
(2008: 84) suggests about other transitional justice efforts, testimonies ‘are not 
considered as individual and valuable truth claims in their unique formulation’. 
Testimonies are in fact constrained by transitional mechanisms’ prior assumptions about 
what counts as relevant to their investigations and what is considered peripheral (Moon 
2008: 84). 
However, this process of ‘validation’ was not always effective for two reasons. 
First, some of the victims’ testimonies could not be verified against official documents 
for the simple reason that there were not always official documents to verify them 
against. To justify this absence of documents, the NHRC offered a flimsy explanation: 
‘forced disappearance is regularly characterised by its authors [not leaving] evidence of 
their action’ (CNDH 2001d: 21). Second, the NHRC determined that not all testimonies 
would be admitted as the NHRC ‘preferred […] those documents, data or public records 
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of full value’ (CNDH 2001d: 17). Thus, victims’ testimonies might have been true, but 
not necessarily right according to the Ombudsman’s criteria. Only the official 
documents selected – ad arbitrium – by the NHRC could offer ‘elements of sufficient 
conviction’ to determine the existence of human rights violations (CNDH 2001d: 17). 
To legitimate this legal reasoning, the NHRC invoked the authority of the First 
Chamber of the Nation’s Supreme Court of Justice. According to the Supreme Court 
(Semanario Judicial de la Federación, Primera Sala, Quinta Época, Tomo CXV cited by 
CNDH 2001d): 
The testimony is the most precise information instrument that the prosecutor [juzgador] 
has, but the most dangerous at the same time, not so much due to how much the witness 
deliberately lies relative to a fact, but because he/she evoke[s] incorrectly the perceived 
act, in other words, the experience of an event that has been seen or heard. 
 
Thus, by invoking the Supreme Court, the NHRC gave itself legal authority to 
evaluate, validate, or ignore the depositions of victims’ relatives. The ‘logical–legal 
analysis’ used by Dr. Soberanes to evaluate testimonies was not only legally correct 
(rational, neutral, natural, lawful) but officially authorised by the highest judicial body 
in the country. 
This complex operation to legitimate, in the name of the law, Recommendation 
26/2001 can be summarised as follows. The complaints of the victims’ relatives were 
analysed by the NHRC. Such analysis was crucial as it determined if the complaints 
could acquire the status of human rights violations. To carry out its analysis, the NHRC 
contacted three hundred and thirty-four victims and collected five hundred and forty-
four testimonies. However, the victims’ tales of suffering had no legal value in 
themselves – hence the collection of testimonies was a farce. Yet, by collecting 
testimonies, the NHRC was able to claim that victims participated and supported the 
Ombudsman’s recommendations. Victims’ testimonies only counted when they could 
be verified against official documents guarded in state files – for example, in the 
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archives of the extinct secret police where the NHRC found ‘thirteen thousand and 
forty-seven documents’ (CNDH 2001d: 26). However, as forced disappearance leaves 
no traces, most of the documents provided no evidence of forced disappearance at all. 
What this means is that the NHRC collected victims’ testimonies for a logical-legal 
analysis all the while knowing that these testimonies would be considered inadmissible 
by such logical-legal analysis. 
The disturbing effect of this ‘logical–legal’ process was that victims’ ‘voices’ 
only existed when the NHRC authenticated them through the ‘voice’ of the perpetrators 
narrated in the official documents of the authoritarian era. So, only the ‘voice’ of the 
official documents of the authoritarian regime could maintain alive the ‘voice’ of the 
victims in the democratic regime. In this process, a state institution established during 
the authoritarian era (i.e. the NHRC) translated victims’ claims into the juridical 
language of human rights (i.e. forced disappearance). 
The historical narrative 
The NHRC justified Mexico’s ‘transitional justice’ process through a particular 
historical narrative. The NHRC’s narrative limited the occurrence of atrocities during 
Mexico’s authoritarian regime to less than fifteen years – from 1970 to 1985 – in order 
to make the idea of political violence and repression coincide with the cases 
investigated by the Ombudsman. Moreover, as the NHRC sought to impose a retributive 
mechanism (i.e. the SPO), its narrative about what happened in the PRI era was only 
about individual offenders who committed specific crimes (the illegal abduction of 
dissidents). In doing so, the NHRC excluded: a) other accounts of the past: e.g. 
Mexico’s history of abuses before 1970 and after 1985; b) other kind of abuses: e.g. 
torture, killing, severe ill treatment; c) collectivities and bystanders: individuals who did 
not perpetrate crimes but ‘did contribute to harm’ (Ainley 2011: 409). As a result, this 
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account sought to portray the authoritarian regime as a brief period of time in which few 
‘bad apples’ disappeared dissidents in isolated fashion. This is certainly relevant 
because, as Moon (2008: 70) has demonstrated, ‘the effect of historicizing such events 
and actions is not simply an act of objective “cataloguing”: it is political. It is to invoke 
the spectre of a particular history in order to justify the investigation of certain events 
over others in order to legitimize particular narratives over others.’ 
Recommendation 26/2001 includes a section on the ‘background and 
environment’ of human rights violations during the authoritarian era (CNDH 2001d: 6-
13). Subtly abandoning the land of the law to enter the field of history, the NHRC 
warned that it was ‘necessary’ to refer to ‘the political, social and economic 
circumstances’ that ‘generated’ forced disappearances (CNDH 2001d: 6). According to 
the NHRC, the history of political violence in Mexico stemmed from structural national 
and international causes that only began at the end of the 1960s and ended definitively 
at the beginning of the 1980s. In the domestic sphere, according to the Ombudsman, 
political violence was the result of ‘grave economic circumstances, high unemployment, 
agrarian problems, criminality, as well as external influences’ (CNDH 2001d: 7). This 
structural cause led Mexican ‘activists’ – the victims – to react ‘to the policies of the 
government in turn’ – the perpetrators (CNDH 2001d: 7). 
Although the NHRC officially acknowledged the socioeconomic pressures that 
gradually led to violence, its final recommendations presented ‘transitional justice’ as a 
process related to the violation of civil and political rights. This is relevant as this move 
echoed the transitional justice ideas that emerged in the 1990s, as examined in Chapter 
Two – rather than coming to terms with historical complexities, ‘transitional justice’ 
was presented as related only to political problems that were legal, and short term in 
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nature (fifteen years) in order to deal with them specifically during the transitional 
period. 
But political violence in Mexico, according to the Ombudsman, was also a 
consequence of the impact of international conflicts. Without abandoning the formality 
of legal language, the NHRC explains the international context which allowed the 
occurrence of atrocities in Mexico – the explanation is so bizarre that it is worth quoting 
at length: 
The journey from bipolarity to multipolarity, stemming from the agreement of pacific 
coexistence between the two superpowers, along with all the political crisis and cultural 
innovations and social changes that the end of an era produces, based on the dominant 
centrality of two hegemonic and confronted worldviews, as well as two versions of the 
world, turned each into each one of both societies and its individuals, in the hard 
nucleus of the ideological and conceptual universe, which had its correspondence in the 
imposition of analytical assumptions and value perceptions which arrived, at the 
ideological extreme, to become petitions of principle with which the intellectual and 
scientific world became official. In both extremes, the ideological field was reduced to 
black and white and the possible spectre of world interpretations to ‘communism’ and 
‘democracy’ [considered to be the only two] possible forms of political regime (CNDH 
2001d: 7). 
 
What the NHRC meant is that past atrocity in Mexico was a direct consequence of the 
Cold War. Although the PRI regime committed gross violations of human rights before 
the 1960s and after the 1990s, the NHRC’s narrative sought to justify state repression in 
Mexico by appealing to the war against the international communism threat. From this 
perspective, ideological battles between socialism and capitalism were the real issue. 
Although the influence of international actors was mentioned, at least tangentially, in 
Recommendation 26/2001, the NHRC did nothing to investigate this issue. 
The NHRC’s narrative can be summarised as follows. National problems and 
international conflicts inevitably ‘detonated’ the student movements in the 1960s which, 
in turn, produced the emergence of subversive groups in the 1970s which, in turn, 
caused state ‘antisubversive policies’. From this perspective, there were human rights 
violations only from 1970 to the early 1980s, and the crime of forced disappearance was 
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perpetrated by few state agents against ‘activists’ (CNDH 2001d: 8). Certainly, this way 
of narrating the history of repression during the PRI era fits in with the cases 
investigated by the NHRC. 
The NHRC also delimited the presence of two different set of actors – precisely 
differentiated – that participated in the political violence: the victims (the guerrilla 
groups that suffered from ‘antisubversive policies’) and the perpetrators (state security 
agents). This taxonomy echoed human rights discourses surrounding the concepts of 
victims and perpetrators in which, as Borer (2003: 1089) argues, ‘the two groups tend to 
be talked about [by transitional justice scholars and human rights activists] as if they 
were two completely separate and homogeneous groups of people’. Scholars, activists, 
and Human Rights NGOs such as Méndez (2007), Orentlicher (1991), Zalaquett (1989), 
Rotberg and Thompson (2000), HRW (2003), and the ICTJ (2008) make this clear 
distinction between victims and offenders in transitional justice processes. However, as 
Borer (2003: 1091) has demonstrated, ‘the differences between the two groups are not 
as clear-cut as human rights scholars and activists […] tend to portray them’. The 
NHRC proved Borer right. Recommendation 26/2001’s narrative assembled within the 
label of victims of human rights abuses not only those individuals who suffered from 
state repression, but also those who made use of violence to challenge the PRI regime. 
The problem with this classification is that those who suffered repression and those who 
made use of violence against state agents were not necessarily the same – there were 
victims of abuses who were not a part of guerrilla groups. 
This taxonomy of victims of abuses served another political purpose: it helped 
the NHRC to reify the image of dissident groups as ‘victims’. The NHRC was very 
careful in not describing any of the ‘victims’ as guerrilla members, or elements of 
armed movements who also perpetrated atrocities. Recommendation 26/2001 calls the 
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opponents of the regime ‘activists’; and armed groups were simply labelled ‘groups’ or 
‘movements’. According to this narrative these ‘groups’ were actually ‘important’ 
because of their ‘transforming capacity’ (CNDH 2001d: 8). ‘Democracy and the fight 
against the authoritarian regime’, warns the NHRC, found in such movements ‘the 
creators and writers of the new political and ideological truths that animated the battle 
during the next three decades’ (CNDH 2001d: 8). Moreover, the NHRC defined the 
type of violence that was justifiable. The NHRC vindicated the political violence of 
(subversive) groups because they only ‘sought the way to be heard’, only tried to 
achieve their ‘accumulated and unresolved demands’ by the state (CNDH 2001d: 8). 
The ‘activists’ used violence because ‘the time for endless and sterile discussions had 
passed and it was time to move on to facts, to action’ (CNDH 2001d: 8). In contrast, the 
NHRC questioned the state’s ‘repressive policies’ against ‘activists’: ‘national security’ 
reasons invoked by the PRI regime were not ‘valid to justify the forced disappearance of 
persons’ (CNDH 2001d: 37). 
The vindication of former guerrilla members, dissident groups, and their crimes 
was particularly relevant in Mexico’s transitional moment as the NHRC did not 
challenge left-wing political organisations that – as examined in Chapters One and 
Three – were supporting Fox’s ‘transitional’ policies during its first year in office. In 
addition, Fox sought to exonerate former dissident groups in order to pay a political 
debt: Fox’s victory was possible because it was backed by leftist political groups 
(formed by former dissidents) that saw in him the right candidate to overthrow the PRI 
regime. In the 2000 presidential election, Fox and his conservative party received 
almost two million votes from the left (Aguayo 2010b: 137). Moreover, this narrative 
helped to justify Fox’s political decision to maintain the amnesty law granted to 
guerrilla members in 1977 (examined in Chapter One); and to concede impunity to 
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those dissidents who perpetrated crimes after that date. The point is that the NHRC’s 
historical narrative sought to answer the question ‘What happened then?’ with reference 
to an understanding of contemporary politics (Veitch 2001). As Hacking (2000: 131) 
suggests, the past is not so fixed: ‘if new kinds are selected, then the past can occur in a 
new world. Events in a life can now be seen as events of a new kind, a kind that may 
not have been conceptualized when the event was experienced or the act performed’. 
Human rights obligations of a new democracy 
The legal dispositions that gave way to Mexico’s ‘transitional justice’ process came 
invested with the authority – neutrality, irrevocability, validity – of human rights 
language. Recommendation 26/2001 was legitimate, the Ombudsman claimed, because 
it had been ‘carried out on the basis of legal and humanitarian premises that govern the 
actions of the National Human Rights Commission’ (CNDH 2001d: 4). So it was lawful 
simply because it had been produced by the NHRC, which, detached from the field of 
politics, guided its actions merely on human rights principles. 
Moreover, the Ombudsman presented his recommendations as ethical duties and 
human rights obligations that the new democratic regime had to comply with. Fox’s 
administration had to investigate and punish the cases of forced disappearance because, 
according to international human rights law, ‘the responsibility [of investigating past 
state crimes] endures with independence the changes in government over the course of 
time’ (CNDH 2001d: 33). Paradoxically, the NHRC asked Fox’s administration to 
comply with the human rights obligations that it never demanded from the PRI 
administrations that preceded it. 
The NHRC also justified, in the name of human rights, its decision to classify 
two hundred and seventy-five complaint files as cases of forced disappearance. The 
Ombudsman sought to legitimise not only this peculiar classification, but also its 
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‘logical–legal’ methodology, as well as the political recommendations that resulted 
from there. The NHRC classified just such cases as human rights violations because the 
victims had suffered abuses according to ‘articles 1, 5, 7, 8.1, 11.1, and 22 of the 
American Convention of Human Rights; 2.1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11.1, and 13.1 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights; I, II, VIII, XVIII, XXV, and XXVI of the American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man; and 9.1 and 12.1 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ (CNDH 2001d: 37). Therefore, more than half 
of the cases under investigation did not have the status of being human rights violations 
and they were abandoned from the ‘transitional justice’ process because the victims’ 
suffering did not correspond to that stipulated under international human rights norms. 
Making ‘transitional justice’ public 
A final strategy used by the NHRC to legitimise its recommendations on ‘transitional 
justice’ was to make use of the media. It leaked Recommendation 26/2001 to the press 
before its official presentation to president Fox on November 27, 2001. The NHRC 
sought to disseminate its particular way of thinking and conceptualising ‘transitional 
justice’; it made the concepts and regulations on ‘transitional justice’ known – and 
shared – effectively by other actors participating in the process, such as non-
governmental human rights organisations, activists, and experts. It sought to make the 
‘transitional justice’ process sound far more credible and reasonable than it actually 
was. There was a reason for this. The NHRC’s recommendations to establish a special 
prosecutor’s office – announced in November 2001 – were unexpected. As explained in 
the last chapter, deliberations to establish a truth commission lasted for nearly one year, 
from July 2000 to April 2001. And in June 2001 Fox actually ordered the establishment 
of a truth commission that never materialised. By leaking its recommendations 
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beforehand, the NHRC sought to ease the impact of this inexplicable move from a 
restorative to retributive model of justice. 
The NHRC’s strategy worked. As Short suggests, the media is one of the main 
institutions that help to promote misinformation and so take a leading role in the 
construction of transitional justice processes (Short 2007: 861). Thus, Recommendation 
26/2001 came as no surprise: its content had been widely circulated beforehand, 
acquiring a powerful sense of familiarity and inevitability before it was officially 
presented. 
The NHRC leaked Recommendation 26/2001 twice. As it sought for the 
information to be credible mainly among left-wing political groups who demanded an 
investigation into past crimes, on November 4, 2001, the NHRC leaked the document to 
two newspapers identified with leftist political movements: La Jornada and Proceso 
magazine (Ballinas 2001; Cabildo and Monge 2001; Granados Chapa 2001). Then, on 
November 26, a day before the report’s launch, the document was leaked to different 
newspapers (Granados Chapa 2001). Consequently, the Ombudsman was ‘severely 
criticised […] by senators for the information leaked to several media’ (Turiati 2001). 
However, Dr. Soberanes denied the accusations and was never investigated. 
‘It’s useless’: making ‘transitional justice’ acceptable to perpetrators 
So far, I have offered an account of the arguments advanced by Mexico’s ombudsman 
to justify the particular kind of ‘transitional justice’ (ideas and practices) that would be 
established during Fox’s administration. However, the validity of Recommendation 
26/2001 also resulted from the fact that, in itself, it had no immediate legal effects. As I 
suggested in the introduction of this thesis, the dilemma that Fox’s administration faced 
with relation to human rights violations committed during the PRI regime was that of 
facing the perpetrators – who still retain power – without disturbing the fragile political 
Chapter Four: Making up ‘Transitional Justice’ 227
stability of the new regime (i.e. why did Fox venture to establish a ‘transitional justice’ 
process that would put at risk the new regime’s stability, and why did the authoritarian 
elite allow it?). Recommendation 26/2001 served, at least temporarily, to sort out this 
dilemma because it was not legally binding, and because it did not reveal the name of 
those guilty of the abuses. Therefore, it actually had no concrete effect that would risk 
the impunity that the perpetrators of the abuses from the PRI era enjoyed. 
Recommendation 26/2001 became valid because it was innocuous. 
NHRC’s recommendations: Legally not binding 
During the 1990s, the enforcement of several of the NHRC’s recommendations had 
been questioned by organisations such as Human Rights Watch as selective and uneven 
at different times concerning different situations (HRW 2008). John M. Ackerman’s 
(2007: 161) study on the NHRC demonstrates that a ‘significant number’ of 
recommendations were rejected by the government, while others were accepted but 
never instituted. According to HRW, the reason for the NHRC’s limited impact is that 
‘it has routinely failed to press state institutions to remedy the abuses it has documented, 
to promote reforms needed to prevent those abuses, to challenge abusive laws, policies, 
and practices that contradict international human rights standards, to disclose and 
disseminate information it has collected on human rights problems’ (HRW 2008). This 
can be understood because, as Wilson suggests, state human rights institutions in many 
Latin American countries have been established to ‘deflect responsibility and criticism 
away from governments’ (Wilson 2001: 28). Therefore, this pattern contrasts with the 
rapid way in which Recommendation 26/2001 was accepted and put into practice by 
Fox’s administration – both steps during the same ceremony. So, why was the 
Recommendation so rapidly accepted by the government? 
Chapter Four: Making up ‘Transitional Justice’ 228
The NHRC’s recommendations urged president Fox to create the SPO. But this 
recommendation, whose legal foundations had been carefully elaborated by the NHRC, 
was not legally binding. In spite of being inspired by international human rights 
principles (the right to truth and the right to see justice done), the recommendation was 
just that: a recommendation. Hence the new and democratic Fox administration could 
accept or not the recommendations and eventually carry them out or not. 
Therefore, at the time it was publicly presented – during Fox’s first year in office 
– Recommendation 26/2001 was just a possibility. President Fox could simply have 
ignored it. Had Fox ignored the NHRC’s recommendations, different transitional justice 
strategies could have been implemented (e.g. a truth commission, a lustration system). 
This is relevant because, by not being legally binding, some of these 
recommendations were actually avoided by Fox’s administration and thus never 
materialised. For example, the NHRC included in the category of those liable not 
merely those officials who perpetrated atrocities, but agents of the public prosecutor’s 
office who knew about the abuses and did nothing to prosecute those guilty. But Fox’s 
administration never contemplated any mechanism by which the complicity of this 
group in the commission of gross violations of human rights might be investigated. 
Human rights abuses that were not yet crimes 
José Luis Soberanes presented the Recommendation 26/2001 (CNDH 2001b) as a result 
of an arduous ‘logical–legal analysis’ that allowed the NHRC to determine ‘without a 
doubt’ that public servants had ‘violated the human rights of those disappeared’ in two 
hundred and seventy-five cases under investigation (CNDH 2001d: 37). According to 
the law, the Ombudsman had collected, evaluated, and classified the available evidence 
in each case. Also, he proved ‘reliably’ that the victims had been detained ‘illegally and 
unconstitutionally’ by public servants (CNDH 2001d: 20). Moreover, he demonstrated 
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that in all the cases there had been violations of the following rights (stipulated in the 
Mexican Constitution and international human rights norms): ‘personal rights and 
adequate defence’, and ‘equality before the law, circulation and residence, liberty, 
judicial security, justice, protection against arbitrary detention, due process, […] the 
integrity of the person’ (CNDH 2001b: 43). 
However, the NHRC was not a legally authorised institution that could 
determine if forced disappearances constituted a crime, nor could it establish if those 
liable were guilty. Legally speaking, the NHRC was not empowered to determine if a 
fact is a crime, given that by law this is the responsibility exclusively of agents of the 
public prosecutors’ office and the courts. So the ‘logical–legal analysis’ that the NHRC 
used to gather and value evidence, and the legal and historic arguments that allowed it 
to conclude that human rights violations had existed, had actually been a toothless 
exercise. Those liable would become guilty – and the abuses would become crimes – 
when the public prosecutor’s office and the court so determined. 
The irony here is obvious. The NHRC claimed that its reasoning was correct and 
legal, but in the end stated that it was toothless as it had no power to pursue legal action 
against perpetrators. The importance of this curious operation is that the NHRC’s 
investigations and recommendations, in themselves, did not threaten the perpetrator’s 
impunity (United Nations 1993).57
Protecting the guilty 
The NHRC confirmed the existence of forced disappearance in just few cases because it 
could ‘have certainty’ that the victims ‘were detained by public servants who exceeded 
                                                 
57 This, however, is not a special characteristic of Mexico’s ombudsman. National human rights 
commissions in the world are not judicial bodies, so they have only a ‘quasi-jurisdictional’ competence. 
They can draw the attention of a given government ‘to situations in any part of the country where human 
rights are violated and making proposals to it for initiatives to put an end to such situations’. So these 
institutions can determine the existence of human rights violations, but they can’t determine if such 
violations are in fact crimes (United Nations 1993). 
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their functions’ in those cases only (CNDH 2001d: 28). The NHRC proved that these 
state agents ‘lacked the faculties to make such an illegal deprivation of liberty’ (CNDH 
2001d: 28). Therefore, the NHRC not only knew the names of the two hundred and 
seventy-five victims of forced disappearance, but the name and post of the perpetrators. 
However, once again, Soberanes stated that the NHRC was not legally 
authorised to pronounce on those alleged to be guilty. Legally speaking, Soberanes 
could not establish whether ‘public servants’ who acted illegally were liable. ‘In any 
case’, the NHRC adverted, ‘it is [the] responsibility of the Public Prosecutor’s Office 
and the judges to determine penal responsibility’ (CNDH 2001b: 28). 
But the subject is far more complex (and disturbing). As observed above, the 
NHRC was legally unable to determine officially whether perpetrators of past human 
rights abuses were liable for punishment, yet it was not prevented from naming their 
names. During the ceremony at The Black Palace, once he presented the 
Recommendation 26/2001, José Luis Soberanes gave President Fox a closed envelope 
containing the names of seventy-four alleged perpetrators of past crimes (Venegas and 
Ballinas 2001). However, Soberanes refused to make the names of those allegedly liable 
known. Soberanes did not name names arguing that he was not ‘legally authorized to do 
so’ on the grounds that those named were only alleged to be suspects and revealing their 
names would be against their good name and reputation (Reforma 2001a). So 
Recommendation 26/2001 establishes that: 
Attending to the formerly exposed, the National Human Rights Commission considered 
that it is in no position to reveal nor make known the names of the public servants 
involved in the facts, considering that their probable liability has not been established 
and in consequence could incur a violation of the rights to […] legal security foreseen 
in articles 14 and 16 of our Republic’s General Constitution, especially when the 
enjoyment of these rights can only be limited via a trial followed by the courts 
previously established, in which the essential formalities of procedure are complied 
with and in accordance [with] the laws issued before the fact (CNDH 2001b: 15). 
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Therefore, the institution that failed to protect the victims of human rights abuses 
for eleven years was now concerned with the perpetrators’ respectability. The best 
account of this kind of irony is given by Cohen (1995: 22): ‘justice, whether justified as 
retribution or just deserts, individual or general deterrence […] must be done and seen 
to be done by giving the accused all the benefits of due process and legality that they 
never allowed their victims’. 
Concealing the names of those found guilty contrasted with the standard method 
followed by the NHRC as it ‘always makes the names of alleged perpetrators of human 
rights abuses public’ (Acosta and Ennelin 2006: 101). According to the law, the NHRC 
was mandated to give the names of the alleged guilty in public without this giving rise 
to any liability (DOF 1992). Thus, the questions remain: why did Soberanes not 
comply? How could he seek to protect the rules he breaks? Was it possible for an 
ombudsman to commit human rights violations in the name of human rights? Perhaps, 
the reason for this is given by Bourdieu (1986: 8): ‘jurists […] have the power to exploit 
the polysemy and ambiguity of juridical forms by […] not applying a law which, 
literally understood, should be applied’ or by ‘applying a law which should not be 
applied’. 
To justify his unusual – and unlawful – decision to conceal the name of the 
alleged perpetrators of past abuses, Soberanes used human rights talk. He invoked 
article eleven of the American Convention on Human Rights, which establishes that 
‘everyone has the right to have his honour respected and his dignity recognized’ (OAS 
1969). According to this reasoning, Soberanes could not reveal the names of the 
perpetrators of atrocities because by doing so he would have violated their dignity. 
Therefore, another irony is evident here. By keeping secret the name of the perpetrators, 
the NHRC was protecting their dignity and thus respecting human rights norms, but was 
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acting illegally – bypassing its own legal mandate. Beyond this irony, this operation was 
politically significant as it avoided exposing and shaming those perpetrators 
reincorporated in the new regime. 
Hence Recommendation 26/2001 did not threaten the impunity of the 
perpetrators of atrocities. This is how the distinguished human rights activist, Rosario 
Ibarra – who founded the Committee Pro-Defence of Prisoners, Persecuted, 
Disappeared, and Politically Exiled of Mexico in 1977, after the disappearance of her 
son in 1975 – interpreted this event: ‘What kind of a report is it if it does not have the 
names of those responsible or the whereabouts of the disappeared?’ (Grayson 2001). To 
put it simply, Rosario concluded, ‘It’s useless’ (Grayson 2001). This is what Moon 
means in her description of the appeals made by Argentina’s mothers of the 
disappeared, when she claims that the state in transitional societies often privileges 
‘certain types of truth – who died, how many, and how’, which sometimes displaces, for 
the victims,  more important truths such as ‘who killed them?’ (Moon 2012: 194). 
Social, political, and material effects 
President Fox accepted the NHRC’s report and put into effect the majority of its 
recommendations (the way in which they were implemented is the subject of Chapter 
Five). Contrary to what Rosario Ibarra argued, Recommendation 26/2001 was not that 
‘useless’ after all. This section examines the most significant outcomes of this particular 
way of problematising, conceptualising, and organising Mexico’s process of 
‘transitional justice’. I have already hinted at a few of these effects throughout the 
chapter; here I seek to examine them in further detail. 
The (authoritarian) lineage of human rights categories 
In her study on women before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South 
Africa, Fiona C. Ross (2003) addresses ‘the history’ of specific ‘categories’ that emerge 
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in transitional justice moments. In South Africa, Ross (2003: 25) explains, ‘women […] 
was a category with a particular history in the Commission’s work’, which ‘emerged 
after specific interventions: patterns in testimonies given before public hearings […] 
and interventions by a variety of social specialists’. ‘Such interventions’, Ross (2003: 
25) claims, ‘succeeded in drawing attention to particular forms of violation […] while 
eluding others.’ In the case of Mexico, Recommendation 26/2001 also presented a 
series of transitional justice categories ‘with a history’, which resulted from the 
intervention of non-governmental human rights organisations that presented complaints 
before the NHRC, as well as from a decade of the mediation of NHRC agents who were 
experts in human rights but part of the authoritarian bureaucracy at the same time. The 
outcome of such interventions was to produce particular categories of human rights 
abuses, victims, and perpetrators, while excluding others from Mexico’s ‘transitional 
justice’ process, as I explain in what follows. 
The Special Programme on Alleged Disappearances, which led to 
Recommendation 26/2001, constituted the first filter through which victims and 
perpetrators were excluded from the process. The victims of past abuses who did not 
file a complaint before the NHRC between 1990 and 2000 thus appeared never to have 
existed. There were numerous reasons why the victims or their relatives could have not 
gone before the NHRC. First, there was the problem of the NHRC’s historical context. 
The Special Programme on Alleged Disappearances began shortly after the NHRC was 
created by presidential decree in 1990. At that time, the NHRC was a new institution 
with no reputation, whose programmes (such as the one on ‘alleged disappearances’) 
began to be known by Mexican people. Not all the victims of abuses knew or trusted an 
institution recently created by the authoritarian regime. 
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Besides the problem of the NHRC’s legitimacy, there was a geographical 
problem. The complaints about abuses were not necessarily filed by the victims’ 
relatives, but by various human rights organisations that represented them (CNDH 
2001d: 1). The headquarters of the NHRC are in Mexico City, as are most of the non-
governmental human rights organisations. However, there were victims of abuses 
throughout the entire country as the repression of dissidents took place not only in 
Mexico City, but in other cities. As explained in Chapter One, the guerrilla was not only 
urban, but rural: for example, out of the five hundred and thirty-two cases under 
investigation by the NHRC, three hundred and eight were alleged to have taken place in 
rural areas (CNDH 2001d: 1). Therefore, the victims’ relatives who did not have the 
means to access the NGO network in Mexico City or the NHRC directly had less 
chance of being heard. 
Another problem was related to the slow and disappointing development of the 
Special Programme on Alleged Disappearances. Even if victims of abuses, their 
relatives, or non-governmental human rights organisations might have been reticent in 
going to the NHRC in the beginning, perhaps they would have eventually done so 
afterwards had there been some significant progress in the investigations. But that was 
not the case. The investigations of the NHRC stalled for a decade. Thus, it is very 
unlikely that the victims’ relatives or non-governmental human rights organisations 
decided to go to the NHRC to file a complaint about atrocities committed during the 
previous regime when the investigations had not produced any results in years. 
But there is a darker side of this story of how human rights categories came into 
being. As mentioned before, the NHRC had been created by President Carlos Salinas in 
order to legitimise his administration before the international community (Covarrubias 
Velasco 1999; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Mazza 2000). Salinas had been accused of gross 
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violations of human rights: e.g. he was responsible for the massacre of Zapatistas 
sympathisers. Thus, Salinas established the NHRC by presidential decree as an 
indication of his commitment to human rights. This is how Tim Padgett, Newsweek and 
Time correspondent in Mexico, put it: ‘the Zapatista rebellion […] wrought some of the 
worst carnage I’ve ever seen’. However, Padgett says, Salinas ‘fooled us into thinking 
that he had modernized Mexico […]. He charmed us into forgetting that most Mexican 
politics is a byzantine, Mafioso affair’ (Padgett 1996). This can be explained because, as 
Kathryin Sikkink suggests, Salinas was ‘extremely sensitive to his country’s external 
image and to the international repercussions of human rights complaints. More than 
many leaders, Salinas often takes pre-emptive measures to project the image of his 
administration’s concern with human rights’ (Sikkink 1993: 434). 
In this context, the victims’ relatives faced a dilemma. The NHRC’s special 
programme on disappearances was the first official investigation into the matter. It 
offered the victims’ relatives an opportunity to learn about the whereabouts of the 
disappeared family members. However, by participating with the NHRC programme, 
they would be accepting Salinas’ arrangements. If they refused to cooperate with the 
NHRC, the victims gave up the only chance they had to participate in an official 
investigation to find out the destiny of their disappeared relatives. But, at the same time, 
by accepting the human rights policies of the authoritarian regime, they directly 
contributed to increasing the legitimacy of Salinas’ administration. 
Moreover, during its first years of existence, the NHRC was managed by the 
Ministry of the Interior (Ackerman 2007: 121). The problem with this was that the 
Secretary of the Interior during Salinas’ administration was none other than Fernando 
Gutiérrez Barrios – the ‘professional of violence’ who worked in the secret police for 
years and became its director between 1964 and 1970. Gutiérrez Barrios – as examined 
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in Chapter One – was one of the main persons accused of having been responsible for 
repression (Aguayo 1998: 38; Rodríguez Munguía 2008: 77). Therefore, between 1990 
and 1992, the NHRC was accountable over its investigations on forced disappearances 
to the former director of the secret police.58 So in that context it was unlikely that the 
victims of repression or their relatives would go to a human rights institution that 
depended bureaucratically on the former state agent in charge of repression. It is 
arguable, then, that Mexico’s ‘transitional justice’ had actually ‘begun’ in the PRI era. 
Atrocities that were not counted in the process 
The victims, their relatives, and the non-governmental human rights organisations that 
did go before the NHRC did not have their access to the ‘transitional justice’ process 
guaranteed either. As already indicated, their complaints were not always accepted by 
the Special Programme on Alleged Disappearances and so were not considered by 
Recommendation 26/2001. The NHRC offered multiple legal excuses that denied the 
occurrence of abuses documented by human rights activists or rejected the victim’s 
testimonies of suffering (‘there is not enough evidence to be certain that a person in fact 
disappeared’; ‘there are not official documents to confirm what the victims’ relatives 
testified’; ‘what victims suffered was not exactly forced disappearance, but something 
else’; ‘this is a human right violation, but not exactly a crime’; ‘this looks like forced 
disappearance, but the General Attorney should keep investigating’ (CNDH 2001d)). 
So, in the end, the NHRC received complaints only about forced disappearances that 
had occurred between 1970 and 1980. 
But the process of delimiting Mexico’s ‘transitional justice’ to the investigation 
of forced disappearance was a complex operation. The NHRC had in fact demonstrated 
                                                 
58 In 1992, the Mexican Constitution was reformed and granted the NHRC independent standing from the 
Executive Branch. And, anyway, in 1993, Gutiérrez Barrios abandoned the Ministry of Interior.  
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the occurrence of other type of abuses, which were then bypassed. For example, 
Recommendation 26/2001 documented ‘acts of torture’, stating: 
in countless number of cases, when being detained people were remitted to the 
installations that were at the disposition of agents of the [now] extinct Federal Direction 
of Security, where they were blindfolded and interrogated and forced to declare through 
threats, beatings, the application of electric current to their genitals, and subjected to 
rape and ill treatment (CNDH 2001d: 29). 
 
Yet, in spite of the evidence, the NHRC did not recommend any type of ‘transitional 
justice’ mechanism to investigate and seek justice for these abuses. 
Recommendation 26/2001 also pointed out: 
It is not overlooked […] that the modus operandi of the public servants […] to carry out 
detentions of the disappeared began in public; however, once they interrogated the first 
people, and the denunciations that contributed the facts had occurred, they would 
afterwards, without any written warrant from the authority to support and motivate their 
acting, go to different addresses to detain other people (CNDH 2001d: 28). 
 
Thus, it was clear to the NHRC that the authoritarian state consistently used a 
policy based on fear, which affected not only the guerrillas but also all those people 
who – according to the secret police – had information related to insurgent groups. Even 
so, the NHRC did not consider that these abuses – e.g. illegal searches, arbitrary arrest, 
and detention – were human rights violations, and threw them out of Mexico’s 
‘transitional justice’ process. The NHRC offered no explanation for not looking at these 
crimes. 
Limiting ‘transitional justice’ to the category of forced disappearances had four 
main outcomes. First, it wiped out from the ‘transitional justice’ process other types of 
human rights violations perpetrated by state officials during the PRI era. This is relevant 
as it reinforced the exclusion of victims whose cases were not to be addressed by any 
‘transitional justice’ mechanism. As a result perpetrators who were not involved in the 
disappearance of dissidents but participated in the commission of other abuses were not 
identified. For these criminals there would never be punishment. 
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Second, it attempted to frame the way in which Mexican people understood what 
occurred during the authoritarian past. Forced disappearance was a regular state practice 
mainly during the 1970s. However, the use of political violence began before 1970, and 
ended after 1980, the temporary limits delimited by the NHRC. As Chapter One of this 
thesis shows, Mexico’s authoritarian regime employed political violence between the 
1940s and the 1990s. That chapter provides evidence of state violence that occurred as 
early as 1946 (the killing of twenty-six student protestors), and as late as 1994 (the 
massacre of Zapatista sympathisers). However, the occurrence of atrocities between 
1940 and 1970 and between 1980 and 1994 was not acknowledged by the NHRC, and 
was thus ignored in the ‘transitional justice’ process. 
Third, forced disappearance affected mainly members of guerrilla groups, but 
the survival of the authoritarian regime was made possible by a complex repressive 
machine that affected other segments of the population. Aguayo (1998) demonstrated 
that the PRI administrations were characterised by the ‘ease with which they [used] 
force’. The authoritarian state agents intimidated, tortured, repressed, and assassinated 
university students, journalists, relatives of political dissidents, members of opposition 
parties, members of labour organisations, and peasants unions. As shown in Chapter 
One, this is how it happened with the rail workers protests and the doctors’ movement – 
repressed in 1959 and 1964 (Meyer 1991: 378). In neither of these episodes were 
protestors disappeared: state agents detained and tortured people who were later 
released (the rail workers’ leaders stayed in jail until 1970). These victims of abuses 
never disappeared, but their suffering was excluded from the ‘transitional justice’ 
process because the NHRC decided to do so. 
Finally, confining ‘transitional justice’ to the category of forced disappearance 
affected Mexican society’s understanding of the country’s democratic transition. For 
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Ortega-Ortiz (2008: 18) Mexico’s transition was ‘the result of multiple controversial 
political struggles’ in which ‘workers, farmers and student unions, who confronted the 
authoritarian state’ participated. There were political parties in the transition which 
sought political transition through elections, but there were also social movements, 
mainly leftist, which made use of political violence or suffered state repression. This is 
important because, as Ortega-Ortiz (2008: 37) argues, Mexico did not have a ‘velvet 
transition’ as we tend to believe.59 Yet the importance of examining the extended use of 
repression – beyond forced disappearance – that diverse social movements suffered – 
beyond the guerrilla – was overlooked by the NHRC. 
Representing victims’ suffering 
A great deal of ingenuity is being devoted to the problem of defining ‘forced 
disappearance’ because no concept can capture a process in which the victims are 
illegally detained, deprived of their liberty illegally, incommunicado, illegally 
interrogated, possibly tortured, and assassinated – as Nigel Rodley (1999: 245) points 
out, ‘words fail to capture reality’. No explanation makes sense. This problem of 
definition is better examined by Cohen (2005: 105): 
The phenomenon of ‘disappearances’ takes its very definition from the government’s 
ability to deny that it happened. The victim has no legal corpus or physical body; there 
is no evidence to prosecute, not even a sign of a crime […]. For a disappearance to be a 
disappearance, it has to be denied […]. Desaparecidos, ‘the disappeared’, were people 
who would be […] ‘absent forever’ […]. Officially they were neither living nor dead. 
 
Nevertheless, Recommendation 26/2001 echoed the way in which different 
human rights authorities – activists, experts, members of transnational organisations – 
have built the most appropriate definition to capture the issue of forced disappearance in 
                                                 
59 As examined in Chapter One, the idea of ‘velvet transition’ has been widely used by political actors and 
journalists to describe Mexico’s transition toward democracy. See, for instance, Carmen Aristegui’s 
interview with Manuel Espino in Carmen Aristegui and Ricardo Trabulsi (2009: 127). 
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the past thirty years.60 Therefore, the way in which the NHRC defined and classified 
‘forced disappearance’ was not only legally correct, but in line with international human 
rights norms on the matter (OAS 2012; OUNHCHR 2006). 
As a result, the suffering and experiences of harm of a particular group of 
victims – los desaparecidos – came to be a legal category that required investigation, 
analysis and justice. But this particular definition was also significant because of the 
suffering it was unable to represent. Forced disappearance, Rodley (1999: 248) argues, 
is a ‘ghoulish process’, but ‘it is in fact just that: a process, with various phases’. 
According to the language of human rights, the suffering of a victim in each of these 
phases is codified in a right – the right to life, to be free of torture, to the protection of 
inhumane, cruel and degrading treatment, to personal freedom, to legal personality, and 
to access to justice (Perez Solla 2006: Chapter Two). The importance of this legal 
codification lies in it defining suffering only as the use of violence on the victims’ 
bodies. Therefore, by limiting ‘transitional justice’ to the category of forced 
disappearance, the NHRC restricted our understanding of suffering in the authoritarian 
era to the mere use of physical violence on a particular group of people. 
The suffering ignored by the legal language of human rights – whose emphasis 
is placed on physical violence – was never counted in the ‘transitional justice’ process. 
That is what Ross (2003: 12) meant when she claimed that ‘using a notion of “even-
handedness” that presumed that “violation” necessarily produced “victims”’, 
transitional justice mechanisms strip away context and ‘the effects of power by 
                                                 
60 The debate to define forced disappearance began in 1978, but the United Nations General Assembly 
only adopted the Disappearances Convention in 2006. Kramer and Weissbrodt (1981) give a detailed 
account of the intervention and political negotiations between human rights activists, state agents, and 
human rights experts who sought to define and classify forced disappearance at the United Nations 
Commission on Human Rights in 1980. Frey (2009) describes how forced disappearance was defined 
from 1978 to 2006. 
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condensing suffering to its traces on the body’. This is relevant because, as Borer (2003: 
1092) argues in relation to South Africa’s TRC: 
The decision of the Commission to concentrate only on violations committed as specific 
acts, resulting in severe physical and or mental injury in the course of past political 
conflicts, was controversial and often unpopular. It meant that victims of […] laws 
passed by the apartheid government, or of the effects of those laws including hunger, 
poverty and the lack of basic health care, would not be deemed victims according [to] 
the TRC. 
 
My intention is not to undermine the suffering of the disappeared or of those 
who suffered the regime’s political violence. My point is simply this: by limiting 
‘transitional justice’ to the category of forced disappearance, the NHRC highlighted the 
physical suffering of certain dissidents, but obscured the experiences of relatives and 
kin. For instance, it overlooks how the phenomenon of the disappeared produced 
separated and impoverished families. It also ignores the fact that the disappearance of 
men affected women directly, who found themselves in a disadvantaged situation.61
A final effect of defining suffering as the use of violence on the victims’ bodies 
was that only the most dramatic cases of abuses were reported, which were not 
necessarily the most widespread. For instance, Chapter One of this thesis shows how the 
authoritarian system intimidated and oppressed daily the opponents of the regime with 
measures that infused fear, without recurring to physical violence or grave human rights 
violations: threats of being fired, manipulation of information, phone taps, and death 
threats. 
                                                 
61 It is not the main purpose of this thesis to analyse the transitional justice process in Mexico from a 
gender perspective, but it is important to acknowledge how ignoring the suffering of the women who 
were related to the disappeared determined their position in the transitional justice process. The women 
would talk as mothers, daughters, or wives of the victims, but never presented themselves as victims. Two 
widely known cases in Mexico – and internationally – that exemplify this are those of Rosario Ibarra and 
Tita Radilla. The first speaks as the mother of Jesús Piedra, the second as the daughter of Rosendo 
Radilla. Jesús Piedra and Rosendo Radilla disappeared in the 1970s. I will analyse Tita Radilla’s case in 
the Conclusions to this thesis. 
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Perpetrators, responsibility, and punishment 
Recommendation 26/2001 established, officially, a retributive justice process, whose 
main purpose was the punishment of perpetrators. However, as I argued earlier in this 
chapter, Recommendation 26/2001 allowed for many crimes to simply cease being 
crimes: all those that were not catalogued as forced disappearances between 1970 and 
1980. In doing this the recommendation ensured that the perpetrators of other types of 
human rights violations – or other unclassified abuses – would never be investigated, 
prosecuted, or punished. The political effect of this measure was to allow the 
perpetrators to be reintegrated within the new democratic regime: as must perpetrators 
were not prosecuted, exposed or dismissed, they simply retained their posts as if nothing 
had happened. By not risking the impunity that most perpetrators enjoyed, Fox managed 
to maintain the political stability of Mexico’s incipient democracy. Moreover, as I 
mentioned in the previous section, by avoiding the investigation and prosecution of 
human rights violations perpetrated by dissidents, the NHRC decriminalised the acts of 
those who used political violence to oppose the former authoritarian system. 
As the NHRC placed forced disappearance into the category of being a human 
rights abuse, it implied that forced disappearances were perpetrated by state agents who 
acted illegally. This was significant because it left aside those perpetrators of forced 
disappearance who were working for the state, but without being a part of the formal 
state structure: members of paramilitary groups. 
Finally, another effect of limiting the ‘transitional justice’ process to forced 
disappearances was that of obstructing the assertion of responsibility. As forced 
disappearance consists of a process with different phases, it is difficult to prove 
individual liability. Rodley (1999: 248) describes forced disappearance as a process – 
‘the initial capture, the taking to a place of detention, possible removal from place to 
place of detention, possible interrogation during detention, final removal from the place 
Chapter Four: Making up ‘Transitional Justice’ 243
of detention and eventual disposal of the body, the person having been deprived of life 
at some point in the process’ – in which a great number of perpetrators are involved. 
But those involved in one phase do not necessarily know about the other phases or those 
involved. So the concept of forced disappearance used by the NHRC did not distinguish 
between individuals who perpetrated only one crime and those whose responsibility was 
to order the commission of such acts. This is why Ainley challenges retributivists’ 
assumptions on the allocation of responsibility for past abuses via retributive 
mechanisms (e.g. the SPO). According to retributivists such as Méndez (1997b) and 
Zalaquett (1989), as human rights abuses are committed by identifiable offenders, 
culpability must be allocated to those individuals found guilty of perpetrating such 
offenses. However, as Ainley claims, responsibility for past state crimes ‘cannot be 
parcelled out neatly to the direct perpetrators of harm […]. Assigning responsibility for 
atrocity is extremely complicated given the layers of culpability involved’ (Ainley 
2011: 411). This is insight is appropriate to the Mexican case. Therefore, another irony 
here is evident: the same institution (the NHRC) that established a retributive style of 
‘transitional justice’, whose purpose was that of prosecuting individual perpetrators, 
determined as well a category of crime – forced disappearance – which hindered the 
identification of individual responsibility and thus precluded justice. 
Conclusions 
This chapter has sought to answer the second research question that framed this thesis: 
how was the ‘transitional justice’ process in Mexico constructed, and what were the 
implications of this construction? To answer this question, this chapter examined how 
the NHRC’s Recommendation 26/2001 provided the organising concepts that would 
govern ‘transitional justice’ mechanisms during Fox’s administration (knowledge). In 
doing so, the Recommendation outlined and justified the institutions and actors that, in 
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the new regime, were allowed to intervene in the process – all in the name of human 
rights. 
Thus, this chapter helps us to understand how certain human rights categories 
(e.g. forced disappearance) were deployed by Mexico’s ‘transitional justice’ process 
rather than others; how such categories emerged through a sophisticated ‘logical-legal’ 
analysis that was everything but neutral, natural, methodical, apolitical or even rational; 
the political purposes this particular construction served; and how once they emerged, 
these categories had political, material and social effects on people and the country’s 
transitional moment. 
Also, this chapter showed that Mexico’s ‘transitional justice’ process was 
devised by an institution – the NHRC – associated with the PRI regime which was 
consequent upon the interpretation of  human rights categories which, whilst 
superficially seeming to serve the victims were in fact constructed in such a way as to 
actually maintain the impunity enjoyed by perpetrators. 
The Recommendation and its human rights regulations had diverse effects, not 
only within Fox’s administration, but in Mexico’s democratisation. The NHRC 
specified that only the forced disappearance of two hundred and seventy-five persons 
would be counted in the ‘transitional justice’ process. Other types of abuses committed 
during the PRI era were ignored and never treated as abuses. As a result, many 
perpetrators of abuse would never face justice. Moreover, by specifying that forced 
disappearance would be the only human rights abuse to be addressed by ‘transitional 
justice’, a conceptualisation based on the use of physical violence on the victims’ 
bodies, the Recommendation bypassed other types of suffering and activities endured 
by Mexican people during the authoritarian era. 
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But this chapter also sought to examine further the first research question 
explored in the previous chapter: why did Fox venture to establish a ‘transitional 
justice’ process that would put at risk the new regime’s stability, and why did the 
authoritarian elite allow it? This chapter showed that the political significance of 
Recommendation 26/2001 was that it allowed the Fox administration to overcome the 
dilemma it faced during the transition: how to confront without risk the perpetrators of 
abuses during the past regime. Recommendation 26/2001 did not threaten the impunity 
of the perpetrators of atrocities (e.g. it was not legally binding, it did not revealed the 
name of those guilty) and simultaneously and paradoxically appeared to addressing the 
demands of those attempting to confront the perpetrators of abuses, while defining the 
‘transitional justice’ mechanisms that would in fact further endorse impunity.  
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Chapter Five – 
The SPO’s Retributive Goals: 
A de facto Amnesty 
 
Chapters Three and Four of my thesis examined the factors that shaped Mexico’s 
‘transitional justice’. Chapter Three sought to answer the first key question that guides 
this research: why did Fox venture to establish a ‘transitional justice’ process that would 
put at risk the new regime’s stability, and why did the authoritarian elite allow it? 
Chapter Four sought to answer the second key research question posed in the 
introduction to this thesis: how was the ‘transitional justice’ process constructed, and 
how did its particular construction condition its performance? 
In this chapter the discussion turns to the analysis of the development and 
workings of ‘transitional justice’ mechanisms and its consequences for Mexico’s 
democratic transition. Thus if Chapters Three and Four examined the factors that led to 
the creation of, and gave shape to, specific ‘transitional justice’ mechanisms, this last 
chapter analyses how those same factors compromised their evolution, performance and 
results – the relationship between the way in which ‘transitional justice’ was 
constructed and its policing. It seeks to answer the third and last research question 
framing this thesis: how, and to what extent, did ‘transitional justice’ affect the process 
of democratisation?  
In addressing this question, and in adherence to my methodological and 
theoretical framework, this chapter demonstrates three things. First, it shows how the 
different factors that allowed the establishment of a retributive justice mechanism to 
deal with the past led to its results – i.e. impunity, absence of punishment. Far from 
being ‘a very appropriate response to impunity’, the Mexican Solution granted a de 
facto amnesty to perpetrators of past abuses. The Mexican case captures what Cohen 
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terms ‘policing the past’: the way in which states (such as Mexico) control the past 
through transitional justice strategies (e.g. a retributive strategy that treats perpetrators 
with impunity) in order to meet the political agenda of the present (e.g. political 
stability).62
Second, the chapter shows how the ‘organising concepts’ provided by 
Recommendation 26/2001 of the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) 
constrained the development of Mexico’s ‘transitional justice’ process until its closure 
in 2006. As examined in Chapter Two, the language of human rights allows for the 
conceptualisation, and policing of ‘transitional justice’ mechanisms. Through this 
language, crimes and protagonists of the past are socially and politically constituted in 
such a way as to allow particular forms of action in relation to the past, to bring certain 
authorities, laws and institutions into being (policing). In Mexico, the language of 
human rights allowed Fox’s administration to channel the work of the Special 
Prosecutor’s Office (SPO) through existing structures of power: laws and institutions 
that were influenced by members of the previous authoritarian regime. 
Third, the chapter shows how the functioning of the SPO was affected by the 
continuous political negotiations between the different actors that participated in the 
process. Political deliberations on how to regulate the ‘transitional justice’ process did 
not end with the establishment of the SPO in 2001 – on the contrary, such deliberations 
continued until its closure five years later. 
In other words, this chapter shows that ‘transitional justice’ mechanisms were 
not immutable or foreign to their social or political context (Short 2007). In Mexico, the 
SPO evolved during its functional period, for example as a result of bureaucratic or 
political issues. This is important because, as I explained in Chapter Two, authors of the 
                                                 
62 The concept of policing the past was examined in detail in Chapter Two. 
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first and second cluster of transitional justice literature assume that transitional justice 
mechanisms are indifferent to the social, historical and political medium in which they 
are in. These studies take a certain institution as a departure point – say the TRC in 
South Africa – and from there analyse its alleged benefits or flaws. However, they 
ignore the fact that the TRC in 1998 was not identical to the TRC originally established 
in 1995; for example, the gathering of testimonials suffered serious changes in 1996 and 
then in 1997 (‘there was a sea-change in the TRC’s activities which were refocused 
from victims’ narratives to perpetrators findings’) (Wilson 2001: 38). Similarly, for 
legal and political reasons, the SPO in Mexico gradually modified its strategies to ‘see 
justice done’ from its origins in 2001 until it was shut down in 2006. 
The chapter is divided into four parts. The first explores the way in which the 
Fox administration materialised – and altered – the NHRC’s Recommendation 26/2001. 
The second and third parts analyse the most important cases investigated by the SPO: 
the disappearance of political dissidents during the 1970s, and the assassination of 
students in 1968 and 1971 (known as the genocide cases). The final section summarises 
the most relevant political effects that this particular way of facing past state crimes had 
in Mexico’s new democracy. 
Materialising and adjusting ‘The Mexican Solution’ 
The case of Carlos Francisco Castañeda de la Fuente 
On February 5, 1970, President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz arrived on time for his appointment 
at the Revolution Monument in Mexico City. His strategists programmed a public 
ceremony at eleven in the morning to commemorate the fifty-third anniversary of the 
Mexican constitution. That was Díaz Ordaz’s last year in power and this event was an 
opportunity to reiterate that the PRI regime was democratic and respectful of the law 
(Loaeza 2005). 
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That same day, Carlos Francisco Castañeda de la Fuente woke up at eight in the 
morning, had breakfast and went out to buy a newspaper. He was employed in a garage, 
but took the day off because he had more important plans: to kill the president. 
Castañeda de la Fuente returned to his flat, shaved and read the newspaper (El 
Universal), where he found the schedule for Díaz Ordaz’s public activities for that 
morning. The Revolution Monument was not far away from where he lived. If he left 
his flat at ten, by eleven he would be ready to shoot his Pistole Parabellum 1908, known 
as a Luger, which he had bought with the money he saved for a year (Castillo 2004a). 
Castañeda de la Fuente put away his gun in a plastic case and walked for half an 
hour to meet the president. His idea of obedience to the law was very different from that 
of Díaz Ordaz. A fervent Catholic, Castañeda de la Fuente was ‘willing to die in the 
fulfilment of divine justice’ (Castillo 2004d). He wanted to kill the president to avenge 
the students assassinated by the army in 1968. To justify his plan, Castañeda de la 
Fuente elaborated a peculiar syllogism: in Mexico ninety per cent of the population is 
Catholic; all the assassinated students in 1968 were Mexican; hence, ‘many Catholics 
died that night and I had to avenge them’ (Castillo 2004a). 
Castañeda de la Fuente pulled the gun out of the case and shot the car in which 
he thought the President was travelling, but that day Díaz Ordaz had taken another 
route. In his place was the Minister of Defence, and in any case no one was hurt, as the 
shot hit the car’s chassis. Immediately after he had fired the gun Castañeda de la Fuente 
was detained and taken to the Federal Security Direction (DFS) – the defunct secret 
police – where he was held incommunicado and tortured: ‘Commander Miguel Nazar 
Haro made me pull down my pants and with a hemp string he tied my testicles and gave 
a strong pull; he told me to pray’ (Castillo 2004a). He was then interrogated: ‘What do 
you want me to pull, an eye, a tooth or a nail? […] How do you want to die, [to be] shot 
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or burnt?’ (Castillo 2004c). Meanwhile, in less than six hours, the secret police 
captured, interrogated and tortured Castañeda de la Fuente’s family and friends, who 
were illegally detained for eight days (Castillo 2004d). 
However, Castañeda confessed nothing relevant: he was not a part of any 
dissident group or guerrilla movement, nor did he have accomplices or a criminal 
record. He was submitted for psychiatric evaluation on March 7, 1970, a month after his 
attack against the president. The Criminal Medical Office concluded that ‘currently [he] 
does not display an evident psychiatric pathology’ nor ‘a paranoid psychosis’ (Castillo 
2004b). Castañeda de la Fuente was a lonely gunman who appeared to be completely 
sane. 
Had he been presented to a judge, Carlos Francisco would have received a 
maximum sentence of five years for ‘attempted murder’. Instead, he continued to be 
detained, held incommunicado, tortured and held without due process for four months at 
the DFS installations, then at Military Camp Number One, and finally at a Migrant 
Station in Iztapalapa (Castillo 2004a). During this time, neither the police nor the 
Military discovered anything new. 
Then unexpectedly, on June 5, 1970, the chief of the Forensic Medical Service 
concluded that Carlos Francisco ‘does suffer from a mental disease’: he was ‘mentally 
weak with a paranoid state whose relevant pathological nucleus is a reformist idealist 
delirium’. As he displayed ‘symptoms that were threatening to society’ it was necessary 
for him ‘to be transferred to a mental facility’ (Castillo 2004b). According to his 
medical record, his mental disorders possibly came from birth: his delivery was 
premature, ‘he was born in the street and hit his head’, he was always ‘shy and 
introverted’ (Castillo 2004d). Or maybe it all began during his teenage years, when he 
had ‘ideas referring to great intellectual and emotional conflicts on political issues, on 
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his sexual roles, and his role in life’. Whatever the reason, Castañeda de la Fuente was 
diagnosed with a ‘psychotic schizophrenic process of chronic and incurable course’ and 
remaining free constituted a hazard to other people (Castillo 2004b). 
Foucault (1991a: 236) argued that the first principle that gave way in the prison 
reform of the nineteenth century was that of ‘isolation’: ‘the isolation of the convict 
from the external world […] the isolation of the prisoners from one another’, as 
‘solitude must be a positive instrument of reform’. In Mexico, the Attorney General and 
the DFS took this principle to its extreme: Castañeda de la Fuente was completely 
isolated, not in prison but in a psychiatric hospital. Through the Construction 
Committee of Sanitary Engineering of the Ministry of Health, the psychiatric hospital 
built a special ‘bunker’ for the new patient: a small room made out of a ‘solid block of 
concrete’ (Castillo 2004b). And in order to protect his rights and interests, the judge on 
the case assigned a ‘tutor’ to him, a state agent dependent on the Ministry of the Interior 
(Castillo 2004c). Castañeda de la Fuente was committed there for four years. However, 
his tutor never contacted him again. 
In 1974, the hospital authorities transferred Castañeda de la Fuente to ‘ward 
five’, the area for ‘dangerous patients’ (Castillo 2004b). There, Carlos Francisco was 
used as a guinea pig for the trial of ‘a very ample gamut of drugs’ – ‘all known 
neuroleptics, ataraxics and antipsychotics’ (Castillo 2004b). He was even used for the 
development of a ‘clinical pharmacological research trial […] presented at the fifth 
world specialty congress’ (Castillo 2004b). 
Nearly twenty years later, in 1992, the paralegal Norma Ibañez was carrying out 
an internship at the psychiatric hospital where Castañeda de la Fuente had been 
committed on June 4, 1970. Norma noticed what no one (none of the hundreds of 
interns who had worked at the hospital, nor the social workers, doctors or nurses) had 
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observed before: Castañeda de la Fuente had ‘no criminal record’ (Castillo 2004c). Why 
was he interned there and for so long? Once she was aware of this, Norma made a 
complaint to the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC).63
A year went by. The NHRC did not issue a single human rights recommendation 
to any state authority related to this case. The Interior Ministry confirmed that ‘neither 
in the ordinary record nor the confidential archive’ were there any reports explaining 
why Castañeda de la Fuente was imprisoned (Castillo 2004c). Meanwhile, the hospital 
authorities submitted Castañeda de la Fuente for one final psychiatric examination, but 
found nothing abnormal about his mental health: there was ‘improvement of the 
symptomatology for which he was seen’, the doctors said (Castillo 2004c). After 
twenty-three years, as he had no criminal record and had had no trial, Castañeda de la 
Fuente was released. ‘President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz forgave me, and I also forgave 
him’ were the last words Castañeda de la Fuente said the paralegal Norma Ibañez, in 
1992 (but Díaz Ordaz had died in 1979). 
We know about this case because it was under investigation by the SPO (Castillo 
2004a), but it was not unusual. ‘How many cases like these took place during the dirty 
war?’ asked journalist Gustavo Castillo (2004c). Ignacio Carrillo Prieto, the Special 
Prosecutor, put it this way: it is possible that some members of armed movements 
during the 1960s and 1980s were imprisoned in clandestine jails’ or mental institutions 
for decades. As a result, Carrillo Prieto said, these dissidents became mentally ill, so 
once they were released ‘became homeless’ (Castillo 2004c). 
I described this case in detail because it allows me to connect the previous 
chapters – about the background and construction of the ‘transitional justice’ process – 
                                                 
63 As I explained in the previous chapter, the NHRC was created in 1990 by president Carlos Salinas. 
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with this chapter on the policing of the ‘transitional justice’ process and its effects on 
Mexico’s democratic transition in three ways. 
First, as I mentioned in Chapter Two, in her critique of transitional justice, 
Arthur (2009: 333) suggests that transitional justice practices do not really ‘come to 
terms with historical complexities’ as one might expect in an effort to deal with the past. 
The case of Castañeda de la Fuente demonstrates this insight. This case shows that the 
systematic violation of human rights in Mexico was possible for decades not only as a 
result of the sophisticated security machinery (Military, police, secret police), but also 
because of the complicity of other state institutions that had nothing to do with internal 
security (e.g. the mental health system). At least eleven state institutions were related to 
Castañeda de la Fuente’s case: the DFS, which detained and tortured him; the army 
personnel at Military Camp Number One; the state agents of the Migration Station of 
Iztapalapa who tortured him; the Criminal Medical Office, which certified that he was 
sane; the Forensic Medical Service, which determined he was insane; the court that 
ordered his commitment in a psychiatric hospital; the Sanitary Engineering 
Construction Committee, which built the bunker where he remained completely isolated 
for four years; the Health Ministry; the psychiatric hospital where he stayed for twenty-
three years and was used for medical experiments; the Interior Ministry, which assigned 
him a ‘tutor’; and the National Human Rights Commission, which did nothing to 
redress the damage. However, as the SPO was based on a retributive sense of justice, 
the institutions involved in Castañeda de la Fuente’s case were never investigated – the 
SPO sought to identify and prosecute only individual offenders. Hence, the institutional 
framework that made abuses possible was not addressed or changed under the new 
regime. 
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Second, Castañeda de la Fuente’s case is interesting because it shows the 
difficulties encountered by the SPO in using the language of human rights when 
establishing responsibility for past atrocity. From 1970 to 1993, Castañeda de la Fuente 
was a victim of unimaginable abuses, which were not perpetrated by sadists, but by a 
multiplicity of ‘tiny cogs’ in the authoritarian regime machinery: the police, the 
Military, immigration officers, nurses, doctors, psychiatrists, social workers, and 
interns. This story exemplifies Hannah Arendt’s (1994) concept of the banality of evil. 
Arendt warns about the atrocities – the inconceivable evil – that can result from a series 
of ordinary acts carried out by ordinary people who are ‘terribly and terrifyingly 
normal’ (Arendt 1994: 276). And this normality, as Cohen (2005: 100) points out, is 
born out of ‘ordinary human qualities: not fully realizing the immorality of what you are 
doing; being as normal as all your peers doing the same thing; having motives that are 
dull, unimaginative and commonplace (going along with others, professional ambition, 
job security) […], not grasping what the fuss was about’. However, the SPO’s 
investigations into Castañeda de la Fuente’s case had no results: no one was arrested or 
prosecuted. As the SPO had a retributive approach to justice, and therefore sought to 
punish individual perpetrators, we might want to ask who the SPO should prosecute in 
Castañeda de la Fuente’s case – the DFS agents who tortured him, the army personnel 
who illegally detained him, the doctors who experimented on him, or the nurses who 
knew about his case and did nothing? How can one define through the language of 
human rights twenty-three years of suffering: forced disappearance, illegal 
imprisonment, torture, cruel and inhumane treatment? This case is a powerful 
demonstration of Ainley’s (2011: 409) claim that the responsibility for past atrocity ‘lies 
not with individual perpetrators alone but also in significant measure with collectives 
and with those individuals who did not commit crimes but did contribute to harm’. 
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Collaborators and bystanders (nurses, doctors, judges) are not completely innocent nor 
criminally guilty. They are, however, central to atrocity – as they fail to prevent the 
commission of abuses – but they are rarely prosecuted (Ainley 2011: 422). 
Third, Carlos Francisco’s case is important because it shows the ambiguities of 
the SPO’s mandate. As I examined in the previous chapter, the NHRC recommended 
that President Fox should create a SPO to prosecute state agents related to the 
disappearance of dissidents. However, Castañeda de la Fuente’s case did not constitute 
forced disappearance according to the NHRC’s guidelines, nor had it been included 
originally in the cases that the SPO had to investigate. So, why was the case under 
investigation? This and other cases were included in the ‘transitional justice’ process as 
a result of political negotiations. Hence, the mere existence of Castañeda de la Fuente’s 
case is relevant because it shows that beyond the alleged ideals of justice or truth by 
which it is inspired, ‘transitional justice’ was a site for political deliberation par 
excellence. I will address below how, why and with what effect Carlos Francisco’s case 
came to be investigated by the SPO. 
The SPO’s ever changing retributive mandate 
In the previous chapter I explained that on November 27, 2001, in the Black Palace, the 
NHRC ‘recommended’ the creation of the SPO (CNDH 2001c; CNDH 2001d). 
According to the NHRC, the SPO was supposed to investigate two hundred and 
seventy-five cases of forced disappearance that were allegedly perpetrated by state 
agents in the 1970s. As President Fox accepted this recommendation, this would be the 
SPO’s only task (Presidencia de la República 2001b).64
                                                 
64 It is important to highlight that Fox only agreed to carry out the investigation regarding the disappeared 
during the 1970s. He ignored other equally relevant recommendations. For instance, a crucial 
recommendation for the new democracy that never materialised was linked to reforms of the intelligence 
services. The Centre of Investigation and National Security (CISEN), established in 1989, is the 
intelligence organ in Mexico. But the CISEN substituted the secret police (DFS), which had been partly 
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However, the original objective of Mexico’s ‘transitional justice’ – to investigate 
and prosecute cases of forced disappearance – did not hold for long. Indeed, the only 
constant in the ‘transitional justice’ process was that the SPO’s mandate was perpetually 
changed. The first modification occurred only twenty-four hours after the ceremony at 
the Black Palace when the presidential decree by which the SPO was officially 
established came into force. According to this decree, the SPO’s task would be: 
To know of all investigations, integrate preliminary investigations that are initiated by 
complaints formulated […] on facts that probably constitute federal crimes committed 
directly or indirectly by public servants against people linked to social or political 
movements, as well as prosecute the resulting crimes before competent courts in 
accordance with the applicable law (Poder Ejecutivo Federal 2001a). 
 
This paragraph is obscure. It is a good example of what Bourdieu (1986: 9) in his study 
La force du droit called a ‘legal field’: a space bordered by ‘legal language’ that 
separates those ‘specialists’ (e.g. lawyers, judges) who are ‘prepared’ to enter that space 
and those who will be excluded (the client, the victim, ‘the simple layman who use 
ordinary language’). And this division, according to Bourdieu (1986: 8), allows 
specialists of the legal language to deal with the law arbitrarily, as a ‘docile, adaptable, 
flexible instrument’ to ‘profit the most from the law’s elasticity’, its ‘contradictions, 
ambiguities and its gaps’. In Mexico, as I will demonstrate in what follows, the main 
beneficiaries of the SPO’s ‘legal language’ were perpetrators of past human rights 
violations. 
Clearly, we do not need to be experts in legal language to know that the SPO’s 
new mandate did not refer to forced disappearance – as was originally intended by the 
NHRC’s Recommendation 26/2001. What was not so evident was the way in which this 
                                                                                                                                               
responsible for human rights violations during the PRI era. As transitional justice mechanisms had as a 
goal ‘that these things [human rights violations] [should] never again occur in Mexico’, the Ombudsman 
recommended the democratisation of Mexico’s intelligence services (CNDH 2001c: 38). This was 
important because these services continued to work as they had during the previous regime (Benítez 
Manaut 2008b: 273). Yet this recommendation was overlooked by the Fox administration and even today 
the CISEN works in the same premises as the previous regime (Rodríguez Sumano 2008: 167; Benítez 
Manaut 2008a: 186; Herrera Lasso 2009). I will return to this point in the Conclusions to this thesis. 
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mandate was to be interpreted. As the International Centre for Transitional Justice put it, 
‘from the beginning, the SPO’s mandate was limited and vague’ (ICTJ 2008: 2). 
For example, it is unclear what the decree meant by ‘federal offences’. 
According to Acosta and Ennelin (2006: 103) this meant that ‘in general the SPO 
[would] not deal with matters committed by public servants at the state level, ruling out 
of the investigation […] acts committed by the local state police’. A contradiction is 
evident here. How could the SPO prosecute only ‘federal offences’ when most of the 
cases of forced disappearances documented in the NHRC’s Recommendation 26/2001 
were perpetrated by local state agents? Therefore, one of the contributions of the SPO 
was to help decriminalise the actions of the majority of those who opposed the former 
state. 
A second problem was related to the victims of abuses. According to this new 
presidential decree, the victims had to be ‘linked to social or political movements’. The 
idea that the SPO had to investigate political crimes exclusively was not unusual. On the 
contrary, as I examined in Chapter Three, human rights have always been based on a 
distinction between politically motivated abuse – a human rights violation – and a 
simply criminal act. Hence ‘separating human rights and common crime is the first 
distinguishing act of all human rights institutions’ (Wilson 2001: 81). The problem was 
that in Mexico the distinction between victims of abuses ‘linked’ to ‘social and political 
movements’ and those that were not was never outlined. The SPO’s mandate did not 
establish, a priori, what that link comprised, nor how the concept of ‘social or political 
movements’ should be understood (Aguayo and Trevino-Rangel 2007). As Acosta and 
Ennelin (2006: 103) stated, the decision regarding which victims were linked to social 
or political movements would be ‘a task which may prove difficult’ as it ‘is dependent 
on the SPO’s and the Court’s interpretations, since the Decree offers no definition of 
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these and no guidance on the criteria to be applied’. Thus, despite being inspired by 
human rights ideals, defining the link between victims and political groups was not just 
a matter of neutral classification, but also a political act (Moon 2008). That is why 
Wilson (Wilson 2001: 81) suggests that in transitional justice institutions ‘politics 
operates at the level of assumptions about what is “political” and what is not’. 
A third complication of the SPO’s mandate was related to the historical period 
under criminal investigation: how far back did the SPO have to go in order to see justice 
done? According to Cohen (1995: 31), this is an ‘obvious’ ‘temporal problem’ that all 
transitional justice mechanisms have to deal with: ‘how far back to go in looking for 
accountability (truth or justice)?’ For restorativists – examined in Chapter Two – the 
answer is, in part, clear: truth commissions should investigate a pattern of abuses over a 
specific period of time (Hayner 2002). For example, the Commission for Historical 
Clarification in Guatemala covered the period from 1962 to 1996 (a time period 
coterminous with the thirty-six year period of civil war); the National Commission on 
the Disappearance of Persons in Argentina investigated only the years 1976 to 1983 (a 
period coterminous with the rule of the military junta). The Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission in South Africa covered the period from 1960 to 1994 (a periodisation that 
was clearly contingent as it marked the turn to violent opposition against the state, 
rather than the date when the apartheid was formally inaugurated, 1948). But Cohen 
suggested that the answer was not that simple: ‘my own personal opinion is that no 
amount of time can be “too long” to satisfy the needs for truth and some measure of 
accountability, nor can some arbitrary legal time limit be set (Cohen 1995: 31). The 
argument that some wounds are too old to be exposed has little moral integrity.’ 
Whatever we might think of these suggestions, in Mexico the problem was much more 
serious: the SPO’s mandate never established a time limit, so the SPO ‘did not have a 
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specific historical period on which to focus its investigations, and the duration of its 
mandate was never established’ (ICTJ 2008: 2). I will discuss the implications of this 
failure to periodise later in this chapter. 
This new and ambiguous SPO mandate lasted only two months. The tasks that 
the SPO had to carry out drastically changed as a result of a ‘political accident’ 
completely outside the ‘transitional justice’ process. On January 30, 2002, the Supreme 
Court of Justice decided that the General Attorney’s Office should initiate an immediate 
investigation into the ‘massacre of Tlatelolco’: the killing of an undetermined number 
of students on October 2, 1968 (Aranda 2002b; Suprema Corte 2002). Almost a month 
later, the General Attorney’s Office publicly announced that it would abide by the 
court’s order and therefore opened the preliminary investigation 064/FESPLE/02 (PGR 
2002a). However, the General Attorney’s Office would not conduct the investigation 
itself. The General Attorney arbitrarily decided to transfer the responsibility of carrying 
out the prosecutions to the recently created SPO (PGR 2002b). 
But what was this political accident? The Supreme Court’s decision was 
anything but spontaneous – it was a result of almost four years of legal proceedings and 
political deliberations. To understand the court’s decision we must go back to 1998 
(Suprema Corte 2002). That year, a group of activists and victims of repression 
presented a complaint before the General Attorney’s Office for the killing of students on 
October 2, 1968 (before the change of regime). They argued that what had occurred that 
fateful day constituted: ‘genocide, abuse of authority and illegal abduction’ (Aranda 
2002b). In other words, the victims were asking the General Attorney’s Office of the 
PRI regime to initiate a criminal investigation against state agents of the PRI regime 
related to the massacre. Predictably, the General Attorney’s Office rejected the 
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complaint and invoked a refined legal excuse: the crimes had expired according to the 
statute of limitations. 
In response to the negative reply from the General Attorney’s Office, the victims 
and activists took their case to court (Suprema Corte 2002). The case then became 
trapped in the labyrinth of Mexico’s legal system, which took four years to reach a 
conclusion: how could the General Attorney’s Office determine that the crimes had 
reached their statute of limitation without knowing anything about them? As a result of 
this acute legal reasoning, in January 2002 (i.e. after the change of regime), the Supreme 
Court ordered the General Attorney’s Office to investigate immediately whether the 
facts presented by the victims constituted a crime in the first place, and then conclude if 
such crimes had expired or not according to the statute of limitation (La Jornada 2002). 
The General Attorney’s Office complied with the Supreme Court’s order. However, the 
General Attorney explained that as the ‘facts that led to this criminal investigation’ (the 
killing of students in 1968) were ‘related to past social movements’, they had to be 
investigated by the institution specifically created to investigate such kind of events: the 
SPO.65
Thus, at the end of February 2002, less than one hundred days after its creation, 
the SPO’s mandate had been altered twice. The press reported this confusion: the ‘SPO 
on the disappearance of persons during the 1970s’ would hereafter be known as the 
‘SPO on genocide’ (Aranda 2002b; Avilés Allende 2002). 
Days later, the SPO made public a ‘working plan’ through which it clarified 
what it sought to do. Three months had passed since its creation and the Special 
Prosecutor was not announcing what the SPO had done during that time, but what it was 
planning to do in the future. The SPO would carry out three different investigations. 
                                                 
65 It is important to note that not all activists or victims of abuses celebrated this decision. Some, like Ana 
Ignacia Rodríguez, unsuccessfully opposed this measure, for they considered the SPO distrustful: ‘a truth 
commission’ would be ‘more adequate’ (Aranda 2002b). 
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First, it would set up a ‘Legal Investigations Programme A’ in charge of the cases of 
forced disappearances, which had been previously investigated by the National Human 
Rights Commission. Second, there would be a ‘Legal Investigations Programme B’, 
which would address the Supreme Court of Justice’s resolution regarding the killing of 
students in 1968. Finally, the SPO would establish ‘Legal Investigations Programme C’, 
which would be in charge of all ‘complaints filed’ to the SPO that had not been 
included in the previous ministerial programmes (SPO 2002). 
It was never clear, however, what the SPO sought to achieve with the ‘Legal 
Investigations Programme C’. The effect of the programme was that it maintained the 
ambiguity on the SPO’s tasks. As it did not focus on a predetermined historical period, 
‘Programme C’ implied that the SPO would investigate anything that had taken place in 
the past. Yet, exactly which state crimes would be investigated was a mystery: the 
assassination of more than forty indigenous people in Acteal, Chiapas, in 1997? The 
killing of Zapatistas in 1994? The abuses committed by the secret police between 1947 
and 1985? The repression of railroad workers in 1959? 
The story of how the SPO’s mandate changed does not end here. Following 
another political accident outside the ‘transitional justice’ process, the SPO modified its 
mandate for a third time in July 2002. From then on, the SPO was also in charge of 
investigating ‘the Corpus Christi massacre’: the massacre of twenty-five dissident 
students by the paramilitary group ‘Los Halcones’ (The Hawks), which took place on 
June 10, 1971, in Mexico City. 
To return to the political accident that played into these questions, in June 2002, 
the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) presented a complaint against the person 
whom they maintained was responsible for the 1971 massacre: former president Luis 
Echeverría. The normal procedure would have been for the PRD to go to the Special 
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Prosecutor, Ignacio Carrillo, since he was in charge of the SPO, which investigated 
abuses committed in the past. However, PRD members filed their complaint before 
Mexico City’s District Attorney as they ‘did not trust the work of the SPO’ because ‘the 
Special Prosecutor’s Office on Forced Disappearances […] has not given even a 
glimpse of its work’ (Proceso 2002a and 2002b). ‘We do[n’t] see Mr Carrillo [the 
Special Prosecutor] doing anything’, they said. Yet, a month later, Mexico City’s 
District Attorney did exactly what the PRD wished to avoid: transferred the Corpus 
Christi case to the SPO. This was the third and last change to the SPO’s mandate. This 
is relevant because, as I explained in Chapter Two, authors of the first and second 
cluster of transitional justice literature consider that transitional justice mechanisms are 
indifferent to the political and social medium in which they are in. The account of how 
the SPO’s mandate changed shows that the institutionalisation of human rights norms 
through transitional justice mechanisms is a quintessentially political process shaped by 
its social context, a means through which power is exercised (McEvoy 2007; Short 
2007). 
In the following years, although its mandate remained intact, the number of 
criminal investigations the SPO carried out increased under ‘Programme C’. In less than 
a year, the SPO was investigating the homicide of Joel Arriaga in the city of Puebla; the 
assassination of students on the rooftop of the University of Puebla; the death of six 
hundred and sixty-two members of the PRD between 1988 and 2001; the murder of 
seventeen peasants in Aguas Blancas in 1995; the killing of the teacher Misael Nuñez 
ordered by the teachers’ union leader, Elba Esther Gordillo; the assassination of seven 
peasants in Sonora in 1975; and the death of several people in Oaxaca in 1996 (PGR 
2003). 
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These cases led nowhere. The cases brought under ‘Programme C’ ended in 
impunity. Not at single case reached the court because the SPO gave priority to cases 
under ‘Programme A’ and ‘Programme B’. Therefore, the only cases that opened a way 
through the Mexican justice labyrinth and achieved mass media celebrity status were 
those of forced disappearance during the 1970s; the slaughter of students in 1968; and 
the Corpus Christi massacre case in 1971. The analysis of how these three cases were 
governed through what Nikolas Rose and Mariana Valverde (1998: 542) term a ‘legal 
complex’ – ‘the assemblage of legal practices, legal institutions, statutes, legal codes, 
authorities, discourses, texts, norms and forms of judgement’ – is the subject I tackle 
next. 
Before embarking on this analysis, allow me to emphasise that the story of the 
SPO’s mandate is relevant for four reasons. First, these changes in the norms created 
new human rights categories (e.g. genocide), which would be investigated by the SPO; 
therefore new types of victims would be considered within the ‘transitional justice’ 
process, new perpetrators would be prosecuted, and new authorities, laws and 
institutions would intervene. Second, because this story proves, once again, that in the 
Mexican ‘transitional justice’ process different political accidents had greater 
consequences than human rights principles. The SPO’s mandate changed at least three 
times as a pragmatic response to political conflicts – ‘little dramas’. Third, because 
unlike the first and second cluster of literature on transitional justice, this story shows 
that transitional justice mechanisms are constrained by their social context. 
Fourth, as I explained in previous chapters, the Fox administration presented the 
SPO as an inevitable and necessary mechanism for the country’s democratisation. 
However, the story of the SPO’s mandate shows that the idea that ‘transitional justice’ 
could be reformed had existed from the beginning. From the outset, the SPO had an 
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ambiguous mandate that allowed the Fox administration to change arbitrarily the SPO’s 
goals, strategies and tasks and, hence, the objectives of ‘transitional justice’. And each 
transformation was justified in the name of human rights. 
Forced disappearances 
In spite of the SPO’s mandate transformations, forced disappearances remained a 
crucial issue in the ‘transitional justice’ process. The SPO sought to prosecute the 
forced disappearance cases that had occurred in the 1970s through ‘Programme A’, and 
would prosecute any other forced disappearance case that took place in the past through 
‘Programme C’. However, until the shutting down of the SPO in 2006 there was not a 
single conviction related to forced disappearance cases (ICTJ 2008: 3). 
The analysis that follows examines the different factors that allowed the 
‘transitional justice’ process to protect, rather than punish, the perpetrators of forced 
disappearance. 
Illegal abduction, forced disappearance or crime against humanity? 
In the previous chapter, following Rodley and Cohen, I explained that the existing 
definition of forced disappearance can hardly capture the suffering of victims of such a 
‘ghoulish process’, which has different phases: the victim is captured illegally, held 
incommunicado, tortured, illegally interrogated, then murdered (Rodley 1999). In this 
chapter, I return to the concept of forced disappearance. But this time I am interested in 
the way in which this concept travelled through Mexico’s ‘legal complex’ (Rose and 
Valverde 1998). 
In 2003, in a special report on the ‘transitional justice’ process in Mexico, HRW 
warned that ‘the crime that most adequately describes what took place in the majority of 
cases investigated by the SPO is forced disappearance’(HRW 2003). HRW’s opinion 
coincides exactly with what the NHRC concluded in its Recommendation 26/2001: the 
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SPO should investigate the forced disappearance of hundreds of people. However, 
forced disappearance did not exist in any Mexican legal text when the events took place 
– in the 1970s. Therefore, as forced disappearance did not exist in the legislation, what 
occurred in the past – the disappearance of people by the secret police or the army – 
could be anything except forced disappearance. This exquisite legal reasoning can seem 
absurd, but is legally correct. As Cohen affirms, ‘many such legalistic moves are 
wonderfully plausible as long as common sense is suspended’ (Cohen 2005: 108). Thus, 
the SPO was created to prosecute a crime that, according to the law, never existed. And, 
if a crime never took place, there would be nothing and no-one to investigate, judge, and 
prosecute. 
Legal problems pertaining to the relationship between past crimes and current 
jurisdiction – ‘retroactive justice’ – have been addressed by early transitional justice 
literature (Cohen 1995):  how can one apply the principles of the present to the actions 
of the past when the crimes articulated in the present were not considered crimes in the 
past. The rule against retroactivity is a widely accepted principle of international 
criminal law. These problems are also familiar in domestic criminal contexts (e.g. 
statutes of limitation, double jeopardy, retrospective liability). But in Mexico the subject 
was more complex and disturbing. It was not that the new democracy suddenly 
encountered these legal problems; rather, problems of ‘retroactive justice’ were foreseen 
well in advance by the PRI regime. The SPO was officially created in 2001 by the new 
democratic regime. However, as explained in the previous chapter, President Fox 
established the SPO at the suggestion of the NHRC, a holdover from the authoritarian 
regime. This is perverse because the NHRC was an institution that served to preserve 
PRI immunity (Ackerman 2007). This example underscores, empirically, Cohen’s claim 
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that ‘some perpetrators “anticipate” the techniques of denial and cover-up that will be 
used later’ (Cohen 1995: 19). 
The point is that the authoritarian regime that systematically disappeared 
political dissidents never ratified international conventions on forced disappearance, so 
this crime was not included in the penal code. Mexico established the crime of forced 
disappearance in the legislation after the regime change, in 2001. However, according to 
article 14 of the Mexican Constitution, ‘no law will be applied retroactively to the 
detriment of any person’. Therefore, as HRW put it, ‘under Mexican law […] it is 
impossible to charge someone with a specific offence of forced disappearance that was 
carried out before 2001’ (HRW 2003: 20). As already stated, this legal obstacle had 
been foreseen before the SPO was created. The NHRC had warned in Recommendation 
26/2001 – the recommendation that led to the creation of the SPO in 2001 – that the 
absence of ‘legal precepts’ on forced disappearance in Mexico would make it very hard 
to punish the perpetrators (CNDH 2001b: 44). The irony here is obvious: the Nation 
Human Rights Commission knew that it was almost impossible to prosecute the 
perpetrators of forced disappearance – and nonetheless recommended Vicente Fox the 
creation of a SPO to do exactly that. 
However, the NHRC itself offered a solution to solve this problem. According to 
Recommendation 26/2001, as the term ‘forced disappearance’ did not exist in Mexican 
legislation, the SPO could use the term ‘crime against humanity’ to prosecute state 
agents who disappeared dissidents (CNDH 2001b: 31). The NHRC came to this 
conclusion through a legal reasoning: when forced disappearance occurs multiple rights 
are violated (e.g. the right to life; to be free of torture; to the protection of inhumane, 
cruel and degrading treatment; to personal freedom; to legal personality; and to access 
to justice); hence forced disappearance could be considered a ‘crime against humanity’ 
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(CNDH 2001d). Using this logic, if forced disappearance is a crime against humanity, 
the Fox administration had the obligation of investigating and prosecuting those 
responsible – this was expected of ‘states with democratic aspirations’ such as Mexico, 
according to the NHRC. 
This NHRC’s sophisticated argument may have been legally correct, but it was 
nonetheless naïve in a country like Mexico. HRW put it this way: 
It [was] not enough merely to choose the legal arguments that were legally sound. [The 
SPO] had to convince judges that [its] novel legal arguments were consistent with 
Mexican law. [The SPO] had to impress upon judges the weight of Mexico’s 
international obligations to prosecute human rights violations. In short, prosecuting 
these cases require[d] pushing Mexican criminal law in new directions. It require[d] 
overcoming the very legal doctrine and habits that had, for decades, served to 
perpetuate the culture of impunity (HRW 2006: 101). 
 
But the SPO had another alternative to navigate through Mexico’s ‘legal field’ 
(Bourdieu 1986). Before 2001, the Mexican legislation included a crime that was 
somewhat similar to forced disappearance: illegal abduction. This crime had existed in 
the penal code when the disappearances took place, so the SPO could prosecute the 
perpetrators by pressing charges for illegal abduction. The concept of illegal abduction 
was not free from juridical problems and legal contradictions, however. The first 
complication was that this crime had already expired. The time period established by the 
statute of limitations for the crime of illegal abduction is only twenty-two years and six 
months, according to Mexico’s legislation. As most cases of illegal abduction under 
investigation by the SPO took place in the 1970s, it was clear that the time allotted by 
the statute of limitations had run out for these crimes (HRW 2003; HRW 2006; ICTJ 
2008). 
The second problem with the concept of illegal abduction was related to the 
identity of the perpetrators. According to the NGO Mexican Commission of Defence 
and Promotion of Human Rights, the Mexican penal code establishes that the crime of 
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illegal abduction can be perpetrated only by privates or non-state agents (Comité 68, et 
al. 2006: 21). Therefore, this concept would have been useless to the SPO as the cases 
of forced disappearance under investigation were committed by state agents. 
The SPO had three alternatives to prosecute state agents responsible for the 
disappearance of hundreds of people during the previous regime. The first option was to 
use a human rights concept par excellence: forced disappearance, but this strategy was 
destined to ‘fail’ as the concept could not be used retroactively. The second choice was 
to employ the concept of crimes against humanity, but this was unknown to Mexican 
judges. The last alternative was to use the term of illegal abduction, but this was absurd 
given that this crime had expired, and it also implied that it had been perpetrated by 
non-state agents. 
Stretching the law: the role of the Congress 
Vicente Fox’s triumph implied there had been a radical transformation – at least in the 
official discourse – in Mexican foreign policy. The country would stop being 
authoritarian, attend to human rights international treaties, and instead become a 
democracy that would seek a ‘more intense activity’ in the ‘international scenario’ 
regarding human rights norms (Castañeda 2001b). Fox and his strategists stated that his 
main priority for Mexico’s foreign policy between 2001 and 2006 would be to ‘promote 
and strengthen democracy and human rights as fundamental bases for the new 
international system’ (Poder Ejecutivo Federal 2001b: 60). To do so, Fox’s 
administration proposed to accept ‘the universally recognised rules’ on human rights 
and ‘the harmonisation of our internal legislation to international commitments’ in 
human rights and humanitarian law (Poder Ejecutivo Federal 2001b: 61). 
Following this strategy, the foreign minister, Jorge Castañeda (who had 
proposed the creation of a truth commission in 2001) promoted the signing and 
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ratification of at least fourteen international treaties related to human rights during the 
first two years of the Fox administration. Out of these international instruments, the 
most important for the ‘transitional justice’ process, was the Inter-American Convention 
on Forced Disappearance of Persons, signed on May 4, 2001, and ratified on April 9, 
2002 (OAS 2012; SRE 2012). 
The press reflected the celebratory atmosphere before the ratification of this 
treaty. The newspaper Reforma’s headline was self-descriptive: ‘Forced disappearance 
will have no statute of limitation’ (Reforma 2001b). According to the press, this was a 
sign that ‘Mexico joins the international trend that seeks to strengthen the international 
system of protection of human rights’ (Reforma 2001b). 
The ratification of the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of 
Persons seemed a positive signal for the ‘transitional justice’ process: it would allow the 
use of the concept of forced disappearance retroactively. According to article VII of the 
Convention, ‘criminal prosecution for the forced disappearance of persons and the 
penalty judicially imposed on its perpetrator shall not be subject to statutes of 
limitations’ (OAS 2012). Thus the convention would allow charges to be pressed for 
forced disappearance although the crime did not exist in the Mexican legislation in the 
1970s. 
However, the Convention was born dead. When Fox sent it to the Mexican 
Senate for its ratification it included some legal traps – a reservation and an 
interpretative declaration – which rendered it harmless. An ‘interpretative declaration’ is 
a legal euphemism used by the United Nations that allows states of the international 
community ‘to clarify the meaning of certain provisions or of the entire treaty’ (UN 
Office of Legal Affairs 2006: 16) – as if human rights treaties were not sufficiently 
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clear. This illustrates Cohen’s argument that ‘powerful forms of […] denial come from 
the language of legality itself’: 
Countries with democratic credentials sensitive to their international image now offer 
legalistic defences, drawn from the accredited human rights discourse. This results in 
the intricate textual commentaries that circulate between governments and their critics 
[…]. Does the second clause of article 16(b), para. 6, apply to all the state parties? 
(2005: 107) 
 
The peculiar way in which Fox’s administration reinterpreted the meaning of the 
Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons resulted in a 
‘reservation’ that protected perpetrators of forced disappearance. The main beneficiaries 
were military personnel. According to article IX of the Convention, ‘acts constituting 
forced disappearance shall not be deemed to have been committed in the course of 
military duties’ (OAS 2012). Moreover, the convention states that ‘persons alleged to be 
responsible for the acts constituting the offence of forced disappearance of persons may 
be tried only in the competent jurisdictions of ordinary law in each state, to the 
exclusion of all other special jurisdictions, particularly military jurisdictions’ (OAS 
2012). However, Fox’s administration stated that in Mexico this article would be 
understood in the opposite way: ‘Military jurisdiction does not constitute a special 
jurisdiction in the sense of the Convention’ – hence the military justice system would 
continue to assert jurisdiction ‘when a member of the armed forces commits an illicit act 
while on duty’ (SRE 2012). This meant that, in Mexico, members of the armed forces 
charged with forced disappearances would be tried in military courts (Academia 
Mexicana de Derechos Humanos 2003: 10). Therefore, as HRW claimed, this 
reservation ‘contradict[ed] the purpose of the treaty and violat[ed] international law, as 
international bodies have repeatedly held that military jurisdiction may never apply to 
cases involving human rights violations’ (HRW 2006: 24). 
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In addition to this reservation, Fox included an ‘interpretative declaration’ that 
neutralised the Convention’s temporary dimension: ‘it shall be understood that the 
provisions of said Convention shall apply to acts constituting the forced disappearance 
of persons ordered, executed, or committed after the entry into force of this Convention’ 
(SRE 2012) – after April 2002. Therefore, the Convention would apply only to those 
cases of forced disappearance that could occur from 2002 onwards. What this really 
meant was that the Convention could not be used by the SPO because, as we know, its 
objective was to investigate human rights violations that took place in the past, not in 
the future. 
The Mexican Senate – also elected in 2000 – could have rejected both the 
‘reservation’ and the ‘interpretative declaration’, but it did not. The Senate discussed the 
ratification of this treaty on December 10, 2001. The fact that the discussion took place 
on that day was no accident: the senators chose a politically significant date – December 
10 marks the annual (and global) celebration of Human Rights Day. 
As was predictable, the PRI senators defended the legal traps attached to the 
treaty. Senator César Camacho Quiroz, for example, said that it was ‘evident that the 
passing of time does not alleviate the pain that the crimes of war and crimes against 
humanity provoke’. These crimes, he said, ‘dishonour all of human civilisation’s efforts, 
hence perpetrators should not escape justice, invoking any legal pretext’ (Senado de la 
República 2001). For this reason, Senator Camacho applauded this treaty’s ratification 
as it ‘is an instrument against impunity’. However, he also accepted the interpretive 
declaration and reservation because, he said, they would serve to ‘remain congruous’ 
with the Mexican Constitution (Senado de la República 2001). The problem with 
Senator Camacho’s interpretation is that the point of ratifying the treaties was, 
precisely, not to remain congruent with the Mexican Constitution – as the Constitution 
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allowed the impunity that those who had violated human rights in the past enjoyed to be 
perpetuated.  
But the PRI senators were not alone in approving the ‘reservation’ and the 
‘interpretative declaration’. Senators of the PAN – Fox’s party – backed them up. Only 
the left-wing parliamentary group – the PRD – criticised the chicanery attached to the 
Convention. Senator Rutilio Cruz Escandón warned ‘that the interpretive declaration, 
that the Mexican government holds in this case, completely alters the Convention’s 
nature and shows the lack of the Mexican government’s will to take on concrete 
commitments’ on human rights (Senado de la República 2001), but his warning was 
ignored by the members of his party. 
At the end of the discussion, all senators of the new democratic regime – ninety-
one who attended the session that day – voted in favour of the treaties, chicanery and all 
(Senado de la República 2001). As a result, the human rights treaty could be potentially 
useful in the future if the new democratic regime carried out forced disappearances – 
but would be irrelevant for the ‘transitional justice’ process that sought to deal with the 
disappearances that took place in the past. 
There was another way in which the Mexican Congress stretched the law in 
order to perpetuate the impunity that perpetrators of past state crimes enjoyed. The 
Congress took advantage of what Cohen identified as one of the ‘temporal problems’ of 
transitional justice: for some people, claims Cohen (1995: 31), ‘there is something 
faintly repellent, even unjust, in the relentless judicial pursuit of fugitive monsters from 
a decade or even a generation ago’. Should the new democratic regime really be 
prosecuting a frail seventy-year-old man living quietly in Mexico City? The problem 
with this interpretation, as Cohen argues, is that transitional justice is about the ‘the 
creature empowered to dispatch millions to death, not the balding old man wearing 
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headphones; about the doctor who raped and tortured, not this pleasant man running a 
clinic in Montevideo’ (Cohen 1995: 47). 
Suddenly, in Mexico it was inhuman to send elderly perpetrators to jail. On 
December 11, 2003, Congressman Joel Padilla Peña, a member of the Work Party (PT), 
a left-wing party, presented a legal initiative to reform Article 55 of the penal code 
(Cámara de Diputados 2004). Under this initiative, people in prison who were older 
than seventy years could leave jail and retire in the comfort of their home, where they 
would be placed under house arrest (Cámara de Diputados 2004). Aiming to justify this 
measure, the PT parliamentary group invoked the language of human rights – civil 
rights, human rights of people imprisoned, and human rights of the elderly. For the PT 
congressmen, these human rights norms established in ‘most international instruments 
[…] enunciate universally recognised fundamental ethical principles which, although 
they do not impose obligations, are an ethical imperative for UN member states, such as 
Mexico’ (Grupo Parlamentario del PT 2003). 
Although it was justified as a moral imperative, inspired by the universal 
principles of human rights, this legal disposition had a clear political intent. Most 
perpetrators of crimes of the past were older than seventy. Therefore, should they be 
arrested, perpetrators of forced disappearance would never set a foot in jail – they could 
follow the legal process against them while watching television with their grandchildren 
in their living room. 
Congressmen viewed this legal initiative favourably, but transferred it to the 
Justice and Human Rights Commission in the Lower House for ‘analysis and study’ 
(Cámara de Diputados 2004). Five months later, in April 2004, the initiative was 
approved unanimously. Every congressman voted for this measure – including the 
eighty-eight PRD congressmen – although the SPO was investigating at the time the 
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disappearance of six hundred and sixty-two PRD members in the 1990s. Even more 
absurd was that within the PRD parliamentary group were congressmen Pablo Gómez 
and Salvador Martínez Della Roca, who had been victims of repression during the 
authoritarian regime. How could victims of repression promote ‘transitional justice’ and 
block it at the same time? I do not have an explanation for their behaviour. However, it 
is a variant of what McEvoy (2011) has referred to as ‘culture of quietism’: ‘not 
speaking out’ about significant events (e.g. the emergence of laws) that undermine 
human rights ‘is in fact a very meaningful act of language, an inherently active rather 
than a passive response’. Silence in such circumstances is a form of collusion (McEvoy 
2011: 369).  
The law was passed on to the Mexican Senate. The senators could have rejected 
this initiative, but did not. On April 28, 2004, the senators approved this reform to the 
penal code, again unanimously. Since then, perpetrators of past state crimes had nothing 
to be concerned about given that the Mexican Congress had granted them a de facto 
amnesty (Comité 68, et al. 2006: 50) – they would never go to prison for human rights 
abuses. 
(Ad hoc) military ‘transitional justice’: the role of the army 
When the SPO was created, President Fox ordered the armed forces to cooperate closely 
with the ‘transitional justice’ process. However, unsurprisingly, the Mexican military 
was ‘the institution that has shown the least willingness to collaborate with the Special 
Prosecutor’s Office’ (HRW 2006: 71). 
First, the armed forces were reluctant to testify before the SPO to what had 
occurred in the past. By carrying out the investigations on forced disappearances, the 
SPO should have requested the testimony of a great number of military personnel 
involved in them, but the SPO only subpoenaed five retired servicemen. These state 
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officials – unlike their victims – had a due process right to a fair hearing, and they opted 
to remain silent (Comité 68, et al. 2006: 35; HRW 2006: 84). 
Second, the Military were also hesitant to give information that might lead to the 
location of those who had disappeared. The members of the Argentine Team of Forensic 
Anthropologists, who briefly collaborated – unsuccessfully – with the SPO in 2003, so 
confirmed: ‘it would be very difficult to find the remains of victims without having 
direct witnesses who could point out precisely where investigators should dig’ (HRW 
2006: 85). 
Third, the Military refused to provide documentary evidence. The presidential 
decree through which the SPO was officially established instructed the ‘National 
Defence Minister to […] request the Military Prosecutor’s Office […] to provide the 
General Attorney, the information that it required’ in order to investigate and prosecute 
past state crimes (Poder Ejecutivo Federal 2001a). However, the Military did exactly the 
opposite: it withheld all information, and even denied that the events had ever taken 
place. As I showed in Chapter One, the armed forces disappeared dissidents by using 
‘death flights’. Dissidents were illegally imprisoned by military personnel at Military 
Camp Number One in Mexico City; then they were transferred to a military base in the 
state of Guerrero; and finally they were shot in the head and thrown into deep sea inside 
sacks filled with stones (Cedillo 2008). In spite of the available evidence about this 
terrifying process, the army denied everything (HRW 2006). According to the Ministry 
of Defence, ‘military prisons’ were never used to detain civilians, although they were 
used to detain ‘military personnel’ who had ‘infringed military discipline’ (HRW 2006: 
90); and the information on the death flights in the state of Guerrero never existed 
(Comité 68, et al. 2006: 19; Medellín 2004b). 
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But the history of how the armed forces blocked the ‘transitional justice’ process 
does not end here. Not only was the army unwilling to cooperate; it also undertook 
direct measures to block the process. Surprisingly, in September 2002, the Military 
Prosecutor’s Office accused three senior officers – Mario Arturo Acosta Chaparro, 
Francisco Quirós Hermosillo and Francisco Barquín – of participating in the death 
flights and the disappearance of one hundred and forty-three people (HRW 2003: 15). 
But, how could the armed forces accuse three of its members of being responsible for 
the atrocities they denied had occurred? What purpose could this denial serve? 
The first effect of this military trial was that it helped to legitimise the armed 
forces in the new democratic regime. This trial seemed to be a signal that the armed 
forces had changed: this was the first time that their participation in past human rights 
abuses was formally acknowledged; and all seemed to indicate that the armed forces 
would combat the impunity that they had enjoyed for decades. 
However, the trial was a farce, a result of another ‘political accident’ that had 
nothing to do with the ‘transitional justice’ process. Generals Acosta Chaparro and 
Quirós Hermosillo had been in prison since 2000, accused of drug trafficking (Reforma 
2000a), so they did not have to be arrested and then prosecuted on charges of forced 
disappearance – they were already serving sixteen- and fifteen-year sentences 
respectively (Aranda 2002a; Medellín 2004a). In fact, information on their participation 
in the death flights came to light accidentally while they were being investigated for 
drug trafficking (HRW 2006: 91). They were simply being ‘recycled’ through the 
‘justice process’. 
There were three additional issues that made this military trial a sham. The first 
related to the victims. The Military were being investigated for the disappearance of one 
hundred and forty-three people, but at least seven of them were still alive and their 
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location known (Barajas 2003).66 Thus, it is understandable that the activist Rosario 
Ibarra – whose son disappeared in the 1970s – considered this ad hoc military process 
‘suspicious’ (Castillo and Herrera 2002). She thought this was all a ‘ruse’: it was much 
easier and more convenient to say that the armed forces had thrown the bodies into the 
ocean than to investigate the real location of the disappeared – many of the disappeared 
had been seen alive in military prisons, said Rosario Ibarra (Castillo and Herrera 2002; 
Moon 2012).67
The second issue was related to the categorisation of what had occurred. How 
would the Military define a process in which the victim is illegally arrested, held 
incommunicado, tortured, illegally interrogated, transferred from one military prison to 
another, shot in the head and finally thrown into the ocean? The Military Prosecutor’s 
Office did not classify this process as a human rights violation, but as a criminal act – 
thus it accused the officers of ‘simple homicide’. Yet, for this crime the time allotted by 
the statute of limitations had already elapsed (Castillo and Herrera 2002; Medellín 
2004a). The Military Prosecutor’s Office granted these perpetrators a de facto amnesty 
(Fundación Diego Lucero, et al. 2005: 7). 
The third issue was related to a blatant conflict of interest. During the trial, the 
Military Prosecutor’s Office called various members of the armed forces as witnesses. 
One of the most important was General David Quintero Rocha, as he was stationed at 
Military Zone 27 in the state of Guerrero between 1977 and 1983 – during the years, 
and at the place, where the death flights took place. However, this witness was none 
other than one of the three judges of the Military Supreme Court in charge of hearing 
                                                 
66 Despite the evidence, the military court considered that the legal process would only take twenty-two 
cases into consideration. 
67 Since the late 1970s, Rosario Ibarra has followed the same strategy as las Madres de la Plaza de Mayo 
in Argentina, who have refused financial and memorial reparation from the state. According to las Madres 
de la Plaza de Mayo ‘the reappearance of those disappeared’ is the only acceptable form of repair: ‘bring 
them back alive’ (See Moon 2012). 
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this case – for this improvised military trial, this judge played the role of witness at the 
same time as hearing the case (Aranda 2003). 
In his role as witness, interrogated on the illegal detention, torture and murder of 
dissidents in the military facilities in the state of Guerrero, General Quintero Rocha 
responded: ‘I don’t remember’ (Aranda 2004). This is a good example of Cohen’s ‘Kurt 
Waldheim Syndrome’: the personal denial of publicly known past atrocities – ‘At the 
time, I didn’t know what was happening’; ‘I might have known at the time, but 
afterwards I forgot it all’; ‘I don’t remember’ (Cohen 2005: 125).68 But General 
Quintero Rocha was not the only person who suffered from this syndrome. Five other 
high ranking military officers were called to testify, but none of them remembered 
anything regarding the death flights: ‘we know nothing about it’, they said (Aranda 
2003). 
In the end, none of the three older officials was sentenced for their participation 
in the death flights. Major Barquín Alonso died of diabetes in 2005; General Quirós 
Hermosillo died of cancer in 2006 (Aranda 2006; Medellín 2005); and General Acosta 
Chaparro was released in 2006 after an order by a military judge. Thus, General Acosta 
Chaparro was able to recover his ‘emoluments and his General rank’ (Castillo 2007). 
Beyond the impunity that this military trial guaranteed the three officers, the 
case had three important political consequences for the Mexican transition. The first 
effect was that it blocked the investigations that the SPO was carrying out regarding 
members of the armed forces. Was it necessary to have two prosecutors – the Military 
and the SPO – working on the same issue at the same time?69 (Castillo and Herrera 
2002). If the Military were being investigated by the Military Prosecutor’s Office, they 
                                                 
68 Kurt Waldheim was the fourth Secretary General of the United Nations. His hidden complicity in Nazi 
war crimes was exposed in the 1980s. 
69 The one hundred and forty-three cases of forced disappearance investigated by the Military 
Prosecutor’s Office were taken from Recommendation 26/2001 that the SPO was investigating at the 
time. 
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would most certainly not be investigated by the SPO. And although the trial ended in 
acquittal, the SPO could not press charges against these officers because of the principle 
known as ‘double jeopardy’ – a person cannot be judged twice for the same crime 
(Academia Mexicana de Derechos Humanos 2003: 6). 
The second effect of this process was to confirm that the armed forces had 
enough power to neutralise the ‘transitional justice’ process. A widely known principle 
of human rights establishes that military courts should not prosecute or investigate 
human rights violations – so state authorities should transfer jurisdiction over human 
rights cases from military to civilian authorities (Fundación Diego Lucero, et al. 2005: 
6; HRW 2003: 16). However, in the new Mexican democracy, the army decided to 
ignore this elemental principle and investigate itself, and President Fox allowed this to 
happen; he could have ordered the army to transfer these investigations to the SPO, but 
he did not (Fundación Diego Lucero, et al. 2005: 10). 
The third political effect was related to the victims’ families. Cohen rightly notes 
that ‘perpetrators […] only pretend to forget’, but that ‘this hardly ever happens to 
victims’ (Cohen 2005: 131). However, in Mexico’s ‘transitional justice’ process, the 
victims had powerful reasons not to remember publicly what had occurred in the past. 
As part of its investigations, the Military Prosecutor’s Office installed an office in the 
state of Guerrero with the object of obtaining information about people disappeared by 
the army in that area (HRW 2006). Once there, the Military Prosecutor’s Office called 
the victims’ families to give evidence about what had occurred, but they were reluctant 
to talk to the army (Academia Mexicana de Derechos Humanos 2003: 6). According to 
HRW, there were three reasons for this. First, some were simply afraid of members of 
the armed forces: ‘How am I going to go to the Military Prosecutor’s Office when I’m 
denouncing an army general?’ Second, they could not believe in the army’s political 
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will to investigate past crimes: ‘they ignored us back then, why would it be different 
now?’ Third, they did not want to collaborate with the former perpetrators of 
disappearances: ‘they are the ones who took my husband away’ (HRW 2003: 18). 
The Military Prosecutor’s Office in the state of Guerrero also seriously affected 
the SPO’s job. As part of its investigative tasks, the SPO installed an office in the state 
of Guerrero. The result was that the victims and their families believed that the SPO and 
the Military Prosecutor’s Office were the same thing, hence their reluctance to 
collaborate with either. 
The army’s role in the ‘transitional justice’ process was aptly summarised by 
HRW: ‘The country [was] once again leaving the task of justice in the hands of the 
institution that carried out the crimes in the first place. It [was] perpetuating the old 
system in which those involved in public security are not bound by the rule of law’ 
(HRW 2006: 105). 
Results: the role of the courts 
Before being shut down in 2006, the SPO had initiated criminal investigations in seven 
hundred and ninety-seven cases of forced disappearance (OUNHCHR 2011). Some of 
these cases were investigated by the SPO through ‘Programme A’ – exclusively 
dedicated to the cases of disappearance of political dissidents in the 1970s. Most of the 
cases under investigation were related to the disappearance of members of the 
Revolutionary Democratic Party (PRD) in the 1990s and were thus addressed through 
‘Programme C’. 
As I mentioned earlier, the SPO could have initiated criminal investigations of 
all these cases using two different legal terms: forced disappearance or illegal 
abduction. The former was a human rights category which had only existed in Mexico 
since 2002 and could not be used retroactively because of the interpretive declaration 
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imposed by President Fox and ratified by the Senate. The latter, although it was not a 
human rights category, was included in the Mexican penal code, but the period allotted 
by the statute of limitations for this crime had run. Even though the reasons for this 
decision were never made public, the Special Prosecutor chose to support his criminal 
investigations into the concept of illegal abduction (HRW 2006: 100). In so doing, the 
SPO had to convince judges that the statute of limitations for illegal abduction cases did 
not began to run out so long as the victim remained missing. Hence the obvious irony: 
Mexican ‘transitional justice’ was run by an institution that should have investigated 
human rights violations – but this same institution was incapable of using a human 
rights violation category. 
In the end, as Acosta and Ennelin (2006: 106) said, ‘the SPO […] had to fight 
against the Mexican justice system, notorious for its long history of corruption and 
incompetence’. In more than five years of existence, the SPO was able to file charges in 
only fifteen of the seven hundred and ninety-seven cases. It obtained arrest warrants for 
twelve former officials, but only six were arrested. One of them was Miguel Nazar Haro 
– feared former director of the secret police (DFS). He was arrested in 2004, but 
because he was older than seventy years, he was set free and placed under house arrest. 
Nazar Haro was thus the first beneficiary of the recently established reform to the penal 
code, which, inspired by the language of human rights, allowed elderly criminals to stay 
at home. Although the law came into force three months after Nazar Haro was arrested, 
the judges agreed that the law should be applied at once and retroactively – respecting 
the human rights of the elderly and those in prison seemed to be an urgent issue. 
In November 2002, just one year after the SPO was established, President Fox 
said it was ‘very likely that most of those responsible will not go to jail, because we 
have already gone through all legal provisions to indict them for past crimes’ (Reforma 
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2002). And Fox’s statement proved right. Until its closure, the SPO did not obtain a 
single criminal conviction for forced disappearance (ICTJ 2008; OUNHCHR 2011). 
Mexican genocide 
As previously explained, the SPO was not created by the Fox administration to 
investigate the murder of dissident students in 1968 and 1971. These fateful events 
became a part of the ‘transitional justice’ process once the SPO was already running. 
Even so, the criminal investigations ended in impunity. 
Aggravated homicide, crimes against humanity, or genocide? 
What human rights category could best capture what occurred in 1968 and 1971? 
According to HRW, an option was to press charges for ‘aggravated homicide’: ‘there is 
no question that the killings fit the definition of this crime’ (HRW 2006: 97). However, 
the concept of ‘aggravated homicide’ is not a human rights category; the term has 
existed in the Mexican penal code for years. Once more, the SPO was an institution 
allegedly in charge of prosecuting human rights violations, but because of its context it 
could only prosecute ‘normal’ crimes (Comité 68, et al. 2006: 20). 
The problem with the concept of ‘aggravated homicide’ was that, according to 
the law that applied when the events took place, the statute of limitations for this crime 
was thirty years. Thus the time allowed by the statute of limitations had elapsed. 
Was there another way of investigating the killing of students in 1968 and 1971? 
Several human rights organisations came up with an idea: the SPO should use the 
concept of ‘crimes against humanity’ (Comité 68, et al. 2006; Fundación Diego Lucero, 
et al. 2005; HRW 2003). According to HRW, for instance, as the murder, torture, 
executions and illegal abductions ‘appear to have been carried out in a widespread and 
systematic way by state agents, they almost certainly [could be treated as] “crimes 
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against humanity,” as defined in international law’ (HRW 2003: 23; ICC 2002).70 In 
addition, as crimes against humanity are deemed to be part of jus cogens, the Mexican 
government was supposed to accept that no derogation is ever permitted for these 
crimes. 
However, the SPO ignored this legal strategy. The reasons why it did not use the 
concept of crimes against humanity are unknown (HRW 2006). According to HRW, a 
possible explanation is related to the setbacks of the Mexican legal system: 
 [I]f the ‘crimes against humanity’ option makes good sense from an international law 
perspective, it would have represented a major new development for Mexican criminal 
law […]. Making this case to judges who are generally unversed in international law 
would have been a difficult task (HRW 2006: 98). 
 
If the SPO decided not to use the figure of ‘aggravated homicide’ nor ‘crimes 
against humanity’ for fear of ‘failing’ within Mexican ‘legal complex’, it is perplexing 
that it chose to deploy the category of ‘genocide’.71
The idea that what had occurred in 1968 and 1971 constituted genocide was not 
new, nor was it a crazy idea of the Special Prosecutor. As I mentioned earlier in this 
chapter, since at least 1998 human rights organisations and victims’ families had 
requested the General Attorney’s Office to investigate the murder of the students at 
Tlatelolco as a case of genocide (Aranda 2002b). Thus the use of the term genocide in 
the Mexican ‘transitional justice’ process did not come out of the blue – it had 
circulated since at least 1998 and was shared among victims, and by the human rights 
community in Mexico (Comité 68, et al. 2006: 10). 
                                                 
70 According to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, ‘crimes against humanity means 
any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against 
any civilian population […]: (a) Murder; […] (e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical 
liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law; (f) Torture […]’ (ICC 2002). 
71 The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide defines genocide as any 
of a number of acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or 
religious group, e.g. killing members of a group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of a 
group; or deliberately inflicting on a group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical 
destruction in whole or in part (UN General Assembly 1948). 
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But the idea of genocide became much more important as a result of yet another 
‘political accident’ that was completely unrelated to the process of ‘transitional justice’: 
the arrest and extradition of the Argentinean former military Ricardo Miguel Cavallo.  
Ricardo Miguel Cavallo – also known as Marcelo or Serpico – was a member of 
the intelligence group of Argentina’s notorious Mechanic School of the Armed Forces 
(ESMA) in 1976, in whose headquarters at least five thousand people were tortured 
after the coup d’état that imposed a military junta under the leadership of Jorge Videla 
between 1976 and 1982. In 1983, Cavallo was investigated for genocide, homicide and 
forced disappearance, but benefited from the ‘Full Stop Law’ promoted by the new 
democratic government in Argentina (Castro 2008). 
In 1990, Cavallo retired from the Argentine Armed Forces and became a 
businessman. He joined TALSUD, an Intel company that developed electronic driving 
licences in Argentina, in 1994 (O’Donnell 2000). In 1999, TALSUD was such a 
successful company that its operations expanded to Mexico. There, the company won a 
public bid to provide the National Vehicle Registration (RENAVE in Spanish) service, 
a public database that allowed the government to follow a vehicle’s status from leaving 
a plant to when it was no longer roadworthy. RENAVE depended on the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industrial Promotion. It had been created by President Ernesto Zedillo 
(1994–2000) in order to curb the increasing theft of vehicles in Mexico. Ricardo 
Cavallo moved to Mexico City and took over as Director of RENAVE. The former 
Argentine torturer would help to reduce crime in Mexico. 
In his position as RENAVE’s Director, Cavallo was inevitably under the 
spotlight – understandably, he was endlessly interviewed by Mexican media on the 
recently created institution that sought to limit the theft of cars in the country, a business 
that generated more than three hundred million dollars a year (Flores 2000a). On 
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August 22, 2000 – a few weeks after Vicente Fox’s electoral triumph – some of 
Cavallo’s victims who resided in Mexico recognised him on television. The victims 
contacted Reforma and asked the newspaper to initiate a journalistic investigation on 
Cavallo’s past (Ekaizer 2003). 
On August 23, Reforma contacted Cavallo. ‘Are you this person?’ the journalist 
asked. ‘He looks very much like me, I can’t deny it’, Cavallo answered (Flores 2000b). 
However, Cavallo assured the journalist that it was all a mistake, and he had nothing to 
do with the man in the photographs who was wearing a military uniform. His only 
contact with the army happened when he performed his military service as a young man 
(Flores 2000a). 
The next day, Reforma revealed on its first page that the successful businessman 
in charge of RENAVE, Ricardo Miguel Cavallo, had a striking resemblance to an 
Argentine former military who was investigated in Spain by Judge Baltasar Garzón for 
car theft in Argentina, falsification of documents, terrorism, torture and genocide (Vales 
2000). In response, Cavallo denied all accusations and invoked a conspiracy theory: 
‘this project – i.e. the RENAVE – has enemies and I am in awe at how far they can go’ 
(Flores 2000a). He maintained that the accusations against him were false and 
detrimental to the institution where he worked. The Mexican Minister of Commerce, 
Herminio Blanco, also came to his defence: ‘that grand journalistic investigation’ 
against Cavallo, he said, ‘proves that we have touched upon personal interests, such as 
car theft’ (Reforma 2000b). Car thieves were the real issue. 
Offended by the accusations of the press, Cavallo proposed a trip to Argentina to 
obtain the necessary documentation to prove his identity and clear his reputation: ‘I 
have taken the immediate decision to return to my country, to personally gather all those 
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documents that describe and prove my always law-abiding personality’, Cavallo said to 
the press (Cavallo 2000). Cavallo travelled to Buenos Aires the same day. 
Cavallo was in part correct. Although he had worked at Latin America’s largest 
torture centre, there was no warrant for his arrest in any country – not in Spain, Mexico 
or Argentina. He was a free man and, legally speaking, innocent. Cavallo could thus 
take his flight without any worry. His plan was working without a hitch: he would 
arrive in Argentina in a few hours where he would be protected by the amnesty laws. 
The Mexican federal police and Interpol quickly came up with an idea: to arrest 
Cavallo for alleged falsification of documents. The accusation was preposterous and 
unsustainable, but would prevent his escape and, more crucially, give any country 
interested in issuing a warrant for his arrest a little more time. Cavallo’s airplane made a 
brief stop in the Mexican city of Cancun, where he was arrested for carrying false 
documentation, and transferred to Interpol’s offices in Mexico City. However, if in 
forty-eight hours Interpol did not receive an international warrant for his arrest, Cavallo 
would be set free. 
The next day, victims of the dictatorship in Argentina impatiently awaited Judge 
Baltasar Garzón – whom they had contacted in 1996 – to request Cavallo’s extradition. 
If the request was not made in a few hours, Cavallo would be set free. But Garzón was 
on vacation in Costa Rica (Ekaizer 2003; Gasparini 2000), so the victims had to 
convince Spanish judge Guillermo Ruiz Polanco – who was unaware of the case – to 
request the Mexican government to keep Cavallo under arrest until an extradition order 
was processed (Acosta and Ennelin 2006: 98). It was not until September 12, 2000, that 
judge Garzón was able to make an official request for the extradition of Cavallo for 
terrorism and genocide. 
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Four months later, in January 2001, a Mexican judge ordered Cavallo to be 
extradited to Spain, but Cavallo appealed the verdict and the case reached the Mexican 
Supreme Court of Justice. ‘Don’t you realize I am another person? […] Why is 
everyone bent on taking me twenty years back, as if I were a dummy mounted on a time 
machine?’ Cavallo asked (Pérez Andrade 2001). Two and a half years later, the 
Mexican Supreme Court of Justice confirmed the judge’s decision and authorised 
Cavallo’s extradition to face trial for terrorism and genocide. Cavallo was sent to Spain 
in June 2003. 
The story of Cavallo’s extradition is important because it had an impact on the 
‘transitional justice’ process. Mexico became the first Latin American country to allow 
the extradition of someone for gross violations of human rights. According to the 
Mexican Foreign Minister, Cavallo’s arrest and extradition showed ‘the government’s 
commitment to human rights in our country and in all the world’ (Castañeda 2001a). 
The Cavallo case was also crucial because it helped legitimise the SPO’s legal strategy. 
For the Special Prosecutor, Ignacio Carrillo Prieto, the assassination of students in 1968 
and 1971 constituted genocide because ‘genocide implies the homicidal repression 
against a national group. The Court said in the Cavallo case that genocide implies the 
extermination of a national group, like the students and dissidents in Argentina, who 
opposed the dictatorship’ (Castillo 2003). From Carrillo Prieto’s perspective, if judge 
Baltasar Garzón pressed charges against Cavallo for genocide, why not do the same in 
Mexico against state agents in the PRI era? ‘Let the image of genocide go beyond 
Auschwitz’, Carrillo Prieto vehemently declared to the press (Castillo 2003). 
The problem with the Special Prosecutor’s sophisticated syllogisms is that they 
did not correspond with what the Mexican judges had said in the Cavallo case. The 
Mexican Supreme Court of Justice allowed Cavallo’s extradition, but never addressed 
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the underlying issue of whether genocide could be committed against a political group 
(Acosta and Ennelin 2006: 99). The Mexican judge who received and allowed the 
extradition request did not address the question of whether a political group can be the 
victim of genocide or not. The judge only evaluated whether Spain’s extradition request 
had been carried out in adherence to Mexico and Spain’s bilateral extradition treaty 
(HRW 2006: 96). Thus, Carrillo Prieto never understood – or made us think he never 
understood – the judges’ arguments and this misunderstanding led to the ‘failure’ of his 
legal strategy based on genocide. 
The idea of prosecuting state agents of the PRI era for genocide was severely 
criticised from the beginning. Yet, a year after Cavallo’s extradition, in June 2004, the 
SPO charged eleven people involved with the massacre of twenty-five students in 1971 
with genocide (PGR 2002a). Over more than nine thousand pages, the SPO elaborated 
convoluted legal arguments to support this controversial case, which can be summarised 
as follows.  
First, the SPO defined what a group is because in order for it to be possible ‘to 
destroy a group […] such [a] group must, necessarily and previously, exist’ (PGR 
2002a: 8708). ‘Obviously’, the Special Prosecutor clarified, a group refers to ‘a group 
of humans’ (PGR 2002a: 8708). 
Second, since the Convention against genocide did not include political groups, 
the SPO desperately tried to classify the twenty-five assassinated students as a ‘national 
group’. Paraphrasing the nineteen-century French philosopher, Ernest Renán, the SPO 
pointed out that a national group is one that is formed by people who share ‘a complex 
of material and spiritual links’ like the Mayas in Mexico, or the Welsh, the Scottish and 
the British: ‘three different nations’ within Great Britain (PGR 2002a: 8711). Following 
this reasoning, the SPO considered that the students were a national group because they 
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were a group of people who shared something in common: they were dissidents (!). 
Therefore, the SPO concluded, the assassination of twenty-five students constituted 
genocide because: the state ‘committed acts’ with the purpose of ‘destroying, 
completely or partially, a Mexican national group’; the group was ‘clearly identified’ as 
the ‘Mexican student community’; and the group ‘shared a common political ideology’: 
all the students were ‘dissidents’ (PGR 2002a: 8719). 
I now examine how this legal strategy – the genocide cases – led to impunity. 
But before embarking on that analysis, it is worth noting that the story of how the SPO 
defined the killing of students protestors in 1968 and 1971 is relevant because it shows 
– again – that transitional justice is not ‘intrinsic’ or ‘necessary’ – as the first and 
second clusters of literature on transitional justice claim. These cases confirm that 
transitional justice ideas and practices – e.g. the idea that the killing of students 
constituted genocide – are created and transformed within a particular historical setting. 
The genocide cases in Mexico’s ‘transitional justice’ process resulted from different 
‘political accidents’, and political negotiations. 
The story of these cases is also relevant because it renders visible the role played 
by the language of human rights as a means through which power is exercised – a role 
that is often ignored by scholars whose work comprises the first and second clusters of 
literature on transitional justice who characterise transitional justice as something that is 
based on moral, legal, universal, neutral and depoliticised imperatives that states are 
obliged to follow. However, the Tlatelolco and Corpus Christi massacres confirm what 
Moon suggests in her reflection on the criminological study of genocide: that the events 
that international law attempts to describe and regulate are not taking place beyond but 
within politics (Moon 2011). Through the language of human rights, the SPO was re-
reading and re-writing the past – the events that took place in 1968 and 1971 – in order 
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to satisfy contemporary political demands. And the ‘conditional re-reading of the events 
of the past’, as Scott Veitch puts it, ‘requires a determinedly political assessment of the 
legal response’. So ‘the legal truth, always at one remove from a “factual” truth, is here 
further displaced in the production of a legal memory that sees process indistinguishable 
from outcome’ (Veitch 2001: 42). 
Stretching the law (again): the role of the Congress 
Another human rights international instrument ratified by Vicente Fox which seemed 
crucial in the ‘transitional justice’ process was the Convention on the Non-Applicability 
of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity. This Convention 
had been signed on July 3, 1969, but was never ratified by the PRI regime. The Fox 
administration ratified the Convention on March 15, 2002 – just a month after ratifying 
the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons (UN Treaty 
Collection 2012). 
The press registered this event as an additional sign that the new regime was 
completely committed to democracy and human rights. According to the newspaper 
Reforma, gross violations of human rights – such as assassinations, exterminations, 
submission, slavery, deportation, and persecution for political, racial or religious 
reasons committed against any civilian population – would never cease in Mexico 
(Reforma 2001b). The Convention would help address the overused government legal 
reasoning that human rights abuses expire after a certain number of years. Additionally, 
the press reported that by ratifying this Convention, senators ‘sought to deter the 
commission of such conducts’ in the future (Reforma 2001b). 
However, as with the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of 
Persons, the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War 
Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity was useless from the beginning. President Fox 
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sent the Convention to the Senate for ratification, but he proposed to add an 
interpretative declaration which rendered it harmless. 
The ‘interpretative declaration’ imposed by Fox sought to abolish the 
Convention’s temporary dimension – it sought to neutralise the Convention’s essence. It 
was no surprise that Article I of the Convention on the non-applicability of statutory 
limitations established that statutory limitations do not apply to crimes against humanity 
‘irrespective of the date of their commission’ (UN General Assembly 2012).72 In 
addition, article IV states that countries have to ‘undertake to adopt […] any legislative 
or other measures necessary to ensure that statutory or other limitations shall not apply 
to the prosecution and punishment of the crimes […] and that, where they exist, such 
limitations shall be abolished’ (UN General Assembly 2012). However, absurd as it 
sounds, the Convention would be acceptable to the Fox administration ‘on the 
understanding that it will consider statutory limitations non-applicable only to crimes 
[…] which are committed after the entry into effect of the Convention’ – that is, from 
March 2002 onwards (SRE 2012; UN Treaty Collection 2012). 
Once more, the Mexican Senate could have ignored the legal trap added to the 
Convention by President Fox. Had the interpretive declaration been rejected, the SPO 
could have prosecuted those guilty by pressing charges for illegal abduction, aggravated 
homicide, or crimes against humanity without fearing that the court would argue that 
the time allotted by the statute of limitations for these crimes has elapsed. However, the 
Mexican Senate approved unanimously the interpretive declaration which rendered the 
Convention useless. 
                                                 
72 The Convention refers to war crimes and crimes against humanity, whether committed in time of war 
or in time of peace. 
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The PRI senators, understandably, gladly accepted the legal trap. Less 
understandable is that the PAN did so as well. For example, Víctor Manuel Torres 
Herrera from PAN supported the Convention’s ratification: 
War crimes and crimes against humanity go against […] a person’s dignity, against the 
community’s harmonic life, they undermine social structures, constitute the most abject 
expression of the obtuseness of power and they close off all hope for a certain and 
happy future for our descendants […]. [Therefore], the National Action Party could not 
agree more with this opinion, so we do not doubt to vote in its favour (Senado de la 
República 2001). 
 
However, simultaneously, Senator Torres Herrera defended ‘the interpretive 
declaration’ arguing that it was ‘a clear example of the reconciliation spirit and the 
Mexican Executive’s sense of justice’ (Senado de la República 2001). Another PAN 
Senator, Jorge Zermeño, also supported the Convention’s ratification: in the new 
Mexican democratic regime it is not possible to continue to have laws that allow the 
expiration of ‘barbaric acts […] repugnant and grotesque’ committed in the past, he 
declared to the press (Reforma 2001b). But then he – like the rest of his colleagues – 
voted in favour of the legal traps that allowed these crimes to expire. How could the 
PAN agree, at the same time, with a human rights treaty and the chicanery that annuls 
it? What happened in Mexico is a good example of what Veitch meant when he claimed 
that ‘in the process of transition and coming to terms with the past, law and legal 
institutions afford an elasticity that challenges a reading of law – and arguably the rule 
of law – to a novel demand of justice corresponding to the perceived needs of the 
transitional period’ (Veitch 2001: 42). The effect of the ‘interpretative declaration’ was 
that the statutory limitations to gross violations of human rights perpetrated in the past 
would continue to apply as if the Convention did not exist. The irony here is evident. To 
demonstrate its commitment to human rights, those recently elected in the executive and 
legislative branches ratified an international treaty which was essential to ‘transitional 
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justice’ since it made it possible to prosecute crimes of the past – but those same 
authorities made this treaty applicable only in the future. 
Results: the role of the courts 
On Thursday July 22, 2004, the SPO charged former president Luis Echeverría and 
another ten top aides and high-ranking military officials with ‘genocide’ for the killing 
of twenty-five protesters on June 10, 1971, in Mexico City (Castillo and Méndez 2004). 
Questioned by a reporter on whether he had a solid case, the Special Prosecutor 
answered: ‘I have many flaws. I am a half-wit, but not completely stupid’ (Gutiérrez 
Vega 2006). 
The case received immediate support from experts and human rights 
organisations. International human rights activists, such as Daniel Wilkinson of HRW, 
celebrated the indictments as ‘achieving the unthinkable’ (Thompson and Weiner 
2004b). Relatives of the protestors killed in 1971, such as Jesús Martín del Campo, 
called the indictments ‘a small, but important step’. ‘So many governments had told us 
this case was closed. At least now we are a little closer to justice’ (Thompson and 
Weiner 2004b). Former president Echeverría, at that time eighty-two, was the first 
president ever charged with a crime in Mexico. 
Amid rumours that Echeverría had fled the country in order to escape justice, 
journalists began a search. But he was at home. ‘I am at peace’, he told to the 
journalists, because ‘there had never been genocide in Mexico’ (Thompson and Weiner 
2004b). 
The next day, Friday July 23, 2004, the Judge and his team began to analyse 
thirteen volumes of evidence and legal arguments that the SPO had meticulously put 
together over almost two years. Only twenty-four hours later, after allegedly revising 
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more than nine thousand pages of evidence, the judge determined that what had 
occurred on June 10, 1971, did not constitute ‘genocide’. 
The judge argued that, according to the evidence provided by the SPO, the 
killing of students was a case of ‘simple homicide’ (not aggravated homicide nor a 
crime against humanity). However, the time allotted by the statute of limitations for 
‘simple homicide’ cases had run out. So the court refused to grant arrest warrants 
(Méndez and Castillo 2004). 
But the Special Prosecutor insisted that his legal arguments were right – 
Echeverría and members of his administration perpetrated genocide. What happened in 
the court, Carillo Prieto claimed, was that the judge did not ‘adequately weigh each and 
every one of the elements’ of the nine thousand pages of evidence and testimony he had 
presented (Thompson and Weiner 2004a). But Juan Velázquez, Echeverría’s lawyer, 
had a different opinion. According to him, ‘in Mexico, there has never been genocide 
[…]. There have been clashes, deaths, but never genocide, as a policy of the state’. ‘In 
my thirty-five years in as a lawyer, in all my political cases’, Velazquez said with a 
certain irony, ‘this one is the easiest of them all. It is doomed to fail’ (Thompson and 
Weiner 2004a). 
Sure of its legal arguments, the SPO filed an appeal, which eventually reached 
the Supreme Court. A year later, in June 2005, the Supreme Court reached the decision 
that the statute of limitations had been reached for ten of the twelve accused (Aranda 
2005). These ten perpetrators would never be held responsible for their actions. The 
situation of former President Echeverría and his former Prime Minister, Mario Moya, 
was very different: the Supreme Court determined that the time allotted for the statute of 
limitations had not expired because they had enjoyed legal immunity during their 
administration (from 1970 to 1976). For them, the thirty-year period allowed for 
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prosecution would terminate in 2006. Therefore, the Supreme Court returned the case to 
trial court for it to determine if the charges pressed by the SPO against the former 
president and his former minister were sufficiently founded to proceed to trial (Aranda 
2005). 
A month later, on July 27, the judge determined that the SPO had been unable to 
prove that the assassination of students in 1971 constituted genocide, and closed the 
case (Méndez Ortiz 2005a). According to the judge, a group of students cannot be 
considered a national group just because its members studied in the same school or just 
because they were dissidents. This ruling was not subject to appeal. 
After this predictable defeat, the genocide strategy was criticised even more. 
However, the Special Prosecutor did not wish to change his legal strategy – the 
assassination of students would be a genocide case or none at all. Furthermore, the 
Special Prosecutor counterattacked his detractors. The problem was not in his legal 
arguments, but because there was a conspiracy against him. According to Carrillo 
Prieto, ‘everything is subject to this plan’s matrix’: ‘we are going to disqualify this poor 
man who is the Special Prosecutor, in order to say he is an asshole’ (Gutiérrez Vega 
2006). Given that the media played a relevant role in this plan against him, the Special 
Prosecutor warned them: ‘let the media assume their responsibility: either they’re with 
the cover-up or they’re with this Office’ (Gutiérrez Vega 2006). Between May 31, 2005, 
and May 25, 2006, the SPO paid more than one hundred thousand pounds (two and a 
half million pesos) in press releases in Mexican newspapers against activists, 
academics, experts and journalists who criticised his strategy (Aguayo and Trevino-
Rangel 2006a).73
                                                 
73 I have the honour of being attacked by the Special Prosecutor through the press (twice). In light of this 
event, I began to research how many press releases he had paid for and how much they cost. This 
information has been analysed in Chapter Two of this thesis. 
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The Special Prosecutor also embarked on a smearing campaign against the 
judges. According to the Special Prosecutor, the problem was not his legal strategy but 
the courts: ‘mechanisms that sound old, that rattle like junk, like jalopies’ (Gutiérrez 
Vega 2006). Questioned on the role played by the judicial power, the Special Prosecutor 
answered: ‘The Judicial Power can have judges so stupid that they sympathise with the 
perpetrators’ (Gutiérrez Vega 2006). 
Even so, he used the same strategy to address the case of the assassination of 
students in 1968. On September 19, 2005, after three years of investigation, through 
thirty-six tomes (thirty-four thousand pages), the SPO pressed charges of genocide 
against former President Luis Echeverría and six other state agents (Méndez Ortiz 
2005c). Two days later, the judge rejected the charges, using different – and 
contradictory – legal arguments. In the case of former President Echeverría, the judges 
argued that there was insufficient evidence to prove that what had occurred in 1968 had 
been genocide (Méndez Ortiz 2005b). In contrast, for the seven other state agents, the 
judge considered that what had occurred in 1968 had indeed been genocide, but 
considered that the period allowed for prosecution by the statute of limitations had run. 
How could the same judge determine that the same event was and was not genocide at 
the same time? This remains a mystery – the point is that the eight accused by the SPO 
were innocent according to the law. 
Understandably, the SPO appealed the ruling, but this time the Supreme Court 
declined to review the appeal, which was then reconsidered by a lower court. The case 
was accepted again and travelled through the labyrinths of Mexican justice for four 
more years. 
The case came to an end on March 26, 2009. That day the judges determined 
that former President Echeverría was innocent. This time, the judges used a completely 
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different argument to set him free: what occurred on October 2, 1968, did constitute 
genocide, the period allowed for prosecution by the statute of limitations had not run 
yet, but they found insufficient evidence to prove that Echeverría had been involved in 
the assassination of students. At the end, no one was held responsible for genocide, 
simple homicide, aggravated homicide or crimes against humanity. 
‘What are the Prosecution’s pending issues?’, a journalist asked the Special 
Prosecutor in June 2006. ‘We are only getting started. If you are keeping track we have 
processed the case of 1968 and 1971 [but] we still have about two hundred cases left. So 
you are not going to say goodbye to the SPO for a long time’, Carrillo Prieto replied 
confidently (Gutiérrez Vega 2006). However, only five months later President Fox 
ordered that the SPO should be closed. 
‘Transitional justice’ and its effects in the process of democratisation 
By following a retributive sense of justice to come to terms with the past, Fox’s 
government helped to legitimise (indeed, protect) key political institutions that were still 
working under authoritarian premises. One example is that of the courts, which 
tolerated the perpetration of human rights violations during the PRI era. Although no 
court accepted the SPO’s prosecutorial strategies on forced disappearance or genocide, 
the tainted past of the courts was cleansed as their rulings were according to the 
Constitution. In a country where the law was constantly bypassed during the 
authoritarian era, the fact that the process of ‘transitional justice’ followed the rule of 
law was an indication that things had changed with the arrival of democracy. The 
‘transitional justice’ process helped to improve the image of the justice system, which 
seemed no longer to be subordinated to the president as it was during the PRI era. 
Although the courts did not send a single perpetrator to jail, ‘the judicial branch has 
been strengthened, something that is always of the greatest importance’, said the 
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Mexican historian Enrique Krauze (2004) to The New York Times. ‘The wide publicity 
that the events [the court’s rulings on the genocide cases] received’, he argued, was an 
‘achievement’ – ‘fruit of the freedom of expression that didn’t exist’ in the PRI era 
(Krauze 2004). 
Another example of how the SPO helped to legitimise key institutions is that of 
the General Attorney’s Office. Before the change of regime, the General Attorney’s 
Office failed to investigate the whereabouts of the disappeared. Nor did it do anything 
to prevent, investigate, or punish other type of abuses (e.g., torture) perpetrated by the 
security forces against dissidents. In fact, as examined in Chapter One, the Public 
Prosecutor’s Office’s agents participated in atrocity: they oppressed political dissidents 
with measures that induced fear (phone taps, death threats) and were responsible for 
other types of human rights violations (illegal searches, arbitrary arrest, kidnappings). 
However, during Fox’s administration, not a single tainted official working in this state 
office was exposed or dismissed; nor was the role of this institution in the commission 
of abuses assessed. On the contrary, it was the very same General Attorney’s Office – 
via the SPO – the institution in charge of investigating and prosecuting past state 
crimes. The SPO depended on the General Attorney’s Office. That is, Fox left the duty 
to investigate past abuses in the hands of the institution that turned a blind eye to such 
abuses in the past. 
The Military also benefited from the creation of the SPO. Only three army 
generals were prosecuted – Acosta Chaparro, Quirós Hermosillo, and Barquín – but 
they were already in prison for drug trafficking. In addition, the Military were allowed 
to investigate (and punish) themselves. An essential principle of human rights states that 
military courts should not prosecute human rights abuses – therefore, Vicente Fox was 
supposed to transfer jurisdiction over human rights cases from military to civilian 
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authorities, but he did not. As a result, the trial of the Military obstructed the 
investigations that the SPO was conducting about members of the armed forces. If the 
Military were being investigated by the Military Prosecutor’s Office, they would not be 
investigated by the SPO. 
Beyond legitimising key institutions and tainted officials who were then 
incorporated into the new democratic regime, the SPO had other political effects. The 
SPO served to attract and control other ‘transitional justice’ practices. For example, the 
SPO absorbed the investigation of the student massacre in 1968 – an investigation 
which had existed since 1998. The same occurred with the killing of students in 1971, 
which was originally investigated by Mexico City’s District Attorney. As Human 
Rights Watch (HRW) (2006: 70) put it, the ‘creation of a “special” entity [the SPO] 
may have merely made it easier for the “regular” institutions of the justice sector to 
continue to duck their responsibility – leaving it to the new office to do what they 
should have been doing all along, and to take the blame for its failure to produce more 
substantial results’. 
However, the SPO not only attracted and controlled investigations about past 
state crimes which already existed, but for more than five years it also helped to block 
any other transitional justice effort. For example, the victims of abuses could not take 
their cases to the International Criminal Court or the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights as these are courts of last resort. These courts cannot act if a case is investigated 
or prosecuted by a national judicial system. Therefore, the victims had to go to the SPO 
first and wait for years before taking their cases to international courts. Thus, the SPO 
served, paradoxically, as an obstacle to justice. 
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Conclusions 
In 2003, Argentina’s President, Néstor Kirchner, rescinded the laws of Due Obedience 
and Full Stop. This allowed forty-six former repressors to be taken to justice in 
Argentina. Meanwhile, Miguel Cavallo was still being tried in Spain. In 2008, Cavallo 
was extradited to Argentina and his trial extended until October 2011. Then, the court 
sentenced him to life imprisonment, along with ten other former servicemen, for crimes 
against humanity committed during the military dictatorship (Goni 2011). 
In Mexico, in contrast, President Fox closed down the SPO on the last day of his 
administration, November 30, 2006. It had not obtained a single criminal conviction. It 
was capable of determining the whereabouts of only six people (out of more than six 
hundred cases under investigation). Two of them were killed while in detention. The 
other four had the same fate as Carlos Francisco Castañeda de la Fuente: they were 
committed to psychiatric hospitals (HRW 2006: 83). 
As this chapter showed, even if the ‘transitional justice’ process did not obtain 
truth or justice, it brought about important consequences for the Fox administration. It 
contributed to the reincorporation and empowerment of the military forces within the 
new system; it helped to improve the image of the justice system, which seemed no 
longer to be subordinated to the President as it was during the PRI era; it granted a de 
facto amnesty to former perpetrators; it blocked other transitional justice efforts; it 
strengthened the Fox administration’s legitimacy by being seemingly committed to 
human rights; and it preserved the fragile democracy’s political stability. 
This chapter showed how the many factors that led to the establishment of this 
particular version of ‘transitional justice’ in Mexico – analysed in Chapters Three and 
Four – restricted its development and results. From the outset Mexican ‘transitional 
justice’ had the same logic: comply with demands to face the past, without disturbing 
the PRI elites.  
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Particularly, throughout this chapter I showed that Mexican ‘transitional justice’ 
was affected by continuous political negotiations between different actors that 
participated in the process (e.g. members of the PRI era; Fox, his strategists and his 
party; left-wing political parties, human rights organisations; and former victims of 
repression). I also showed that the language of human rights played a crucial role in the 
‘transitional justice’ process. This language led to the ‘transitional justice’ process that 
evolved through the existing structures of power – laws and institutions that kept 
working under authoritarian premises. Additionally, it was a rhetoric that served to 
justify – a priori or a posteriori – political decisions that seemed always to benefit 
former perpetrators. 
The language of human rights also served to legitimise whatever resulted from 
this particular ‘transitional justice’ process – even the de facto exoneration of 
perpetrators was justified, as the application of the law is independent of its outcome. 
Thus, paradoxically, the language of human rights on which transitional justice is 
founded can be a useful tool to expose past abuses of power, but equally, as 
demonstrated in this case, can serve to legitimise such abuses. 
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Conclusions 
 
Background 
This thesis has explored how President Vicente Fox faced past state crimes perpetrated 
during the Institutional Revolutionary Party’s seventy-year authoritarian regime through 
a Special Prosecutor’s Office (SPO). As the SPO has been ignored as a topic of 
academic enquiry, I began this thesis by explaining why Mexico was an auspicious 
scenario for the emergence of ‘transitional justice’ in the first place. I showed that the 
PRI era survived for decades because the one-party state limited political pluralism 
(opposition political parties were insignificant until the 1980s), and articulated and 
restricted social demands through worker and peasant unions controlled by the official 
party; and the centralisation of power in the presidency allowed for the manipulation of 
the mass media, the co-opting of political dissidents, and pervasive corruption. Finally, 
and crucially, I demonstrated that the authoritarian regime harshly repressed its 
enemies. The violation of human rights was not an unusual practice carried out by a few 
bad apples in the police, the secret police, or the army. Kidnappings, torture, 
assassinations, forced disappearances, and other abuses were part of an official policy in 
which a multiplicity of institutions and state agents were involved, e.g., paramilitary 
groups and the health system. Already in 1997, Ernesto Zedillo’s administration (1994–
2000) was responsible for killing forty-five men, toddlers, and women (five of them 
pregnant) in Acteal, an impoverished Mayan Indian community in the state of Chiapas. 
In Chapter One I explained how the triumph of Vicente Fox’s conservative 
National Action Party (PAN) in 2000 was a significant step in the process of 
democratisation. The 2000 presidential election was the conclusion of a protracted 
process of political openness, the culmination of the steady liberalisation of the 
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authoritarian system. However, as I showed, in the government’s official discourse and 
for many observers, Fox’s electoral triumph was not the end of the democratisation 
process, but rather the juncture from which a series of political reforms could be 
implemented to consolidate a democratic regime in Mexico, e.g., the transformation of 
the police and the tax system reform. Hence the PAN’s ascendance to government, 
more than a change in the ruling party, represented a change of regime – the elimination 
of the PRI and the political, social, and cultural practices associated with that party, a 
change from authoritarian rule to an incipient democracy. 
Later, this thesis described how after the July 2000 election President Fox 
advanced a series of reforms to consolidate Mexico’s democratic rule. Among the new 
policies, ‘transitional justice’ was a priority. However, Fox’s decision to come to terms 
with the past generated controversy and divergent opinions. Human rights activists, 
victims of past abuses and their relatives, scholars, the left-wing Revolutionary 
Democratic Party (PRD), and international organisations such as Human Rights Watch 
(HRW) supported Fox’s electoral promises to know the truth of what happened during 
the PRI era, and to bring perpetrators to justice. For this group, ‘transitional justice’ was 
a prerequisite to secure Mexico’s democratic rule. In contrast, the PAN – Vicente Fox’s 
conservative party – and some of the new administration cabinet’s members opposed 
any effort to face the past, fearing that ‘transitional justice’ could put at risk the stability 
of the new democracy. The PRI was still a powerful political force and could challenge 
the Fox government’s efforts to democratise Mexico. Therefore, those who opposed 
‘transitional justice’ within the new regime considered it irrational to prosecute the 
members of the political party – the PRI – with which they sought to negotiate political 
reforms to modernise the country. 
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Therefore, I showed how Fox’s administration faced the dilemma captured by 
Cohen’s seminal article on transitional justice in 1995, in which he said: ‘in these 
circumstances you may feel that punishment should happen but also agree that it is 
politically expedient and in the national interest that it should not’ (Cohen 1995: 35). 
Thus Fox’s government had to settle accounts with the PRI for the human rights 
violations perpetrated in the past, but without upsetting it in order to reach certain 
reforms to strengthen democratisation. 
The aim of this research was to explore how the Fox administration solved this 
dilemma – meeting demands to ‘do something’ about the past, without provoking the 
PRI. Supported by detailed documentary research, this thesis offered a complete 
account of the factors that facilitated the emergence of Mexico’s ‘transitional justice’ 
process in such a complex political context. In so doing, it pointed out some of the most 
important consequences of the ‘transitional justice’ process in Mexico’s 
democratisation: e.g., it strengthened Fox’s authority; it bolstered the idea that the Fox 
administration represented not only a change of political party in government, but a 
change of regime; it showed that the new regime was allegedly committed to human 
rights; it avoided inquiry into the role played by different institutions involved in gross 
violation of human rights (the ministry of health); it legitimised and protect political 
institutions still working under authoritarian premises (the Courts); it left the 
investigations in the hands of the institutions that turned a blind eye to such abuses in 
the past (the General Attorney’s Office); it affected Mexican society’s understanding of 
the country’s history of abuses; as only a very limited number of abuses was 
investigated, must perpetrators were not prosecuted, exposed or dismissed; finally, it 
granted a de facto amnesty to perpetrators; as the PRI was never threatened, it return to 
power in 2012. 
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One main question guided my research: what factors facilitated the emergence of 
the ‘transitional justice’ process, and did these factors lead to its results – impunity? My 
responses to this question were also elaborated in relationship to three sub-questions: 
why did Fox venture to establish a ‘transitional justice’ process that would put at risk 
the new regime’s stability, and why did the authoritarian elite allow it?; how was the 
‘transitional justice’ process constructed, and how did its particular construction 
condition its performance?; and how, and to what extent, did ‘transitional justice’ affect 
the process of democratisation? 
As explained in Chapter Two, these research questions and the way I explored 
them were shaped by the third cluster of literature on transitional justice – a social 
constructivist approach. Transitional justice literature, the main field of enquiry that 
addresses how states and societies deal with past atrocities, emerged in the mid-1990s 
and since then has followed three main strands. The first cluster of literature – what 
Moon (2008) terms restorative and retributive approaches – promoted the value of 
facing past atrocity according to the standard legal responses available: truth 
commissions and tribunals. The second cluster of literature – what I call ‘broadened’ 
approaches’ – has sought to assess why transitional justice does not live up to the ideal 
in order to remedy its failures; and has broadened the scope of transitional justice from 
its original focus (on political transitions and human rights) to whatever is considered a 
case of present suffering produced by past abuses. Most studies on transitional justice 
belong to these two clusters of research. Despite their differences, scholars participating 
in these two clusters share some basic assumptions: transitional justice is ‘intrinsic’ in 
transitions; it is ‘good’ because of the benefits it brings with it, e.g. democracy and 
reconciliation; ‘all good things go together’, e.g. ‘only a democratic state can guarantee 
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truth and justice, only truth and justice can sustain a democratic state’ (Arenhovel 2008: 
581); and even if transitional justice goes wrong, it can always be improved. 
In this thesis I followed a third cluster of studies on transitional justice – a social 
constructivist viewpoint – that emerged as a reaction to the two aforementioned clusters. 
Rather than ‘promoting’ or ‘rectifying’ transitional justice ideals or practices, scholars 
participating in this constructivist approach are concerned with exploring how 
transitional justice claims and activities are constructed, and how such construction 
affects societies. Unlike the first and second clusters of literature on transitional justice, 
the third cluster, which this thesis endorses, does not assume that transitional justice is 
‘good’, ‘apolitical’, or ‘inherent’ to transitional societies because of its alleged merits or 
benefits. On the contrary, it does not take these common claims on transitional justice as 
self-evident, but seeks to understand how such claims were created, shaped, contested, 
and adapted by their historical milieus, social actions, and political bargains. This is a 
growing body of literature that explores the contextual factors that allow the emergence 
(and policing) of transitional justice knowledge and practices. 
Findings 
In this section I present the most significant findings of my research. I have already 
examined them in detail throughout the thesis; here I seek to summarise them. 
 
Why did Fox venture to establish a ‘transitional justice’ process, and why did the 
authoritarian elite allow it? 
As demonstrated in Chapter Three, Mexico’s ‘transitional justice’ process was not 
intrinsic or necessary to the country’s democratisation. President Fox decided to 
establish ‘transitional justice’ to serve three political purposes. First, the ‘transitional 
justice’ process helped to legitimise the new regime’s democratic identity and appear to 
confirm its allegiance to human rights. The process appeared to underline the 
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discontinuity between the PRI era and the new democratic administration. Unlike his 
predecessors, President Fox appeared committed to human rights principles – 
unearthing the past, digging up graves, and opening up wounds, in order to establish the 
truth and see justice done (in Cohen’s words, ‘control by opening’). 
Second, strategically, by creating the ‘rules of the game’ President Fox was able 
to control the intervention of the other actors taking part in the process: activists, 
academics, human rights NGOs, victims’ relatives, or left-wing political groups such as 
the PRD – whose members demanded that Fox should come to terms with the past – as 
well as those members of the new administration who differed from his stance (e.g. 
Fox’s strategists who advocated for the establishment of a truth commission or a policy 
of oblivion). Had the Congress intervened – e.g. in the selection of the special 
prosecutor – Fox’s proposal may have suffered changes or been blocked. 
Third, by establishing a retributive institution (the SPO) to unearth past crimes, 
Fox and his strategists sought to channel the investigations into the past through the 
prevailing structures of power: laws designed during the previous regime and 
institutions that were managed by members of the PRI era (the courts, the Attorney 
General’s Office, even the Military). Had a truth commission existed, Fox’s authority 
and plans to reform the country may have been challenged by the Military and the PRI 
elite. Therefore, Fox opted to come to terms with the past but left this job to the 
institutions whose officials had committed the crimes or did nothing to prevent them. 
As a result, Fox was able to maintain the stability of the new democracy as the SPO’s 
prosecutorial strategies never really threatened the PRI elite – the priistas were de facto 
investigating (and thus granting immunity to) themselves. Hence it is understandable 
why the PRI did not oppose the ‘transitional justice’ process. 
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Moreover, the PRI promptly allowed (in fact, urged) the creation of the SPO 
because, as I have demonstrated in Chapter Four, some of the prosecutorial strategies to 
investigate and prosecute the PRI were devised by the PRI’s own elite during the 
previous regime (via the National Human Rights Commission). Such prosecutorial 
methods, unsurprisingly, led to impunity. Therefore, in the new democratic system, 
tainted officials of the PRI era sought to preserve the immunity they had enjoyed in the 
past. Perhaps they were not powerful enough to oppose ‘transitional justice’ 
mechanisms completely, but preserved sufficient power to intervene in their making. 
How was the ‘transitional justice’ process constructed, and how did its particular 
construction condition its performance? 
As I demonstrated in Chapter Four, in Mexico the ‘transitional justice’ process was 
constructed in such a way as actually to maintain the immunity of perpetrators of past 
state crimes. The language of human rights played a crucial role in this endeavour. 
Human rights talk framed the SPO’s investigations into the past: the type of abuses that 
were considered to constitute human rights violations; then the kind of human rights 
violations that qualified for investigation (e.g. forced disappearance, genocide) and, 
therefore, the type of victims who were counted in the process; the perpetrators of 
certain crimes who would be subject to prosecution; and the institution and authorities 
that would intervene (the policing of the past). 
The Fox administration limited ‘transitional justice’ to two human rights 
categories: forced disappearance and genocide. Only these ‘dramatic cases’ of abuses 
were reported, which were not necessarily the most generalised. Therefore, other types 
of abuses committed during the PRI era were ignored and never treated as human rights 
violations: torture, ill treatment, killing, kidnapping. The result of this operation was 
that most perpetrators of abuses never faced justice. 
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Besides, by limiting ‘transitional justice’ to the categories of forced 
disappearance and genocide, conceptualisations based on the use of physical violence 
on the victims’ bodies, the Fox’s government restricted our understanding of suffering 
in the authoritarian era to the mere use of physical violence on a particular group of 
people. The Fox’s administration highlighted the physical suffering of certain 
dissidents, but obscured the experiences of relatives and kin; it bypassed other type of 
harm and activities endured by Mexican people during the authoritarian era. As a result, 
there was never any punishment for those tainted officials who enabled atrocities by 
creating the social conditions which made them possible – those who did not commit 
crimes but did contribute to harm. Most individuals (and collectives) who contributed to 
the perpetration of abuses (the bystanders, the collaborators) were outside the 
jurisdiction of courts. In Mexico, the language of human rights, arguable, worked 
against victims of past atrocity rather than in their favour by establishing accountability. 
Moreover, the human rights categories of genocide and forced disappearance 
were constructed, adapted, and manipulated in such a way as to grant a de facto amnesty 
to perpetrators. A prosecutorial strategy based on the category of forced disappearance, 
for instance, was destined to ‘fail’ as the concept could not be used retroactively in the 
country. The Fox administration adapted the international conventions on forced 
disappearance in such a way as to obstruct the prosecution of this crime in the past – the 
Mexican state would only prosecute those cases of forced disappearance that could 
occur from 2002 onwards. In addition, Fox manipulated international treaties on this 
issue in order to protect members of the armed forces, who would be tried for forced 
disappearances in military courts – the Military would prosecute themselves if, and only 
if, they decided to do so. And, as I demonstrated in Chapter Five, the SPO’s strategy to 
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charge former state officials with the crime of genocide for the killing of twenty-five 
students was preposterous. 
Finally, the language of human rights served to legitimise whatever resulted 
from this particular ‘transitional justice’ process – even the de facto exoneration of 
perpetrators was justified, as the application of the law is independent of its outcome. 
How, and to what extent, did ‘transitional justice’ affect the process of 
democratisation? 
Apart from legitimising the new regime’s democratic credentials and strengthening 
Fox’s authority, the ‘transitional justice’ process brought about important consequences 
for the Fox administration, which I sum up below. 
By establishing the SPO, Fox avoided an inquiry into the role played by 
different institutions involved in gross violations of human rights. The SPO would 
investigate individual offenders, rather than a pattern of past abuses. Therefore, by 
following a retributive sense of justice to come to terms with the past, Fox’s 
government helped to legitimise key institutions that were still working under 
authoritarian premises: e.g., the courts and the General Attorney’s Office. The Military 
also benefited from the ‘transitional justice’ process. Members of the Military were 
reincorporated into the new system without being unmasked or suspended. Only three 
army generals were prosecuted – Mario Arturo Acosta Chaparro, Francisco Quirós 
Hermosillo, and Francisco Barquín – but they were already in jail serving sentences of 
sixteen years for drug trafficking. They had been simply ‘recycled’ through the justice 
process. I also explained in Chapter Five that generals Quirós Hermosillo and Francisco 
Barquín died in prison without being tried for past state crimes, and Acosta Chaparro 
was set free. 
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Moreover, in Mexico’s ‘transitional justice’ process, the Military were allowed 
to investigate and prosecute themselves. A basic principle of human rights establishes 
that military courts cannot prosecute human rights violations – therefore, President Fox 
was supposed to transfer jurisdiction over human rights cases from military to civilian 
authorities, but he did not. The effect of the ad hoc trial of the Military established in 
Mexico was that it contributed to legitimise the armed forces in the new democratic 
system – the trial seemed to be an indication that the Military had changed: it was a 
signal that the armed forces would combat the impunity they had enjoyed in the past. 
However, what really happened was that the trial of the Military blocked the 
investigations that the SPO was carrying out into members of the armed forces. If the 
Military were being investigated by the Military Prosecutor’s Office, they would not be 
investigated by the SPO. Even if the trial ended in acquittal, the SPO could not press 
charges against these military officers because a person cannot be judged twice for the 
same crime. That is why human rights NGOs in Mexico claimed that the Military 
violated human rights twice: first, when they perpetrated the abuses in the past (e.g. 
through torture and forced disappearances), and later when they obstructed the SPO’s 
investigations by allegedly prosecuting military members in military courts – they 
violated the right of victims to see justice done (Fundación Diego Lucero, et al. 2005). 
That is why Cohen questioned the alleged deterrent effect that transitional justice is 
supposed to bring with it, as there is the ‘brutal political reality that despite all the 
knowledge about the past, the same institutions of repression reproduce themselves in a 
different social order’ (Cohen 1995: 20). 
Beyond legitimising key institutions and tainted officials, who were then 
incorporated into the new democratic system as if nothing had happened, the 
‘transitional justice’ process served another crucial political purpose: it granted a de 
Conclusions 312
facto amnesty to former perpetrators. As a very limited number of abuses was 
investigated, must perpetrators were never prosecuted or exposed; and the few 
perpetrators who were investigated were exonerated. 
The SPO also served to attract and control other transitional justice efforts. For 
instance, the SPO absorbed the investigations of the student massacres in 1968 and 
1971 – criminal investigations that existed independently of the SPO’s work. However, 
the SPO not only attracted (and controlled) investigations about past state crimes which 
already existed, but for five years it also helped to obstruct any other transitional justice 
effort. Victims of abuses had to go to the SPO first and wait for years before taking their 
cases to international courts. The SPO was thus an obstacle to justice. 
But did the ‘transitional justice’ process have an effect on Mexico’s current 
political situation? A detailed examination of this question is beyond the scope of this 
research, yet let me offer some tentative answers. 
I described in Chapter Three that in April 2001 President Fox scrawled on a 
small piece of paper the following instruction: ‘Adolfo [Aguilar Zínser] will be the 
Coordinator for the Project “Truth Commission” and also will be in charge of the 
democratisation of the CISEN [Centre for Research and National Security, which is 
Mexico’s intelligence agency]’ (Fox 2001). I have explained already why such a truth 
commission never materialised – the PRI fiercely opposed the establishment of a truth 
commission and promoted instead the creation of the SPO. This time I am interested in 
the reasons why Fox and his strategists originally linked the idea of ‘transitional justice’ 
with the transformation of Mexico’s intelligence services – a transformation that never 
materialised either. 
After the 2000 election, some members of the newly appointed cabinet urged 
that the intelligence services inherited from the previous regime should be investigated 
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and dismantled. Beyond dismissing compromised personnel, reforming the intelligence 
services would be an opportunity to really know (and understand) the size and modus 
operandi of the former regime’s security apparatus. In November 2004, Adolfo Aguilar 
Zínser, former Fox strategist, was clear about the significance of linking the 
establishment of ‘transitional justice’ with the reformation of the security apparatus: 
All the information about you that has been compiled by intelligence operations, 
telephone intervention, credit cards, correspondence, personal activities, is scattered 
throughout the files and can only be pulled together via CISEN’s security codes. But the 
spider web can only be unravelled by those who know its secrets. However, Fox’s 
government did not dare to take control of CISEN – this was one of Fox’s big mistakes 
(quoted in Jaquez 2004). 
 
Aguilar Zínser’s conclusion was frightening: ‘I have no doubt that CISEN continues to 
serve the individuals and groups of the old regime’ (quoted in Jaquez 2004). 
Beyond intelligence services, with the change of regime human rights experts 
claimed that the investigation of the institutions that made the abuses possible – e.g. the 
Military, the police – would allow President Fox to begin the reform and 
democratisation of such institutions (Benítez Manaut 2008b; Rodríguez Sumano 2008). 
That was important for the new democracy, these experts said, because these 
institutions continued working with exactly the same rules, structure, and laws as they 
did during the authoritarian era. However, as John Ackerman argues, President Fox 
‘squandered his opportunity as the first opposition president after more than seventy 
years of PRI rule. Instead of rolling up his sleeves to transform public institutions, he 
took the easy route of leaving in place the vested interests of the past’ (Ackerman 2012). 
As a result, according to human rights experts, as the old regime’s security mechanisms 
did not go through any process of democratising reforms, they remain intact today. 
From this point of view, the disappearances and state crimes that occur today are tightly 
linked to the impunity of the past. This is how dozens of human rights NGOs put it in a 
report: 
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It is true that current perpetration of forced disappearance in Mexico cannot be 
compared to what happened during the ‘Dirty War’. However, it is also true that forced 
disappearance is still practised in the country. This sheds light on the fact that the 
authoritarian structures that made the occurrence of forced disappearances possible have 
not yet been dismantled, and that the impunity of former criminals has created a 
favourable atmosphere for the perpetration of more gross violation of human rights in 
the present (Secretaría Ejecutiva de la Red TDT 2010). 
 
But are these human rights activists correct? The answer has been suggested by 
journalists. From 2006 to 2011, at least twenty thousand people have been abducted in 
the context of the ‘war against drug-trafficking’ (HRW 2011). In a few cases we know 
that victims were abducted, detained, tortured, and executed as their bodies were found 
in mass graves. However, in most cases what happened to victims is still unknown – 
they are not dead, nor alive. Who abducted these people? It is not possible to know who 
are responsible for the disappearance of twenty thousand people as the cases are rarely 
investigated by Felipe Calderón’s administration. The government claims that all these 
cases are abductions perpetrated by rival cartels. The problem with the government’s 
statement, as widely documented by journalists, is that local security forces in Mexico 
have drastically deteriorated to the extent that ‘now you don’t know who is connected 
with whom, or where the threats are coming from […] Every local commander, every 
official, and every community must work out an accommodation with organized crime’ 
(Finnegan 2012). So, are the police being taught how to torture and abduct people from 
members of criminal groups or are those involved in organised crime learning their 
methods from the security forces trained in the authoritarian era? For instance, the Zetas 
– the most feared criminal group in Mexico – were founded by deserters from the 
Mexican military’s élite special forces in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Today’s Zetas 
are yesterday’s members of the army. This is how William Finnegan describes them: 
Trained as paratroopers and intelligence operatives, they introduced a paramilitary 
element to narco-trafficking, outgunning police units. Beheadings became their 
signature, along with castrations with genitals stuffed in mouths and corpses with a ‘Z’ 
carved into the flesh. Their ranks swelled with infusions from a notorious Guatemalan 
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counter-insurgency unit, the Kaibiles […] The Zetas were military [in the PRI era]. 
Their mission was to kill and destroy (Finnegan 2012). 
 
Beyond the sphere of organised crime, human rights activists have evidenced 
that Mexico’s security forces go on perpetrating illegal abductions. The National 
Human Rights Commission (NHRC) has confirmed the participation of security forces 
in five hundred cases of forced disappearance from 2006 to 2011 – more than the total 
number of cases of forced disappearance under investigation by the SPO. As the UN 
Working Group on Enforced and Involuntary Disappearance concluded about Mexico in 
2011: forced disappearances perpetrated by state agents ‘happened in the past and 
continue to happen in the present’ (OUNHCHR 2011). 
In sum, the argument of human rights NGOs goes like this: the democratisation 
of the Military and the police, as well as the punishment of past state crimes during 
Fox’s administration, would have been enough to prevent the repetition of such abuses 
in the current context. Had the ‘transitional justice’ process worked, it might well have 
helped to prevent the perpetration of abuses in the new regime. But can we really know 
whether the impunity of the past is related to the occurrence of human rights violations 
in the present? Cohen suggests a different answer. ‘It might seem plausible enough that 
the cycle of political violence will never be broken under a regime of impunity’ but ‘the 
actual deterrent value of individual punishment in this political context remains even 
more uncertain than it is for conventional crime […] In fact everything we know about 
the political conditions under which crimes of obedience occur makes it extremely 
unlikely that the risk of future punishment has even the remotest deterrent effect’ 
(Cohen 1995: 37). 
Whether Cohen or the NGOs are right, there were other – perhaps unintended – 
consequences of the ‘transitional justice’ process. For instance, there were no temporal 
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limits to the operation of the SPO, which could prolong its work indefinitely. The 
absence of a fixed deadline benefitted Fox, who was able to postpone indefinitely the 
punishment of perpetrators. The sense of ‘urgency’ to ‘do something’ about the past 
grew weaker over the years, giving way to other issues also relevant to the new regime’s 
agenda, e.g. drug trafficking or a new electoral cycle. As a result, the ‘forget the past’ 
rhetoric – ‘turning a new page’ – became increasingly popular. The sentiment that we 
should forget and move on was captured by Enrique Krauze in The New York Times: 
‘despite its grave problems Mexico is confident enough to move ahead without turning 
too much toward the wrongs of the past’ (Krauze 2004). 
The passing of time worked also in favour of the PRI elite, which gradually 
recovered its power. During Fox’s electoral campaign the idea of a ‘change of regime’ 
was identified with the idea of eliminating the PRI and its authoritarian legacy. 
However, as the PRI elite was not really threatened by the ‘transitional justice’ process, 
the former ‘official party’ has been getting ready to regain office in the 2012 
presidential election (e.g., by blocking most bills in Congress from 2006 to 2012 in 
order to render President Felipe Calderón’s administration unworkable; negotiating 
unlawful contracts to receive biased media coverage; and trading poor people’s votes 
for food or money) (Hernández Navarro 2012; The Economist 2012; Tuckman 2012a). 
This paradox was captured by Jo Tuckman in The New York Times: in 2000, the PRI, 
‘which had run Mexico for seventy years with the help of a mixture of authoritarianism, 
corruption and election-tampering, was voted out of office. This was seen as the end of 
an era, the relegation of an anachronistic institution to the scrapheap of history.’ 
However, ‘after twelve years in exile, the PRI is preparing to reassume its traditional 
place of power’ (Tuckman 2012b).  
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Further research 
While answering three key research questions, my thesis also raises a number of 
important issues which would benefit from further research. 
A ‘transitional justice’ process that never was 
This research constitutes the brief biography of an institution that did not deliver what it 
promised: neither truth nor justice were achieved. In this sense, this is the story about a 
new democratic regime that attempted to comply with demands to face the past without 
disturbing the previous authoritarian elites and therefore established a ‘transitional 
justice’ mechanism that produced a de facto state of impunity. Instead of delivering 
truth and justice, the SPO ultimately deflected responsibility and criticism away from 
the new government (as the government pretended to be doing something about the 
past); and it helped to perpetuate the impunity enjoyed by perpetrators in the previous 
regime. 
The findings of this research relate specifically to Mexico, but they give reason 
to reconsider transitional justice processes in other countries in a new light. For 
instance, as explained in Chapter Two, most studies within the first and second clusters 
of literature on transitional justice begin their analysis by describing a certain 
transitional justice institution (say the TRC in South Africa), taking for granted its 
alleged benefits, and then explain how things went wrong (e.g. the commission’s failure 
to achieve reconciliation). In so doing, these clusters of literature seek to examine how 
‘good’ transitional justice ideals went wrong in practice. Wrong in the sense that such 
ideals resulted in projects that failed. The problem with these assumptions is, as this 
thesis shows, that transitional justice processes are political balancing acts that try to 
achieve certain things, but keep others at bay (e.g. prosecutions). 
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Scholars participating in the third cluster of literature on transitional justice, 
which this thesis endorses, have offered empirical evidence in this sense. For instance, 
in his study on South Africa’s transitional justice process, Wilson suggests that truth 
commissions are not meant to deliver truth or reconciliation, but to be simply ‘the 
Trojan horse used to smuggle an unpleasant aspect of the past (that is, impunity) into 
the present political order, to transform political compromises into transcendental moral 
principles’ (Wilson 2001: 97). Since 1995, Stan Cohen has pointed out this paradox 
(transitional justice institutions that do not deliver): ‘sometimes the new regime starts 
with the rhetoric of accountability but then […] creates a de facto state of impunity’ 
(Cohen 1995: 28). The Mexican case confirms this insight. 
Therefore, more research is needed about the factors that facilitate the 
emergence of particular transitional justice processes. This is relevant as the normative 
discourses that vaunt transitional justice processes usually conceal the political bargains 
that make them fall short of their ostensible objectives. This insight should be 
particularly relevant for scholars participating within the second cluster of literature on 
transitional justice – e.g., Arriaza and Roht-Arriaza 2008; Sikkink and Booth Walling 
2007 – as they seek to assess if tribunals or truth commissions have delivered the goals 
they claim to reach or whether transitional justice interventions were well executed. 
Their research is of limited use if they do not first explore how transitional justice 
institutions were constructed, and the political purposes such construction served. 
Restorative goals 
Mexico’s ‘transitional justice’ process was founded on a retributive style of justice: the 
Fox administration established the SPO, which depended on the General Attorney’s 
Office, to investigate and prosecute perpetrators of past state crimes. The SPO sought to 
bring perpetrators to court, where they would be judged according to the law. However, 
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the ‘transitional justice’ process had what might be called a ‘restorative side’, which had 
not been addressed by any academic enquiry. 
Mexico’s ‘transitional justice’ process was proudly named ‘The Mexican 
Solution’ by Ignacio Carrillo, the Special Prosecutor, because ‘truth, justice and 
reparations all go together’ (Doyle 2003: 69). So, what happened to the ‘truth’ and the 
‘reparations’? 
 In an interview with HRW, the Special Prosecutor claimed to have ‘set up a two-
person team to develop a programme to provide psychological care to the victims and 
relatives of past abuses’ (HRW 2003). In addition, the last version of the SPO’s 
working plan available on its official website stated that the SPO would establish ‘free 
telephone lines’ that would allow for ‘direct communication between society and the 
SPO’ (SPO 2002). I thought these mechanisms – the phone lines and the psychological 
care – were relevant as they were the only means by which victims of past abuses and 
their relatives could narrate their stories of suffering, without having to navigate through 
Mexico’s ‘legal complex’. Moreover, these mechanisms were not linked to the SPO’s 
prosecutorial strategies, so they would allow victims to give information – to tell the 
truth – about other type of abuses they had endured in the past that were not 
investigated: e.g., torture, ill treatment, killings, and kidnappings. 
Using the newly created ‘transparency law’, I requested information on these 
mechanisms whose goals were to establish the truth and to heal old wounds.74 The 
General Attorney’s Office responded that the programme to provide psychological 
assistance was indeed established, but only in two states of the Republic: Sinaloa and 
Guerrero. According to the official response, the team of psychologists worked with 
victims from September 2002 to June 2004. However, the General Attorney’s Office 
                                                 
74 Request number 1700065906. 
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claimed that it was unable to provide other information about the psychological 
programme because such information was classified as confidential. But why was this 
information treated as secret? What have victims of past abuses revealed about the past? 
How did this psychological programme actually work? Was it control by closing? 
Then, I requested all the information available about the free telephone lines.75 
However, the General Attorney’s Office responded that ‘due to problems of a budgetary 
nature, it was not possible to install media reception and citizen services, such as a 
special free access line’ (Trevino-Rangel 2007). But what exactly happened with these 
telephone lines? Is it true that they never existed? If they existed has the information 
about them been concealed? Even if these lines never materialised, had there been a 
plan to establish them? 
To show his commitment to democracy, in 2002 President Fox ordered the 
opening of thousands of files of the disbanded secret police. He also instructed all 
ministries of state to dig into their files and select the documents that in their opinion 
might be useful for investigating past human rights violations. As a result, the 
government transferred more than eighty million files to the National Archives (Archivo 
General Nacional, AGN) where they would be available for public consultation. Again, 
this measure, which sought to reveal what happened in the past, was independent from 
the SPO’s prosecutorial strategies. Of course, these files contained relevant information 
used by the SPO to construct its legal cases, but beyond the SPO’s work, the disclosure 
of files was important as it offered victims and their relatives an opportunity to know 
about what happened in the PRI era (who died, how many, who tortured them, where 
the bodies are). This was particularly relevant for those who have not given up hope of 
finding their relatives alive (Aguayo 2001b). 
                                                 
75 Requests 1700066206 and 1700066306. 
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However, the AGN has consistently denied access to such information, invoking 
a human rights principle. According to the AGN, the files are used by the SPO in its 
judicial investigations, so they cannot be disclosed to victims as that would violate one 
of the most basic principles of human rights: due process of law. Victims of past abuses 
cannot access the former secret police’s files as that could ‘damage the SPO’s 
procedural strategies’ (Trevino-Rangel 2007). The AGN’s argument is preposterous, but 
it has served to make information about past atrocity inaccessible (‘control by closing’). 
Another reason why victims’ families have not had access to the files disclosed 
by President Fox is related to the way in which such files are administered. Fox 
transferred the archives of the now-extinct secret police to the AGN together with its 
archivist, and the archives are now controlled by the same person who has managed 
them for thirty years. The former custodian of official secrets is the same individual 
who now decides who has access to what document and under what circumstances 
(Trevino-Rangel 2007). The only in-depth research about this issue has been undertaken 
by the journalist Kate Doyle. Her conclusions are disturbing: the SPO’s investigation 
has served to identify the most dangerous information in the AGN’s files, not with the 
purpose of disclosing the truth, but seeking to eliminate uncomfortable information 
forever (Doyle 2006c). 
Finally, Fox promised to grant compensation to the victims of human rights 
violations and their families. For this purpose he ordered the establishment of a 
committee, within the Ministry of the Interior, which would define the criteria for 
redress (Poder Ejecutivo Federal 2001a). However, although the committee for 
reparations was – allegedly – established, no reparations were ever made to victims. In 
addition, as the International Centre for Transitional Justice has documented, no 
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information is available to the public about the reparations committee’s work or its results 
(ICTJ 2008: 4). 
Cultural denial 
Another issue that justifies more research is the question of why Mexican society knew 
and did not know, at the same time, about the human rights violations perpetrated in the 
PRI era. Was it possible for the PRI governments to perpetrate abuses over seven 
decades without Mexican society knowing? How many ordinary Mexicans knew what 
was happening? Did they know but not care? What did they know? Paraphrasing 
Cohen: what did they do with their knowledge about state repression, and what did this 
knowledge do to them? (Cohen 2005: x). 
Cohen says that denial of atrocity might occur through official state policy – the 
deliberate cover up (Cohen 2005: 132). This was clearly the case in Mexico during the 
authoritarian era. As explained in Chapter One, the PRI regime efficiently denied that 
human rights abuses were taking place and so was able to maintain a democratic façade 
for decades. To do so, the PRI governments manipulated and censored mass media, and 
co-opted intellectuals and journalists through bribes, death threats, exile, and diplomatic 
careers. Moreover, details of torture, the disposal of bodies, and the illegal detention of 
dissidents in clandestine jails remained genuinely secret. 
However, as Cohen argues, ‘even the most repressive and closed regime cannot 
achieve total secrecy or information control. Ordinary citizens come to know some truth 
[…] How can the impression be sustained that everything is normal when it so 
manifestly isn’t?’ (Cohen 2005: 145). So there can be no doubt that some sections of 
Mexico’s population knew or suspected what was happening to dissidents. Let me 
return to the case of Carlos Francisco Castañeda de la Fuente. He was illegally 
imprisoned for more than twenty years in a psychiatric hospital, where dozens of nurses, 
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doctors, psychiatrists, social workers, and interns knew about him. Castañeda de la 
Fuente was committed in 1970, but it was not until 1992 – when the paralegal Norma 
Ibañez made a complaint – that he was released. Why did other paralegals or caretakers 
before Norma Ibañez fail to take up his case? Did fear generate a state of self-
censorship? 
The analysis of what Mexicans knew at that time and what they did with that 
knowledge is important as it could help to increase our understanding about degrees of 
involvement in the commission of atrocity. How do we identify the different modes of 
involvement in keeping the PRI regime going? How do we understand the difference 
between commission and complicity, between active and passive collusion, between 
deliberate silence and wilful ignorance? 
Moreover, with the arrival of democracy, what does Mexican society know now 
about what happened in the past? I wrote the last sections of this thesis in Mexico and 
discussed some of these questions with friends and former colleagues. Invariably, when 
talking about Mexico’s history of abuses, I got two types of response. The first was 
literal or interpretive denial: ‘I did not know’, ‘Did things like this happen in Mexico?’, 
‘You cannot believe victims and human rights reports’ (victims and human rights 
organisations were biased, ignorant, or exaggerating). A possible explanation for this 
has been suggested by Cohen: sometimes disturbing knowledge can be forgotten 
without direct state manipulation, as whole societies have an amazing ability to deny the 
past (Cohen 2005: 138). In contrast, those making the second type of response fully 
acknowledged what happened during the previous regime – former colleagues reminded 
me that ‘this is what we always knew’. A Mexican classmate at LSE asked me without 
irony: ‘Were you able to sum up Mexico’s history of abuses in one chapter?’ So the 
Conclusions 324
questions remains: why did some Mexicans know about what happened, but others did 
not? Why do some remember and others forget? 
There is a final question about this issue: does the way in which society dealt 
with the knowledge about suffering under authoritarianism effect how society deals 
with social suffering in the present? This question is relevant in the context of the ‘war 
against drugs’, in which from 2006 to 2012 at least sixty thousand people have been 
killed and, as mentioned before, twenty thousand more have disappeared. Joy Olson, 
from the Washington Office for Latin America, considers that the human rights crisis 
that Mexico currently experiences has been worsened precisely because bystanders fail 
to act. Her concerns are worth quoting at length. 
It was a horrifying scene – seventy two people murdered all at once. One survivor bore 
witness to the massacre. The dead were migrants, mostly Central Americans […] trying 
to make their way to a better future. It was August of 2010 when their bodies were 
found in Tamaulipas, Mexico. They were apparently killed by Mexico’s most feared 
drug trafficking organization, the Zetas […]. Official reports said that the migrants were 
kidnapped off of buses. How could seventy two people be kidnapped and no one 
notice? Bus drivers must have known something. The bus company must have noticed. 
Other travelers? Government authorities? How was this possible? Where is the outrage? 
(Olson 2012). 
 
So, we might want to ask, has Mexican society incorporated the culture of denial, a 
characteristic of the authoritarian era, into the new democracy? 
Iatrogenesis 
In his book Visions of Social Control, Cohen uses Ivan Illich’s term ‘iatrogenesis’ to 
illustrate the perverse effects of social control mechanisms such as imprisonment. The 
term ‘iatrogenesis’ implies an irony: disease caused by medical intervention. Illich used 
the concept to suggest that medical progress is a myth: not only is medical treatment 
useless, but it can produce more pain or dysfunction. In his research on deviancy 
control, Cohen adapted this concept to show that ‘most forms of intervention 
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demonstrably do not work very well [...] Many forms of intervention are iatrogenic: 
they make things worse’ (Cohen 1985: 168). 
This examination of the Mexican ‘transitional justice’ process has provided an 
empirical examination of iatrogenesis. Throughout the work, I have demonstrated how 
the ‘transitional justice’ process achieved the opposite of what it – allegedly – sought to 
accomplish. For example, the SPO did not obtain justice, nor truth, but impunity. The 
‘transitional justice’ process also led to the creations of new laws – justified in the name 
of human rights – that made the prosecution of perpetrators impossible, e.g., the law 
that proscribes the incarceration of those criminals older than seventy – the age of most 
perpetrators of past state crimes. 
So far, as the aforementioned examples show, this thesis explored the effects of 
‘transitional justice’ on Mexico’s democratisation process. However, it would be worth 
researching in more detail the iatrogenic effects of Mexico’s ‘transitional justice’ on 
victims of past abuses. Not only did victims get no truth or justice, but ‘things got 
worse’ for some of them. Let me illustrate this with three examples. 
Rosendo Radilla was stopped at a military check-point in 1974. ‘I won’t be 
coming back for a long time’ he said to his daughter Tita, who has been looking for him 
ever since. Tita Radilla is now vice-president of the Association of Relatives of the 
Detained-Disappeared in Mexico (AFADEM), a small non-profit organisation based in 
Atoyac de Alvarez, northwest Acapulco. She helps the relatives of more than six 
hundred victims to pursue justice and find the whereabouts of those who disappeared. 
As a result of her work, Tita Radilla has been harassed and is the victim of death threats. 
Since 2003 she cannot leave her office without the company of members of Peace 
Brigades International, a human rights organisation that seeks to minimise the danger 
she is in (Comité 68, et al. 2006). This measure to protect Ms Radilla was taken after 
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Zacarías Barrientos Peralta was killed that year – Mr Barrientos Peralta was a key 
witness in some of the cases under investigation by the SPO (Comité 68, et al. 2006: 
28). 
In June 2011, I attended a national conference on ‘transitional justice’, which 
took place in Mexico City, organised by scholars, victims’ families, NGOs, and human 
rights experts. Victims’ relatives narrated how by pursuing justice they ended up being 
intimidated, blamed, and even investigated by the police. With the arrival of democracy, 
victims’ relatives believed that the General Attorney’s Office would help them to find 
the whereabouts of their loved ones, but this did not happen and they always got the 
same responses from the prosecutors: ‘your relative must have done something’, or 
‘your relative got what he deserved as he/she was certainly involved with the guerrillas’. 
So, the prosecutors blamed victims’ relatives for what happened, and in some cases they 
threatened victims’ relatives that they would investigate them to see if they were not 
still related to alleged subversive groups. 
My last example is the historian Adela Cedillo, who has conducted the most 
important academic research on the ‘death flights’ to date. Former guerrilla members, 
who became part of the SPO’s working team, did not always agree with Cedillo’s 
interpretations of the past, so they publicly accused her of being a member of the police 
and of having obscure interests. Cedillo has received threats. 
Postscript 
Vicente Fox closed down the SPO in November 30, 2006 – his last day in office. 
Meanwhile, almost ninety employees of the defunct SPO were investigated as there 
were fifty million pesos (about two million pounds) inexplicably missing (Gutiérrez 
Vega 2006). 
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In 2008, Tita Radilla’s case reached the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(Radilla Pacheco v. Mexico). In November 2009, the Inter-American Court found that 
the Mexican Military were responsible for the disappearance of Rosendo Radilla in 
1974 and that the government had failed to investigate the crime adequately. Thus, the 
Mexican State was sentenced to provide reparation to the family in the form of 
monetary compensation, and to modify its Code of Military Justice to make it 
‘compatible with international standards’. Felipe Calderón’s administration (2006–
2012) accepted that it had to pay Tita Radilla monetary compensation but it was very 
reluctant to reform the Military justice system. The Interior Minister justified 
Calderón’s reluctance to obey the court’s ruling with a sophisticated excuse: ‘It is 
incorrect that the Inter-American Court judges Mexico for something that happened in 
the past, given that today’s Mexico is very different from yesterday’s Mexico’ (Aguayo 
and Trevino-Rangel 2010). Calderón gave Ms Radilla a cheque payable to Rosendo 
Radilla – her father, who has been missing for thirty-five years. This odd operation was 
not a mistake. By doing so, Calderón’s government sought to oblige Tita Radilla to 
accept that his father was not disappeared, but dead, if she wanted to cash the cheque.76
After ten years, Digna Ochoa’s case was finally closed, when in September 2011 
Mexican courts ruled that the cause of her death was suicide. At the time of writing this 
chapter (July 2012), former President Ernesto Zedillo – currently Director of the Centre 
for the Study of Globalisation at Yale University – is facing charges of ‘crimes against 
humanity’ in the United States. He is responsible for the killing of forty-five members 
of a Mayan community in Acteal, Chiapas, in 1997. However, he has blocked the case 
claiming that his presidential status gives him immunity from any legal action. 
Simultaneously, Acosta Chaparro, one of the three military generals accused of 
                                                 
76 In Argentina, President Alfonsín offered monetary reparations to victims. Like in Mexico, in Argentina 
these compensations were predicated on a presumption of the death of the victim (Moon 2012). 
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participating in the death flights, became President Felipe Calderón’s assessor in 
security issues (Carrasco 2012). In April 2012, he was shot dead by an unidentified 
gunman as he dropped off his car at a garage in Mexico City. 
I wrote most of this thesis in the British Library. For almost three years, former 
President Carlos Salinas, responsible for the massacre of Zapatistas sympathisers in 
1994, sat at a desk, close to where I conducted much of this research. Exiled in London, 
Salinas went to the library every day to write his memoirs. He has never faced justice. 
In July 2012, Enrique Peña Nieto, Salinas’ political disciple, won the presidential 
election bringing the PRI back to power. Paradoxically, during the 2012 electoral 
campaigns, former President Vicente Fox publicly supported Peña Nieto’s candidacy. 
The same president who made history twelve years ago by ousting the PRI was now 
requesting Mexicans to ‘close ranks’ behind the PRI.  
According to Finnegan, ‘in Mexico, it is often impossible to know who is behind 
something – a massacre, a candidacy, an assassination, the capture of a crime boss, a 
“discovery” of high-level corruption. Either the truth is too fluid and complex to define 
or it remains opaque to anyone not directly involved in manipulating events.’ That is 
why, ‘when Mexicans discuss the news, they talk often about pantallas – screens, 
illusions, behind which are more screens, all created to obscure the facts’ (Finnegan 
2012). Was the SPO simply a pantalla? Ultimately, Mexico’s ‘transitional justice’ 
process represented an exercise, par excellence, in political denial. To paraphrase Cohen 
once again, it offered an example of ‘knowledge without acknowledgment; suffering 
without compensation; violation without accountability; horrors that are not exorcised’ 
(Cohen 2005: 247). 
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